Authoritarianism

Tanzania’s fundamentally flawed elections in late October, and the additional repression unleashed in their immediate aftermath, have provoked international alarm and criticism. From pre-election conditions that stifled free speech and criminalized civic action to election-day irregularities including communications blackouts and ballot box tampering, the entire exercise lacked credibility, making the anodyne statements of the Southern African Development Community nothing short of embarrassing. When opposition leaders are arrested in the aftermath of an election and shortly afterward must flee the country fearing for their lives, there are no congratulations in order for anyone. But sometimes lost in the sheer quantity of alarming news stories about Tanzania’s slide into authoritarianism is the fact that the people of Zanzibar, the semiautonomous region off the coast of mainland Tanzania, have been repeatedly denied their civil and political rights, even in the era when the rest of the country appeared to be on a democratic trajectory. As the International Crisis Group has noted, international observers have corroborated opposition allegations of cheating in every election in Zanzibar since 1995, the year multiparty elections were reintroduced countrywide. In this year’s election, a heavy military and police presence in Zanzibar set an intimidating tone that escalated into beatings, violent expulsions of legitimate observers from polling places, the use of tear gas against civilians, and killings. The people of Zanzibar are almost entirely Muslim, whereas Muslims are a minority on the mainland. Their political rights are consistently denied. Asking them to have faith in the rule of law and peaceful institutions of government to address their grievances is a very tall order, given their repeated experiences.  Zanzibar would seem a very ripe target for violent extremists. As alarm bells sound ever more loudly about the insurgency in northern Mozambique, which has already spilled over into Tanzania, some international soul-searching about why Zanzibar’s plight has persisted for so long is overdue. The point is not that the people of Zanzibar are dangerous; it is that their disenfranchisement is dangerous, in addition to simply being wrong. Those who claim to focus solely on security issues with transnational implications cannot ignore the very real consequences of politics.  

Internet control is more than just an authoritarian problem. It invades the openness of democratic societies as well.

In response to internet censorship by governments across the continent, Africans have turned to technologies of freedom to access blocked content online.

The draft report of the U.S. Commission on Unalienable Rights provides a gift to despotic regimes and reveals the Trump administration’s hypocritical human rights policy.

In the United States and around the world, societies are struggling to balance the sometimes draconian social controls needed to combat a highly contagious infectious disease with the need for limits on government power and the protection of civil liberties. Public health concerns can be used to justify crackdowns on opposition politicians, the manipulation of vital humanitarian assistance, and the emergency overriding of mechanisms meant to prohibit private gain at the public’s expense. In societies where the scales had already tipped toward authoritarianism before the emergence of COVID-19, the disease is providing cover for the further consolidation of power and abuse of citizens. Zimbabwe is a clear example of this trend. But the endgame for Zimbabwe’s government remains very uncertain. The government of Zimbabwe’s shocking campaign to persecute political opponents, which has long been a constant that varies only in intensity over time, has ramped up once again. To take only one egregious recent example, three members of the main opposition MDC Alliance party, Member of Parliament Joana Mamombe, Cecilia Chimbiri, and Netsai Marova were detained at a checkpoint in May, ostensibly for violating lockdown orders to attend a peaceful protest. All three women report subsequently being abducted, tortured, and sexually assaulted. True to form, government officials have publicly mooted wild theories claiming that the allegations were fabricated, or that a mysterious “third force” could be responsible. Last week, the three women were arrested for allegedly lying about their ordeal. Meanwhile, hunger stalked Zimbabwe even before the economic outlook dimmed for the entire region as a result of the pandemic. The World Food Program indicates that half of the population is severely food insecure, and that urban hunger will get even worse by next spring. But the urgency of the crisis has not stopped the government from arbitrarily shutting down urban spaces, or from politicizing the distribution of food aid to punish citizens who support the opposition. Likewise, the desperate circumstances of the population have not stopped government officials seeking to capitalize on the pandemic to enrich themselves. Officials were recently compelled to cancel inflated contracts for medical supplies with a consulting firm linked to the President of Zimbabwe and his family, but not before berating journalists for covering the story. As eagerly as the government of Zimbabwe has seized on this crisis to consolidate power and wealth, there is little evidence of a viable plan for the future. Brutality cannot tame the second-highest inflation rate in the world, make the government’s “command agriculture” scheme anything more than a vehicle for elite corruption, or help the country manage the global economic consequences of COVID-19. Rumors of toxic rifts in the senior ranks of government and even coup plots illustrate the limits of Zimbabwe’s authoritarian consolidation, even in a crisis.

In North Korea, all authority flows from Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un. He has reinstated the party as the central hub to consolidate his power and bring elites to heel.

Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, it’s full steam ahead in Burundi with regard to the presidential and parliamentary elections slated for May 20. As recent weeks brought news of the first recorded cases of the coronavirus in Burundi, they have also featured coverage of crowded campaign rallies. President Pierre Nukurunziza’s reluctance to impose policies aimed at stopping the virus from spreading is converging with his enthusiasm for democratic authoritarianism, putting not only Burundi, but Burundi’s neighbors at risk. There is no suspense whatsoever surrounding the upcoming polls. After Nkurunziza’s run for a third term in 2015 was marred by serious violence, the state has been systematically and brutally eliminating all potential challenges to its authority. Civil society groups that haven’t been banned outright have been bullied into submission, and there is virtually no independent media left in the country. The ruling party’s militia, the Imbonerakure, intimidate and harass Burundians with impunity, even shaking them down for contributions toward the cost of the upcoming electoral exercise. The country’s leadership has chosen impoverishment and isolation as part of its campaign for total control, and it is clear to all that Nkurunziza’s hand-picked successor, Evariste Ndayishimiye, will emerge as the winner later this month in a climate that could not possibly be described as free or fair. Burundi’s trajectory has been apparent for some time. But the pandemic now raises the stakes for neighboring states whose attempts to control the virus are threatened by Burundi’s insistence on moving ahead with electoral theater regardless of the public health risks involved. Regional organizations are supposed to be the venue through which neighbors can coordinate and deconflict their agendas, but Burundi continues to expose the weakness of the East African Community. Just as the EAC’s attempts to advance dialogue in Burundi did nothing to stave off the closing of political space, today the organization seems helpless at best as Burundi and neighboring Tanzania refuse to take COVID-19 seriously. In a region as volatile as the Great Lakes, it is not unduly alarmist to fear that the failure of regional institutions to manage threats may prompt some actors to take matters into their own hands, feeding persistent cycles of instability.

Azerbaijan’s dictator, Ilham Aliyev, is a wily survivor. He woos European democracies with gas exports, hosts the Eurovision song contest and wins $100 million offers of military aid from the United States. Those laurels are all the more remarkable considering he is a ruthless autocrat who tosses politicians and reporters in prison. Now, he sees a new opportunity to consolidate his rule. In recent weeks, Aliyev has used the threat of the novel coronavirus to crack down on opposition groups and independent media: Last month, for instance, he closed a dissident group’s office, saying people could not “gather en masse.” There were four people present. Aliyev is hardly alone. Indeed, from the Philippines to Hungary, autocratic leaders in many nations are using the virus to enhance their own powers—­to put in place new rules that will be hard to overturn even if the coronavirus is defeated. Yet many of the new powers have no clear end date. The pandemic will have entrenched these strongmen indefinitely. For more on my analysis of how authoritarians are taking advantage of the virus to bolster their powers, see my new Washington Post Outlook article.

A new Freedom House report finds that India and the United States were among the foremost contributors last year to democratic backslide and that global freedom continues to decline.

The recent unlawful detention of a journalist and politician is the latest in a series of moves by Muhammadu Buhari’s administration that weaken the rule of law.

1. Continuing Political Regression In recent weeks, Southeast Asia’s authoritarian drift has continued, with several notable events. The Thai government moved to ban the opposition Future Forward Party, sparking major protests in Bangkok. The Cambodian government announced that opposition leader Kem Sokha will go on trial for treason in early 2020. And, of course, former Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi has appeared in The Hague to defend Myanmar against genocide charges. She returned home to a warm reception, suggesting that her defense enjoys wide popularity across Myanmar. Other than in Malaysia, there are few signs of hope for political progress in the region in 2020. 2. Elections: Part 1 As I noted in a previous blog post, there are two consequential elections in Southeast Asia in 2020. In Singapore, the result is essentially foretold, but the extent of the almost assured People’s Action Party (PAP) victory will be interesting to watch—as will how Singapore’s anti-fake news law comes into play. In Myanmar, the result is less certain, and there are real fears that in the run-up to national elections, the politicized environment could spark new rounds of violence. 3. Elections: Part 2 Although the U.S. presidential election does not take place in Southeast Asia, the results of the November 2020 contest will have a significant impact on the region. The Trump administration has tried to beef up links with important partners like Thailand and Vietnam, has developed a new strategy for the region, and has taken a tough stance on human rights challenges in some countries like Cambodia. But it also often has ignored the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as an organization, sending a relatively low level delegation to recent ASEAN meetings. The White House also has had little to say about issues of major importance to the region like climate change. A Democratic president’s Southeast Asia policy cannot be foretold with certainty, but a Democratic president likely would take a greater interest in climate change and try to reinvigorate links with ASEAN as an organization. However, given growing skepticism of many trade deals in segments of the Democratic Party as well, a Democratic president still would be unlikely to make the United States a major player in Asia’s regional trade integration. And while a Democratic president might take a slightly more hands-off approach to bilateral trade disputes with Southeast Asian nations, a United States that is more hawkish on trade overall is probably here to stay. 4. U.S.-China Relations Southeast Asian countries continue to struggle with how to adapt to a regional environment in which the United States and China have become increasingly confrontational, on issues ranging from trade to cybersecurity. Some Southeast Asian countries seem to have benefited from U.S.-China trade tensions—notably, Vietnam, but also possibly Malaysia and the Philippines. Still, many of the most trade-dependent Southeast Asian economies, like Singapore, are terrified of a return to U.S.-China trade tensions, and also are furious at the overall breakdown of global trade institutions, and the United States’ increasing hawkishness on trade. And, Southeast Asian countries increasingly accept that China is the dominant regional economic actor, and will become the dominant strategic actor, too. But China’s bullying in Southeast Asia has alienated segments of the population even in countries with relatively warm views of Beijing, like Malaysia and Thailand—and it has badly strained relations with Singapore and Vietnam. Countries are adapting, and will continue to adapt in 2020. Vietnam, for instance, continues to improve its military capabilities—and likely will continue to move slowly toward a closer partnership with the United States.

A "Right to Assist" could help prevent violent conflict and ease democratic transitions. But several important questions remain unanswered.