Asia

Vietnam

  • Vietnam
    Why Was Vietnam Better Prepared Than the Philippines for Typhoon Haiyan?
    Over the past week, as aid trickled and now is flowing into the Philippines in the wake of Typhoon Haiyan, some broader questions about the country’s preparedness—or lack thereof—have arisen. Although it would be unfair to compare the Philippines, a country with a GDP per capita of around $2,600, with richer countries hit by natural disasters (such as Thailand in the 2004 tsunami), it is worth asking why the Philippines seemed much less prepared for Haiyan than neighboring Vietnam, a country with a GDP per capita of only $1,600. Although the typhoon also passed through Vietnam, albeit after slowing down somewhat over the water in between, Vietnam suffered fourteen deaths, as compared to what appears to be thousands of fatalities in the Philippines. Vietnam managed to evacuate over 800,000 people well before the storm hit; the total number of people who evacuated in the Philippines prior to the storm remains unknown, but a sizable percentage of people on Leyte did not evacuate, a factor that surely increased fatalities. What differed in the two countries’ preparations?  To be sure, Vietnam is an authoritarian state where the central government retains far more power than in the Philippines, one of the most vibrant democracies in Asia. But well before the typhoon hit, Vietnam’s government already had labeled it the most serious possible emergency, making it easier for provincial officials to convince people to leave their homes. Philippines President Benigno Aquino III did not label the typhoon the most serious possible emergency, a categorization that would have allowed him to mobilize more resources and possibly force the evacuation of more people prior to landfall. In addition, those who were evacuated in the Philippines were moved only a few hours before the storm made landfall, leaving authorities little time to look for isolated or elderly people who might not have heard warnings or been able to follow them. Vietnam’s buildings also simply seem to have been stronger; structures designated as storm shelters generally did not collapse, while those in the Philippines frequently did. This difference in the quality of building is a testament to the continuing serious problem of graft in the Philippines, where corruption siphons off funds for infrastructure and leads to shoddy work. Although parts of Leyte are regularly hit by typhoons that carry the risk of surges of water, the area had few significant water breaks; many buildings and roads were built with substandard materials, probably because contractors had to pay kickbacks. Vietnam is hardly a model of clean government—the country was ranked among the most corrupt countries in East Asia last year by Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index—but the Philippines is in many respects worse, particularly in areas of the country long under the control of family dynasties. Indeed, because Vietnam’s graft is more centralized, the government sometimes is able to overcome corruption within the Party, whereas in the freer Philippines a more decentralized kind of corruption is much harder to combat from Manila. Finally, Vietnam appears to have more clearly studied government responses to past major disasters in Asia, including the 2004 tsunami and the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan. This might seem somewhat surprising, given that Vietnam’s leaders are in many respects suspicious of interactions with other countries and highly opaque in how they run their government. Yet below the senior leadership, Vietnam boasts a relatively (for the size of its economy) qualified group of civil servants and diplomats, particularly in areas that are not politically sensitive, like disaster management. Although the Philippines does have some fine civil servants, particularly in prestigious jobs like the foreign ministry, the overall quality of the civil service is poor, in part because Filipinos with top-quality educations, which includes fluency in English, have more opportunities in the domestic private sector and overseas than educated Vietnamese.
  • Japan
    Friday Asia Update: Top Five Stories for the Week of October 11, 2013
    Will Piekos and Sharone Tobias look at the top five stories in Asia this week. 1. China surpasses U.S. in oil imports. According to EIA data, China has surpassed the United States in oil imports, taking the number one spot. The United States still uses more oil than China, consuming an average of 18.6 million barrels per day compared to China’s 10.9 billion, but imports less thanks to increased domestic production. According to analysis by the Wall Street Journal, China’s increased imports of Middle Eastern oil have caused tensions with the United States, because it leaves the U.S. navy to continue policing trade choke points for China’s oil shipments without much help from Chinese forces. 2. Kerry focuses on South China Sea disputes at summits. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry pressed China and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) leaders to come to an agreement on disputes in the South China Sea during a meeting of the East Asia Summit in Brunei. Beijing responded by warning the United States to stay out of the disputes; China has resisted negotiating territorial disputes with ASEAN, an organization with ten member states, preferring bilateral negotiations in which it usually has the upper hand. China claims nearly all of the disputed territory in the South China Sea, competing with claims by Vietnam, the Phillipines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan. Beijing agreed earlier this year to agree to hold a dialogue towards a "code of conduct" with the other nations, though critics argue that these dialogues lack substance. 3. Fukushima radiation levels hit a two-year high. Radiation levels in seawater near Japan’s damaged nuclear plant jumped to thirteen times the previous day’s reading, reaching its highest point since 2011. The Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), which is in charge of the plant, said that the increased radiation levels were a result of nearby construction. Also this week, six workers were exposed to radiation after a pipe connected to the water treatment system was mistakenly detached. TEPCO, which stores saltwater to cool reactors, has struggled to contain the radioactive water since the power station was hit by a massive tsunami in March 2011. 4. Kim Jong Un replaces military chief again. North Korean media referenced a new chief of general staff of the Korean People’s Army, signaling that the country’s young dictator, Kim Jong Un, has once again switched the head of the military. The new chief, Ri Yong Gil, is the Hermit Kingdom’s fourth since Kim came into power in December 2011, and little is known about him. His predecessor is believed responsible for attacks on South Korea in 2010 that killed fifty people, so some hope that that his removal represents a move away from a more hard-line approach to South Korea by Pyongyang. Analysts suggest that the move solidifies Kim’s grip on power and the military. Unrelated, North Korea granted permission this week for the mother of Kenneth Bae to visit her son, an American who has been held in North Korea for nearly a year and is in failing health. 5. U.S., Vietnam ink nuclear deal. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Vietnam Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh initialed a nuclear agreement while at the East Asia Summit this past week. If the deal is signed by President Obama and passed by Congress, it would allow American companies to sell nuclear fuel and technology to Vietnam, and Vietnam would be prohibited from enriching or reprocessing plutonium or uranium. Vietnam has plans to build as many as thirteen nuclear power stations in the next two decades; said Secretary Kerry, “Vietnam has the second-largest market, after China, for nuclear power in East Asia, and our companies can now compete.” Bonus: National Cricket Fighting Championships held in Beijing. More than twenty teams from across China competed in the two-day National Cricket Fighting Championships this week. The crickets, with only a one-hundred-day lifespan, are in their prime in autumn; they are fed a high-protein diet and trained regularly in preparation for their bouts. The traditional Chinese sport is more than 1,000 years old, and the rules of cricket fighting date back to the thirteenth century.
  • China
    China’s Internet Suppression Tactics Diffuse into Southeast Asia
    In an excellent new piece on Voice of America (VOA) news, Steve Herman analyzes how several nations in Southeast Asia appear to be moving to “emulate China” in the way that these countries, like China, regulate and harshly restrict social media. In Thailand, for example, which has one of the harshest climate for Internet speech in the world—despite being theoretically a democracy—the government is now moving to crack down on Facebook users who just post or “like” any articles that could be deemed insulting to the Thai monarchy. Unlike in most other countries that still have lèse-majesté laws on the books, Thailand actually enforces its  lèse-majesté laws, and anyone—not just the king, queen, and other royals—can file a lèse-majesté charge against anyone else in Thailand. As a result, the  lèse-majesté law has become an oppressive tool of political repression by all sides in Thailand’s never ending political drama. As VOA notes, a well-known Thai journalist, Sermsuk Kasitipradit, is now being questioned by police for some of his Facebook postings. Senior Thai officials also have publicly warned that simply “liking” something on Facebook that could be deemed offensive to the monarchy will result in potential prosecutions under lèse-majesté and computer crimes laws. Similarly, Vietnam just passed a  new law, Decree 72, which apparently prohibits people from posting news articles on social media or blogs. Vietnam’s new law requires any posts on social media to be related only to personal information. There is little doubt that the Vietnamese authorities will enforce the new laws on social media; over the past four years, Vietnam already has been engaged in one of the harshest crackdowns in the world on bloggers posting items on politics, land grabbing, or other sensitive issues. Are Thailand, Vietnam, and other Southeast Asian countries just emulating China’s restrictions on social media? Or is there a more direct connection? Vietnam routinely sends senior officials to China to learn about many aspects of Chinese governance, including Internet monitoring and control. So, it is not unreasonable to assume that officials in Vietnam have modeled their social media strategy directly on tactics learned in China. Similarly, Thai officials have traveled on several occasions to China to study the way China monitors and controls social media and microblogging, so—again— it’s not unreasonable to think that Thailand is modeling its policy on tactics Thai officials have personally seen in China.
  • Vietnam
    The Elephant in the Room During President Sang’s Visit
    The president of Vietnam, Truong Tan Sang, is visiting Washington, only the second visit by the top leader of the country to D.C. since the end of the Vietnam War, even though Washington and Hanoi have had close relations for nearly a decade now. In part, this avoidance of public visits to Washington is because leaders of Vietnam do not like having to face vocal complaints from congresspeople, journalists, and some American officials about Hanoi’s horrible human rights record, which actually has gotten worse in the last year, with a growing number of arrests of bloggers, activists, and religious figures. Vietnam’s terrible human rights record would seem to be the elephant in the room during the visit. In his introduction of President Sang at the State Department, Secretary of State John Kerry, who was one of the two American figures most instrumental in getting the U.S. to restore ties with Vietnam in the early 1990s (the other was John McCain) gushed over Mr. Sang and made no mention of Vietnam’s serious abuses. President Obama has largely avoided the topic too, but Vietnam’s crackdown has been at the center of op-eds about the visit, as well as Congress’ discussion of the relationship. And yet for President Sang, there is a bigger elephant, one that also has gotten little attention during his visit. Although many administration officials and congresspeople still treat Vietnam like a powerhouse economy, a competitor eating the United States’ and other Asian countries’ lunch, in reality Vietnam’s economy continues to tailspin downward; the ruling party—and President Sang—seem paralyzed in trying to stop it. Chinese leaders face their own economic problems today, but they are far more responsive to economic slowdowns, and transparent (it’s all relevant) about their problems than Vietnamese leaders. Vietnam’s state companies remain bloated, the true amounts of the debt on their books largely concealed. Indeed, no reformer like former Chinese premier Zhu Rongji has been empowered by the party to rapidly clean up the state sector and try to right the economy. The government has, in theory, approved a reform and restructuring plan for the debt-laden state enterprises and the overall financial system in the country, including creating an asset management company to deal with bad debts. But this plan is moving far too slowly into action to be effective, and this slowness is infecting the entire economy. Reformers who are promoted, such as  party secretary of Danang Nguyen Ba Thanh, they and their political allies are stifled by hard-liners in Hanoi, or they are panned off to cosmetic but unimportant posts. And so Vietnam’s economy grew in the second quarter of this year by five percent, but this is well off its 7-8 percent growth for much of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Even this second quarter growth was due in part to foreign investment and rate cuts by the central bank, which are important but will not solve the country’s debt morass. Vietnamese households don’t see a recovery – consumer spending is still way off, and so the economy only sputters. And, with one of the youngest populations in Southeast Asia, Vietnam actually needs to grow faster than five percent to absorb all the young people coming into the job force. Like China’s leaders, on whom Vietnam modeled its reform programs, top party officials like President Sang essentially rest their legitimacy on economic performance, since they do not allow elections and their credibility from previous wars has eroded. That legitimacy is waning; the current group of Vietnamese leaders can arrest lots of their citizens, but they do not seem able to arrest Vietnam’s decline.
  • China
    Friday Asia Update: Top Five Stories for the Week of June 7, 2013
    Sharone Tobias and Will Piekos look at the top five stories in Asia this week. 1. Obama and Xi convene in Sunnylands. The much-touted two-day summit between U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping began on Friday. Cybersecurity and North Korea are expected to be topics raised by the U.S. side, while China would like to hear more about the U.S. pivot to Asia. Experts are generally hopeful that the summit will increase familiarity, though most are quick to temper any hopes of real deliverables coming from the meeting. For its part, China’s state-sponsored Global Times states that the summit “represents not only a conversation in which both leaders can exchange ideas on important global issues, but also puts forward a glimpse of what China’s future might look like when it catches up with the United States.” 2. Positive steps on the Korean Peninsula. On Thursday, North Korea proposed government-to-government talks, which would be the first in years. Pyongyang also offered to reconnect a Red Cross hotline that was cut in March following North Korea’s February 12 nuclear test. The two Koreas are planning talks to discuss a proposed cabinet-level meeting in Seoul, which would be the first in six years. The new diplomatic efforts are a welcome reprieve from months of bellicose rhetoric from the North and heightened tensions on the Peninsula; how long the détente lasts, however, is remains an open question. 3. Japan and France tighten nuclear ties. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and French President Francois Hollande met in Tokyo on Friday to discuss nuclear and defense ties. The two leaders signed a five-year action plan to work together to supply nuclear technology to export markets. Though the two countries are competitors in nuclear-reactor exports, the cooperation is seen as a response to cheaper Chinese reactors. Tokyo has expressed concern to Paris about French military exports to China. 4. China and Vietnam establish a naval hotline. The defense ministries of China and Vietnam agreed to set up a hotline between their respective navies. Qi Jianguo, deputy chief of the general staff of the PLA, stated that “amid rapid changes in international and regional situation, it is significant that the two countries hold talks on defence and security issues, seek effective control of the current disputes and solutions to related issues.” The hotline will hopefully serve as another outlet to resolve flare-ups in the South China Sea. All is not well between the two countries however, as a rare demonstration occurred in Hanoi against China on June 3. Many Vietnamese citizens feel that China is bullying Vietnam in the South China Sea and the government is not doing enough in response. 5. Poultry plant fire in China is one of the worst in years. A fire at a poultry plant in northeast China on Monday killed 120 and injured seventy-seven. Two senior executives of Jilin Baoyuanfeng Poultry Company were detained as part of a criminal investigation that uncovered major security breaches—the plant lacked fire extinguishers and locked nearly all the exits to prevent employees from leaving. The same factory had burst into flames once before, four years ago. About 70,000 workers are killed on the job each year in China. Bonus: Chinese high school students take gaokao (college entry exam). On Friday, nine million high school students began the three-day-long gaokao, China’s college entrance exam. This year, students will only be allowed to take the test where they hold a hukou, or household registry, rather than their current residence. The gaokao has long been criticized for its lack of creativity and testing non-essential information. It includes essay prompts such as “Why chase mice when there are fish to eat?”
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Tracking the Traffickers: Eradicating Rhinos
    This is a guest post by Emily Mellgard, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. Demand for rhino horn increased exponentially over the past few years. The market is heavily concentrated in Asia, particularly Vietnam. Rhino poaching has leapt to keep pace with demand. South Africa’s rhinos are among the most affected. According to the Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa (WESSA), in 2010, 2011, and 2012, the number of rhinos killed for their horns went from 333 to 448 to 668. So far in 2013, 216 rhinos have been poached in South Africa’s Kruger national park alone. That is more death the past five months than in the years 2000-2008 combined. The rhino population in Mozambique, which was wiped out by large game hunters a century ago and later reintroduced to the national parks, has again been eradicated; this time with the connivance of some of Mozambique’s own rangers. Convictions for poaching and trafficking in rhino horn are rare. But the U.S. attorney’s office in Los Angeles, California announced on May 16 the conviction of Vinh Chung “Jimmy” Kha, and Felix Khaon for, among other crimes, smuggling rhino horn into the United States with the intent of selling it to Vietnam. In Vietnam, and other parts of Asia, powdered rhino horn is considered a cure for everything from a headache, hangover, or cold to cancer; and is also often advertised as an aphrodisiac. It holds no such properties. In fact, rhino horn is keratin, the same substance as human hair and fingernails. Despite this, rhino horn sells for between U.S. $25,000 and $40,000 per kilogram. A Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) conference in March 2013, appears to have invigorated the international community to act to save these great creatures. South Africa is threatening to re-erect the boundary fences between the South African and Mozambican halves of Kruger national park. Some game parks in South Africa have taken the additional measure of poisoning their rhinos’ horns to deter consumer demand. The poison is combination of a parasiticide normally used against ticks on livestock and a pink dye that can be detected by airport scanners and is visible even when in powdered form; meaning potential consumers will know what they are buying. The parasiticide is not lethal, but it does make the consumer “seriously ill.” A logical next step is campaigns to raise awareness of rhino horn’s complete lack of medicinal properties and that the animals die, horribly, through the process. Similar campaigns are running in Asia against elephant poaching. They are spearheaded by celebrities such as China’s Li Bingbing, an actress and UNEP goodwill ambassador, and retired NBA basketball player Yao Ming. These initiatives are key because they focus on a crucial truth; anti-poaching and conservation efforts must be holistic to be effective. By addressing conservation efforts not just at halting the poachers, but also in decreasing the demand for rhino horn altogether, poisoning the horns and educating consumers is an important step forward.  
  • China
    South China Sea: Going to Get Worse Before It (Might) Gets Better
    This week’s latest South China Sea incident, in which a Chinese fishing boat cut a Vietnamese seismic cable —at least according to Hanoi— is a reminder that, despite the South China Sea dominating nearly every meeting in Southeast Asia this year, the situation in the Sea appears to be getting worse. This is in contrast to flare-ups in the past, when after a period of tension, as in the mid-1990s, there was usually a cooling-off period. Although there have been several brief cooling-off periods in the past two years, including some initiated by senior Chinese leaders traveling to Southeast Asia, they have not stuck, and the situation continues to deteriorate and get more dangerous. In the new year, it will likely get even worse. Here’s why: The new Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) secretary-general comes from Vietnam. Over the past three years, a more openly forceful China has found it difficult to deal with ASEAN leaders who even voice ASEAN concerns. But these leaders, like former Thai foreign minister and ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan, were nothing compared to the new ASEAN secretary-general, Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Le Luong Minh. Although he is a career diplomat and certainly can be suave and attentive, he is still a former Vietnamese official, and undoubtedly will bring with him some of the Vietnamese perspective toward China, which is quickly turning more acrid. This year’s ASEAN chair is Brunei. Keeping to its tradition of rotating the chair every year, in 2013 ASEAN will be headed by Brunei. Although some might think Brunei’s leadership will be better for stability than the 2012 ASEAN leadership of Cambodia, perceived by many other ASEAN members as carrying China’s water, the fact that Brunei is just as much of a diplomatic minnow as Cambodia will mean there is no powerful wrangler in the chair’s seat to hammer out a common ASEAN perspective. Were Indonesia or Singapore the chair, the situation might be different. India is playing a larger and larger role in the South China Sea, adding even more potential players to the mix, and more powerful navies. The recent warning by Beijing that India and Vietnam should not engage in joint exploration is only going to lead to a harsher Indian response, since Indian elites pay far more attention to —and are more easily aggrieved by— China than the reverse. The more they look, the more likely they will find. As reported by the New York Times, “On Monday, China’s National Energy Administration named the South China Sea as the main offshore site for natural gas production. Within two years, China aims to produce 150 billion cubic meters of natural gas from fields in the sea, a significant increase from the 20 billion cubic meters produced so far, the agency said.” Although I do not think that the oil and gas potential in the Sea is the biggest driver of conflict, compared to its strategic value, the more China (and anyone else) explores for energy in the Sea, the more likely they will (eventually) come up with potential deposits that will only raise the stakes, if the forecasts of the Sea’s petroleum potential are to be believed. A new Chinese leadership is unlikely to want to show any weakness. With the leadership of this generation even more split than in the past, following a contentious Party Congress, continued infighting among acolytes of the major Chinese leaders, and the Bo Xilai fiasco, the new leadership is in no position, with Party members and the general educated public, to give any room on a contentious issue like the South China Sea. The Obama administration has passed its period of focusing on more effective dialogue and crisis mediation with China. Officials from the administration’s first term, who naturally had the highest hopes for better dialogue, are gone, with many of them leaving just as convinced as their Bush predecessors that real dialogue was difficult if not impossible. Don’t expect a second term to yield better results with such a dialogue. Happy New Year, South China Sea.  
  • Defense and Security
    TWE Remembers: Thich Quang Duc’s Self-Immolation
    The New York Times, the Washington Post, and the BBC all ran stories in June 2012 about Tibetan monks who have set themselves on fire to protest against the Chinese government. The stories provoked little reaction in Washington. That was not the case when a sixty-six year-old Buddhist monk named Thich Quang Duc set himself on fire on June 11, 1963 on the streets of Saigon, the capital of South Vietnam. To understand Quang Duc’s story it is essential to know the story of Ngo Dinh Diem, the U.S.-backed president of South Vietnam. He came to power in 1955 in the aftermath of the Geneva Accords, which ended French colonial rule and split Vietnam along the 17th parallel. He had gained national fame when he quit a critical job working for the French colonial government before World War II and then refused to cooperate with the Japanese occupiers during it. But he was hardly the ideal choice to lead the new South Vietnam. He was a French-educated Catholic in a Buddhist majority country, and he had spent much of the decade after World War II living in the United States rather than building a political organization in South Vietnam. And he was hardly a democrat. When he ran in a “national” referendum in October 1955, he arranged it so that he won more than 98 percent of the vote. Not surprisingly, the Vietnamese public’s support for Diem soon faded. He repressed his opponents and favored his friends and family. His policies to counter the growing strength of the Viet Cong had the opposite effect; they alienated many South Vietnamese against his government. By the spring of 1963, public unrest reached a crisis point. On May 8, residents of Hue, the imperial capital of old Vietnam, organized a rally to protest a ban on flying the Buddhist flag. Police fired on the crowd, killing nine and wounding fourteen. Hunger strikes and more protests followed. On June 11, 1963, Thich Quang Duc and more than 300 other monks and nuns marched in a procession down one of Saigon’s major boulevards. Wearing a saffron robe, he sat down in the lotus position on a cushion in the middle of the street. Two other monks emptied a five-gallon can of gasoline on him. Quang Duc then took a match, struck it, and dropped it on himself. The journalist David Halberstam, who was present, described what happened next: Flames were coming from a human being; his body was slowly withering and shriveling up, his head blackening and charring. In the air was the smell of burning flesh; human beings burn surprisingly quickly. Behind me I could hear the sobbing of the Vietnamese who were now gathering. I was too shocked to cry, too confused to take notes or ask questions, too bewildered even to think. . . . As he burned he never moved a muscle, never uttered a sound, his outward composure in sharp contrast to the wailing people around him. A fire engine raced to extinguish the blaze, but several monks blocked its path. The flames eventually burned out, and the monks placed Quang Duc’s body in a coffin and carried him away. Malcolm Browne, an Associated Press photographer, caught the self-immolation on film. His photograph won the award for World Press Photo of the Year, and it remains among the most famous (and haunting) images from the Vietnam War. It certainly stunned millions of people around the world who saw it in June 1963. As a U.S. embassy official put it, the photo “had a shock effect of incalculable value to the Buddhist cause, becoming a symbol of the state of things in Vietnam.” Seven other monks soon followed Quang Duc’s example and set themselves afire to protest Diem’s rule. Convinced of his own rectitude, Diem did nothing to appease the growing anger being directed his way. His sister-in-law, Madame Nhu, however, added to it. She likened Quang Duc’s suicide to a “barbecue.” “Let them burn,” she said, “and we shall clap our hands.” President John F. Kennedy said of Browne’s photo that “no news picture in history has generated so much emotion around the world as that one.” The so-called Buddhist Crisis incident certainly helped sour Kennedy on Diem. Five months later, Kennedy looked the other way as a group of South Vietnamese Army generals overthrew and executed Diem. Kennedy himself was assassinated three weeks later in Dallas. The political crisis that Quang Duc’s self-immolation highlighted did not, however, prompt either Kennedy or his successor, Lyndon Johnson, to rethink the wisdom of the American involvement in South Vietnam. In late 1963, the United States had fewer than 16,000 troops in South Vietnam. Four years later, it had half a million. The differences between South Vietnam in 1963 and Tibet in 2012 are many and vast. But if history provides any guide, Beijing will no more learn from today’s events than Washington did nearly a half century ago. Indeed, in the wake of two recent self-immolations in Lhasa, China responded by closing Tibet to foreign visitors.
  • Vietnam
    Lessons Learned: The Tet Offensive
    CFR’s James M. Lindsay recalls the 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam and the importance of managing public expectations amid major foreign policy initiatives.
  • Asia
    Myanmar – the Next Asian Tiger Cub Economy?
    With the upgrading of American diplomatic relations with Myanmar, and a wave of political reform in the country over the past year, many businesses have begun eying the Southeast Asian nation, which has a population of over 50 million people and has been essentially isolated from Western companies by U.S., Japanese, and EU sanctions. A delegation of Japanese business leaders recently visited the country, as did an American delegation. Business magnate and philanthropist George Soros also visited recently (of course, the U.S. would have to drop sanctions for investment to happen, but that is looking more likely).  Asia Sentinel has provided an update on all the corporate interest in Myanmar. I have personally heard from a number of Western businesspeople who see great potential in Myanmar – they see the sizable population, the history of British law, and the significant natural resources including offshore petroleum, and compare Myanmar today to Vietnam in the early 1990s, when that country began to seriously open up to Western investment. But, at least right now, that comparison is seriously flawed. Myanmar is a large consumer market, but its development indicators overall are more on the level of some of the poorest countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Large areas of the country have virtually no infrastructure, having been dominated by ethnic insurgencies for decades. Although the country has a history of quality education and use of English, for decades the regime essentially shut down the best universities, fearful that they would be breeding grounds for anti-government protests as they have been many times in Myanmar’s history. This was perhaps the most destructive blow to the country’s economic future – despite some government talk of IT and computer science in recent years, in reality Myanmar is one of the least technologically advanced nations in Asia, outside North Korea. It would be very hard for a multinational to build an office of any size in Myanmar doing medium-value or high-value added work, without recruiting many Burmese exiles to come back to the country, which probably is not going to happen at this point. Of course, in certain industries such as natural resources, all these flaws may not matter; Oil companies have prospered in other climates inhospitable to business. But then there is another problem, which did not exist as much in Vietnam: Even in the resources industry, any Western companies coming in will start with at least a ten-year disadvantage against Chinese firms already established in Myanmar, and with shorter supply chains, more diplomatic support, and large pools of cash.
  • Development
    A Conversation with Pham Binh Minh
    Play
    BOB WOODRUFF: Good afternoon, everybody. Thank you very much for the free lunch, since it's always good. I'm Bob Woodruff. As you know, who's going to be speaking today is Pham Binh Minh, the foreign minister of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. And he will have a chance to give a statement up here, probably for about 10 minutes or so, followed by some questioning that we will do together up here and then followed by any questions that you can make as well. I just have a couple notes before we start, is that the -- if you could, please, you know, turn off your cellphones. Of course, use them in vibration, that's fine. Also, remember: This is going to be on the record. You can see there's cameras back there. So just be very careful about what you say. And I just want to introduce Foreign Minister Mr. Minh. MINISTER PHAM BINH MINH: Dr. Richard Haass, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to thank the Council on Foreign Relations for inviting me to this discussion. And thank you all for coming. We view the Council on Foreign Relations as an important partner and appreciate your interest in the development of Vietnam-U.S. relations. We recall the visit by the council in 1993 when our two countries (were still ?) preparing for the normalizations of relations between Vietnam and the United States. We had the normalizations in 1995. And last year, we were delighted to receive Dr. Richard Haass and the council delegation in Vietnam. And I believe this visit has helped members of the council understand better our country and our people and -- (inaudible) -- in the areas of the -- (inaudible) -- reform. And today I'm very honored to have this opportunity to share with you some of our thoughts on the foreign policies of Vietnam. We have been pursuing a consistent foreign policy of independence, self-reliance, cooperation, development, multilateralization and diversification of relations, active and proactive international integration. And we have a slogan that we are determined to be reliable, be a friend, a reliable partner and a responsible member of the international community. The active and proactive international integration orientation is a new element in our foreign policy which was adopted at the 11th national -- the Party Congress early this year. This was turning point in the -- in the -- in our foreign policy, because before we focus on early -- on economic integration, but now we also integration in all areas such as not only economic but trade politics, diplomacy, security, defense, (culture and social effects ?). Vietnam's successful nonpermanent membership at the United Nations Security Council during the term 2008 and 2009, our chairmanship of ASEAN in 2010, cooperation with countries and the United Nations in many fields such as nuclear security and safety, climate change; realizing the Millennium Development Goals, et cetera; active preparation to take part in peacekeeping operation and active participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations are some instances of our foreign policy. We aim to further deepen our foreign relations, upgrade relations with leading partners, of which establishment of strategic partnership with major powers and important global economic centers is among our priorities. We have established strategic partnership with Russia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom and Spain. I hope in the near future Vietnam will have strategic partnership with other major powers, including the United States. At the same time we look -- we work to strengthen our relationship with traditional friends and partners as far as our participation in international organizations, especially the United Nations. In terms of economic, at present the Vietnamese government identifies the priority task of stabilizing the macroeconomy, creating conditions for the economy to continue to develop fast and sustainably. Together with many other comprehensive efforts, the effort to reduce and streamline public expenditure has helped to stabilize the macroeconomy, address challenges posed by the impacts of the global economic/financial crisis and create the necessary foundation for the realization of our 2011-2015 social/economic development plan and the 2011-2020 -- what we call the socio-economic strategy, which set the goal by 2020 Vietnam will become a modern-oriented industrial country. To achieve this target, during this term our government is focusing on three main tasks: one, simple market-economy institutions with emphasis given to creating a level playing field and administrative reform; two, human resources development, particularly high-quality human resource development; three, construction of integrated infrastructure system. At the same time we view international economic cooperation as an important factor for Vietnam's economic development strategy, and this will be the priority for Vietnam's foreign relations in the coming years. We are working with ASEAN countries to step into a new cooperation era pursuant the ASEAN charter, striving to build an ASEAN community by 2015 based on three main pillars -- politics, security, economic and social -- (inaudible) -- and to promote ASEAN centrality in an evolving regional architecture. We hope to further promote partnership between ASEAN and major powers through increased dialogue, cooperation, confidence-building and preventive diplomacy with a view to developing lasting mechanism and structure to ensure peace, stability and sustainable development in the Asia-Pacific region. We welcome the policy of increasing cooperations with the countries in the region by all countries, including the United States. As for peace and security, it is always our top priority. We look to the United Nations to continue its concerted and coherent efforts to promote peaceful settlement of civil wars and local conflicts in several regions of the world, especially those in North Africa and in Middle East, while preventing others from erupting. It is a long-term necessity that we cultivate the culture of peace, dialogue and promote peaceful settlement of dispute. Vietnam supports efforts to end violence and strengthen national reconstruction and reconciliation in Afghanistan, in Iraq. As regards the hot issue now at the General Assembly -- that is, the applications of Palestine to be a full member of United Nations -- we can say that we recognized the state of Palestine in 1988 and have always supported the just struggle of the Palestinian people for their inalienable rights, including the right to establish an independent and sovereign state that co-exists peacefully with Israel, which their border lies, set up before June 1967. That's why we think we will support the applications of Palestine for full membership at United Nations, but (seems ?) at the present the discussion's in the arms of the Security Council but not yet brought to the table of the General Assembly. It is Vietnam's consistent policy to support and promote general and complete disarmament, with top priority given to the three pillars of the nuclear issue -- namely, nuclear disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy and technology. We have been party to all major international instruments for the disarmament of weapons of mass destruction, including CTBT, NPT, BWC and CWC. We also have been fulfilling our obligations under relevant United Nations mechanisms, especially those set up by the U.N. Security Council. We strongly support United Nations in translating the outcome of the 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference and the newly concluded High-level Meeting on Nuclear Safety and Security into concrete results, revitalizing the work of the conference on disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations. And in our region, in our Southeast Asia, we, together with ASEAN fellow country, working to promote -- are working to promote the treaty on Southeast Asian -- Southeast Asian nuclear weapon-free zone, and we wish that the -- all states, especially nuclear-weapon states, to sign and ratify the protocol annexed to the treaty. In implementation of our foreign policy, we view the U.S. as a leading partner of strategic significance. When President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister of Vietnam Vo Van Kiet decided to normalize our relations 16 years ago, it is hard to imagine our relations would one day achieve this level of development. Dialogue and consultation mechanisms have now been in place, thereby creating a strong framework for the continued growth in bilateral relations in different areas, from political-diplomatic relations to economic, trade, security, national defense, cancer, education, science an technology, human assistance, et cetera. Economic cooperation is currently seen as the highlight in our bilateral relations, with more than 18 billion (dollars) in trade turnover. I remember in 1995 the trade turnover was about a few hundred million U.S. dollars and now it's 180 times of that amount in 1995. More and more American companies, including leading corporations, are investing and expanding their market in Vietnam. There exists enormous potential for our economic cooperation since both sides together with other partners are discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership, one of the largest and freest trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific region. Other areas of cooperation have also achieved very impressive progress, particularly in people-to-people exchange. The United States currently destination of choice for well over 13,000 students is why Vietnam is becoming one of the destinations of choice for American tourists. The two sides also have good cooperation in according -- in accounting for personnel missing in action, and in humanitarian activities such as HIV/AIDS, land mine clearance, solving the Agent Orange dioxin. Additionally, security defense cooperation has meant positive progress. The second dialogue on defense policy recently held in Washington, D.C., was the signing for the first time the memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation was the example of the cooperation between Vietnam and United States. Building on the positive momentum of relations, Vietnam and United States are engaging in discussions about the upgrading of relations towards the strategic partnership. In July 2010, on her visit to Vietnam on the occasion of celebrating the 15th anniversary for normalizations of relations, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has brought with her President Obama's message (willing ?) to elevate our relations to a higher level toward a strategic partnership. I believe that now more than ever is the right time for us to bring our relationship into the next phase of cooperation. Yesterday I had a very productive meeting with Secretary Clinton on this subject. It is her strong belief that this further enhancement of our relationship will help us realize a positive, (firmly ?) constructed, multi-sided cooperative -- mutual respect and mutually beneficial relationship of peace, stability and development as stated in a joint declaration by our leaders. We are also of the view that better U.S.-Vietnam partnership not only means promoting similarity in mutual interests, but also taking into account each other's interests based on a spirit of understanding and respect for independence and sovereignty. As for the bigger picture, I am confident that the Vietnam-U.S. partnership will continue to contribute positively to common efforts to promote peace, stability and development in the region (over the world ?). Our two countries are presented with major opportunities to further enhance and deepen our bilateral and multilateral cooperation. I hope that the Council on Foreign Relations and other stakeholders of Vietnam-United States relations be actively -- take part in this process for the long-term benefits of our two countries and our two people. So I would like to end my remarks here, and thank you very much for your attention. Thank you. (Applause.) WOODRUFF: Well, thank you very much. Very nice. I know that I'm just going to ask some questions probably for the next 15 minutes or so and then open up any questions to you. I'd like to say, though, for the first time -- and I'll sort of personally with us -- I think you and I are about the same age. You're 52 years old; I'm 50 years old. But during that time, when the Vietnam War existed, you and I were young teenagers. Of course, I was in Detroit, and you were in Hanoi. What did -- what did you see and what did you think about the United States at that time? We know that it's changed significantly since then. But I just -- what did -- what did you witness, and what did you go through? MINH: Yes, as you mentioned, at that time during the war -- and we was very young. I can say that I was a very small child at that time. I remember during the bombing of Hanoi because I lived in Hanoi. And during the bombing I had to evacuate to the countryside. And from the countryside, every night I look at the sky, seeing, like, planes dropping bombs. Of course, the hatred was -- (inaudible). And then in 1975 I was old enough, went to school -- went to the School of Foreign Affairs. And I studied diplomacy to become a diplomat, and with the dream that we can get, you know, to the normalizations of relations between Vietnam and the United States. So this is the areas that now is -- in 1995 that dream came true. And you know, we have the stage of level relations these days. WOODRUFF: You know, I know you've been a very large advocacy for trying to increase the relationship between the United States and Vietnam. Did you ever even imagine you would be here in the United States those years ago? MINH: At that time? WOODRUFF: Yeah, back in the 1970s? MINH: No. (Laughter.) At that time no because the -- before 1975 -- didn't know when the war would end. So that's why I could not imagine that would be in the States. (Chuckles.) WOODRUFF: Well, when did you first -- when was the first time you did think about that? MINH: That's when -- in the 1980s when I enter into the foreign affairs -- foreign ministry. And at that time I work in the -- (inaudible) -- diplomacy, or what we call the International Organization Department. And my job at that time directly linked to the work of the United Nations. So I went to New York to attend the United Nations sessions. WOODRUFF: I know that again this is personal, but what was your father's -- I mean, what is his opinion of that, his thoughts about you following the kind of work that you did and coming eventually to this country where, you know, he was -- he was deeply involved in the war back then? MINH: Yes. You know that we have a policy set up when we normalized our relationship with the United States; we have slogan that put the past aside and look to the future. So every effort to normalize the relations between the two enemies -- that is a perfect one. WOODRUFF: And that's why the last -- that's my last question about the past. (Chuckles.) Let's move on to the -- to the present and the future. You know, certainly when you look at -- the change in this country economically is huge. And I lived from -- it's pretty amazing -- in all of Southeast Asia, I've never been to Vietnam. That's about the only country I haven't been to. MINH: (Inaudible.) WOODRUFF: So that's mainly why I want to meet you, so I can go visit you there. (Laughter.) But I lived in China, in Beijing, in 1988 and 1989. And then we saw a country that was just beginning to change significantly at that time, of course triggered and set back significantly by Tianenmen Square, which was the end of my stay there. But if you look at the numbers of people emerging out of -- out of poverty in China, I think there's about 300 million have come out of poverty for the last 30 years. For you, I think the poverty ratings -- I think it was about 75 percent considered in poverty level, and then down to 14 percent now, from 1990 until now. How do you see the economy and the reason for this recovery over time? MINH: You know, for Vietnam for the past 10 years we have maintained the economic grow rate at about 7 (percent) to -- 7 percent to 8 percent, and that helped reduce the poverty rate a lot, and also the government has a priority policy for the poor people. That's why, you know, for the MDG, this is one of the target we have achieved beyond -- before the date -- set for 2015. That's the package for 2015, but we got that packet before that date. So that is I think the reason (I thought ?) the economic growth in Vietnam. WOODRUFF: And you've got growth every year in the economy. I think the number now is about 18 percent inflation. MINH: Eighteen percent inflation -- yes, for this year. And that is one of the most -- one of the problematic issue for the economy of Vietnam. WOODRUFF: So what do you do about that? MINH: Now there's a couple of measures adopted by the government. That is one of the -- one of the measure, is to control the public expenditure, reduce the projects. The investment for the projects seems to be not very productive, so we reduce the -- those projects. And also, to keep the interest rate down a little bit. But still, the inflation still high. For this month, it seems to be better than last month, but still very high. WOODRUFF: So moving on to regional tension, which of course is a -- certainly, significantly with China, which, of course, is the most powerful country right now all throughout Asia, what are your fears about that right now? Obviously, (I've been ?), and it's said before that China looks at the China Sea as a large cow's tongue that kind of goes deeply below China and goes right along the border from the water of Vietnam. How is that going to continue without some kind of battle, some kind of potential -- wouldn't call it a war, but how would you -- what do you think is going to happen to try to control what China is trying to impose on you? MINH: You know that with China at the present time we have -- what we describe the relationship is a comprehensive cooperation. And also, China is our -- one of our -- we set up the strategic partnership with China. China is among the seven countries we have the strategic partnership. And the relationship between Vietnam and China is good in all fields. Look at the economic side. We had the trade turnover, about 20 billion U.S. dollar, because we are at an advantage. We -- you know, we have deficit in trade with China. And political side, we have exchange of visits at the high-level officials. Culture, education and other aspects: Good. Only one remaining issue. That is what you mentioned that -- the cow tongue. The cow tongue is legally groundless. There is no legal foundation for the cow tongue. Both China and Vietnam are member -- are party to the united convention from the law of the sea, 1982. And the United Nations Convention from (sic) the Law of the Sea recognized the exclusive economic zone of the country with the sea. And Vietnam has the exclusive economic zone of the sea in 200 miles. And the cow tongue reached to the continental shelf not only of Vietnam, but also of the Philippines and other countries in Southeast Asia. That is why it's not in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea -- which China and Vietnam are both members of the convention. WOODRUFF: And so, of course, this is a, potentially, much larger naval war zone than has been anywhere else in the world, because of the sea. In terms of the relationship with the -- with the U.S. military, certainly in some ways our naval power has now peaked. I think the budget restrictions in our country are to some degree weakening our potential military, you know, work and operations in the part near Vietnam, and certainly the Middle East, where we're diverting a lot of that now to that part of the world. If the United States, in terms of the military power and assistance to you in that world -- how do you think that will affect you and how much badly and deeply do you now (need ?) the United States to set up our -- step up our power, in Southeast Asia especially? MINH: You know that in South China Sea, what we call Eastern Sea, there are three dimensions of the issue. The territorial dispute must be solved through peaceful solution by the country concerned. The second dimensions of the South China Sea is the stability, security, stability in the region. Anything happens in South China Sea will affect peace and stability of the countries in the region -- of the region, of course indirectly but to other countries. And the first dimension is the navigation, freedom of navigation. So, anything happens in South China Sea will affect the freedom of navigation, so, of course, affect other countries, not only United States -- Japan, other -- India, as well. So we see that -- the efforts by countries inside and outside to make that stable. We appreciate that effort. WOODRUFF: I know you've relied on it for a long time. Now there's been -- well, our budget certainly is, you know, difficult for us right now, but your budget is -- as much of Southeast Asia -- the budget for military defense is now on the rise, and huge percentage of importing weapons is on the rise. Where do you see Vietnam going in terms of what kinds of weapons you're going to be buying different than before, what countries you would be importing it from, other than Russia, and how that's going to change over time? MINH: No, in comparisons with the budgets for military expenditure, the budget of Vietnam is very small. WOODRUFF: Small but (growing ?). MINH: Very small. You compare with, you know, percentage of GDP, that we have enough weapons to defend our country. That is the target (solely ?). And surely now at the present time we buy weapons from Russia. This is true. And still we have -- we need only enough weapons to defend our country. This is our target. WOODRUFF: You know, once I did an hour on China's expansion, and we looked everywhere from Brazil to Angola -- Angola, where they're, you know, getting oil, and Brazil, they need more, you know, food and soybeans, which numbers have gone up gigantically for them. And in terms of countries around, you know, in the southeastern -- in Asia, it's largely influence that they're trying to increase, and largely because of that, of course, is, like you said, navigation -- it's largely to get oil and gas and things, you know, through those areas back into their country. Do you think if you were to pick a reason why there'll be a huge -- a large conflict, would it be because of that, because China has difficulty getting its energy and food into its country? MINH: There are different analyses on that. You know, the conflicts -- the cause of conflicts may come from different reasons. So on a specific case -- WOODRUFF: What about importing oil, for example, through the sea in (Malacca ?). MINH: In what? WOODRUFF: To go through -- over the sea towards China, largely from the Middle East. MINH: I don't have the figure for the oil reserves in South China Sea. So I don't know how the resources of oil in South China Sea could affect -- could lead to the conflict, not like in the Middle East. Middle East is absolutely sure that the course of conflict in that may come from oil. WOODRUFF: I know we're going to open this up for questions in a minute, but what about human rights in Vietnam? How do you see that changing since it was 10 years ago, 20 years ago, and certainly particularly about religious rights? MINH: You mentioned that you haven't been to Vietnam, right? WOODRUFF: Not yet. And I'm still waiting for your -- (laughter) -- I'm waiting for your invitation. MINH: Yes. And I know that some of you in this room have been to Vietnam and you have seen a lot of changes in Vietnam, especially since 1975 until now. And one thing may not be changed: that is our commitment to the protection of human rights in Vietnam. If you look at the policies of Vietnam, we -- our policies always focusing on the betterment of the living standard of the people, and also along with that is the rights of the people. So that is our commitment to that. Of course, there is a different approach to the human rights. That's why every year we have conducted many dialogues with different countries, including the United States, on the issue of human rights. WOODRUFF: Well, how does -- how about diplomacy overseas? You know, with the United States, we -- obviously there's a lot of -- MINH: (Inaudible.) WOODRUFF: -- (inaudible) -- human rights and -- overseas. China, you know, stays away from that as much as they can. Where do you see Vietnam going on that? MINH: As I mentioned, that is a different kind of approach to human rights agenda. Nowadays, many Vietnamese, what you would call the "overseas Vietnamese," return to Vietnam for visiting their friends, their families and for doing business. And of course, one part of the community still not yet return to Vietnam, because they know that we had a war in Vietnam. And there still exists the -- you know, the misunderstanding of this, even the hatred. So that can give the reasons why some of them have not come home yet. But we are -- we welcome all of them to come back -- (inaudible). We are open. WOODRUFF: And then the last. Given what we're talking about, certainly about the growth of the economy especially and what you're doing to raise that, do you still consider Vietnam to be a communist country, a capitalist country, a balance between the two, significantly different than it was before? MINH: (Inaudible.) (Laughter.) We have -- we have the party, the Communist Party. As I mentioned in my paper, we have just held the 11th National Party Congress. And we adopted the -- what you call the market economy, because it's suitable for the development of Vietnam. But we're still continuing to be a communist country. As the name of Vietnam -- (inaudible) -- Socialist Republic of Vietnam. WOODRUFF: So certainly in name. MINH: Well, we're still also -- (inaudible). WOODRUFF: Thank you very much. If -- obviously open up for questions. QUESTIONER: Following up on that. (Off mic.) Larry Pressler (sp). Following up on that, Vietnam seems to be caught in between being a state-run economy and free enterprise. And for example, in free trade agreements and investment -- by way of disclosure, I serve on a board at the Vietnam Fund, and we find it much more difficult to make investments or to deal with the stock market or transparency. And I'm certainly not criticizing, but are you going to be a state-run economy or are you going to invite more foreign investment? MINH: Thank you. Thank you for that question. And you know that now in Vietnam we have the stock exchange market, and also we have the private companies, and of course we also have the state-run companies. And also -- and now the government has the policy to what you call the equitization of the state-run companies. So you look at that, we have -- still have the state-run companies, the private -- 100-percent owned by foreign -- foreign-owned companies, joint ventures. So you can see the mixture of the investment in Vietnam. And of course, we welcome all kind of investment in Vietnam. And we treat investment from outside as well as domestic investments at the same treatment. We have the same treatment, the same favorable conditions for all foreign investor, also domestic investors. We had the law on that. QUESTIONER: Ken Roth from Human Rights Watch. I wanted to follow up on the human rights question because I heard you answer by referring to economic development, which is, of course, you know, one important part, you know. But I didn't hear anything about the other parts. I'm wondering why, given Vietnam's self confidence today -- (off mic) -- is it still not allowing, say, people to -- (off mic) -- the government -- (off mic)? I mean, why is it still suppressing bloggers who might write about production -- (off mic)? There are a range of the other kinds of rights that we haven't gotten yet. And given its self-confidence in the world, I'm just wondering -- (off mic). MINH: You know that Vietnam is a party to nearly all conventions on human rights. And like the United States, we also are members of the -- what do you call -- the Universal Declarations of Human Rights. QUESTIONER: (Off mic.) MINH: And we respect the particularities and universality of human rights. Both economic, political rights -- those are in the constitution of Vietnam. As you mentioned, some individuals -- yes, like any countries -- if anyone violates the constitution, the law, they must be put in jail; they must be dealt with, you know, legally. I remember a few years ago recently we have -- we had dialogues with United Kingdom, for example. And they mentioned that why you control the -- some kind of demonstration. But look at U.K., all right? A few weeks or few months ago they adopt the -- I don't know the rule or something -- control demonstration after the burning down in London, or something like that. So look, if you had some security concern, you had to adopt some kind of measure. So that is normal. But we respect the human rights in all fields because we are members of the -- all conventions on human rights. QUESTIONER: Thank you, Minister. Dinah PoKempner, also of Human Rights Watch. Following on that question, while Vietnam does have a very good record of signing human rights treaties, it has a less admirable record when it comes to transparency in admitting U.N. human rights mechanisms or international groups to visit. Recently there's been a controversy, for example, on the possible export of some products produced by forced labor -- "blood cashews." And I'm wondering, since Vietnam is taking a very -- more forward and prominent role in international affairs and diplomacy, whether it would also be starting to become more transparent and welcoming of human rights mechanisms. Thank you. MINH: Sorry, I cannot -- (inaudible) -- your question on the -- what labor? MR. : (Off mic.) MINH: We welcome the visits to those areas because I don't know that information. There is no -- it's not the right information on that. So we welcome the visit. MR. : (Off mic.) WOODRUFF: (Chuckles.) That's right. That's a different kind of tourism, though, so I'm not going to -- (laughter) -- QUESTIONER: Hi, I'm Brett Dakin, a term member here at the council. I wanted to draw attention for a second to the importance of the Mekong River and the region; and in particular, some rather unusual disputes recently between Vietnam and the Lao PDR about the use of the Mekong River for hydroelectric power. So if you could comment on Vietnam's approach to that issue, and in particular on the project that the Lao PDR would like to pursue with respect to harnessing the power of the Mekong to produce electricity. Thanks. MINH: Thank you. I would not describe it a dispute between Vietnam and Lao (sic) on that. You know, along the Mekong River there are six countries. We had the commission, the Mekong Commission, which comprised four countries. Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam are members of the commission. And in the commission, we have agreement that if any country develop hydro -- hydrotic (sic) power, in the mainstream of the Mekong River, must inform other members of the commission of the project, of the utilization and also the details of the project. Of course, upstream, there are two other countries. They have developed many projects along the mainstream, but they haven't inform us. But they already install the projects upstream. For Laos, Lao (sic) has an intention to develop the projects along the Mekong River. When we know -- when Lao (sic) inform the Mekong Commission about the project, the members of the Mekong Commission, Vietnam and other countries, asked Lao (sic) to give details of the project. And also, we asked for study, a scientific study, to make sure that the project, if affect the -- what do you call the change that the mainstream on the -- that the water flow -- the water flow, which affect the lower Mekong country like Vietnam and Cambodia -- because it will affect the production of rice area in Vietnam. And now the process is that we ask Lao (sic) to give us the detail in a scientific manner, the project. And Lao (sic) already hire a company, a Swiss company, a Swiss -- what do you call the -- MR. : (Consulting company ?). MINH: Consulting company, to make study on the utilization -- on the dam in Xayaburi. And they will inform us with the help of the study. QUESTIONER: Yes, Elizabeth Bramwell, Bramwell Capital. Your 7 (percent) to 8 percent growth rate is very impressive. And I was wondering if that's sustainable, given the fact that Europe and the U.S. are slowing down to something like 2 percent, maybe less; and where Vietnam is in terms of moving from more of an export market, export-driven economy, to one that is more domestically driven, or maybe ASEAN driven. MINH: Thank you for that question. That is also the -- (inaudible) -- now for us, as I mentioned, that we have maintained the economic grow rate for -- you know, for 10 years at the rate of 7 (percent) to 8 percent. And right now, the grow rate registers at 5.5 percent. And that -- our economy is very much -- we very much depends on export, that's sure. And that's why we depends on the market outside. If the demand going down, like in the United States if you don't spend your money on consumption, so that's hard for us. And now the government is considering the restructuring of the economy, how to restructure it. That is a problem. We still continue to restructure the economy. QUESTIONER: (Name inaudible.) I work at the United Nations Foundation, and I'm a term member of the council. Thank you for being here. I think some people were very encouraged to see Vietnam playing a greater role in the world, particularly with your membership on the Security Council. And I think many people see that as bringing along with it a greater responsibility as well in the world. And I know that some were also disappointed at the same time to see that there were crackdowns -- just following up on Ken Roth's question -- crackdowns on practice of religion there. And some would say there's a difference between practicing religion and demonstrations and crowd control. Is there any possibility of adjusting the laws so that people can practice their religion freely there, and in line with Vietnam's sort of greater responsibility in the world? (In Vietnamese.) MINH: (Please ?) come to visit Vietnam and see the church on Sunday. Even I myself cannot get into the church on Sunday or even in the Christmas Eve. It's very crowded. So I don't see any, you know, kind of discriminations against the practice of religious practice in Vietnam. So please come to visit us. QUESTIONER: Jeff Laurenti with the Century Foundation. This is somewhat of a mirror to Ken Roth's question, and it deals with the economic rights. Chinese business is concerned about Vietnam being an even lower-wage economy and draining business and investment to Vietnam. The producers of apparel and such look to Vietnam and idealize it as a place that you aren't bothered with unions and have low wages and a docile workforce. What are the protections that Vietnam actually enforces for the rights of workers to be able to organize in unions, or are they entirely under pretty firm government control? What kind of static do you have from the International Labor Organization on compliance with the international conventions on labor rights? And how does the Communist Party see its vocation as the movement of workers and peasants and yet trying to find a way to bring in as much foreign investment as possible by restricting labor rights in order to encourage the maximum amount of investment to get to economic takeoff? MINH: Yes, thank you. And yes, in Vietnam, we have union(s). And you could call it the state union or union. That is a union. And the workers are members of the unions. And I think that also in the foreign (investment factory ?), there's still union in that. So I don't understand what is this restriction on these low rates. We encourage, you know, the labor can receive high salary, high income. So I don't see any restrictions on the labor costs in Vietnam. So I'm not sure that it is the question that you have raised about the restrictions of labor rate of -- (inaudible). QUESTIONER: And the protections of the -- of the guarantees in the ILO convention, freedom of association, in order to assure the maximum chance for workers to get a larger share of the fruits of their work. MINH: Surely -- (inaudible) -- discussions in the National Assembly on the -- (inaudible) -- labor court in Vietnam. There's -- I believe that there is a kind of discussions on the new labor court in Vietnam. So maybe take into consideration that -- (inaudible). QUESTIONER: Yes, George Weiksner, Credit Suisse. I want to congratulate you on normalizing relations with the U.S. We're sometimes a difficult political entity to deal with. I'd be interested in what advice you might give Cuba, who's trying to normalize relationship, in emulating your success. MR. : (Off mic.) (Laughter.) MINH: It's a tough question, because each country has its own characteristics and different background of history. So -- maybe our advice is patience. (Laughter.) We had 20 years after 1975 until 1995, 20 years of discussions for the normalization. And that is long enough for patience; and also, you know, both sides has interest in normalizing the relationship. WOODRUFF: Do you want to -- (inaudible)? QUESTIONER: No. WOODRUFF: Huh? QUESTIONER: (Off mic.) WOODRUFF: OK. All right. Since you run the place, you can go back. (Laughter.) QUESTIONER: I rarely ask a question. I'm going to break my rule. I'm Richard Haass. I work here. (Laughter.) You said something very interesting in your remarks. You said in your meeting with the secretary of state, you were discussing the possibility of a strategic partnership between the United States and your country. So I would be curious what would be the content of that partnership. What would you like to see in our relationship in the future that you don't see now? And to what extent would it be oriented towards the rise of China or something in addition to that? MINH: Me also, very curious on the content -- (laughter) -- of the strategic partnership, because we are now still discussing what would be the coverage of the strategic partnership. Yes, of course, we focus on all aspects, because to be a strategic partnership, we believe that it would cover all political relations, economic ties, education, defense, security, technology, that all areas would be covered in the strategic partnership, like the strategic partnership we have established with other countries. And of course we have -- at present time we have six or seven strategic partnerships, and none of these will be against any country. So it's absolutely (that ?) -- strategic partnership, we promote the relations between the two countries and also contribute to the peace and stability in the region. This I believe. QUESTIONER: My name is Jim Harmon. Eleven, 12 years ago, I was chairman of the Ex-Im Bank, and we reopened in Vietnam. At the time, we thought a lot about further normalization of relationships between the United States and Vietnam, and we expected then that state-owned enterprises as a percentage of that which consumes capital or produces would be reduced significantly in Vietnam. Today I run a fund which invests in the developing and frontier world, including Vietnam, and we're a little bit discouraged by the fact that state-owned enterprises still consume 50 percent of the capital in the country but produce 25 percent, or represent 25 percent of the production. So as you think about restructuring the economy -- and I know that you can do this -- you would focus in on further privatization and maybe even the limitations that you place on foreign investors not exceeding more than 50 percent of the number of publicly owned companies. So there are things that you could do which would significantly encourage investment in Vietnam from not only the United States but all over the world. And also, I think it would help relative to the inflation problem, of course, that you have. MINH: Yes, as I mentioned, that now the government is trying to restructure the economy, (in that ?), of course, the state-owned enterprises. We have the plan for reduce the state-owned enterprises, especially those ineffective enterprises. With the state-owned enterprises which stay -- which are -- which stay effective, we continue to keep it and maintain it because they can -- they make contributions to the growth of the economy of Vietnam. And as I mentioned, that we welcome all kind of investment in Vietnam. There is no distinction between the state-owned enterprises or the foreign-owned companies. There is the same playing level for all enterprises in Vietnam, for all kind of foreign investment. I don't know whether I -- my answer will be appropriate to your question or not. WOODRUFF: Well, thank you very much. It's been a great education from our professor. (Laughter.) I appreciate it. MINH: Thank you. WOODRUFF: Take me over to your country very soon with my little children, who want to go. (Laughter.) We'll figure a(n) exact semester to go to -- we'll figure that out later. But again, thank you very much for all the -- (applause) -- MR. : Thank you. MINH: Thank you, Bob. Thank you very much. (C) COPYRIGHT 2011, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1000 VERMONT AVE. NW; 5TH FLOOR; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED. UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION. FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES. FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL 202-347-1400 OR E-MAIL [email protected]. THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. BOB WOODRUFF: Good afternoon, everybody. Thank you very much for the free lunch, since it's always good. I'm Bob Woodruff. As you know, who's going to be speaking today is Pham Binh Minh, the foreign minister of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. And he will have a chance to give a statement up here, probably for about 10 minutes or so, followed by some questioning that we will do together up here and then followed by any questions that you can make as well. I just have a couple notes before we start, is that the -- if you could, please, you know, turn off your cellphones. Of course, use them in vibration, that's fine. Also, remember: This is going to be on the record. You can see there's cameras back there. So just be very careful about what you say. And I just want to introduce Foreign Minister Mr. Minh. MINISTER PHAM BINH MINH: Dr. Richard Haass, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to thank the Council on Foreign Relations for inviting me to this discussion. And thank you all for coming. We view the Council on Foreign Relations as an important partner and appreciate your interest in the development of Vietnam-U.S. relations. We recall the visit by the council in 1993 when our two countries (were still ?) preparing for the normalizations of relations between Vietnam and the United States. We had the normalizations in 1995. And last year, we were delighted to receive Dr. Richard Haass and the council delegation in Vietnam. And I believe this visit has helped members of the council understand better our country and our people and -- (inaudible) -- in the areas of the -- (inaudible) -- reform. And today I'm very honored to have this opportunity to share with you some of our thoughts on the foreign policies of Vietnam. We have been pursuing a consistent foreign policy of independence, self-reliance, cooperation, development, multilateralization and diversification of relations, active and proactive international integration. And we have a slogan that we are determined to be reliable, be a friend, a reliable partner and a responsible member of the international community. The active and proactive international integration orientation is a new element in our foreign policy which was adopted at the 11th national -- the Party Congress early this year. This was turning point in the -- in the -- in our foreign policy, because before we focus on early -- on economic integration, but now we also integration in all areas such as not only economic but trade politics, diplomacy, security, defense, (culture and social effects ?). Vietnam's successful nonpermanent membership at the United Nations Security Council during the term 2008 and 2009, our chairmanship of ASEAN in 2010, cooperation with countries and the United Nations in many fields such as nuclear security and safety, climate change; realizing the Millennium Development Goals, et cetera; active preparation to take part in peacekeeping operation and active participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations are some instances of our foreign policy. We aim to further deepen our foreign relations, upgrade relations with leading partners, of which establishment of strategic partnership with major powers and important global economic centers is among our priorities. We have established strategic partnership with Russia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom and Spain. I hope in the near future Vietnam will have strategic partnership with other major powers, including the United States. At the same time we look -- we work to strengthen our relationship with traditional friends and partners as far as our participation in international organizations, especially the United Nations. In terms of economic, at present the Vietnamese government identifies the priority task of stabilizing the macroeconomy, creating conditions for the economy to continue to develop fast and sustainably. Together with many other comprehensive efforts, the effort to reduce and streamline public expenditure has helped to stabilize the macroeconomy, address challenges posed by the impacts of the global economic/financial crisis and create the necessary foundation for the realization of our 2011-2015 social/economic development plan and the 2011-2020 -- what we call the socio-economic strategy, which set the goal by 2020 Vietnam will become a modern-oriented industrial country. To achieve this target, during this term our government is focusing on three main tasks: one, simple market-economy institutions with emphasis given to creating a level playing field and administrative reform; two, human resources development, particularly high-quality human resource development; three, construction of integrated infrastructure system. At the same time we view international economic cooperation as an important factor for Vietnam's economic development strategy, and this will be the priority for Vietnam's foreign relations in the coming years. We are working with ASEAN countries to step into a new cooperation era pursuant the ASEAN charter, striving to build an ASEAN community by 2015 based on three main pillars -- politics, security, economic and social -- (inaudible) -- and to promote ASEAN centrality in an evolving regional architecture. We hope to further promote partnership between ASEAN and major powers through increased dialogue, cooperation, confidence-building and preventive diplomacy with a view to developing lasting mechanism and structure to ensure peace, stability and sustainable development in the Asia-Pacific region. We welcome the policy of increasing cooperations with the countries in the region by all countries, including the United States. As for peace and security, it is always our top priority. We look to the United Nations to continue its concerted and coherent efforts to promote peaceful settlement of civil wars and local conflicts in several regions of the world, especially those in North Africa and in Middle East, while preventing others from erupting. It is a long-term necessity that we cultivate the culture of peace, dialogue and promote peaceful settlement of dispute. Vietnam supports efforts to end violence and strengthen national reconstruction and reconciliation in Afghanistan, in Iraq. As regards the hot issue now at the General Assembly -- that is, the applications of Palestine to be a full member of United Nations -- we can say that we recognized the state of Palestine in 1988 and have always supported the just struggle of the Palestinian people for their inalienable rights, including the right to establish an independent and sovereign state that co-exists peacefully with Israel, which their border lies, set up before June 1967. That's why we think we will support the applications of Palestine for full membership at United Nations, but (seems ?) at the present the discussion's in the arms of the Security Council but not yet brought to the table of the General Assembly. It is Vietnam's consistent policy to support and promote general and complete disarmament, with top priority given to the three pillars of the nuclear issue -- namely, nuclear disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy and technology. We have been party to all major international instruments for the disarmament of weapons of mass destruction, including CTBT, NPT, BWC and CWC. We also have been fulfilling our obligations under relevant United Nations mechanisms, especially those set up by the U.N. Security Council. We strongly support United Nations in translating the outcome of the 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference and the newly concluded High-level Meeting on Nuclear Safety and Security into concrete results, revitalizing the work of the conference on disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations. And in our region, in our Southeast Asia, we, together with ASEAN fellow country, working to promote -- are working to promote the treaty on Southeast Asian -- Southeast Asian nuclear weapon-free zone, and we wish that the -- all states, especially nuclear-weapon states, to sign and ratify the protocol annexed to the treaty. In implementation of our foreign policy, we view the U.S. as a leading partner of strategic significance. When President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister of Vietnam Vo Van Kiet decided to normalize our relations 16 years ago, it is hard to imagine our relations would one day achieve this level of development. Dialogue and consultation mechanisms have now been in place, thereby creating a strong framework for the continued growth in bilateral relations in different areas, from political-diplomatic relations to economic, trade, security, national defense, cancer, education, science an technology, human assistance, et cetera. Economic cooperation is currently seen as the highlight in our bilateral relations, with more than 18 billion (dollars) in trade turnover. I remember in 1995 the trade turnover was about a few hundred million U.S. dollars and now it's 180 times of that amount in 1995. More and more American companies, including leading corporations, are investing and expanding their market in Vietnam. There exists enormous potential for our economic cooperation since both sides together with other partners are discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership, one of the largest and freest trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific region. Other areas of cooperation have also achieved very impressive progress, particularly in people-to-people exchange. The United States currently destination of choice for well over 13,000 students is why Vietnam is becoming one of the destinations of choice for American tourists. The two sides also have good cooperation in according -- in accounting for personnel missing in action, and in humanitarian activities such as HIV/AIDS, land mine clearance, solving the Agent Orange dioxin. Additionally, security defense cooperation has meant positive progress. The second dialogue on defense policy recently held in Washington, D.C., was the signing for the first time the memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation was the example of the cooperation between Vietnam and United States. Building on the positive momentum of relations, Vietnam and United States are engaging in discussions about the upgrading of relations towards the strategic partnership. In July 2010, on her visit to Vietnam on the occasion of celebrating the 15th anniversary for normalizations of relations, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has brought with her President Obama's message (willing ?) to elevate our relations to a higher level toward a strategic partnership. I believe that now more than ever is the right time for us to bring our relationship into the next phase of cooperation. Yesterday I had a very productive meeting with Secretary Clinton on this subject. It is her strong belief that this further enhancement of our relationship will help us realize a positive, (firmly ?) constructed, multi-sided cooperative -- mutual respect and mutually beneficial relationship of peace, stability and development as stated in a joint declaration by our leaders. We are also of the view that better U.S.-Vietnam partnership not only means promoting similarity in mutual interests, but also taking into account each other's interests based on a spirit of understanding and respect for independence and sovereignty. As for the bigger picture, I am confident that the Vietnam-U.S. partnership will continue to contribute positively to common efforts to promote peace, stability and development in the region (over the world ?). Our two countries are presented with major opportunities to further enhance and deepen our bilateral and multilateral cooperation. I hope that the Council on Foreign Relations and other stakeholders of Vietnam-United States relations be actively -- take part in this process for the long-term benefits of our two countries and our two people. So I would like to end my remarks here, and thank you very much for your attention. Thank you. (Applause.) WOODRUFF: Well, thank you very much. Very nice. I know that I'm just going to ask some questions probably for the next 15 minutes or so and then open up any questions to you. I'd like to say, though, for the first time -- and I'll sort of personally with us -- I think you and I are about the same age. You're 52 years old; I'm 50 years old. But during that time, when the Vietnam War existed, you and I were young teenagers. Of course, I was in Detroit, and you were in Hanoi. What did -- what did you see and what did you think about the United States at that time? We know that it's changed significantly since then. But I just -- what did -- what did you witness, and what did you go through? MINH: Yes, as you mentioned, at that time during the war -- and we was very young. I can say that I was a very small child at that time. I remember during the bombing of Hanoi because I lived in Hanoi. And during the bombing I had to evacuate to the countryside. And from the countryside, every night I look at the sky, seeing, like, planes dropping bombs. Of course, the hatred was -- (inaudible). And then in 1975 I was old enough, went to school -- went to the School of Foreign Affairs. And I studied diplomacy to become a diplomat, and with the dream that we can get, you know, to the normalizations of relations between Vietnam and the United States. So this is the areas that now is -- in 1995 that dream came true. And you know, we have the stage of level relations these days. WOODRUFF: You know, I know you've been a very large advocacy for trying to increase the relationship between the United States and Vietnam. Did you ever even imagine you would be here in the United States those years ago? MINH: At that time? WOODRUFF: Yeah, back in the 1970s? MINH: No. (Laughter.) At that time no because the -- before 1975 -- didn't know when the war would end. So that's why I could not imagine that would be in the States. (Chuckles.) WOODRUFF: Well, when did you first -- when was the first time you did think about that? MINH: That's when -- in the 1980s when I enter into the foreign affairs -- foreign ministry. And at that time I work in the -- (inaudible) -- diplomacy, or what we call the International Organization Department. And my job at that time directly linked to the work of the United Nations. So I went to New York to attend the United Nations sessions. WOODRUFF: I know that again this is personal, but what was your father's -- I mean, what is his opinion of that, his thoughts about you following the kind of work that you did and coming eventually to this country where, you know, he was -- he was deeply involved in the war back then? MINH: Yes. You know that we have a policy set up when we normalized our relationship with the United States; we have slogan that put the past aside and look to the future. So every effort to normalize the relations between the two enemies -- that is a perfect one. WOODRUFF: And that's why the last -- that's my last question about the past. (Chuckles.) Let's move on to the -- to the present and the future. You know, certainly when you look at -- the change in this country economically is huge. And I lived from -- it's pretty amazing -- in all of Southeast Asia, I've never been to Vietnam. That's about the only country I haven't been to. MINH: (Inaudible.) WOODRUFF: So that's mainly why I want to meet you, so I can go visit you there. (Laughter.) But I lived in China, in Beijing, in 1988 and 1989. And then we saw a country that was just beginning to change significantly at that time, of course triggered and set back significantly by Tianenmen Square, which was the end of my stay there. But if you look at the numbers of people emerging out of -- out of poverty in China, I think there's about 300 million have come out of poverty for the last 30 years. For you, I think the poverty ratings -- I think it was about 75 percent considered in poverty level, and then down to 14 percent now, from 1990 until now. How do you see the economy and the reason for this recovery over time? MINH: You know, for Vietnam for the past 10 years we have maintained the economic grow rate at about 7 (percent) to -- 7 percent to 8 percent, and that helped reduce the poverty rate a lot, and also the government has a priority policy for the poor people. That's why, you know, for the MDG, this is one of the target we have achieved beyond -- before the date -- set for 2015. That's the package for 2015, but we got that packet before that date. So that is I think the reason (I thought ?) the economic growth in Vietnam. WOODRUFF: And you've got growth every year in the economy. I think the number now is about 18 percent inflation. MINH: Eighteen percent inflation -- yes, for this year. And that is one of the most -- one of the problematic issue for the economy of Vietnam. WOODRUFF: So what do you do about that? MINH: Now there's a couple of measures adopted by the government. That is one of the -- one of the measure, is to control the public expenditure, reduce the projects. The investment for the projects seems to be not very productive, so we reduce the -- those projects. And also, to keep the interest rate down a little bit. But still, the inflation still high. For this month, it seems to be better than last month, but still very high. WOODRUFF: So moving on to regional tension, which of course is a -- certainly, significantly with China, which, of course, is the most powerful country right now all throughout Asia, what are your fears about that right now? Obviously, (I've been ?), and it's said before that China looks at the China Sea as a large cow's tongue that kind of goes deeply below China and goes right along the border from the water of Vietnam. How is that going to continue without some kind of battle, some kind of potential -- wouldn't call it a war, but how would you -- what do you think is going to happen to try to control what China is trying to impose on you? MINH: You know that with China at the present time we have -- what we describe the relationship is a comprehensive cooperation. And also, China is our -- one of our -- we set up the strategic partnership with China. China is among the seven countries we have the strategic partnership. And the relationship between Vietnam and China is good in all fields. Look at the economic side. We had the trade turnover, about 20 billion U.S. dollar, because we are at an advantage. We -- you know, we have deficit in trade with China. And political side, we have exchange of visits at the high-level officials. Culture, education and other aspects: Good. Only one remaining issue. That is what you mentioned that -- the cow tongue. The cow tongue is legally groundless. There is no legal foundation for the cow tongue. Both China and Vietnam are member -- are party to the united convention from the law of the sea, 1982. And the United Nations Convention from (sic) the Law of the Sea recognized the exclusive economic zone of the country with the sea. And Vietnam has the exclusive economic zone of the sea in 200 miles. And the cow tongue reached to the continental shelf not only of Vietnam, but also of the Philippines and other countries in Southeast Asia. That is why it's not in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea -- which China and Vietnam are both members of the convention. WOODRUFF: And so, of course, this is a, potentially, much larger naval war zone than has been anywhere else in the world, because of the sea. In terms of the relationship with the -- with the U.S. military, certainly in some ways our naval power has now peaked. I think the budget restrictions in our country are to some degree weakening our potential military, you know, work and operations in the part near Vietnam, and certainly the Middle East, where we're diverting a lot of that now to that part of the world. If the United States, in terms of the military power and assistance to you in that world -- how do you think that will affect you and how much badly and deeply do you now (need ?) the United States to set up our -- step up our power, in Southeast Asia especially? MINH: You know that in South China Sea, what we call Eastern Sea, there are three dimensions of the issue. The territorial dispute must be solved through peaceful solution by the country concerned. The second dimensions of the South China Sea is the stability, security, stability in the region. Anything happens in South China Sea will affect peace and stability of the countries in the region -- of the region, of course indirectly but to other countries. And the first dimension is the navigation, freedom of navigation. So, anything happens in South China Sea will affect the freedom of navigation, so, of course, affect other countries, not only United States -- Japan, other -- India, as well. So we see that -- the efforts by countries inside and outside to make that stable. We appreciate that effort. WOODRUFF: I know you've relied on it for a long time. Now there's been -- well, our budget certainly is, you know, difficult for us right now, but your budget is -- as much of Southeast Asia -- the budget for military defense is now on the rise, and huge percentage of importing weapons is on the rise. Where do you see Vietnam going in terms of what kinds of weapons you're going to be buying different than before, what countries you would be importing it from, other than Russia, and how that's going to change over time? MINH: No, in comparisons with the budgets for military expenditure, the budget of Vietnam is very small. WOODRUFF: Small but (growing ?). MINH: Very small. You compare with, you know, percentage of GDP, that we have enough weapons to defend our country. That is the target (solely ?). And surely now at the present time we buy weapons from Russia. This is true. And still we have -- we need only enough weapons to defend our country. This is our target. WOODRUFF: You know, once I did an hour on China's expansion, and we looked everywhere from Brazil to Angola -- Angola, where they're, you know, getting oil, and Brazil, they need more, you know, food and soybeans, which numbers have gone up gigantically for them. And in terms of countries around, you know, in the southeastern -- in Asia, it's largely influence that they're trying to increase, and largely because of that, of course, is, like you said, navigation -- it's largely to get oil and gas and things, you know, through those areas back into their country. Do you think if you were to pick a reason why there'll be a huge -- a large conflict, would it be because of that, because China has difficulty getting its energy and food into its country? MINH: There are different analyses on that. You know, the conflicts -- the cause of conflicts may come from different reasons. So on a specific case -- WOODRUFF: What about importing oil, for example, through the sea in (Malacca ?). MINH: In what? WOODRUFF: To go through -- over the sea towards China, largely from the Middle East. MINH: I don't have the figure for the oil reserves in South China Sea. So I don't know how the resources of oil in South China Sea could affect -- could lead to the conflict, not like in the Middle East. Middle East is absolutely sure that the course of conflict in that may come from oil. WOODRUFF: I know we're going to open this up for questions in a minute, but what about human rights in Vietnam? How do you see that changing since it was 10 years ago, 20 years ago, and certainly particularly about religious rights? MINH: You mentioned that you haven't been to Vietnam, right? WOODRUFF: Not yet. And I'm still waiting for your -- (laughter) -- I'm waiting for your invitation. MINH: Yes. And I know that some of you in this room have been to Vietnam and you have seen a lot of changes in Vietnam, especially since 1975 until now. And one thing may not be changed: that is our commitment to the protection of human rights in Vietnam. If you look at the policies of Vietnam, we -- our policies always focusing on the betterment of the living standard of the people, and also along with that is the rights of the people. So that is our commitment to that. Of course, there is a different approach to the human rights. That's why every year we have conducted many dialogues with different countries, including the United States, on the issue of human rights. WOODRUFF: Well, how does -- how about diplomacy overseas? You know, with the United States, we -- obviously there's a lot of -- MINH: (Inaudible.) WOODRUFF: -- (inaudible) -- human rights and -- overseas. China, you know, stays away from that as much as they can. Where do you see Vietnam going on that? MINH: As I mentioned, that is a different kind of approach to human rights agenda. Nowadays, many Vietnamese, what you would call the "overseas Vietnamese," return to Vietnam for visiting their friends, their families and for doing business. And of course, one part of the community still not yet return to Vietnam, because they know that we had a war in Vietnam. And there still exists the -- you know, the misunderstanding of this, even the hatred. So that can give the reasons why some of them have not come home yet. But we are -- we welcome all of them to come back -- (inaudible). We are open. WOODRUFF: And then the last. Given what we're talking about, certainly about the growth of the economy especially and what you're doing to raise that, do you still consider Vietnam to be a communist country, a capitalist country, a balance between the two, significantly different than it was before? MINH: (Inaudible.) (Laughter.) We have -- we have the party, the Communist Party. As I mentioned in my paper, we have just held the 11th National Party Congress. And we adopted the -- what you call the market economy, because it's suitable for the development of Vietnam. But we're still continuing to be a communist country. As the name of Vietnam -- (inaudible) -- Socialist Republic of Vietnam. WOODRUFF: So certainly in name. MINH: Well, we're still also -- (inaudible). WOODRUFF: Thank you very much. If -- obviously open up for questions. QUESTIONER: Following up on that. (Off mic.) Larry Pressler (sp). Following up on that, Vietnam seems to be caught in between being a state-run economy and free enterprise. And for example, in free trade agreements and investment -- by way of disclosure, I serve on a board at the Vietnam Fund, and we find it much more difficult to make investments or to deal with the stock market or transparency. And I'm certainly not criticizing, but are you going to be a state-run economy or are you going to invite more foreign investment? MINH: Thank you. Thank you for that question. And you know that now in Vietnam we have the stock exchange market, and also we have the private companies, and of course we also have the state-run companies. And also -- and now the government has the policy to what you call the equitization of the state-run companies. So you look at that, we have -- still have the state-run companies, the private -- 100-percent owned by foreign -- foreign-owned companies, joint ventures. So you can see the mixture of the investment in Vietnam. And of course, we welcome all kind of investment in Vietnam. And we treat investment from outside as well as domestic investments at the same treatment. We have the same treatment, the same favorable conditions for all foreign investor, also domestic investors. We had the law on that. QUESTIONER: Ken Roth from Human Rights Watch. I wanted to follow up on the human rights question because I heard you answer by referring to economic development, which is, of course, you know, one important part, you know. But I didn't hear anything about the other parts. I'm wondering why, given Vietnam's self confidence today -- (off mic) -- is it still not allowing, say, people to -- (off mic) -- the government -- (off mic)? I mean, why is it still suppressing bloggers who might write about production -- (off mic)? There are a range of the other kinds of rights that we haven't gotten yet. And given its self-confidence in the world, I'm just wondering -- (off mic). MINH: You know that Vietnam is a party to nearly all conventions on human rights. And like the United States, we also are members of the -- what do you call -- the Universal Declarations of Human Rights. QUESTIONER: (Off mic.) MINH: And we respect the particularities and universality of human rights. Both economic, political rights -- those are in the constitution of Vietnam. As you mentioned, some individuals -- yes, like any countries -- if anyone violates the constitution, the law, they must be put in jail; they must be dealt with, you know, legally. I remember a few years ago recently we have -- we had dialogues with United Kingdom, for example. And they mentioned that why you control the -- some kind of demonstration. But look at U.K., all right? A few weeks or few months ago they adopt the -- I don't know the rule or something -- control demonstration after the burning down in London, or something like that. So look, if you had some security concern, you had to adopt some kind of measure. So that is normal. But we respect the human rights in all fields because we are members of the -- all conventions on human rights. QUESTIONER: Thank you, Minister. Dinah PoKempner, also of Human Rights Watch. Following on that question, while Vietnam does have a very good record of signing human rights treaties, it has a less admirable record when it comes to transparency in admitting U.N. human rights mechanisms or international groups to visit. Recently there's been a controversy, for example, on the possible export of some products produced by forced labor -- "blood cashews." And I'm wondering, since Vietnam is taking a very -- more forward and prominent role in international affairs and diplomacy, whether it would also be starting to become more transparent and welcoming of human rights mechanisms. Thank you. MINH: Sorry, I cannot -- (inaudible) -- your question on the -- what labor? MR. : (Off mic.) MINH: We welcome the visits to those areas because I don't know that information. There is no -- it's not the right information on that. So we welcome the visit. MR. : (Off mic.) WOODRUFF: (Chuckles.) That's right. That's a different kind of tourism, though, so I'm not going to -- (laughter) -- QUESTIONER: Hi, I'm Brett Dakin, a term member here at the council. I wanted to draw attention for a second to the importance of the Mekong River and the region; and in particular, some rather unusual disputes recently between Vietnam and the Lao PDR about the use of the Mekong River for hydroelectric power. So if you could comment on Vietnam's approach to that issue, and in particular on the project that the Lao PDR would like to pursue with respect to harnessing the power of the Mekong to produce electricity. Thanks. MINH: Thank you. I would not describe it a dispute between Vietnam and Lao (sic) on that. You know, along the Mekong River there are six countries. We had the commission, the Mekong Commission, which comprised four countries. Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam are members of the commission. And in the commission, we have agreement that if any country develop hydro -- hydrotic (sic) power, in the mainstream of the Mekong River, must inform other members of the commission of the project, of the utilization and also the details of the project. Of course, upstream, there are two other countries. They have developed many projects along the mainstream, but they haven't inform us. But they already install the projects upstream. For Laos, Lao (sic) has an intention to develop the projects along the Mekong River. When we know -- when Lao (sic) inform the Mekong Commission about the project, the members of the Mekong Commission, Vietnam and other countries, asked Lao (sic) to give details of the project. And also, we asked for study, a scientific study, to make sure that the project, if affect the -- what do you call the change that the mainstream on the -- that the water flow -- the water flow, which affect the lower Mekong country like Vietnam and Cambodia -- because it will affect the production of rice area in Vietnam. And now the process is that we ask Lao (sic) to give us the detail in a scientific manner, the project. And Lao (sic) already hire a company, a Swiss company, a Swiss -- what do you call the -- MR. : (Consulting company ?). MINH: Consulting company, to make study on the utilization -- on the dam in Xayaburi. And they will inform us with the help of the study. QUESTIONER: Yes, Elizabeth Bramwell, Bramwell Capital. Your 7 (percent) to 8 percent growth rate is very impressive. And I was wondering if that's sustainable, given the fact that Europe and the U.S. are slowing down to something like 2 percent, maybe less; and where Vietnam is in terms of moving from more of an export market, export-driven economy, to one that is more domestically driven, or maybe ASEAN driven. MINH: Thank you for that question. That is also the -- (inaudible) -- now for us, as I mentioned, that we have maintained the economic grow rate for -- you know, for 10 years at the rate of 7 (percent) to 8 percent. And right now, the grow rate registers at 5.5 percent. And that -- our economy is very much -- we very much depends on export, that's sure. And that's why we depends on the market outside. If the demand going down, like in the United States if you don't spend your money on consumption, so that's hard for us. And now the government is considering the restructuring of the economy, how to restructure it. That is a problem. We still continue to restructure the economy. QUESTIONER: (Name inaudible.) I work at the United Nations Foundation, and I'm a term member of the council. Thank you for being here. I think some people were very encouraged to see Vietnam playing a greater role in the world, particularly with your membership on the Security Council. And I think many people see that as bringing along with it a greater responsibility as well in the world. And I know that some were also disappointed at the same time to see that there were crackdowns -- just following up on Ken Roth's question -- crackdowns on practice of religion there. And some would say there's a difference between practicing religion and demonstrations and crowd control. Is there any possibility of adjusting the laws so that people can practice their religion freely there, and in line with Vietnam's sort of greater responsibility in the world? (In Vietnamese.) MINH: (Please ?) come to visit Vietnam and see the church on Sunday. Even I myself cannot get into the church on Sunday or even in the Christmas Eve. It's very crowded. So I don't see any, you know, kind of discriminations against the practice of religious practice in Vietnam. So please come to visit us. QUESTIONER: Jeff Laurenti with the Century Foundation. This is somewhat of a mirror to Ken Roth's question, and it deals with the economic rights. Chinese business is concerned about Vietnam being an even lower-wage economy and draining business and investment to Vietnam. The producers of apparel and such look to Vietnam and idealize it as a place that you aren't bothered with unions and have low wages and a docile workforce. What are the protections that Vietnam actually enforces for the rights of workers to be able to organize in unions, or are they entirely under pretty firm government control? What kind of static do you have from the International Labor Organization on compliance with the international conventions on labor rights? And how does the Communist Party see its vocation as the movement of workers and peasants and yet trying to find a way to bring in as much foreign investment as possible by restricting labor rights in order to encourage the maximum amount of investment to get to economic takeoff? MINH: Yes, thank you. And yes, in Vietnam, we have union(s). And you could call it the state union or union. That is a union. And the workers are members of the unions. And I think that also in the foreign (investment factory ?), there's still union in that. So I don't understand what is this restriction on these low rates. We encourage, you know, the labor can receive high salary, high income. So I don't see any restrictions on the labor costs in Vietnam. So I'm not sure that it is the question that you have raised about the restrictions of labor rate of -- (inaudible). QUESTIONER: And the protections of the -- of the guarantees in the ILO convention, freedom of association, in order to assure the maximum chance for workers to get a larger share of the fruits of their work. MINH: Surely -- (inaudible) -- discussions in the National Assembly on the -- (inaudible) -- labor court in Vietnam. There's -- I believe that there is a kind of discussions on the new labor court in Vietnam. So maybe take into consideration that -- (inaudible). QUESTIONER: Yes, George Weiksner, Credit Suisse. I want to congratulate you on normalizing relations with the U.S. We're sometimes a difficult political entity to deal with. I'd be interested in what advice you might give Cuba, who's trying to normalize relationship, in emulating your success. MR. : (Off mic.) (Laughter.) MINH: It's a tough question, because each country has its own characteristics and different background of history. So -- maybe our advice is patience. (Laughter.) We had 20 years after 1975 until 1995, 20 years of discussions for the normalization. And that is long enough for patience; and also, you know, both sides has interest in normalizing the relationship. WOODRUFF: Do you want to -- (inaudible)? QUESTIONER: No. WOODRUFF: Huh? QUESTIONER: (Off mic.) WOODRUFF: OK. All right. Since you run the place, you can go back. (Laughter.) QUESTIONER: I rarely ask a question. I'm going to break my rule. I'm Richard Haass. I work here. (Laughter.) You said something very interesting in your remarks. You said in your meeting with the secretary of state, you were discussing the possibility of a strategic partnership between the United States and your country. So I would be curious what would be the content of that partnership. What would you like to see in our relationship in the future that you don't see now? And to what extent would it be oriented towards the rise of China or something in addition to that? MINH: Me also, very curious on the content -- (laughter) -- of the strategic partnership, because we are now still discussing what would be the coverage of the strategic partnership. Yes, of course, we focus on all aspects, because to be a strategic partnership, we believe that it would cover all political relations, economic ties, education, defense, security, technology, that all areas would be covered in the strategic partnership, like the strategic partnership we have established with other countries. And of course we have -- at present time we have six or seven strategic partnerships, and none of these will be against any country. So it's absolutely (that ?) -- strategic partnership, we promote the relations between the two countries and also contribute to the peace and stability in the region. This I believe. QUESTIONER: My name is Jim Harmon. Eleven, 12 years ago, I was chairman of the Ex-Im Bank, and we reopened in Vietnam. At the time, we thought a lot about further normalization of relationships between the United States and Vietnam, and we expected then that state-owned enterprises as a percentage of that which consumes capital or produces would be reduced significantly in Vietnam. Today I run a fund which invests in the developing and frontier world, including Vietnam, and we're a little bit discouraged by the fact that state-owned enterprises still consume 50 percent of the capital in the country but produce 25 percent, or represent 25 percent of the production. So as you think about restructuring the economy -- and I know that you can do this -- you would focus in on further privatization and maybe even the limitations that you place on foreign investors not exceeding more than 50 percent of the number of publicly owned companies. So there are things that you could do which would significantly encourage investment in Vietnam from not only the United States but all over the world. And also, I think it would help relative to the inflation problem, of course, that you have. MINH: Yes, as I mentioned, that now the government is trying to restructure the economy, (in that ?), of course, the state-owned enterprises. We have the plan for reduce the state-owned enterprises, especially those ineffective enterprises. With the state-owned enterprises which stay -- which are -- which stay effective, we continue to keep it and maintain it because they can -- they make contributions to the growth of the economy of Vietnam. And as I mentioned, that we welcome all kind of investment in Vietnam. There is no distinction between the state-owned enterprises or the foreign-owned companies. There is the same playing level for all enterprises in Vietnam, for all kind of foreign investment. I don't know whether I -- my answer will be appropriate to your question or not. WOODRUFF: Well, thank you very much. It's been a great education from our professor. (Laughter.) I appreciate it. MINH: Thank you. WOODRUFF: Take me over to your country very soon with my little children, who want to go. (Laughter.) We'll figure a(n) exact semester to go to -- we'll figure that out later. But again, thank you very much for all the -- (applause) -- MR. : Thank you. MINH: Thank you, Bob. Thank you very much. (C) COPYRIGHT 2011, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1000 VERMONT AVE. NW; 5TH FLOOR; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED. UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION. FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. 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  • Development
    A Conversation with Pham Binh Minh
    Play
    Pham Binh Minh, minister of foreign affairs for the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, analyzes Vietnam's relationship with the United States and the surrounding nations, and outlines the country's strategy for economic growth.
  • Defense and Security
    TWE Remembers: The Fall of Saigon
    On April 30, 1975, the last U.S. Marines left Saigon. By nightfall, North Vietnamese forces seized control of the city, and South Vietnam ceased to exist. Anyone who lived through America’s exit from Vietnam—or who has relived it by watching the History Channel—knows that it was chaotic, ugly, and humiliating. The consensus at the time was that Vietnam had dealt a grievous blow to American foreign policy, one from which the country might not recover. Much of the argument for keeping troops in South Vietnam after the Tet Offensive in 1968 rested on a perceived need to protect America’s credibility. The assumption was that failure in Vietnam would cripple American foreign policy, not just in Asia but around the world. The thing is, history went in a different direction. Within four years of the fall of Saigon, China was at war with Vietnam, and the Soviet Union had begun its calamitous occupation of Afghanistan. Ten years out it was “morning in America,” and the United States was the dominant power in Asia. Sixteen years out, the Soviet Union joined South Vietnam on the ash heap of history. We now have normal relations with the communist government of Vietnam. China buys the Treasury notes that help us run a trillion dollar deficit. Vietnam, it turned out, hadn’t been a strategic or vital interest to the United States after all, even though policymakers and pundits had insisted otherwise for years. We wound down our presence in Vietnam grudgingly and slowly, and only after vehement protests at home that tore at our social fabric. When we did leave, however ignominiously, we found ourselves freed from a policy that had been economically, strategically, and politically draining. The global geopolitical reshuffling we feared turned out not to be so daunting after all. Indeed, we learned to use it to our advantage. Nearly sixty thousand Americans died in Vietnam. Hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese did as well. Cambodia became a killing field in a horrifying example of what people in my business euphemistically call “collateral damage.” One of the last Americans to die in Vietnam was Corporal Charles McMahon. He was a Marine from Woburn, Massachusetts. It’s a blue-collar town not too far from the historic battlefields at Lexington and Concord. Charles was killed in a rocket attack on Saigon’s Tan Son Nhut airport, less than twenty-four hours before the city fell. He was twenty-one. I sometimes wonder what might have been in store for Corporal McMahon and tens of thousands of others if the United States had taken Sen. George Aiken’s (R-Vt.) advice back in 1966 to “Declare victory and get out.” (Aiken actually said something else, but sometimes it’s what people remember you saying that matters more.) History, of course, doesn’t allow for do-overs. But it does offer lessons. I would take three from Vietnam. The first is that if a policy isn’t working and it is economically, strategically, and politically draining, change course. And the sooner the better. Pretending that things are going to get better when you know they won’t isn’t strategy. It’s wishful thinking. The second is that credibility in international relations is easier to recover than you think. Circumstances change, sometimes quickly, and countries care more about what you can do for them now than what you did to someone else before. The third lesson is to be prepared for the future to defy your expectations. It seldom sticks to the script we write for it.