Thailand

Although General Prayuth Chan-ocha’s meeting with President Trump, which was supposed to take place this week, has been postponed, Thailand’s relations with the United States still appear warmer now than at any time since the country’s 2014 coup. Back then, in May 2014, Prayuth and other officers ousted an elected government, headed by Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, which had been buffeted by street protests in Bangkok for months. This past April, the Trump administration issued an invite to General Prayuth for a White House visit. This was a break with the Obama administration, which had not hosted the coup leader in Washington, and which had kept some broader distance from Bangkok, reducing the size of joint military exercises, and taking other steps to curtail ties to the Thai junta. (Relations had been coming out of the post-coup freeze at the end of the Obama years, however.) In addition, even though Prayuth’s visit was delayed, Thai and U.S. officials, from the Department of State and the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, held a session of their strategic dialogue last week. Yet the reasons for a recent warming of U.S.-Thailand relations do not demonstrate that much has really changed in Thailand’s stagnant politics, or in the slow-growing Thai economy. For more of why the warming means little about actual events in Thailand, see my new article for Aspenia Online.

In July, according to spokespeople for Thailand’s government, Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha will visit Washington for a White House visit. The visit itself, likely in late July, will be a substantial diplomatic and image boost for Prayuth, who led the coup in May 2014 that deposed Thailand’s most recent elected government. The previous U.S. administration allowed Prayuth to meet with President Obama as part of a summit of Southeast Asian leaders in February 2016 held in Sunnylands, California (other authoritarian rulers from the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, including the leaders of Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia came as well), but it did not offer Prayuth a White House invitation, even though Thailand is a U.S. treaty ally. For more on my assessment of what will come from Prayuth's July visit, read my latest for World Politics Review. 

During the 1990s and early 2000s, when I was based in Thailand, Thai military officers frequently claimed to me that the armed forces, which along with the monarchy had been the central player in Thai politics for decades, were returning to the barracks. They would become apolitical, would no longer intervene in Thai politics, and certainly would never stage a never another coup—not since the disastrous situation in the early 1990s, when their coup attempt and takeover of government was rejected by protestors in Bangkok, leading to bloodshed and a royal intervention that shamed some in the armed forces. That fiction has now been totally annihilated, as the armed forces of course staged a coup in 2006 and then a much harsher putsch in 2014; that junta still runs the country, with a tight grip. But notably, the armed forces also seem to be lavishing funds on themselves. Zachary Abuza of the National War College regularly puts together the statistics on the Thai military’s current and potential future budget allocations, and his figures are a valuable resource. At a time when Thailand is considering cutbacks in its national health care service, the country’s economy remains probably the weakest in Southeast Asia, and the poorly managed education system—it produces too many graduates unprepared for jobs in a middle-income economy—is a major impediment to Thailand’s continued competitiveness, the military is consider a very substantial budget increase for … the military. Indeed, as Abuza and Agence France Presse report, the Thai military is requesting a 30 percent budget increase for next year. Overall, they note, if this budget allocation for next year is approved (and it is likely to be, in a country where dissent is punished harshly) the military’s budget would grow by about 50 percent just since the 2014 coup. [Jerome Taylor of AFP and Abuza’s figures can be found here.] Thailand has no external enemies, and it is relatively comfortable with China’s increasing regional dominance. To be sure, Thailand faces an ongoing and brutal insurgency in its southernmost provinces, as well as continued threats in Bangkok and other parts of the country—potentially from southern militants (who have rarely seemed to attack outside of the deep south) but also possibly from people angry at junta rule or international terrorist groups. But much of the military’s expenditures do little to upgrade the Thai army’s skills in the deep south anyway. The Thai navy plans to buy three submarines from China, even though Thailand is not involved in the main regional maritime dispute in the South China Sea, and it is unclear what the Thai armed forces will use the submarines for. The submarines are certainly unlikely to help stop the insurgency in the deep south. The budget increases thus makes one wonder what the armed forces are planning to use all this potential new cash for.

In September 2014, several months after the Thai armed forces’ May 2014 coup, I suggested that this coup would be different from other ones in more recent memory, like the 2006 Thai coup—and that the United States should consider that this Thai coup would be harsher and longer-lasting. This time around, it seemed the generals were not going to be willing to follow the 2006 script, in which they quickly handed power to a transitional government, and then allowed elections fairly quickly, without really destroying the power of Thaksin Shinawatra and his allies, or changing the structure of Thailand’s political system. I also believed that the generals, in 2014, would be willing to jail significant numbers of dissidents and major political figures. The U.S. government, I suggested, should be prepared for a long break before any resumption of real democracy in Thailand, which once had seemed like a democratic success story. So far, these predictions seem moderately accurate; in fact, I think I underestimated how serious the armed forces were about putting off elections, radically changing Thailand’s political system, and trying to ensure that the kingdom returns to a form of limited, managed democracy. The coup has indeed cemented the army’s grip on power, and the Thaksinite political parties who ruled Thailand for most of the years between 2001 and 2014 have been relatively quiet since 2014, a sharp change from the environment in the year after the 2006 coup. Dissent in Bangkok and central Thailand has been muted and/or crushed, though the bloody insurgency continues on in the deep south and there have been isolated incidents of violence in the capital, such as the recent bombing at a hospital in Bangkok. The armed forces have overseen a significant increase in the use of lèse majesté laws to silence critics, and the charter they oversaw could fundamentally weaken Thai democracy after elections are supposedly held next year. Unelected institutions will have enormous influence under the new charter, and it will be nearly impossible for any one party to gain control of the lower house of parliament, the way that pro-Thaksin parties did in the 2000s, even after the 2006 coup. The armed forces may indeed never really exit Thai politics, as some imagined they would in the 1990s and early 2000s. If anything, three years after the coup the armed forces are in an even stronger position than I imagined they would be back in 2014. Although I expected the army to change Thailand’s constitution to undermine any comeback attempts by a pro-Thaksin party and to weaken the power of political parties, period, I still expected them to hold elections earlier than 2018, now the target date for a vote. I thought that political pressure, built up from two decades of democracy in Thailand, would force the armed forces to pass a charter and hold elections within about two years—by the end of 2016, I expected. The U.S. government took a relatively tough line toward the coup, as well, which seemed to suggest that the junta would pay, internationally, for behavior that dragged out elections indefinitely. I also thought that the army’s disdain for many of the regions that supported Thaksinite parties would result in more protests against the junta in parts of the north and northeast. Instead, the armed forces have been ruthless in suppressing dissent—dissent against repressive policies and dissent over the continuing weak economic situation, which was noted in the World Bank’s March report on the faltering state of the Thai economy. The junta’s economic strategies, supposedly designed to shore up Thailand’s weak economic growth, have no clear plan for helping much of the north and northeast, and are unlikely to really improve Thailand’s competitiveness with neighboring states like Vietnam. Meanwhile, junta leader Prayuth Chan-ocha has recently suggested that elections could be put off even farther than 2018, if the country does not achieve a level of peace, although he remains unclear how that determination will be made. And the new U.S. administration has made clear that human rights will be a lower priority in U.S. foreign relations overall. This benefits the Thai junta, of course; Prayuth recently received an invitation for a White House visit, an honor he was not accorded by the Obama administration. Meanwhile, the new king has added further uncertainty into Thai politics, inserting himself into Thai politics in a relatively direct manner, as I discussed in a recent post. Altogether, a distressing situation three years after the coup, with no clear end in sight.

Since the coup in 2014, Thailand’s climate of free speech, already previously threatened by lèse majesté prosecutions and restrictions in online speech, has gotten far chillier. The country has fallen in the annual Reporters Without Borders press freedom index from 129th in the world in 2014 out of 180 surveyed countries to an abysmal 142nd in the world in the 2017 version of the index, only three places above South Sudan, a country at war with itself. Reporters without Borders noted that media freedom, globally, has never been so threatened in recent times, and this is certainly true in Southeast Asia more broadly as well. Since 2014, the Thai military has reportedly detained at least hundreds if not thousands of possible opponents for sessions in army camps, has overseen an environment in which even formerly independent media outlets are increasingly afraid to publish any criticism of the military and the prime minister, and has also overseen a growing number of threats against foreign reporters in Thailand. The British Broadcasting Corporation’s Southeast Asia correspondent, Jonathan Head, who is based in Bangkok, has had his passport seized, effectively preventing him from leaving the country, while he faces defamation charges after a story he did about alleged fraud in Phuket. But even in Thailand’s already repressive post-coup environment for the domestic and foreign media, the situation has become noticeably worse since late last year. According to Agence France Presse, prosecutions for cases related to lèse majesté already had been rising since 2014, the year of the coup, but in recent weeks the severity of charges for lèse majesté defendants also have increased. Earlier this week, a Thai court brought a wide range of charges related to lèse majesté and other related offenses against a prominent activist, lawyer, and writer, Prawet Prapanuku. If found guilty, he could face a maximum sentence of some 150 years in jail, which reportedly would be the longest sentence handed out in modern times for lèse majesté. Earlier this week, the Thai government also banned an event planned to be held at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand; the military has in the past three years banned other events at the club, which had tended to be an oasis of free speech even during past periods of military rule. Thailand’s rulers have even recently gone so far as to publicly announce, through the ministry responsible for the digital economy and society, that Thais are now prohibited from any interaction with three of the kingdom’s most well-known critics. These three are Thai academic in exile Pavin Chachavalpongpun, author in exile Andrew MacGregor Marshall, and historian Somsak Jeamteerasakul, who also lives in exile. According to the Guardian, “The [Thai] ministry statement said citizens should not follow, contact or share content from the trio on the internet or social media [even though all three do not even live in Thailand.] The letter added that people who disseminate their information, directly or indirectly, could be violating the country’s Computer Crime Act.” Why is Thailand’s media environment becoming even more constrained? In part, this further crackdown may be due to rising uncertainty within Thai domestic politics, as the military and the increasingly assertive king seem to be struggling behind the scenes for greater control in Bangkok. The crackdown could be due as well as the uncertain timetable for elections supposedly promised for next year. It may be due to a lingering fear among some Thai government officials that, despite changing the constitution to reduce the power of major parties, there is still some chance that a Thaksinite party, or the Democrat Party, will gain substantial control of the lower house of parliament in the next election; ensuring that independent media outlets have little space to report allows the military to dominate the daily discourse about domestic politics. The growing suppression of media voices may also be due, in part, to the lack of external pressure on the Prayuth government to take a more accommodating approach to free expression and free speech. The new U.S. administration has said little about the Thai government’s crackdown on the press, and the U.S. president recently invited Prayuth to a visit to the White House. Other nations in the region that historically have spoke up for press freedom, like the Philippines, are now led by presidents and prime ministers who also have taken a harsh approach to the independent media, and are unlikely to push for rights in other Southeast Asian nations. Given that the new U.S. administration, the leader of the Philippines, the secretary-general of ASEAN, and other major regional figures, are unlikely to pay more attention to rights in Thailand in the next two years, the crackdown on journalism in the kingdom will almost surely get worse.

Two weeks ago, David Streckfuss, a longtime analyst of Thai royal politics, wrote an incisive op-ed in the New York Times. It effectively summarized a growing current of analysis about how Thailand’s new king, Maha Vajiralongkorn, may upend the country’s already fractious politics. Before assuming the throne, the longtime crown prince was described, in many media outlets, as a playboy who had spent much of his recent time abroad. He seemed relatively unlikely to exert the same level of influence over Thai politics as his father, King Bhumibol, who assumed the throne at a much younger age, enjoyed high levels of public popularity, and worked assiduously to build the monarchy’s influence and image during his long reign. Prior to assuming the throne, the new king also seemed to be mending fences with some of his critics in the royalist/military establishment, and many analysts assumed he would closely cultivate the powerful junta leaders, including junta head Prayuth Chan-ocha, once enthroned. He also had worked to improve his public image among Thais, such as by leading massive bike rallies to celebrate his father---rallies that seemed designed to promote the new king as a unifying and responsible actor. As Kevin Hewison notes, the junta in turn “supported the [then] prince in getting his personal life in order” after 2014, before he became king. But over the past five months, the new king has begun throwing his weight around, potentially undermining the military’s grip, though doing little to restore democratic rule. He does not necessarily seem to be trying to make nice with the junta. As Streckfuss notes, in early April the king signed Thailand’s new constitution, its twentieth. The new charter, which had been approved in a public referendum during which the junta weighed in heavily to swing the vote, likely will dilute the influence of Thailand’s biggest political parties when new elections are finally held, force the lower house of parliament to have unwieldy political coalitions, and place greater power in the hands of a range of unelected institutions. The new king, however---who spent much of his time in Germany as crown prince---did not just sign the constitution, which is probably what military leaders expected. He also challenged the junta. He asked to make changes in the constitution before he signed it, including giving the monarch more powers over naming a regent and naming the monarch as the key arbiter in times of constitutional upheaval. The second change is important---it places the king, legally, at the center of potential political disputes. The junta agreed to the changes, even though they could decrease the military’s power, showing that the king---even this king---wields considerable influence, and potentially setting the stage for the monarch intervening more in politics. With this potential increasing presence in politics, the new king adds even more instability to a kingdom still divided by major regional and class divides, and hampered by the armed forces’ continuing deep presence in politics and the uncertainty about a return to civilian rule. Is the king preparing to exert even more power, a kind of “king’s coup,” as Streckfuss asks? If so, how would he wield it? Will he try to assume a role as a kind of anti-elite, populist force? (Streckfuss notes that the new king does not seem to have the same anti-Thaksin Shinawatra views as many elite Thais.) Will he use his influence to elevate his own military allies, doing little to change the balance of power between military and civilian elites? Will he use the power simply for personal gain?

North Korea continues to evade UN sanctions designed to prevent its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) development by embedding its agents and intermediaries within the international trading system, according to the latest assessment of the UN Panel of Experts set up to monitor North Korean compliance with international sanctions. In fact, North Korean sanctions evasion has largely eviscerated the intent and impact of UN sanctions resolutions designed to block international financial and material support for North Korean nuclear and missile development efforts. Aside from the obvious Chinese loophole, the assassination of Kim Jong Nam has shone a bright light on another major portal for North Korean illicit actions and sanctions evasion: Malaysia. The visa-free access to Malaysia that North Korean citizens have enjoyed until it was rescinded earlier this month following the murder of Kim – the half-brother of the isolated regime’s leader, Kim Jong Un -- had provided Pyongyang with a base for both illegal procurement and financing activities that have enabled it to import sensitive materials and finance its WMD development. The Panel of Exports report identifies Glocom as a North Korean front company that relies on an extensive international commercial network to market radio communications equipment for military and paramilitary organizations. More importantly, Glocom is a contact point for Pan Systems Pyongyang, an international firm that has played a major role in procurement and financing of sensitive and dual-use goods on behalf of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. As part of its investigation, the panel identified two Malaysian-based companies, International Golden Services Sdn Bhd and International Global Systems Sdn Bhd, which have served as front companies and contact points for Pan Systems Pyongyang in Malaysia.  Earlier this week, local media reported that Malaysian police had taken preemptive action against the two entities “to ensure that Malaysia is not used for activities detrimental to national security.” ’Prominent regional arms fairs’ The Pan Systems Pyongyang network includes offices in Malaysia and China that were used to procure components and sell completed systems through relationships with suppliers in China and Hong Kong. North Korean citizen Ryang Su Nyo with support from Pyun Won Gon, Kim Sung Su, Kim Chang Hyuk, and others directed these activities. According to the panel, the network was able to build up “significant international recognition including through participation in prominent regional arms fairs and selling high-end arms and related materiel in multiple countries.” The panel asserts that the network was coordinated by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Reconnaissance General Bureau, which has been responsible for some of North Korea’s most notorious provocations. Although the UN resolutions have highly restricted North Korea’s access to the financial system on paper, the report suggests that these sanctions have not affected the ability of North Korean networks such as Pan Systems Pyongyang to finance its operations, asserting that the network maintains bank accounts in China, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Middle East. By conducting financial transactions under the names of its affiliates such as Pan Systems Singapore, the company has been able to maintain sufficient financial access to the international financial system that it was able to transfer funds to a supply chain of more than twenty companies in China, and has also used front companies to conduct transactions via Hong Kong-registered companies that were cleared through U.S. correspondent banks in New York. Suez arms interception The Panel of Experts report also provides details on the interception in the Suez Canal of the Cambodian-flagged and North Korean-crew piloted Jie Shun in what it categorizes as the “largest interdicted ammunition consignment in DPRK sanctions history,” superseding the 2013 interdiction of the North Korean flagged Chong Chon Gang ship that was loaded with vintage Cuban munitions and airplane parts. The interdiction of the Jie Shun by Egypt revealed a cargo from North Korea through the Suez Canal containing 30,000 PG-7 rocket propelled grenades (RPG) and related sub-components shipped in wooden crates concealed under 2,300 tons of limonite (iron ore). The Jie Shun evaded detection by cutting off GPS during most of its journey, with the exception of transit through heavily trafficked straits and ports. The shipment from Haeju in North Korea to an undisclosed Middle Eastern destination were falsely labeled as “assembly parts for an underwater pump,” and the bill of lading showed the address of the “Dalian Haoda Petroleum Chemical Company, Ltd.” Finally, the Panel of Experts report provides an initial assessment of the latest front in North Korean sanctions implementation through monitoring of coal and iron exports to China. The panel finds that North Korean coal and iron ore exports to China have continued to increase year-on-year despite adoption of new UN Resolutions in March and December 2016. In fact, North Korea’s January exports of coal amounted to one-fifth of the UN-mandated quota for 2017, leading to a February announcement by the Chinese ministry of commerce that it would ban imports of North Korean coal for the rest of 2017.  This earned Beijing a rare rebuke from Pyongyang, who accused China of going along with North Korea’s enemies to "bring down its social system." But the pattern to date shows that enforcement of past Chinese announcements has not had a decisive effect on North Korean trade. Instead, whack-a-mole efforts by the international community have come up short, when some countries continue to enable North Korea to evade sanctions, embed its international supply chains in the global system, and defy efforts to squeeze North Korea into compliance with international nuclear norms. A version of this post originally appeared on Forbes.

The three southernmost provinces of Thailand, near the Malaysian border, have been battered by an insurgency dating, in its current iteration, to 2001. More than 6,500 people have died as the insurgents’ actions have become increasingly brutal: setting off bombs near hospitals, beheading victims, and murdering families and children. Since August 2016, the Thai insurgents also have begun trying to strike with bombing attacks nationwide, threatening a large-scale civil conflict in the kingdom. Making matters worse, a significant risk exists that the insurgency will be infiltrated by foreign militants, particularly from the self-proclaimed Islamic State, which has recruited over one thousand Southeast Asians to travel to territory held by the Islamic State in Syria. Successive Thai governments have compounded the problem in the south. The Thai military has used brutal tactics, further alienating many southerners. These tactics have not only helped fuel the insurgency, but they have also fostered a mindset of impunity within the entire culture of the Royal Thai Army. Units from the south have subsequently deployed in Bangkok and other parts of the country where their members have committed abuses. Torture and arbitrary detention, practiced in the south for more than a decade, have become common strategies in dealing with antigovernment protestors nationwide. Thai generals who played a major part in developing the southern policy have risen to top command posts and were leaders of the 2014 coup. The intensification of the southern insurgency and Thailand’s general political regression has come at the same time that the United States is attempting to deepen its strategic relations with Southeast Asia as part of the “rebalance to Asia.” Thai governments, which once led Southeast Asian security and diplomatic alliances, have taken a less active role in the region and Thailand has become a less reliable partner in counterterrorism, combating human trafficking, narcotics interdiction, and other U.S. priorities. Moreover, the cultural divide between the Royal Thai Army and U.S. military officers has grown as control over economic policymaking in Thailand has increasing shifted into the hands of a few generals who have shown little ability to manage Southeast Asia’s second-biggest economy. The United States has a significant stake in seeing the insurgency ended and Thailand’s political regression reversed. To that end, the United States should work with the Thai government to help adopt a new approach to the southern insurgency. For more of my analysis of how Thailand and the United States should approach the southern insurgency, see my new CFR Discussion Paper: A New Approach to Thailand’s Insurgency.

Thai King Bhumibhol Adulyadej’s death was long anticipated, but it still came as a profound shock to Thailand. When it was announced, vast crowds gathered in towns and cities to weep and pay homage to their monarch, who had reigned for seven decades. Thailand’s stock market has fluctuated and the country has entered a period of uncertainty. Most Thais have never known any other king, and Bhumibhol inspired great devotion during a time of enormous political and economic change. During his reign, Thailand was transformed from a poor country into Southeast Asia’s second-largest economy. For more of my analysis of what happens after King Bhumibol’s reign, see my new piece for Project Syndicate.

As Thailand mourns the death of King Bhumibol, the ninth king of his line, the ruling junta has announced that the crown prince will eventually be enthroned as Rama X. However, it also announced that there will be a transitional period in which the monarchy is run by a regent, rather than the crown prince. The junta has announced that the regent will be 96-year-old former prime minister Prem Tinsulanonda, the head of the former king’s council and an archroyalist. Although the news of the appointment of a regent surprised many Thailand observers, including myself, it should not be shocking that the person chosen was Prem. Prem’s time as prime minister is viewed by many Thais as a successful one, since he oversaw high economic growth, was believed to be personally free of corruption, and appointed capable technocrats to head up many ministries. Not a few Bangkok elites yearn to return Thailand to Prem-style rule, in which military and political elites manage the country, allowing a veneer of free elections but keeping most important ministries in the hands of unelected actors. But Prem is also widely disliked by many rural Thais, who view him as committed to maintaining Bangkok’s iron grip over the country, even if that means subverting democracy. Former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, popular among rural Thais, has repeatedly made oblique allegations that Prem played a central role in the 2006 coup that ousted Thaksin’s government. What’s more, the period of waiting for a new king, and the prospect of Prem as regent, suggests that there are deep divides within the palace and the military establishment about the next king. Having Prem serve as regent would allow Thais to accept the new king, who is not beloved, and might also allow the military to solidify its control over the next monarch. For a more extensive discussion of the royal succession, and the forces that led up to it, see one of my previous posts, a review of journalist Andrew MacGregor Marshall’s important book on the Thai monarchy.

To an outsider, an obituary of King Bhumibol Adulyadej might read like one of Queen Elizabeth II, another long-reigning monarch who became a symbol of her country, especially during times of massive political and economic transition. During his staggering seven-decades-long rule, Thailand’s economy boomed and achieved middle-income status, the country took fragile steps toward democracy, and a treaty alliance was cemented with the United States. But Bhumibol Adulyadej’s death may set off shockwaves in Thai politics that the eventual passing of the British queen will not. Also setting the Thai monarch apart is the development of a personality cult that has made it difficult, particularly within Thailand, to separate fact from fiction about his life. (For an excellent analysis of the king’s life up to the mid-2000s pick up Paul Handley’s The King Never Smiles). Most Thais have not known any monarch other than Bhumibol, the ninth of his line of kings. Fear over what his death would bring for a country rattled by an insurgency in the south, recurring violence in Bangkok, and deep political rifts, has been looming for nearly fifteen years. The king’s declining health was always a major unstated rationale for the growing chaos in the kingdom and the return of military dominance over Thai politics. Fore more on my analysis of the mixed legacy of King Bhumibol, read my new CFR Expert Brief.

Rachel Brown, Lincoln Davidson, Gabriella Meltzer, David O’Connor, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Thailand detains Hong Kong democracy activist. Thai authorities detained Occupy Central organizer Joshua Wong for twelve hours earlier this week and denied him entry to the country. Wong, who is nineteen, was visiting Thailand to address students in Bangkok. Following his return to Hong Kong, Wong claimed that the Thai government had detained him because it had been directed to do so by the Chinese government. Over the last year, a Swedish citizen who sold books critiquing the Chinese Communist Party and a Chinese journalist who fled to Thailand seeking asylum both disappeared in Thailand, only to reappear months later in the custody of Chinese authorities. With these disappearances in mind, Wong said he feared being similarly handed over to Chinese authorities. 2. Afghanistan to receive $15.2 billion in foreign aid. This past week, the European Union (EU) and government of Afghanistan co-hosted the Brussels conference on Afghanistan. The meeting convened over seventy nations and thirty international organizations to reaffirm their political and financial commitment to Afghan peace, state-building, and development. The governments in attendance agreed upon a donation of roughly $3 billion annually through 2020 on the condition that Afghanistan will address corruption, reabsorb failed asylum seekers, and improve human rights. This arrangement reflects the country’s current economic situation, where 70 percent of its annual income is dependent upon international aid, 42 percent of which is earmarked for defense. EU officials state that this deal stipulates that all unaccompanied minors will only be returned to Afghanistan if their families are identified and their “well-being is assured.” Cases of single women, elderly, and ill will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Although the EU is obligated under international law to give shelter to refugees, countries are allowed to send back “economic migrants” if their country of origin is deemed safe. Roughly 213,000 Afghans sought asylum in Europe during 2015. Many have voiced strong opposition to this arrangement, citing the record high civilian casualties in Afghanistan as the Taliban continues to launch offensives in some the country’s largest cities, including Kunduz. 3. Xi Jinping may delay choosing his successor. Chinese President Xi Jinping, the country’s most powerful party leader since Mao, seems prepared to subvert the tradition of choosing a successor before the beginning of the current leader’s second term. This convention, developed to minimize intra-party friction, has forced previous party leaders to accept successors they would not have preferred. By upending it, Xi could further consolidate his authority and extend his influence beyond his administration, but he also risks upsetting party leaders and raising fears that he may seek a third term. Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has already allowed him to attain unusual standing in the party, and there are rumors that he wishes to replace his premier with Wang Qishan, the public face of Xi’s anticorruption drive. An official decision will not be known before the National People’s Congress convention next spring, and internal factional divides are likely to sharpen as the contest unfolds. 4. Mongolian mortgages face an uncertain future. Two years ago, Mongolia’s economy boasted a growth rate of almost 8 percent. Housing prices in Ulaanbaatar in particular were inflated to nearly all-time highs of more than 20 percent, as buildings sprouted up to accommodate rural migrants moving en masse to the country’s capital. But now the generous mortgage program that helped spur construction there has also created a bubble in the affordable housing market. In 2013, the Mongolian finance ministry began offering commercial banks government funding to help underwrite mortgages of 5 or 8 percent. But the central bank discontinued the 5 percent rate last month, and just recently suspended funding for the 8 percent rate after finding that commercial banks were “misusing” the government funds. Mongolia has little choice but to end the program altogether, as funds for it have long since been used up and overall fiscal discipline is waning. However, doing so will have serious economic repercussions: the construction and housing sectors rely heavily on the artificial demand created by state-backed mortgages, and banks are already highly exposed to mortgages that may not be repaid if country-wide economic growth slows further—likely dropping to zero or negative in 2016. 5. New challenges emerge for Chinese projects in Pakistan. Stumbling blocks in the construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a $46 billion trade and investment initiative, have cropped up in the past few weeks. CPEC aims to connect the Pakistani port of Gwadar with China’s Xinjiang province by road and rail, and if completed as planned, it could provide Pakistan with a major economic boost. Over the next fourteen years, the projects associated with CPEC are expected to create roughly 700,000 new jobs and increase yearly GDP growth by 2–2.5 percent there. However, unrest in Balochistan province, through which much of the new infrastructure will pass, could threaten the corridor’s success. For example, a suicide bombing in August may have specifically aimed at undermining CPEC, and there is growing resentment among the local population over whether new projects will benefit their communities. To address security threats, Pakistan already deployed nearly 15,000 security personnel in June. China’s state-run Global Times has also weighed in on the risks of the project, with an article in mid-September stating, “the increasing cost of security is becoming a big problem in efficiently pushing forward the projects” and that “China may not want to put too much focus on the region.” But all hope is not lost; the project is attracting renewed international attention as Iran has conveyed its interest in joining too. Bonus: Fukushima’s unwitting bovine science heroes. In the aftermath of the 2011 Fukushima disaster, the Japanese government ordered all livestock within a twenty-kilometer radius of the damaged power plant to be euthanized. Because the area was designated a no-entry zone, owners could not have continued to feed the animals, so killing them first was seen as the most humane option. But some cattle owners resisted the edict, releasing their cows to roam free or returning two or three times a week to keep them alive out of compassion. Today, researchers have also benefited from these farmers’ benevolence: they maintain 200 of these cattle several miles northwest of the defunct power plant to study the effects of long-term, low-dose radiation levels on large mammals. The scientists visit every three months to collect samples from the cows, and so far have found no increased incidence of leukemia or cancer but have noticed mysterious white spots appearing on many of the animals. Though many ranchers hope animal husbandry will one day return to Fukushima, that is far from a reality at least for now.

Why Trade Deals Matter for Workers Everywhere The shift of low-skilled manufacturing jobs from industrialized to emerging economies helped lift millions out of poverty over the past few decades (even as it displaced Western workers). But a new study of Ethiopia’s growing manufacturing sector shows that while factory jobs raise wages throughout the economy, the benefits for workers are mixed. Compared to a control group of self-employed and informal sector workers, those employed in the new factories did not earn more and faced significantly higher health and safety risks—exposed to chemicals and injuries from unsafe working conditions. These findings show why trade agreements matter. By incorporating labor and environmental standards and mechanisms to enforce these rules, they can improve the livelihood of workers in all places. Thailand Opens Anticorruption Court Inaugurating a new anticorruption court on Monday, Thailand’s junta leader, Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, reaffirmed his promise to eradicate corruption over the next twenty years. Yet studies show that separate anticorruption courts are not always effective. These bodies often suffer from the same limits as regular courts, including lack of judicial independence, few qualified staff, and long backlogs. And specialized or not, prosecutors or judges are often reluctant to go after elites, leading mostly to convictions of low-level officials. More important for rooting out corruption are making government procurement more transparent, and partnering with international organizations that have the resources and clout to tackle large-scale grand corruption. Despite Corruption, Afghan Government Asks for More Aid The deep-seated corruption plaguing Afghanistan overshadows the Ashraf Ghani government’s recent appeal to the United States and other donors for fresh funds. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), a U.S. watchdog agency, estimates that billions of aid dollars have disappeared over the past fifteen years. The United States contributed to this graft by failing to monitor how donations were spent, funding NGOs and contractors that accepted bribes and pocketed funds. This time, the U.S. government says it will make assistance dependent on anticorruption reforms. President Ghani claims his administration has already taken steps to root out graft—Ghani himself became the first senior official to comply with a U.S.-backed effort to disclose public officials’ assets, and his administration has fired hundreds of judges and prosecutors, many on corruption charges.