Thailand

Revellers take part in New Year celebrations in Hong Kong's Times Square. (Tyrone Siu/Courtesy Reuters) Liz already handled the top stories of 2010, so how about a few predictions for Asia for 2011. Of course, predicting is always an inherently dangerous game, so don’t bet your fortune on any of these. Or at least, if you do, don’t come after me. 1.   China-US relations will become even more touchy. (Or tetchy?) With the run-up to the leadership change in Beijing in 2012, I think it’s unlikely that Beijing is going to back significantly off of its harder-line, and sometimes confusing, policy-making shown in 2010. There may be some concessions to better relations with the United States and China’s neighbors, such as China’s supposed recent mediation with North Korea, but don’t expect a wholesale shift back to the charm offensive of the early 2000s. And China’s behavior will continue to push Asian nations – most notably, Vietnam, but also others – into the arms of the Obama administration. 2.   Aung San Suu Kyi will be locked up, limited,  or attacked again. No way will the Burmese junta allow Suu Kyi to repeat the early 2000s, when she was released from house arrest and toured the country, drawing crowds in the tens or even hundreds of thousands. With Burma, you can rarely go wrong expecting the worst from the regime. 3.   Thailand will go farther downhill Thailand is like an aging actor. You see him in a film, with his makeup and airbrushing and special effects, and he looks pretty good. Then, you run into him on the street, without the makeup, the CGI, the airbrushing, and you realize he really doesn’t look so great after all. Thailand has been riding its fine policy-making of the past, its generous approach to foreigners, its previous international reputation, and the global respect for Abhisit and the king, as long as it can. Behind the makeup, there’s a looming political divide, an educational morass  (Thailand is falling behind regional neighbors like Vietnam and others in English and other basic skills), rampant drug use among young men and some women, a potential succession crisis, and a military with too much power. Sure, foreign investors who are there will stay, particularly the Japanese, but in the long run, this actor needs to remake himself to survive. 4.   Indonesia will continue its strong growth, and perhaps even challenge India or China’s growth rates. Despite continuing challenges with graft and other disincentives to foreign investment, Indonesia boasts the demographics, the increasing stability, and the resources to continue its strong growth rates. Foreign Policy named the Indonesian economy one of the underrated stories of 2010, and it could well be so again next year. 5.  North Korea will embark upon more brinkmanship, further upsetting the fragile balance in Northeast Asia. You have to have some easy predictions to look good. This is like betting that Ichiro will hit .300 or the Redskins won’t make the playoffs.

A man looks a screen outside a United Overseas Bank branch in Singapore's financial district on October 31, 2008. (Vivek Prakash/Courtesy Reuters) The Great Foreign Policy Reveal Chalk up 2010 as the year when Chinese rhetoric met reality. Five years worth of political talk about win-win diplomacy, peaceful rise, and a harmonious society unraveled quickly over the course of the year. China seemed to make all the wrong choices: cybersecurity attacks on multinationals and others, embargoes on rare earths, bullying Southeast Asia, ignoring and then defending North Korean aggression, demanding apologies from Japan and South Korea for Chinese-induced military spats, and the country’s greatest diplomatic embarrassment—attacking (and keeping in prison) Liu Xiaobo, the only Chinese Nobel Prize winner who still wants to live in the country. China’s takeaway from these disastrous diplomatic developments ought to be “actions speak louder than words.”  Indeed, recent reports suggest that China is finally exerting some pressure on North Korea. Let’s hope this is the beginning of a trend. We’re Baaaaaaaack… Chinese missteps (see the Great Foreign Policy Reveal above) paved the way for the United States to reengage more significantly in Asia. Without a clear, overarching strategy of its own, the Obama administration was quick to respond to the region’s growing concern over Chinese military and economic assertiveness, as well as Beijing’s reluctance to acknowledge the clear security threat posed by its erstwhile ally North Korea. President Obama, along with Secretaries Clinton and Gates, crisscrossed East, South and Southeast Asia strengthening old ties and establishing new ones. Many Chinese analysts have accused the United States of undermining China’s relations in the region. They have missed the point: U.S. strategy is not the problem; it is China’s own foreign policy that needs to be rescusitated. Korea crisis While outside analysts struggled to figure out what it all meant, the Korean peninsula moved from one crisis to the next. In March, the South Korean Cheonan warship was sunk, apparently by a North Korean torpedo. The North Koreans revealed a new uranium enrichment facility in November.  And later that month, the North shelled Yeonpyeong Island. Was all of this calculated strategy, tied to the ascension of Kim Jong Il’s son Kim Jong Un or another example of DPRK brinksmanship in an attempt to bring the United States back to the negotiating table? The only question more vexing is: what is China, North Korea’s only friend, going to do about its recalcitrant neighbor? Despite some public debates about why China supports the North and Wikileaks cables suggesting Beijing could live with a peninsula reunified under the South’s control, the answer seems to be: not much. Beijing has continued to shield the North and called for all sides to return to negotiations. India’s Bumpy Road President Obama arrived in Delhi proclaiming that U.S.-India relations were one of the “defining partnerships of the 21st century.” While the trip may have been short on major deliverables like the ground-breaking nuclear deal, Obama did promise to support India’s bid for a UN Security Council seat and the two countries agreed to cooperate more closely on maritime, new energy, and cyber issues. The biggest stories, however, were domestic. Unrest worsened in Kashmir and the Naxalite insurgency remained strong. Despite continued strong Indian economic growth, shoddy construction threatened to overshadow the Commonwealth Games (though in the end they went relatively smoothly). Looking ahead, the continuing scandal over the sale of airwaves to cellphone operators may yet derail the ruling Congress Party . Thailand’s Uncertain Future Red shirt protestors, many from the countryside but also supported by the urban working class, occupied large portions of central Bangkok in opposition to the removal of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and what they saw as the domination of the country by the elites. After several months of negotiations, the government launched a crackdown that resulted in the death of at least 90, the dispersal of the protestors, the arrest of numerous red shirt leaders, and a state of emergency. While the Prime Minister has promised political reconciliation, controls on the press, universities, and opposition politicians continue. As our colleague Joshua Kurlantzik noted in several blog posts throughout the unrest, deep regional and class divides threaten the country’s economy and democracy: “If Bangkokians continue to dominate all elite institutions, and there is not a real federalization of political power, expect the anger to build up again.” China’s Nobel Dilemma The brilliant and modest—not to mention imprisoned—Chinese scholar-turned-activist Liu Xiaobo only gained in stature when he declared his newlyawarded Nobel Peace Prize “first and foremost for the Tiananmen martyrs.” Beijing had a clear choice: turn Liu’s win into an opportunity to begin a dialogue on political reform—as Liu himself had suggested —or simply downplay the significance of the award. Yet with a stunning lack of political acumen, Beijing chose a third path, attacking the Nobel Committee as “a bunch of clowns” and proclaiming the award “a western plot.” Efforts to rally other countries behind a boycott of the Nobel ceremony resulted in a coalition of the weak and ugly. It was yet another opportunity lost for Beijing to take the high road; instead China’s leaders managed to exceed everyone’s worst expectations. First Steps in Burma/Myanmar? Across the border, China’s neighbor Burma/Myanmar was enduring its own political travails but chose a different course. Long-suffering Burmese Nobel Peace prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi was released after years of living under house arrest, and the country held its first general election in two decades. While no one believes the elections were the real deal, they may pave the way for improvement the next time around. The country is plagued by militarized ethnic conflict, its GDP per capita is among the lowest in the world, and the political system is rife with corruption. Perhaps the “newly elected” government will try to legitimize itself by tackling these challenges; we’ll have to wait and see. The battle over the Internet Google’s January announcement that it had been hacked set the tone for a very contentious year in U.S.-China relations. Soon after the Google bombshell, Secretary Hillary Clinton declared in a widely publicized speech that the United States stood for “a single Internet where all of humanity has equal access to knowledge and ideas.” The Chinese responded that its citizens had free access to the Internet, and besides, “Though connected, the Internet of various countries belongs to different sovereignties,” —meaning what we do to control the web is our own business. Controlling the web in China, however, continued to be a challenging game of cat and mouse. The popularity of new platforms—the microblog weibo—and netizens forcing the government to address publicly a prominent case of nepotism (“My dad is Li Gang”) and the suspicious death of a local activist (Qian Yunhui) all strained the limits of China’s capacity to restrict the flow of information. 2011: Asia Back on Track Liz’s prediction for 2011: The United States, China, Japan, South Korea, India, and the rest of Asia will work hard to get their collective relationships back on track. No one wants to see the region sink into a perpetually tension-ridden, conflict-prone zone. Yet the “howto” will continue to remain a challenge. For many of the region’s most powerful players, capabilities as well as interests are evolving rapidly, and in some cases with little transparency. They will need to get out ahead of the curve and establish some acceptable rules of the road, not something that has happened easily in the past. Still, 2011 is the Year of the Rabbit—a sign noted for being talented, conservative, and wise. Hopefully we have enough rabbits in the region to get relations back on track. The Game Changer? Adam’s prediction for 2011: For at least a decade, China’s defense spending has increased by double digits. Yet, you could be forgiven for thinking that it is all coming to fruition this week: Chinese officials suggested that they would launch their first aircraft carrier next year; Admiral Robert Willard, the head of Pacific Command, confirmed that the DF-21D (the world’s first long-range, land-based “carrier killer” ) has reached “initial operational capability”; and pictures of the J-20, a new stealth type fighter, surfaced on the Internet. Much remains unknown about Chinese intentions and the actual capability of these weapons, but Adam is pretty confident about this prediction for the next year: there will be growing worry about Chinese military power in the Western Pacific, making Liz’s prediction all that more important—leaders in the region are going to have to work extra hard to get Asia back on track.

A woman holds a portrait of Thailand's King Bhumibol Adulyadej on his 83rd birthday in Bangkok. (Chaiwat Subprasom/Courtesy Reuters) The latest bunch of released Wikileaks cables, online at the Guardian’s archive, offer fascinating insight into Thailand’s opaque monarchy, and should put to rest, once and for all, any idea that the royals stay out of politics except for occasions of national emergency, such as the bloodshed of 1992. Theoretically, Thailand’s monarchy is “above politics” – the royal institution does not involve itself in political life, and is theoretically a constitutional monarch, like Queen Elizabeth II. Of course, Thais and experienced Thailand watchers know this is not the case; Thailand scholar Duncan McCargo, at Leeds University, coined the term “network monarchy” to explain how the palace influences politics through a network of its supporters and loyalists. But the recent batch of leaked cables show in much more detail how directly the monarchy intervenes in Thai politics, and how much more regularly it intervenes than some Thai observers thought. The royals are hardly saving their powder for occasional instances of dire national emergency. In one cable, a former Thai prime minister, Samak Sundaravej, tells US officials that Thailand’s Queen Sirikit pushed for the 2006 coup against former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, and also backed anti-government protests by groups that had demonstrated against Thaksin. In another, senior Thai officials tell American diplomats that Thailand’s king “explicitly told [army commander] Anupong Paojinda not to launch a coup” in 2008, two years after the previous putsch. Though these cables will be blocked from servers in Thailand, and Bangkok-based newspapers and bloggers will refer to them without referencing the royal family, for fear of being charged with lèse majesté, undoubtedly many Thais will find out about them, just as they have found out about most other stories about the royal family. Of course, Thailand’s government will officially ignore them. But eventually, it will have to address their substance. In yet another cable, senior Thai officials express dismay to the US ambassador at the eventual transition to Thailand’s crown prince, whom they hint is flighty, womanizing, and unsuited to rule. When he finally takes over the palace, if Thailand has not crafted a better way to contain the monarchy’s influence, there could be major trouble.

Anti-government "red shirt" protesters hold a picture of Thailand's King Adulyadej in central Bangkok. (Sukree Sukplang/Courtesy Reuters) In the Asia Sentinel this week, Thai academic Pavin Chachavalpongpun has written a fascinating article entitled “Anti-Monarchy Sentiment Grows in Thailand.” In it, he outlines how several leaders of the red shirt protest movement believe that as many as ninety percent of their followers now may be anti-monarchists. This number seems a bit unrealistic to me. From my own conversations with red shirt leaders and supporters, I still think the majority of them respect the current king, Bhumibhol Adulyadej, though they (like most Thais) have grave concerns about his successor and about the influence of the conservative Queen Sirikit after the passing of the king, who is now essentially living in long-term care. But as Pavin notes, there is likely growing anti-monarchical sentiment in Thailand because of the politicization of the crown, and this sentiment creates a perverse cycle. In the name of protecting the monarchy, the government and the military – which now increasingly dominates the government – have unleashed a vast and often ridiculous campaign against any speech that could be construed as the slightest critique of the crown. They have done so even though the king himself has said that he should not be above criticism and even though in previous decades the palace was hardly as protected from criticism. Thailand now bans over 100,000 websites, many for allegedly insulting the palace, though the definition of an insult or critique is so broad as to be useless. There is still virtually no definition of exactly what constitutes criticizing the crown, as Pavin notes. And there probably will never be, since the broad nature of lèse majesté laws makes it easier to arrest people. Even some senior government officials privately realize that this witch hunt has gotten out of hand and threatens to badly tarnish Thailand’s reputation. Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva often does not seem to even be in control of anti-monarch crackdowns. Speaking at our offices in New York earlier this year, the prime minister talked of Thailand’s commitment to media freedom, but later he seemed taken unaware that the authorities had arrested one of the Thai media’s most prominent online editors on a thin charge of critiquing the crown. But the cycle is operating, running out of control. Because of the politicization of the crown and the crackdown, average people become somewhat more anti-palace. The government can then use this as an excuse to crack down further, arguing (as it once did with communism) that there are anti-monarch elements hiding throughout Thai society that need to be ferreted out. This further crackdown then inflames average people more, and potentially makes anti-monarch sentiment worse. And so on. Perhaps the only person who could stop this cycle is the king himself. But given that he essentially put himself out for criticism in the past and still the Thai government refused to allow any discussion of the palace, he is not likely to try again.

The decline of democracy in some of Southeast Asia’s most important states does not only affect the citizens of those countries. The decline has a kind of knock-on effect, in which it also undermines the possibility for democratic change in other countries in the region. Thailand and Burma today provide a clear example of this phenomenon. In the late 1990s, the last time there was a Democrat government in Thailand, the Chuan Leekpai administration pursued some of the most liberal policies toward Burma in Thai history. Thailand at that time did not support Western sanctions on Burma, but Chuan and other members of his government were willing to criticize the junta, to offer moral support for the Burmese democracy movement, and push ASEAN to take a tougher line on the Burmese regime. They could do so in part because of Thailand’s own democratic credentials at the time – it had recently passed a reformist constitution and had entered into probably the freest era in modern Thai history, a time when it seemed unlikely the army would return to power in Bangkok. Fast forward to 2010. Four years after the 2006 coup in Thailand, the military is firmly entrenched in power in Bangkok, with new army chief Prayuth Chan-Ocha, a royalist hard-liner, dominating the government from behind the scenes. Another coup is not out of the question, depending on events over the next year. And with the military re-ensconced in power in Bangkok, Thailand’s policies toward Burma are unlikely to revert to the liberalism of the late 1990s. True, some members of this Democrat government in Bangkok, led by Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, retain sympathies for Burma’s embattled opposition, and are less interested in engaging Burma in order to boost their own commercial opportunities than former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra was. But with Thailand itself no longer a democracy, Bangkok has little moral leverage, and little credibility within ASEAN. So, over the past month the Abhisit government has taken several steps to placate the Burmese government, steps that never would have been taken in the late 1990s. Foreign minister Kasit Piromya has repeatedly suggested that, after Burma’s national elections in November (which are hardly going to be free and fair), the Thai government might consider forcing Burmese living in Thailand after fleeing Burma to return to the military-ruled country. Then, in mid-November, one of the biggest Thai construction companies announced plans to sign a major contract to build a port in southeastern Burma, a massive infrastructure project. Both of these actions will only shore up the power of the Burmese junta. But given how Thailand’s own politics have changed, what else could one expect? (Photo: Pornchai Kittiwongsakul/Pool/courtesy Reuters)

Southeast Asia is a much broader and more diverse region than Northeast Asia or (obviously) China, so it can be hard to keep up with events, particularly when there is so much going on in North Korea, Japan, China, and back here in Washington. So here are a couple recent events worth noting. 1. Indonesia resumes using the military for counterterrorism operations. There is a fine summary of this in the New York Times today.  This was anticipated after Jakarta created a new counterterrorism agency in August. However, it has serious risks, and I don’t really understand the upside. The military in Indonesia, even more than a decade after the fall of Suharto, remains poorly trained, corrupt, and persistently abusive. It also has limited counterterrorism skills, as compared to the elite police units that have been used for counterterrorism, quite successfully, throughout the 2000s. 2. Malaysia continues its crackdown on bloggers. Contrary to Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak’s speech at the United Nations General Assembly touting Malaysia as a model of moderation, in recent months his government has launched crackdowns on bloggers and cartoonists known for poking fun at government agencies and the prime minister himself. In early September, for example, the executive editor of the Malay Mail was charged with lying by making fun of Malaysia’s biggest power company through an obvious parody. The crackdown comes at a time when Malaysia is upgrading its ties to the United States, in part because of Najib’s admittedly progressive economic and trade agenda, and his skill at public relations. But this economic progressivism conceals a decline in political freedoms, and also conceals the fact that Najib is hemmed in by his own political position: He may want to promote an all around more liberal environment, but he needs the votes of power brokers in the ruling coalition, and the Malay majority, in a free election. 3. The Philippines announces that, despite a recommendation by a fact-finding panel of charges against several top police officials after the bungled bus hijacking in Manila in August, no one will actually face charges. Powerful people in the Philippines escape punishment for their (alleged) mistakes and illegal actions? I’m shocked, shocked. 4. Four people were killed in drive-by shootings in the south of Thailand earlier this week. While bombings in Bangkok get some international attention (see my post earlier this week), the killings in southern Thailand, which has become one of the deadliest conflict zones in the world, are almost totally ignored, since they dribble out a few at a time, don’t seem to impact Bangkok or the tourist hubs of Thailand, and (despite some claims to the contrary) are mostly unconnected to any broader Islamist battles. But in one respect the Thai south should get more attention: The spiral of violence there echoes a situation that could be repeated in the heart of Thailand itself, in which an initial revolt, combated by overly repressive government policies (under Thaksin), actually made the situation far more explosive. (Photo: Surapan Boonthano/courtesy Reuters)

On Tuesday, a bombing at an apartment building in Bangkok killed three people and wounded four others. This attack got only minimal coverage in the international media – largely because, over the past six months, bombings have become routine in the Thai capital, which in the past, despite its reputation for sleazy nightlife, was a very safe city. There have been dozens of blasts in Bangkok over the past year (and bombings in regional capitals in Thailand as well), and though the police sometimes round up suspects, usually they seem stumped. “It was likely to have been a bomb but we don’t know which kind and why it was there,” the Thai metropolitan police spokesman told the Straits Times of Singapore. Well, that’s encouraging. The bombs point out two larger issues. First, the lingering political stalemate in Thailand, and the lack of any resolution (see my previous post on “Soft Authoritarianism”) is driving some populist anger underground and toward violent methods. This violence then provides more reasons for the security forces to crack down – they still have not lifted the state of emergency in Bangkok and much of the Thai media operates in a climate now of total fear – which will only lead to a further cycle of violence. For a foreshadowing of this, look to southern Thailand, where locals’ radicalization was met by an overaggressive government response (under former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra), which then sparked worse violence. Second, the bombings raise the question of the Thai security forces’ competence. Since the military coup of 2006, the budget outlay on the military has expanded enormously. Thailand has few real external enemies, so one should imagine that this money is supposed to be spent on domestic counterterrorism and other methods of domestic control. Also, there is a state of emergency in force in Bangkok that gives the security forces enormous powers of search and arrest. If there were ever a situation amenable to cracking down on local violence, this would be it. Yet often the Thai security forces have no leads on bombers, no ideas of where to look, and resort to vast conspiracy theories to explain attacks. So, one has to ask the question, what are Thai citizens even getting out of this state of emergency, if it is not actually providing security or better police work? (Photo: Sukree Sukplang/courtesy Reuters)

In the Bangkok Post, one of the two leading English newspapers in Thailand, Thai academic Thitinan Pongsudhirak offered a sad commentary this week on the state of political affairs in the kingdom. I hate to hit someone who was just our guest, but at roughly the same time that Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva visited CFR in New York to proclaim his support for a free media and his government’s commitment to getting democracy back on track in Thailand, the Thai authorities arrested Chiranuch Premchaiporn, editor of the groundbreaking – and boundary-pushing – Thai website Prachatai. Hmm. Her crime, allegedly, was not taking down comments on the site that the government claimed were offensive to Thailand’s royal family. As Thitinan notes, Prachatai is left-leaning, but no more so than news and opinion publications in many other countries that are “receptive to dissenting opinions.” More broadly, Thitinan notes, the Prachatai case is emblematic of an emerging “soft civil-military authoritarianism” in Thailand in which new technologies are used to control the Internet and other forms of free speech, judicial interference is utilized to disbar opposition politicians, and the smooth Oxford-educated Abhisit presents a public face and a democratic facade to the world. In one reader comment after Thitinan’s piece the writer expressed surprise that someone educated at Oxford could preside over such draconian policies! It may well be, as some Thai friends believe, that Abhisit is not happy with the extent of repression currently hindering Thailand’s media, universities, and politicians; he may indeed not even be informed before the military and other authorities act against critics. Some allies of Abhisit insist he is the “good man,” the only person keeping the military and royalist forces, behind the scenes, from imposing even more draconian policies and potentially canceling the elections scheduled for next year outright. Perhaps. But he hasn’t taken any real public steps to support that view of him, so it’s impossible to confirm. Pushing to keep the heat off sites like Prachatai would be a start. (Photo: Sukree Sukplang/courtesy Reuters)

After a summer of repression, much of the fire of the red shirt protest movement in Thailand appears, on the surface, to have evaporated, though some red shirts have been holding symbolic protests every Sunday, and getting a small crowd. The fact that the ruling Democrat Party won a recent by-election and local elections in Bangkok have been touted by much of the domestic press in Thailand as evidence that the Democrats, and Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, have won the public trust once again. Strong recent economic growth reports have added to the improved mood in Bangkok. But this positive narrative is patently false. The Democrats already were strong in Bangkok – remember, the middle class supports the Democrats in Thailand, and the middle class lives in Bangkok – so it was hardly surprising that the Democrats took the Bangkok elections and a by-election for parliament in Bangkok. And in that by-election, the candidate of the red shirts’ party, who was in jail on charges related to the protest, still only lost by a relatively narrow margin. That’s right – he was in jail during the campaign – that kind of makes it tough to promote his positions to the electorate. As the blogger Bangkok Pundit has noted, the red shirts’ party got roughly the same percentage of the vote in the Bangkok by-election as they had gotten in previous parliamentary polls for seats in Bangkok, and the Democrats did roughly the same as well – despite the fact that they were facing off against a candidate who was in jail. What’s more, as a recent New York Times article captures, outside Bangkok, the mood in Thailand is of sullen resentment toward the government,  rather than any kind of shift. This resentment has been bottled up by tough security measures, and a high degree of online censorship, but it has hardly gone away. The continuing repression over the summer, too, has made it much harder for the government of Prime Minister Abhisit to actually pursue its supposed policies of national reconciliation, since at the same time it is alienating many of the people it is attempting to reconcile with. The tension will erupt again. L’shana tova. (Photo: Sukree Sukplang/courtesy Reuters)

In an increasingly competitive region, and a world where a prolonged economic slowdown looks more than likely, the countries of Southeast Asia, constantly worried about competing with China and India, would want to give themselves every advantage, right? Right? Especially if that means trying to lure the kind of high-tech investment that not only pumps in money but also can help a country upgrade the value and quality of its workforce, right? Right? Well, maybe not. Over the past year, as opposition movements or protests increasingly have threatened the governments of Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, and other countries in the region, many of these governments have taken a major step backwards on Internet freedom, even after previously vowing not to censor the Web the way they control traditional print and broadcast media. Thailand, somewhat surprisingly, has been the worst offender; though it is still nominally a democracy, it now reportedly bans more websites than any other country on earth, a truly remarkable achievement given the competition from places like China and Saudi Arabia. Prominent online editors and bloggers have been jailed. Bangkok blogger Bangkok Pundit recently reported that the Thai police have allotted some 120 people to search for online discourse that potentially defames the monarchy --  an enormous waste of the cops’ resources, and a sign of the paranoia and increasingly authoritarian style of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva’s government. Though Thailand’s stock market has stabilized, and a recent delegation of U.S. investors heard all the right promises from the government, increasingly strict Internet censorship, which poisons the political climate and, in the long run, will stifle Thai high-tech entrepreneurship, can’t be too reassuring to investors. Meanwhile, in neighboring Malaysia, the government, which has steadily retreated from the initial reforms of former prime minister Abdullah Badawi, seems to be taking a similar approach. Though former prime minister Mahathir Mohamad once promised that the Internet would remain totally free in Malaysia, in order to fulfill his vision of the country as a cyberhub in Southeast Asia, those promises are now being broken. As the Asia Sentinel recently reported, the Malaysian government is now considering launching Internet filters to block “undesirable websites,” which could effectively block the only sources of independent information on Malaysia available to Malaysians in the local language. As one senior member of the governing coalition recently said, the original censorship of traditional print and broadcast media have seriously harmed Malaysian youth, by curtailing their education and making them less inquisitive. For a country with severe outflows of domestic capital, major weaknesses in the quality of graduates produced by universities, and that desperately needs to attract new foreign investment, extending these blocks to the Internet seems extraordinarily unwise. Then again, just because it’s unwise has never stopped Kuala Lumpur before. (Photo: Bazuki Muhammad/courtesy Reuters)

Damir Sagolj / courtesy Reuters As international attention has shifted elsewhere following the dispersal of protests in Bangkok in May, the Thai government has quietly moved toward a kind of creeping authoritarianism – suggesting that, in reality, this is the type of approach to the red shirts Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva wanted to take all along. Though there is limited evidence of any continued unrest, the government recently announced it was renewing the state of emergency, which gives the prime minister wide powers to detain potential opponents without charging them for 30 days, and to all but impose martial law in some provinces, overriding the power of any government agencies. Meanwhile, Abhisit has publicly announced a plan to foster reconciliation between the bitterly divided sections of Thai society, a plan that is in many respects a façade. To oversee the reconciliation process, Abhisit appointed Anand Panyarachun, a respected former prime minister, who is known as an archroyalist and could not be more of a symbol of the Thai elite, making him suspicious to the red shirt movement. Meanwhile, the armed forces will appoint a new supreme commander in September, and that job is likely to go to Prayuth Chan-ocha, considered far more of a hard-liner than the current commander in chief. Then there is Thaksin. In exile, the former prime minister has not helped matters by seeming to back a more aggressive, and possibly violent, posture by the red shirts. Yet the Thai government’s insistence on tarring Thaksin – and other red shirt leaders – as terrorists only undermines any desire for real reconciliation. As the International Crisis Group notes in a comprehensive new report on Thailand, neither Thaksin nor any of the other red shirt leaders meet international standards of terrorism. Most foreign countries seem to agree: U.S. officials are extremely uncomfortable with the Thais’ use of the term, and have declined to publicly support Bangkok’s terming of the red shirts as terrorists. Many other nations have refused to cooperate with the Thai government’s demand to extradite Thaksin. For now, Abhisit’s government seems able to take these measures with little pushback. Despite some heated rhetoric, and occasional violent incidents since May, the red shirt movement has not, as some predicted, developed into a kind of insurgency. Websites critical of the government have been closed en masse –-Reporters Without Borders has chronicled a range of abuses against journalists-- creating a climate of fear and chilling discussion on all but the most groundbreaking sites. The United States, Japan, the European Union, ASEAN, and other outside actors, while expressing concern about the state of Thai politics, can only play a limited role in any reconciliation, and realize as much. In theory, Thailand is supposed to hold an election in the next year, which would be the ultimate test of whether any of Abhisit’s programs of reconciliation and attempts to reduce incomedisparity actually have paid off. But that poll, too, is looking increasingly unlikely.

Sukree Sukplang/courtesy Reuters Now that Thailand has resolved the short term crisis of the red short protestors occupying – and often destroying – parts of central Bangkok, the Thai government has launched a charm offensive designed to reassure foreign investors, tourists, American officials, and the international media that the country has returned to normal. Last week, Bangkok sent an envoy of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva to Washington to deliver this message to opinion leaders. In reality, the situation is far from normal – or, at least, a new normal is developing. The current round of Thai unrest is starkly different from the previous cycles in 1973, 1976, and 1992. For one, back then the main antagonists fostered reconciliation through a kind of gentleman’s agreement to exit the political stage, either through going into exile or another means. This time around, neither Abhisit, who was in charge during the bloody crackdown last month, nor former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, show any signs of willingness to leave the political stage. What’s more, while in the past the security forces generally were united in their ability to crack down upon and control the opposition, this time Thai leader cannot be so sure. The violence in April and May revealed that there are conflicting opinions within the security forces, including some troops likely to be sympathetic to the red shirt movement. Third, while in previous crises the opposition had little ability to get out their message because the government had put a lock on the mainstream Thai press, now the red shirt movement has their own websites, radio stations, and online social networks. The Thai government is trying to resort to old means of control, including blasting the foreign media, warning the domestic media to fall into line, and banning websites, but it is proving a far harder task now. Finally, and perhaps most important, while in the past reconciliation was possible largely because the monarch, Bhumibhol Adulyadej, was able to bring both sides together, now his unifying role is much diminished. The red shirt movement and the government and its Bangkok-based supporters do not hail from the same social background – a sharp contrast from, say, 1992, when both the protesters and the army leaders came from the royalist Bangkok-based middle class. As a result,  any kind of royally-sponsored reconciliation today is unlikely to have as great an effect, as many red shirts have lost some trust in the impartiality of the palace. The result, right now, is another looming explosion. The government has, quietly, moved toward outright authoritarian rule, jailing protestors and supposed sympathizers and cracking down on the media; some government allies are suggesting that Abhisit’s government should be allowed to retain power for almost another decade without calling a new election. The red shirt movement, meanwhile, has become more atomized, angrier, and, potentially, even more violent. If this is the new normal, I don’t want to see abnormal.

Stringer Thailand/Courtesy of Reuters In the new issue of Newsweek International, I have an article on the collapse of “Brand Thailand,” the global image of a country that once was viewed, not only as a paradise for tourism, but also as an example of successful democratization and economic development. Like a failing company, Thailand’s decline into internecine political conflict and economic stagnation was due largely to a series of poor decisions made by its “managers” – the political class that, between the 1960s and late 1990s, guided Thailand to stability and fast growth.

Photo Courtesy of Reuters/Yannis Behrakis As Thailand attempts to right itself after two months of political turmoil, the future of the country’s monarchy, probably its most important institution, will be a central part of the debate. In Sunday’s Boston Globe Ideas section, I published an article  that examines why monarchy remains relevant in modern democracies – and how these kings and queens can damage their images by appearing to favor one political party or faction. In Thailand, KingAdulyadej, for over sixty years the bedrock of Thailand’s political system, now runs that risk himself, which could damage his own legacy and make the transition to his successor even harder.

Photo courtesy of Reuters/Adrees Latif At this point, the crisis in Thailand has gotten so grave that it verges on civil war and threatens many things, including the democratic gains made over twenty years, the entire legacy of the reign of King Bhumibhol Adulyadej, and Thailand’s tourism-dominated economy. However, as both sides look for mediators to help resolve the crisis, there is an opportunity for the United States to play a constructive role. Despite the gains made by China in Thailand over the past decade, the United States remains the most important, and respected, outside actor. In 2006, the U.S. decision to essentially not condemn the coup made it easier for the military to take power, and proved a major mistake, as the coup resolved nothing and only made matters worse. Now, the Obama administration has taken a wise and more nuanced response. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell smartly decided, during a visit to Thailand, to meet not only with the government but also with some of the leaders of the red shirt protesters. Despite harsh criticism of this decision from the Thai government, it was the correct one. Though some of the red shirts have regrettably employed violent tactics, and though the government has the right to restore order and disperse protests, the broader social complaints represented by the red shirts – let’s remember, they turned out over 100,000 people in Bangkok not long ago – are not going to go away and need to be understood by the United States and other foreign powers. U.S. officials need to broaden their range of contacts in order to understand the dramatic political changes going on in Thailand, and to move beyond the coverage of the country in the English-language Thai media. (Foreign media tend to do a better job of getting a wider range of Thai voices, since they go outside Bangkok more and interview people in the provinces.) Seeking out a broader range of contacts will also show that the red shirt movement is not merely a tool of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Continuing a policy of only interacting with Bangkok elites would not be in the United States’ interest and, in the long run, would create the possibility that some Chávez-like tribune of the poor would rise to power and be virulently anti-American. Assistant Secretary of State Campbell will be returning to Asia in just a few days, with Thailand certainly high on his agenda. He should both endorse the Thai government’s need to restore order – after all, the White House could not let armed men roam around the streets of Washington, DC unchecked – and ignore the Thai government requests that he interact only with government ministers. He also should seek out moderate voices in the red shirt movement, as well as the most moderate and respected leaders who once clustered around Thaksin, like former MP Chaturon Chaiseng. He should also deliver a firm message to the Thai government that, unlike in 2006, the United States will more aggressively condemn any intervention in electoral politics – a coup, a judicial decision, or the like – just as the Obama administration condemned the coup in Honduras and the potentially rigged election in Iran. (This condemnation could include threatening to cancel Cobra Gold joint exercises, real public condemnation, and a reassessment of other elements of the U.S.-Thai relationship.) Though Thailand may not want to be seen in the company of those two countries, holding a consistent standard about the need for free elections allows the US to better defend its own positions.