Thailand

Thailand's red shirt protester holds pictures of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra during a rally at the Democracy Monument in Bangkok September 18, 2011 (Sukree Sukplang/Courtesy Reuters). In recent weeks, leading members of the Puea Thai government have made it clear that, in terms of Thaksin Shinawatra returning to Thailand, the question is not if but when. The Nation reported last week that Deputy Prime Minister Yongyuth Wichaidit called the former Prime Minister’s return “overdue” -- though he would not elaborate on how Thaksin would come back to the country, given that he is still wanted on criminal charges there. A blanket amnesty would be one way for the government to get Thaksin back. A recent reshuffle in the government, including in the Corrections Department, may be designed to smooth the way for either an amnesty or some kind of return in which Thaksin would not serve jail time. Several factors are pushing for Thaksin’s return. Though he publicly denies it, Thaksin himself clearly wants to return and to play a role in Thai politics from inside the country. He seems unable to contain himself from traveling around Asia and upstaging his sister Yingluck’s government, showing that he still has a great desire to play a political role. He also surely wants to recover more of his assets taken following earlier court rulings. But the desire for return does not just stem from Thaksin, though some Democrat Party supporters believe that. Among the core of Puea Thai and red shirt supporters, many ardently want Thaksin to return home. To survive, Prime Minister Yingluck certainly needs to please those core supporters, who were critical not only to Puea Thai’s electoral success in July but are also at the heart of those programs that deliver the party’s message to grassroots, that run community radio stations, and that promote Yingluck on her trips outside Bangkok. Most likely, it appears Thaksin will return as early as late 2011, in time for his daughter’s wedding. Unfortunately, his return likely will only spark a renewed cycle of political warfare. Although the Democrat Party, now in opposition, could focus their efforts against Yingluck’s policies, or on trying to revive their own grassroots organizations which failed badly before the July poll, Thaksin remains their most obvious target. He is the figure around which they can center all of their complaints about the government, and can stoke fear among the anti-Thaksin segments of the public. The atmosphere, then, will heat up throughout the Fall, as the Democrats are unlikely to turn their focus away from Thaksin. The opposition party will charge that Yingluck’s government is focused solely on Thaksin’s return and that ,when Thaksin returns, he will once again dominate Thai politics.  Thaksin is unlikely to back down. Some kind of clash seems inevitable.

Thailand's first female PM Yingluck Shinawatra receives the royal command appointing her as the country's new premier in front of a portrait of Thai King Bhumibol Adulyadej in Bangkok (Rungroj Yongrit/Courtesy Reuters). Over the past five years Thailand’s Lèse-Majesté law, by far the strictest in the world, went from being scarcely used to being used an extraordinary number of times annually. According to a group of Thailand scholars, statistics from the Office of the Judiciary show a 1,500% increase in Lèse-Majesté cases in the past six years. In addition, Thailand has in recent years broadened the law in order to prosecute Thais who have allegedly insulted the monarchy on the Internet, in blogs, and using social media; one U.S. citizen recently was arrested in Thailand for just such a “crime.” Lèse-Majesté, indeed, has become a political weapon -- perhaps the most potent political weapon in Thailand -- even though the king himself has said that he is not above criticism and seems to dislike the law. Royalists in the military, the bureaucracy, and the Democrat Party have used it to crush dissent. Striking back, the Puea Thai opposition and its allies  have also in recent years used Lèse-Majesté against their political opponents. Whatever the original purpose for the law -- which actually largely fell out of use in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, a time when the monarchy was much weaker, that original purpose has vanished today. The rising use of Lèse-Majesté has grown concurrentlywith increases in censorship of all types, as well as self-censorship in the print and online media in Thailand. Many Thais hoped that the July election of Yingluck Shinawatra and the Puea Thai party would mean a diminishing use of the Lèse-Majesté law, since Puea Thai’s members and followers have themselves had the law used against them many times. Allies of Yingluck say that she is personally sympathetic to trying to reduce use of the law and reform it in the long run. After her election, for example, bloggers posted an interview she had given in which she said that she did not want the law to be misused. But the first months of Yingluck’s administration have not given much hope for advocates of free speech in Thailand. She has done nothing to address the highest-profile cases of Lèse-Majesté, including that of a famous blogger named Daranee Charnchoengsilpakul, who is serving an eighteen-year jail sentence for Lèse-Majesté. The parade of Lèse-Majesté arrests has continued, including that of the aforementioned U.S. citizen. Meanwhile, Yingluck’s government promised two weeks ago to clamp down even harder than in the past on people using computers to allegedly defame the monarchy. A group of concerned scholars have submitted to Yingluck a public letter calling on her to review Thailand’s laws on Lèse-Majesté and on cyber crimes. They also have called on her to push for the release on bail of people facing Lèse-Majesté charges, many of whom are being held without bail. So far, Yingluck and her cabinet have not given any signs that they are taking notice.

Founder of WikiLeaks Julian Assange smiles as he arrives for his extradition hearing at Belmarsh Magistrates' Court in east London (Toby Melville/Courtesy Reuters). The recent releases of new batches of Wikileaks cables, many of which reveal the names of protected sources for American diplomats, has roiled diplomatic relations nearly everywhere in the world, and certainly made potential informants more scared of talking to U.S. diplomats. But the cache of cables available about Southeast Asia is among the largest, if not the largest, of any embassy. And recent weeks have seen the release of cables with major news stories, including: A cable interviewing Singaporean Straits Times editors and reporters who claim that the government applies significant pressure on them to take a rosy view of its policies. Some of the finest Straits Times’ reporters, frustrated by what they perceive as government pressure, try to remain in overseas bureaus, where they are much freer (and put out fine work) or simply leave the Straits Times entirely.  A cable in which the former U.S. ambassador to the Philippines Kristie Kenney (now in Thailand) denigrates current Philippine president Benigno Aquino III, then a Philippine senator and presidential candidate, as “diffident and unassertive.” Other cables by U.S. diplomats in the Philippines highlight an often-fraught relationship, one in which, despite deep cultural, historic, and economic ties, American officials remain exasperated at the failure of reform in the Philippines, and that exasperation sometimes sparks Filipino anger. Numerous cables by U.S. officials outlining rampant corruption in post-Suharto Indonesia – corruption putting the lie to the idea that burgeoning democracy in Indonesia is serving to reduce graft. In fact, as I have noted in previous posts, the early years of democracy in Indonesia actually seem to be creating a kind of decentralization of corruption, with more and more provincial-level and other lower officials able to put their hands out. Troves of cables chronicling the last days of the rule of Rama IX in Bangkok, including ones with information so sensitive anyone posting them in Thailand would be arrested. Some of the cables rank among the most insightful pieces of writing ever done on the Thai monarchy. Many of the cables are summarized at #Thaistory Blog. It remains to be seen whether these revelations, which are among the most sensitive and revealing of any Wikileaks documents out there, will permanently damage American diplomats’ range of freedom in Southeast Asia. But in region with plenty of secrets, and where most governments are not used to those secrets being aired, my guess is the State Department has suffered permanent damage.

A Thai investor walks past an electronic board displaying live market data at a stock broker's office in central Bangkok August 9, 2011 (Chaiwat Subprasom/Courtesy Reuters). A notable new entry on New Mandala points to the latest World Bank report on Thailand. In this announcement, the Bank upgrades Thailand’s economy from lower middle income to upper middle income, which is defined by average incomes of $3976 to $12275. The fact that Thailand’s economy has grown strongly for nearly a decade and poverty has been reduced, as New Mandala notes, clearly helps to account for the growing political awareness of the rural population, which has resulted in continued support for the various populist, pro-Thaksin parties. But it is also simply amazing that, despite the political meltdown of the past five years, and the bloody standoff in Bangkok last spring, Thailand has maintained its economic momentum. In fact, despite last year’s violence, Thailand’s economy grew by over seven percent in 2010. This resiliency is testament to the country’s ongoing strengths, even in the face of political chaos: A business-friendly tax regime, hospitality and services beloved by foreigners, a low-wage platform for manufacturing, and generally pro-investment governments. Thailand, in other words, has a reputation (based in some reality) that helps it glide through even the worst of its political problems. However that reputation has also allowed successive Thai governments to avoid hard economic decisions, most notably about how to upgrade the country’s workforce. Thailand’s educational system is horrific, and this lack of quality education is preventing the country’s economy from rising up the value-added ladder. Eventually, it will have to do so, as even low wages and a business-friendly environment will not be enough of a competitive edge. Yet neither Thaksin nor successive Democrat governments took serious steps to address Thailand’s skill deficit. New Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra also does not seem to understand the depth of Thailand’s educational deficit, and how this deficit -- even more than its political strife -- could put an end to Thailand’s long run of economic good luck. Yingluck has appointed Worawat Ua-apinyakul as education minister in her new cabinet, an MP who has neither the credentials nor the national respect to lead a meaningful overhaul of Thailand’s education system or of the ministry itself.

Thailand's former premier Thaksin Shinawatra greets journalists outside his home in Dubai (Jumana El Heloueh/Courtesy Reuters). This week’s news that, only one week after Thaksin Shinawatra’s sister Yingluck officially became prime minister of Thailand, the Thai government is working to rehabilitate Thaksin, does not bode well for Thai politics. The new foreign minister, who has little experience in foreign affairs but is seen as close to Thaksin, apparently has pushed to help Thaksin travel more freely, including to Japan, even though in theory he is a fugitive from justice in Thailand. Inside the Puea Thai Party, meanwhile, many sources say that Thaksin’s allies are pushing to have him return to Thailand by the fall or early winter, when his daughter is scheduled to be married. To be fair, Thaksin’s charges were hardly unbiased – he was charged with corruption by a court after being deposed by a coup, and in an environment in which the Bangkok elite, including the judiciary, were rabidly anti-Thaksin. It is possible that in a fair trial (which is almost an oxymoron in Thailand), he would be acquitted. Still, as I noted in my previous posting, whether or not Thaksin was mistreated in 2006 and afterwards, he – and his sister – have to have enough sense to realize that he remains a lightning rod that could scuttle Puea Thai’s efforts at fostering reconciliation. These efforts include Yingluck’s currying of favor with the palace and an apparent willingness to avoid army reshuffles, as well as to allow the military its ever-increasing budget requests. Right now, however, Thaksin, a natural politician who can never feel comfortable in exile, does not seem to realize that he could ruin his party’s own success.

Members of Thailand's new cabinet take a group photo at the Government House in Bangkok August 10, 2011. (Chaiwat Subprasom/Courtesy Reuters) New Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra is not exactly getting off to a great start in asserting her independence from her brother, exiled former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Thaksin was unfairly forced out of the country following the 2006 coup and further pressure on his allies. He is clearly the savviest politician in Thailand, but he also remains a lightning rod in the country whose continued influence over government, and possible return, are the main dangers that could cause renewed Bangkok street protests of the type that in 2006 helped spark a coup. No one ever thought that Yingluck, whom Thaksin, nearly two decades older, treated almost like a daughter, would be completely independent. After all, Puea Thai advertised Yingluck in part as a symbol of Thaksin, which they knew would resonate with voters in the North and Northeast. The campaign featured slogans like “Thaksin thinks, Puea Thai acts.”  Thaksin at one point famously claimed that Yingluck was his “clone.” But Yingluck needs to demonstrate a degree of independence to foster reconciliation, and to assuage fears among the army, the palace, and Bangkok’s urban middle classes. Her new cabinet, however, contains primarily close Thaksin allies, some of whom seem to have been handpicked by the former prime minister. The new foreign minister is Thaksin’s cousin and has little experience; the new commerce minister is a longtime Thaksin ally; the new defense minister is another close Thaksin ally. Some of these cabinet members do have international reputations and will be well-received in Thailand; certainly the new foreign minister could hardly be worse than the previous one, Kasit Piromya, whose over-the-top rhetoric and obsessive anti-Thaksin campaign distorted and embarrassed Thailand. And, to her credit, Yingluck steered clear of even more controversial appointments, such as naming cabinet ministers who hailed directly from the red shirt protest movement. But will the cabinet listen to Yingluck, or will the shots be called in Dubai and Brunei, where Thaksin has been spending growing amounts of time? For Yingluck, and for Thailand, the former is the only workable scenario.

Pro-democracy protesters scuffle with police during a protest march to demand universal suffrage and against rising property prices in Hong Kong July 1, 2011. (Tyrone Siu/Courtesy Reuters) The recent uprisings in Malaysia and Thailand, following on the heels of the Arab Spring, which has turned into the Arab Summer, have emboldened democracy advocates around the world. Some see the wave even reaching China, where in recent days there have been fresh protests in Inner Mongolia, southern China, and other regions of the country. But in reality the forecast for democratization is not so sanguine. Already, the revolts in places like Tunisia and Egypt are turning sourer, with the military and other elite actors reasserting their powerful position in society. Meanwhile, in other parts of the developing world, democratization actually has gone backwards over the past decade. In a piece in The National, I chronicle the decline of democracy in recent years, and argue that, Arab Spring and Summer notwithstanding, the future for democracy in the developing world is not bright.

A worker stands inside the shell of a wind turbine tower in the assembly workshop of the Guodian United Power Technology Company in Baoding, China. Courtesy Reuters/David Gray. My latest "DC Diary" column in India’s financial daily, the Business Standard, focuses on Asia’s new geography of manufacturing: China has unsettled its neighbors with naval displays and diplomatic spats. But could erstwhile Asian strategic rivals end up as big winners from China’s economic success? In one sense, at least, Asian economies are already winning from Chinese growth: slack global demand has meant that China increasingly powers the growth of nearly every major economy in Asia. But the question increasingly matters in another sense, as well: Chinese leaders are committed to rebalancing at least some elements of their country’s economy. And while that, in time, will mean a more competitive and powerful China, it will also create new opportunities for those countries in Asia that get manufacturing and investment policies right. Why the change? China is approaching the upper limit of its existing growth model. It has emerged from the global crisis earlier and stronger than nearly any other major economy. But China’s leaders are hardly complacent about their country’s future economic path. To the contrary, despite remarkable successes, Premier Wen Jiabao has repeatedly called the current model, which relies disproportionately on exports and fixed asset investment, "unbalanced, unstable, uncoordinated, and unsustainable." China produces much but consumes little. The creation and perpetuation of its production-intensive economic model owes much to inefficient capital allocation. Few Chinese are reaping the windfalls of China’s growth, and those that are benefiting do so at the expense of the many. Vast regional disparities mean wide gaps in living standards and quality of life. And China’s investment-intensive growth model has exacted heavy environmental and energy costs. The Chinese Communist Party relies heavily on economic success to assure political legitimacy. And it is now increasingly clear that the major pillars of the existing model are flawed: The global economic crisis provided stark evidence that China’s export-driven economy is vulnerable to dips in demand in the rest of the world. At the same time, China’s industrial and financial policies have introduced distortions and inefficiencies into its economy. For these reasons, China’s growth model is almost certain to change in coming years as Beijing works to establish a more rational balance between production and consumption and tempers its longstanding preoccupation with GDP growth in favor of a greater emphasis on human capital-oriented growth. That, in turn, will yield important changes to China’s political economy. The country will become more urban. Capital allocation could begin to shift from corporations to more households. Interior China will become more developed. And Chinese industry will move rapidly up the value chain. Indeed, Beijing has long been determined to develop higher-value-added and technology-intensive industry, and its huge capacity to mobilize domestic capital gives it the power to do so. That means more competition for multinationals, including in third-country markets as Chinese firms produce substitutable (but cheaper) products. But it will also give others opportunities to fill a vacuum. Take labor-intensive manufacturing in coastal China. Export-oriented manufacturers are already reassessing traditional production strategies as labor costs rise. There are stronger incentives to relocate production to interior China. And new options are emerging as some choose to leave China entirely rather than relocate inland. For example, rising costs in China could make Indonesia a more attractive hub for some production. This would help drive Indonesian growth in the near term and ultimately wean its economy off its traditional reliance on natural resource exports. As Chinese demand levels grow, Indonesian manufacturers will also benefit by producing and selling their products in China. Likewise in Vietnam, Thailand, and even smaller economies like Cambodia. Cost advantages will attract new investments to Vietnam. Regional advantage and stronger intellectual property protection will make Thailand more attractive, provided political risk can be held in check. For India, rising incomes and higher-value-added production in China could bring benefits too. Real appreciation of the renminbi, alongside growing Chinese demand, would help India narrow its trade deficit with China over the next five years. The deficit has been of growing concern to the Reserve Bank of India and the commerce ministry. And with the growth of manufacturing, not least in southern states such as Tamil Nadu, India could also capitalize in some areas of production as China moves up the value chain. The National Manufacturing Policy could yield new manufacturing zones with industrial parks, warehousing, and opportunities in special economic zones. And as the Indian government works to increase the share of manufacturing in GDP from around 16% to 25% in a decade, India need not compete only at the bottom of the value chain. It could aim to compete, too, in machinery, auto parts, and even automobiles, particularly through the adoption of new policies at the state level. But huge obstacles remain. Some in India view this as a backdoor to relaxing labor laws. And such policies could falter, too, on land acquisition. That would be a shame. Investors are aggressively seeking new opportunities in Asia. So government policies—including new investments in infrastructure, fiscal incentives and tax breaks, and improvements to supply and distribution networks—will shift Asia’s industrial landscape. Who will be the winners? Who will surge ahead? Policy choices over the next 3-5 years will play a central role in determining the answers.

Thailand's Prime Minister-elect Yingluck Shinawatra (L) poses for photographers as she gives United States ambassador to Thailand Kristie Kenney a bouquet of flowers ahead of U.S. Independence Day celebrations in Bangkok July 5, 2011. (Adrees Latif/Courtesy Reuters) As the major foreign actor in Thailand, U.S. policy toward the Kingdom remains critical, and closely watched by Thai opinion leaders. Following the 2006 coup in Thailand, for example, American policy signals that, in many ways, seemed to indicate that Washington tolerated the coup provided support for the Thai military, even though, in the long run, the coup produced only more chaos. Now, in the wake of Thailand’s July 3 election, the United States may have a role to play again, if Thailand’s establishment is able to nullify the poll through judicial rulings or other maneuverings. In a new piece in the New Republic, I examine U.S. policy toward Thailand’s election. You can see the piece here.

Former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra gestures during a meeting near his home in Dubai, after voting in general elections ended in Bangkok July 3, 2011. (Jumana El Heloueh/Courtesy Reuters) Thailand’s election last Sunday could be the most important in the country’s history. It provides, possibly, a last chance for all sides to come to some reconciliation. I have an article in yesterday’s Financial Times on how the new prime minister, Yingluck Shinawatra, her brother Thaksin, and Thailand’s traditional establishment all can help the country’s democracy get back on track. You can see the article here.

Puea Thai Party's Yingluck Shinawatra (C) poses for a photo with her coalition after a joint news conference in Bangkok July 4, 2011. (Adrees Latif/Courtesy Reuters) Thailand’s political denouement has been building for a decade, since former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra was first elected in early 2001, in a poll that would upend Thailand’s traditional politics and pave the way for a decade-long clash between traditional interests and Thailand’s increasingly empowered poor and new businesspeople. An overview of Thailand’s crisis, and how such a once-promising democracy faltered, can be found here.

Yingluck Shinawatra, sister of ousted premier Thaksin Shinawatra, smiles as she arrives to her party's headquarters after voting in general elections ended in Bangkok July 3, 2011. (Damir Sagolj/Courtesy Reuters) On Sunday, Thai voters went to the polls for the first time since, in 2008, the Democrat Party, supported by Thailand’s traditional elites, maneuvered its way into power through legislative wrangling backed by the army and the palace. It was also only the second election since the 2006 coup, which deposed the government of Thaksin Shinawatra, who previously had been the most powerful prime minister in Thai history, but gained much of his support from the poor, and was extremely unpopular with Thailand’s traditional elites. The result of Sunday’s vote was an overwhelming rejection of both the coup and the 2008 manuevering, and a vote of confidence for Thaksin’s party, now run by his youngest sister, Yingluck. (Since the 2006 coup, Thaksin has lived in exile, mostly in Dubai, but has remained the power behind the scenes in his party and, in the election campaign, called Yingluck “his clone.”) Riding high voter turnout, Yingluck and Thaksin’s party won an absolute majority of the 500-seat lower house of parliament, which will almost certainly make Yingluck the country’s first female prime minister. She made add to her power by allying with several smaller parties that won a handful of seats. The vote further signified that Thai politics have been changed forever by Thaksin, who despite his policies in office that undermined the rule of law and often abused human rights, has been the first figure to empower the Thai rural poor, who comprise the majority of the country, and lead them to be politically engaged. Voting together, the poor and lower middle classes, as well as small businesspeople from outside the capital,  have now become the dominant force in electoral politics, a sharp lesson to the traditional forces--the monarchy, the army, the bureaucracy, and Bangkok-based elites and middle classes--who have dominated Thailand for decades. The Democrat Party, voice of the traditional elites, now has lost every election since 1992. However, there is no guarantee that Thailand’s traditional power brokers are going to concede their dominance gracefully. Yingluck’s win means that Thaksin is likely to return to the country at some point, receiving some kind of amnesty for crimes he was convicted of after the coup. He is the most divisive figure in Thailand, and his potential return, combined with the big victory, could trigger traditional elites’ meddling with the electoral results. Such meddling could include using the judiciary to overturn many of the individual parliament race decisions, a move tried in previous elections; using the judiciary to outlaw Yingluck; or even an outright coup again--though the current army commander has vowed not to stage a coup and has been engaged in reconciliation talks with Thaksin’s representatives, he is known as an archroyalist and traditionalist, and hates Thaksin. Given Yingluck’s landslide, the United States, the most important foreign player in Thailand, should move quickly to applaud the free and fair election and support the formation of the government Thais have elected, run by Yingluck’s party. Meanwhile, if traditional powers attempt to overthrow the result, either through judicial interference or an outright coup, Washington should come down hard on Thailand, including potentially canceling many aspects of the United States’ close military relationship with Thailand.

A Thai official dressed in a traditional costume greets Thailand's Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn (R) during an annual royal ploughing ceremony in cental Bangkok on May 13, 2011. (Damir Sagolj/Courtesy Reuters) In perhaps the biggest bombshell of reportage on Thailand in decades, former Reuters journalist Andrew Marshall, who gained access to a vast trove of WikiLeaks cables on the country, has published a four-part opus, running hundreds of pages, that focuses primarily on the country’s monarchy, including the king, the queen, and the crown prince and heir. The first part is available here (pdf). Marshall’s account is the most thorough, and in many ways damning, assessment of the royal family’s influence over politics in history. His reporting, and the cables they are based upon, leaves no stone unturned – or unblemished: The queen’s influence, often negative, over the tense situation in southern Thailand; the military’s growing use of lese majeste laws to crack down on opposition; the foibles and venality of the crown prince; the vultures circling around the palace as the end of King Bhumibhol’s long reign ends. Though discussion of the monarchy is essentially criminalized in Thailand, and Marshall certainly won’t be returning to the country any time soon, the reporting will open discussion of the monarchy even more, at a time when the election campaign, the growing crackdown on dissent, and the impending demise of the king all are terrifying Thais and forcing some reevaluation of their country’s political system, perhaps leading to a total meltdown of Thai politics.

A supporter of Yingluck Shinawatra, sister of toppled premier Thaksin Shinawatra and the prime ministerial candidate for the country's biggest opposition Pheu Thai Party, holds her poster in front of a building decorated with banners of the Democrat party in Bangkok's notorious Klong Toey slum June 21, 2011. (Damir Sagolj/Courtesy Reuters) In the run up to Thailand’s national elections on July 3, most U.S. officials have said very little about the country and its poll. At recent events, for example, Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell has tended to brush over discussions of Thailand before going on to emphasize the United States’ other treaty allies and close partners in Southeast Asia, such as Singapore, the Philippines, and Vietnam. That is probably a wise move – for now. As Bangkok Pundit notes, though polls suggest that the opposition Puea Thai party is likely to win, and possibly with a large majority. Thai polls are notoriously unreliable, so the Democrat Party and their smaller party partners could still pull off enough of a victory that would allow the Democrats to put together a ruling coalition in parliament. Still, after the election, the U.S. is not going to be able to simply defer talking about Thailand any more. Washington will need to have a clear policy if the military steps in again, as army commander in chief Prayuth Chan-Ocha already has obliquely warned in public statements. Unlike in 2006, the U.S. cannot this time even tacitly tolerate a coup, since the Thai military already has shown, in 2006 and 2007, that a coup will only set back the country’s economy and democratic progress badly. A coup this time should result in suspension of future Cobra Gold U.S.-Thai joint military exercises, and should result in the kind of harsh condemnation of the military’s actions that the U.S. would deliver in the case of nearly any other country. Though some American analysts worry that such a condemnation would push Thailand closer to China, that’s a risk that – at this point – is probably worth taking, given that the Thai government still cannot rely upon Beijing for much of its military needs. What’s more, the administration should be prepared to warn Puea Thai, as well, if it wins the election and immediately tries to use a mandate to launch its own cycle of recriminations against the judges, bureaucrats, and army officers it believes have made life tough for Thaksin supporters over the past five years. After the poll, no matter what the result, Thailand will need some kind of cooling down period, and a new cycle of recriminations would hardly help lower the temperature.

A motorcyclist rides past posters of candidates for the upcoming mayoral elections in Bangkok June 13, 2011. (Chaiwat Subprasom/Courtesy Reuters) As the clock ticks toward Thailand’s elections on July 3, the omens for some kind of nationwide peace and reconciliation don’t look good. The military apparently is warning opposition candidates, while the opposition Puea Thai party is stepping up its rhetoric against the government and also increasingly making former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra the center of its campaign. In my new CFR expert brief, I examine the elections, Thailand’s political crisis, and whether the U.S. can help restore what was once one of the most promising democracies in Asia.