Thailand

Over on Bangkok Pundit, a translation of an op-ed recently published in the Thai publication Matichon offers some revealing quotes from Senator Somjate Boonthanom, the former general who helped lead the 2006 coup that toppled the government of Thaksin Shinawatra. “The elected ones like to refer to the election process as being democracy,” explained Somajate, “From elections, the people choose, but still corruption. Therefore, it is not proof that coming from elections is the best. Democracy that steals from the nation, I view it as worse than a military dictatorship.” Of course, such statements are of little surprise from an appointed Senator whose power, as Bangkok Pundit notes, was not derived from the ballot box, but from a coup against an elected government. But General Somjate is far from alone in his sentiments.Throughout the world, middle classes—once seen as the linchpin to successful democratization— are growing increasingly resentful of the institutions of democracy,  institutions which have lead in many countries to the legitimate election of officials who these middle classes perceive as corrupt, authoritarian and the source of policies that run counter to their own interests. Instead of taking their plight to the ballot box, these middle-class men and women have often taken to the streets in protest and thrown their support behind armed forces. In October, Venezuelans elected Hugo Chavez for a third presidential term. Since his first election in 1999 he has enjoyed popular support among the country’s poor, but his populist policies have destroyed Venezuela’s economy and alienated its middle class. Throughout Chavez’s presidency, middle-class residents and politicians—just as in Thailand— have launched street demonstrations, and they lent their support to the 2002 military coup that briefly ousted Chavez. And in post-Mubarak Egypt, where many of the groups that first stormed Tahrir Square expressed concerned over the military’s continued political power, some Egyptian middle-class men and women actually welcomed the army’s involvement. They viewed the armed forced as a check against Islamists and growing instability. In a second excerpt published in the National Post from my forthcoming book Democracy in Retreat, I explore what is perhaps the most unnerving aspect of democracy’s worldwide regression: the revolt of the middle class. You can read the excerpt here.

Last month, protestors representing the royalist Pitak Siam group gathered in rally sites across Bangkok to force the ouster of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, accusing her government of acting as a puppet for her fugitive brother, former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. While the number of protesters that ultimately turned out—some 20,000— paled in comparison to the hundreds of thousands of people who came out in 2006 for anti-Thaksin rallies, the protest is nonetheless another troubling development in the political meltdown that has engulfed the country in recent years. Since 2006, Thailand, once a poster child for democratization in the developing world, has undergone a rapid democratic regression. And it is hardly alone. Since 2001, a conservative middle class has revolted against electoral democracy —just as it has in Thailand—in  many key developing nations, including Pakistan, the Philippines, Venezuela, and Russia. In my forthcoming book Democracy in Retreat,  I examine how, contrary to public perception in the wake of the Arab Spring, democracy has in reality become weaker, less effective, and less supported by the public around the developing world over the past decade. Democracy in Retreat is being published by the Council on Foreign Relations and Yale University Press, and will be released in early 2013. An excerpt from the book is now available on Asia Sentinel; you can read it here.

This past week, the Thai Department of Special Investigation (DSI) charged former prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and former deputy prime minister Suthep Thaugsuban for authorizing the shooting and killing of protestors in spring 2010, during the worst street violence in Bangkok since 1992. According to the Bangkok Post, the DSI issued these charges since “the pair failed to stop issuing orders to quell the protests when people were killed as a result of the crackdown orders.” But, the Post reported, DSI is not going to bring any charges against soldiers involved in the crackdown. Now, obviously, there is a political component to these charges, which Abhisit immediately used to his defense. The fact that the Thai government is now run by leaders aligned with, or directly from, the red shirt movement, suggests why DSI is moving now against Abhisit and Suthep, who are both still leaders of the opposing Democrat Party. In addition, the fact that DSI does not plan to charge any soldiers, including officers, shows how much the Yingluck government still needs the support of the military, even though it has been promoting its own allies and trying to weaken the power of army commander Prayuth Chan-ocha. Although Abhisit and Suthep bear significant responsibility for the killings, army leaders from the time, as well as senior officers who did not restrain themselves, used excessive force, and actually performed so incompetently in command that parts of downtown, such as Lumpini Park, reportedly were filled with troops firing wildly at other groups of soldiers in the dark or near dark, creating crossing zones of fire with no rationale. Still, even given the obvious politicking, this is a landmark case. In the past, any Thai leaders involved in crackdowns on protestors—whether in 1992, 1973, 1976, or other times—would usually step down or be gently strong-armed out of office, receive a kind of amnesty or leave the country, and return to politics or at least to Thai high society one day. No top Thai leader has ever been sent to jail for actions like the 2010 crackdown. If the Yingluck administration can ensure a free trial and prevent the case from devolving into a political circus, this case could help break the cycle of impunity that has characterized high-level Thai politics for the entire modern era.

While much has been written about President Obama’s recent tour of Southeast Asia, less attention has been paid to the simultaneous visit by U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta to the region.  On November 15, during a stopover in Bangkok, Panetta reaffirmed the United States longstanding military ties with Thailand with a new agreement, the 2012 Joint Vision Statement for the Thai-U.S. Defense Alliance. The next day, the United States also reiterated its military ties with Cambodia during a meeting between Secretary Penetta and Cambodia’s defense minister, General Tea Banh. In my new piece for The New Republic, I examine how the Obama administration relies on the Pentagon to serve as diplomatic interlocutor in Southeast Asia, and argue against U.S. military cooperation with the region’s most oppressive countries. You can read the TNR entire piece here.

Amidst all the chaos in Bangkok over the Pitak Siam rally —a group of monarchists opposed to the Yingluck government who were supposed to bring hundreds of thousands of supporters into the streets— another, similarly important piece of news about Thailand’s decline emerged. As it turns out, the Pitak Siam rally was mostly a bust. Only about 20,000 supporters actually turned out to rally sites in Bangkok, a far cry from the hundreds of thousands of people who came out in 2006 for anti-Thaksin rallies that ultimately helped precipitate the 2006 coup. Although the Yingluck government overreacted by employing the Internal Security Act in fear of the Pitak Siam rallies, the fact that the Pitak Siam leaders were openly calling for a “freeze” of democracy and for a military coup, and had close ties to senior military leaders, were worrying enough to the government to take severe measures. As it turns out, those were not really needed, and the level of violence between protestors and the security forces was relatively low, at least by recent Thai standards. Now, General Boonlert, the rally’s main organizer, says that he is stepping down as Pitak Siam’s leader. On New Mandala, graduate student Aim Simpeng has a fine analysis of the busted rally. It’s unlikely Thailand has heard the last of the Pitak Siam leaders, no matter what the general says. The monarchist yellow shirt movement that helped topple the Thaksin government and helped install the Abhisit-led Democrat government remains powerful, if clearly not as able to turn out large street numbers as in the past. Even if not, it remains a huge distraction for the prime minister, a constant threat, and a serious impediment to governing. Yet the continuing political strife overshadowed the news, reported in the Bangkok Post and elsewhere, that Thailand’s education system was ranked thirty-seventh out of fortydeveloped nations in a global ranking of education systems produced by publishing house Pearson. This is just the latest confirmation that the country’s education system, which was fine for producing widespread basic literacy in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, and producing workers for low-end manufacturing, construction, and agriculture, is failing badly to keep pace in the global economy. Thailand has been slipping behind regional competitors like Vietnam in terms of producing workers competent in English and high-tech skills, and with the introduction of Myanmar into the global economy, a country whose universities had basically been shut for years, Thailand will face even tougher competition in lower-end manufacturing than it already does. Yet the Thai education system continues to prioritize rote learning, offers weak instruction in English, and provides low social status to teachers. In addition, in the deep south, where an insurgency is raging, many schools are closed altogether, and the government has not figured out an effective way to protect teachers. All in all, a sad story. With Indonesia growing strongly, Myanmar emerging, Bangladesh becoming a powerhouse in textiles, and neighboring nations like Vietnam, Singapore, and Malaysia upgrading their education systems, Thailand risks being left behind. This education deficit, even more than the constant political wrangling today, could be the country’s long-term downfall.

President Obama kicked off his tour of Southeast Asia this week with a visit to Bangkok, Thailand where he and Secretary Clinton were granted a royal audience with the country’s ailing monarch, King Bhumibol Adulyadej.  The Washington Post yesterday had an excellent account of the meeting, which took place at the Siriraj Hospital where the king has been hospitalized since 2009. The United States’ courtship of the monarch dates back to the 1950s, when the king and his close ally, then-military leader Sarit Thanarat, allowed U.S. troops to base out of Thailand during the Vietnam War. Washington came to view the monarch as invaluable to stemming the growth of communism, both in Thailand and region-wide. The U.S.-Thai relationship, though treasured by both sides as “special,” is hardly unique. The United States has long relied on monarchs and strong militaries around the world to prop up political systems in developing nations. That strategy, it appears, isn’t working too well anymore. In my new piece for Washington Monthly, I review the biography King Bhumibhol Adulyadej: A Life’s Work and examine how, in Thailand and elsewhere, royal reverence has hampered the development of democracy.  You can read my review essay in its entirety here.

As President Barack Obama sets off this weekend for a historic trip to Southeast Asia, he arrives at a high point for himself —and a low point for the region. Obama, making his first trip since winning re-election at the polls, will be the first sitting American president to visit Myanmar. The country has undoubtedly embarked upon historic reforms, yet is also embroiled in brutal ethnic violence. Thailand, another stop on Obama’s trip, is bracing for what could be a hugely disruptive leadership succession fight. In Cambodia, he will attend the East Asia Summit, as well as the Summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), an organization in the throes of a crisis. The violence in Myanmar’s southwestern Rakhine State may have been sparked in part by the security forces, who are eager to retain a sizable role in the new Myanmar, and it has also been facilitated by radical Buddhist groups that have been attacking Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State and have made it nearly impossible for aid organizations like Doctors without Borders to even provide aid and relief to the tens of thousands of refugees fleeing their homes there. Meanwhile, in other parts of Myanmar like Kachin State, civil war is ramping up again, raising the question of whether the president, Thein Sein, actually has control of his regional army commanders. Thus far, democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi has said little about the violence in Rakhine State, a great disappointment to rights activists in the state and around the world. Meanwhile, in Thailand, a U.S. treaty ally and another country on Obama’s itinerary, the situation is only marginally better. As the king of Thailand’s health continues to decline —rumors suggest he has had multiple strokes and is operating at minimal brain capacity, and in his few public appearances he looks extraordinarily frail— Thailand’s power centers are girding for the post-succession fight of the century. While the government of Yingluck Shinawatra enjoys a majority of popular support and control of parliament, Yingluck and her brother Thaksin, from exile, have been trying to slowly reduce the power of the country’s traditional unelected power centers, such as the military and the palace, in part by reshuffling the army to promote Thaksin loyalists. But the top army leaders remain staunchly anti-Thaksin/Yingluck and extremely royalist, and in recent weeks a new group of middle- and upper-class protestors have descended on the streets of Bangkok. Ostensibly, they are protesting corruption in the Yingluck government (though Yingluck’s government is not demonstrably any more corrupt than any previous Thai government) and they are protesting the possible return to Thailand of the exiled Thaksin, who still faces criminal charges back at home. In reality, the protestors, led by a former general linked to several Privy Councilors close to the king, are rallying Bangkokians to push to oust the government, preferably through another military coup —an openly stated goal of many of the protestors.  The protest group, known as Pitak Siam, has made wild claims about the size of its rallies, but thus far they have tended to be around 20,000 people. Still, as in 2006, when hundreds of thousands of Bangkokians came to the streets to push for the ouster of Thaksin and call for a coup, these demonstrations could get larger, once again showing that there is no compromise on the horizon for Thailand’s deadlocked politics. The poor, who support Thaksin, have the votes to win election after election; the middle and upper classes, so distrustful of Thaksin’s party and poor voters, will turn time and time again to extra-constitutional means to nullify elections. This deadlock, which has lasted since 2006, has paralyzed policymaking in a critical U.S. ally, undermined the economy, and scared off investors. Indeed, the Obama administration now has closer functional ties with Vietnam and Singapore, neither of which actually are treaty allies, than with dysfunctional Thailand. And above it all looms the crisis in ASEAN, the leading regional organization. Though ASEAN’s secretary-general, Surin Pitsuwan, is Thai, and previously served as Thailand’s foreign minister, he has had little success in helping to mediate Thailand’s political crisis. Similarly, even though Surin has pushed for a more assertive, regionally engaged ASEAN Secretariat, he has found himself unable to make much headway in addressing Myanmar’s deadly ethnic conflicts either. On the eve of the president’s visit to Southeast Asia, the CFR Southeast Asian studies program and the International Institutions and Global Governance program are jointly releasing my new Working Paper on ASEAN: “ASEAN’s Future and Asian Integration.” You can read “ASEAN’s Future and Asian Integration” here.

Over the past six months, the insurgency in southern Thailand, which seemed to be cooling off late last year, has once again heated up. Incidents of daily violence are up, and the insurgents are using increasingly sophisticated bombing and gunning techniques. The recent ceasefire deal in the southern Philippines between Manila and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front has shifted attention to the south Thailand insurgency, yet the prospect of change in the Thai south looks remote. In a new piece in The National, I analyze the prospects for the Thai south. Read the whole piece here.

In the wake of the Philippines government announcing last weekend that Manila and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) had agreed upon a peace plan after fifteen years of negotiations and forty years of war, many Thai news outlets are wondering whether Manila could teach Bangkok a lesson in how to deal with the southern Thailand insurgency. The Nation today, in an editorial titled “A Lesson for Thailand from the Philippines,” offers that the Philippine agreement has many key points for Thai policymakers to learn from, a mantra echoed by several other Thai media outlets. Yet there are key differences between southern Thailand and southern Philippines that, at this point, will make it hard to apply many of Manila’s lessons to Thailand: Thai prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra is not personally engaged in ending the insurgency. According to nearly all Philippine news sources, Philippines president Benigno Aquino III made a peace deal with the MILF one of his highest priorities, and agreed to face-to-face meetings with the MILF leaders in order to personally guarantee the peace process and demonstrate his commitment. Prime Minister Yingluck has shown no such interest, perhaps because her brother Thaksin remains the power behind the throne, or perhaps because most Thais in Bangkok and the north/northeast, the Puea Thai power base, do not really care about the situation in the south as long as the war does not trickle beyond the south. The Philippines government was also willing to offer the south a self-governing autonomous zone, which is a red line most Thai politicians will not cross at this point.  The southern insurgents in Thailand do not have any apparent leader. Time and time again, efforts by the Thai government to launch negotiations have been stymied because Bangkok is still not really sure who leads the insurgency, or even whether the top leaders are in touch with each other, since the insurgencies’ cells are so diffuse and disconnected. In contrast, the MILF had a clear leadership to negotiate with.  The Thai government has rejected most assistance from outsiders. As The Nation notes, because the government and insurgents have no trust in each other, outside mediation can be crucial, but the Yingluck government wants to have a peace process with the insurgency with minimal input from outside parties like Malaysia, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, or Saudi Arabia. As a result, the few negotiations that have taken place have failed in acrimony.  The Thai insurgents are not tired of war. Unfortunately, unlike in the southern Philippines, the southern Thai insurgents seem to be only getting stronger and angrier.  Seven people have been killed in the south in the past few days alone, and the insurgency, by shutting down businesses most Fridays, appears to be gaining the upper hand.

Last year, flooding in Thailand breached defenses across the country, ruining many of the industrial estates on the outskirts of Bangkok, bringing the capital to a halt, and resulting in billions of dollars in damage and decisions by several major electronics components manufacturers to either abandon Thailand operations or open new operations to build disc drives and other parts in countries safer from flooding. Last year’s flooding was also horrible for the public image of the government of Yingluck Shinawatra, which appeared to be slow to respond, as compared to the army, which utilized the flooding, and its rapid response, to somewhat rehabilitate its image in the minds of many Thais after the army’s killing of at least ninety protestors in the streets of Bangkok in spring 2010. Given the damage done by last year’s floods to the Thai economy, to the government’s legitimacy, to people’s health, and to the country’s long-term attractiveness to investors, one might think that this year Bangkok would be better prepared for flooding. After all, though some meteorologists attributed last year’s floods to a once-in-decades event, the fact is that Thailand is one of the countries in Asia most exposed to negative impacts from climate change: Bangkok is built on swampy, reclaimed ground, and sinks into the water more and more every year. It is easily flooded, and even in “good” monsoon seasons water often accumulates in the lowest parts of the city. But it does not appear that the Thai government has adequately prepared for this year’s looming floods either. Flooding has already affected up to one quarter of the country’s provinces, according to a recent Reuters report, and thousands of people have fled their homes in parts of the north.  In the areas just outside Bangkok, where flooding was heavy last year, this year construction of new barriers, water diversion devices, and other protection has proceeded far too slowly, leaving many suburbs nearly as exposed as last year. In areas home to a large percentage of foreign companies, such as some outside Ayutthaya, the foreign firms, not wanting to repeat last year’s experience of shutting down production or losing valuable models, have constructed their own defenses. But in other northern and eastern suburbs of the capital, no such defenses are in sight, and by now, September, it is probably too late to set up significant barriers. In many areas, Thais can only hope that the rains are not as severe as last year.

In today’s Washington Post, there is an excellent overview of how the austerity programs in many countries in Europe have led to pressure on monarchies to cut costs and reduce their lifestyles. Most notably, the criticism has extended to even the Spanish monarchy, which for years in Spain was all but exempted from public and press criticism because of the role that King Juan Carlos played in the late 1970s and early 1980s in helping to promote democratization and to prevent a coup from succeeding. The very socialists who, in other countries, might have been used to criticizing the monarchy usually avoided any critiques of Juan Carlos, as the socialists had benefited enormously from the democratization period, dominating the Spanish government for years. Now, however, Juan Carlos’ habits have become fair game for the press, and a recent secret safari that he took to Botswana to shoot elephants, while Spain faces the most severe austerity program in Western Europe, has led to a major backlash against the monarch. The article notes that many in the public, media outlets, and many politicians, are calling on Juan Carlos to drastically cut his annual spending and to be much more transparent about how he is spending money on royal activities. Though it may be able to hold off such inquiries for now, via harsh lèse-majesté laws and the genuine reverence the monarchy enjoys, the Thai monarchy could learn some lessons from Juan Carlos. Like the Spanish king, the current Thai king, Bhumibol Adulyadej, has truly earned a high degree of respect from many Thais over the course of his lengthy reign. But that respect, and the fact that the king’s reign is strongly supported by a core of arch-royalists in Bangkok, does not mean that questions are not increasingly being raised, in private, about the royal family’s finances. Even the royals seem to understand this in Thailand; the recent, royally-approved biography of the king’s life contained significantly more information on the Crown Property Bureau’s finances than any royally-approved book had in the past. But that initial transparency only fuels a hunger for more —though Thais will not say so in public. On social media sites, and in private conversations, discussion of the Crown Property Bureau now is far more common than in the past. For his part, Juan Carlos, even at his advanced age, has always been highly attuned to public opinion and, in July, announced he would be taking a pay cut voluntarily, according to the Washington Post story, in tune with the austere times. A model for other monarchs?  

After some time on vacation, I have returned to find that Thai politics, which almost couldn’t get worse, actually has. Last month, Thitinan Pongsudhirak, in my opinion the most astute observer of Thai politics, captured the fundamental tension in Thailand today in an op-ed: Thailand’s problem is that those who keep winning elections are not allowed to rule, whereas others who ultimately call the shots cannot win elections. [Thanks to Bangkok Pundit for pointing me to Thitinan’s op-ed]  That, in a nutshell, is Thailand’s dilemma, one shared by many middle-income developing nations where middle classes are becoming increasingly skeptical of the benefits of democratization, as I discuss in my forthcoming book The Decline of Democracy (Yale University Press). In Thailand, however, the government of Yingluck Shinawatra seemed at first to make some headway toward at least a short-term solution to this impasse, the kind of solution achieved by more populist governments in places like Brazil: Yingluck and her party would be allowed to hold and exercise power, and might continue some of the populist programs started by her brother Thaksin Shinawatra (and continued by the Democrats), but she would also take significant pains to reassure traditional elites, including the military, that she would not challenge their orbits of power. Yingluck publicly venerated Privy Council members, and, according to several articles by Shawn Crispin and others, allowed pro-royalists to essentially continue their McCarthyite attacks on anyone who even questions the long-term nature of the monarchy unabated. She also had mostly kept her hands off of the military budget. Over time, such a deal, as in Brazil, might eventually have reassured elites —the military, big business, the palace— enough that they would see that a truly democratically elected government would not necessarily be a significant threat to their interests, and surely would be preferable to the alternative: to hold out against real democratic rule for as long as possible, further enraging large portions of the Thai public and thus potentially birthing a more aggressively anti-elite politician than Yingluck or other Puea Thai leaders, who are hardly grassroots populists, along the lines of Hugo Chavez or Evo Morales. But Thaksin has now clearly overstepped the deal, with his desire to show that he is really in charge and that his political purgatory has ended. His planned trip to the United States was originally supposed to be relatively low-profile, just a means of demonstrating that he was again welcome in Western capitals and should not have been treated like a fugitive. But it may become increasingly high-profile, just as his recent trips to Southeast Asian nations have put him at the center of Thai politics again, and made him look exactly like what his opponents always claimed —the puppet master who ruled the "red shirts", Puea Thai and Yingluck from behind the scenes. I don’t believe that this was —or is— really the case. In fact, a fascinating article released late last year by academics Duncan McCargo and Naruemon Thabchumpon shows that the red shirt movement is far more diverse, class-wise and policy-wise, than the simple reductions of poor rural farmers who follow Thaksin. But Thaksin’s increasing desire to place himself again right at the center of the political stage, even while his sister maintains high popularity ratings among the public, is both threatening the reconciliation and allowing his opponents to more effectively make their case.

While the now six-years-old standoff in Bangkok between Thailand’s traditional elites and the pseudo-populist parties allied with former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra has gotten most of the international press, a far more brutal struggle, in Thailand’s Deep South, has gone virtually unnoticed for more than a decade. Since the early 2000s, more than 5,000 people have been killed in the conflict in southern Thailand, and the war shows no signs of ending any time soon. In the Boston Globe’s Sunday Ideas section, I examine the southern Thai conflict, and the reasons why it has been so ignored, both in Thailand and in the international community. Read the article here.

In a recent piece for Foreign Policy, “Bangkok Blues,” I explored the numerous factors that have led to the rapid decline of democracy in Thailand over the past six years. Yesterday, the Royal Thai Embassy submitted its rebuttal to my piece. You can read their response in its entirety here.

As reported on in Siam Voices this week, Google has released its 2012 Transparency Report, which chronicles requests that Google receives, mostly from governments, to block material online. As Lisa Gardner notes on Siam Voices, “Google bucked international trends in 2011 by blocking access to hundreds of web pages at the behest of the Thai Ministry of Information, Communication, and Technology [MICT].” One part of the report shows that Google has restricted or partly restricted at least 149 YouTube videos that the Thai government claimed was insulting to the monarchy. Unlike in many other countries, where Google supposedly makes its decisions to take down material after a local court issues an order (not that courts are infallible, but at least there is a court order), in Thailand it took down material even without court orders being issued, simply at the request of the authorities. Overall, around the world last year, Google complied with about 54 percent of requests by governments and copyright holders to take down material.  But in Thailand, Gardner reports, Google “chose to comply with each request made by Thai government censors” —in essence, 100 percent of their requests, a chilling number. Gardner identifies a number of clear, pressing problems with Google’s approach, and these problems are only going to be magnified as Thailand’s political conflict, already at the boiling point, gets hotter, or if a coup is launched by the military, not an impossible proposition now. For one, although Google claims that it only removes material if the requests to remove are relatively narrow, in Thailand the application of the lèse-majesté law and the Computer Crimes Act has become broader and broader each year, and now is so broadly defined —some would say undefined— as to be almost impossible to understand. (Scholar David Streckfuss, the authority on lèse-majesté, has shown how over the past decade Lèse-Majesté cases have skyrocketed, reaching a number rarely seen in any monarchy in history, other than in late nineteenth century Germany.) Since the Thai courts are not helping to clarify the law —they basically almost never acquit anyone for Lèse-Majesté or violating the Computer Crimes Act, and reduce sentences only when there is major international pressure, as in the case of the editor of Prachatai—how will Google, or any other company, know which Thai requests are narrow enough to act on? Or whether any requests are actually narrow enough to act on? And since the law is increasingly used as a political weapon —by royalists against liberals as well as against pro-Thaksin red shirts, and in reverse by some pro-Thaksin allies against royalists— how can Google be sure that it is not essentially serving as part of either side’s arsenal, or that, if it is going to take down material, it is balancing both sides in the Thai political struggle? In many countries, such as China, Google has stood out in making a strong case for free expression online, and using its corporate power to support that approach. And it does have employees in Thailand, as it did in China, which it needs to be protective of. Still, Google’s actions are very concerning. The company has not yet explained what material MICT tried to block, according to Gardner’s report. More importantly, Google has not shown any clear position on how it determines which online material in Thailand, where the lèse-majesté and Computer Crimes Act have become two of the biggest weapons against free expression, it considers worthy of being taken down. The company should enunciate a clear position, helping Thai (and foreign) users understand its rationale, and drawing a firmer line in the sand for MICT.