Singapore

Singapore, one of the world’s wealthiest and most trade-dependent countries, punches above its weight in regional and global affairs.

As the coronavirus outbreak worsens, the U.S. government should learn from initial responses in Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan.

The coronavirus which originated in Wuhan, China, continues to spread around the globe. New cases are being discovered every day. This past week, the first domestically transmitted cases were reported in Japan, in the United States and in Germany. New cases also recently emerged in Singapore, the Philippines, India and other countries. In light of those developments, the World Health Organization declared the virus a global emergency and the U.S. State Department warned Americans not to travel to China. The downside of intense China links The nations of Southeast Asia have extensive trade, transport and border links to China. It was thus no surprise that the region was one of the first outside of China and Hong Kong to face coronavirus cases. It is highly probable that no level of regional preparation would have stopped some spread of the virus. Southeast Asia is one of the biggest tourism destinations for Chinese travelers and, because of the Chinese New Year’s holiday, many people had already left Wuhan before the city began to shut down. It certainly did not help that the Chinese authorities were initially slow to release information to other countries. Only Singapore gets the job done But even if the Chinese side had been far more circumspect, the fact remains that several Southeast Asian governments have responded poorly to the spreading pandemic. This, in turn, has raised the risk of larger outbreaks in their countries. In fact, many Southeast Asian governments, with the exception of Singapore, have not responded effectively. Singapore, of course, is not only just a city state, but also very rich by comparison to all its neighbors and has an extensive track record in organized public health campaigns. ASEAN’s poorer cousins Not all of Singapore’s poorer cousins are fully at fault. Some regional states, like Cambodia and Vietnam, have limited public health resources. The areas of mainland Southeast Asia which are near the Chinese border are by their nature very porous when it comes to human flows. Moreover, in some cases like the Myanmar-China border, those places are not even under central government control. As it happens, Myanmar has been lucky to date as it has not yet had a confirmed case, although cases have been confirmed in Cambodia and Vietnam. Authoritarianism vs. public health But caution as to the actual factual situation is warranted. Mainland Southeast Asian states that are authoritarian are not used to sharing information. In fact, the authoritarian governments in mainland Southeast Asia worry that any transparency will spark public anger. Indeed, they are often more afraid of their own publics than of an outbreak of the coronavirus. Understandably enough, their inability to share information, as well as the lack of urgency in putting in place effective control measures, is scaring their citizens. The attempt to engage in information control is also making it more likely that the virus will spread. Under pressure, in order to combat the coronavirus more effectively, Vietnam this week finally took some tougher measures. It shut part of its land border with China and cracked down significantly on tourism from China. The wealthier cousins Even in wealthier Southeast Asian states, the response often has been ineffectual and slow. Indonesian authorities have dragged their feet. The country’s health minister Terawan Agus Putranto affected a strange air of nonchalance about the virus. He told the public, “Don’t be anxious. Just enjoy it” (although he seemed to mean enjoy life, not enjoy the virus). He also reminded Indonesians to pray and to think good thoughts. (At least he also told his fellow Indonesians to wash their hands). Thailand flunks the test But Thailand has been the prime example of a Southeast Asian government flunking the Coronavirus test. The kingdom, whose tourism economy relies heavily on Chinese visitors and whose biggest companies have extensive trade and investment links with China, now has the most cases of the virus of any country other than China. All of these cases are Chinese visitors, but a local outbreak is possible. Thailand moved slowly to shut down links to China, probably for fear of hurting diplomatic ties with Beijing and undermining a lucrative tourism connection. The government also dragged its feet on establishing information centers to teach the Thai people about the virus. It also failed to pass out pertinent information about protection at all. The probable cause for this stance is that, although Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha’s government is technically democratically elected, it was effectively installed in power by the 2014 coup regime. It thus only has a narrow mandate. Prayuth remains less popular with the public than the leading opposition leader, and his coalition only took control of parliament following extensive irregularities during and after last year’s election. Even with the power of the military behind him, Prayuth’s own coalition remains unwieldy. Self-defeating information policies When it has informed the public, the Thai government often has put out misinformation that confused people or underestimated the virus. Government officials seemed angered that they even had to be transparent about how they were handling the outbreak. The results have been scary. Thai authorities are warning that there could be virus outbreaks in big tourist centers, like Bangkok and Phuket, which would quickly lead to a spike in cases. When Prime Minister Prayuth came down sick earlier this week, his health minister even rushed to assuage concerns that the he had come down with the coronavirus. As the virus spreads, the kingdom’s initial fumble could cost it dearly.

The coronavirus which originated in Wuhan, China, continues to spread around the globe. New cases are being discovered every day. Last week, the first domestically transmitted cases were reported in Japan, in the United States and in Germany. On Sunday, the Philippines reported the first confirmed death from the virus outside of China. The nations of Southeast Asia have extensive trade, transport and border links to China, and the region is a major travel destination for Chinese tourists, particular during Lunar New Year.  It was thus no surprise that the region was one of the first outside of China and Hong Kong to face coronavirus cases. Nonetheless, multiple several Southeast Asian governments have responded poorly to the spreading pandemic. Thailand in particular has bungled the response, but it is hardly unique. These failures, in turn, have raised the risk of larger outbreaks in their countries. For more on my analysis of how Southeast Asian states are responding to the outbreak, see my new piece in the Globalist.

Coming off a year with critical elections in Thailand and Indonesia, in 2020 Southeast Asians will go to the polls in several important countries. Most notably, both Singapore and Myanmar will hold general elections. Taiwan will hold a general election as well, in January, but I will examine Taiwan’s election prospects in a forthcoming CFR In Brief. Singapore and Myanmar sit at opposite ends of the economic spectrum in Southeast Asia; the city-state is the richest country in the region, and Myanmar is one of the poorest. Their elections, too, will have relatively little in common. In Singapore, the People’s Action Party (PAP), which has dominated the country since independence, will surely be returned to power, although probably with a new prime minister after the vote, current Deputy Prime Minister Heng Swee Keat. Singapore politics has become increasingly contested in the past decade, with opposition parties making modest gains. This year the opposition will include not only the longstanding Workers Party but a new party, the Progress Singapore Party, led by a former PAP member of parliament named Tan Cheng Bock. As a former PAP member of parliament, and a former candidate for the mostly ceremonial presidency, he has a more centrist appeal than the Workers Party, and could potentially draw voters who would never pull the lever for the Workers Party. Still, the opposition will probably be fortunate to keep the tiny fraction of seats it currently holds in parliament, and it is not impossible that the opposition gets shut out entirely. In Myanmar, meanwhile, the election is much more uncertain. Aung San Suu Kyi’s government has not delivered on its economic promises, and instead has fallen back onto appeals to nationalism, including standing up against global criticism of Myanmar’s approach to the Rohingya. This approach has had some effect, domestically, in boosting Suu Kyi’s popularity, and her National League for Democracy (NLD) remains in solid shape for the 2020 elections. The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), the successor to the military’s mass organization during the junta period, still has not become an effective grassroots political party, and its massive loss in the 2015 general election proved difficult to rebound from. It is possible that the NLD’s failures, rising anger against Suu Kyi in some ethnic minority areas, and more effective campaigning by the USDP could work against Suu Kyi’s party in the 2020 contest. However, many ethnic minorities will not want to back what is still viewed as the military’s party, and some voters will instead turn to newly formed parties, like the one set up by former house speaker Shwe Mann. The result could be a parliament with many smaller parties, causing further instability. And the army chief Min Aung Hlaing, who seems to be acting like he wants to become president (while also standing accused of overseeing crimes against humanity) if the USDP and its allies can scratch together enough seats to place him in the presidency, could add another wild card to the equation. One common aspect, however, will be concern about disinformation. In Myanmar, that disinformation largely comes from within. The country has become a hotbed of hate speech and conspiracy-mongering online, often against ethnic and religious minorities—Rohingya, Christian ethnic minorities like the Kachin, and others. Hate speech and conspiracy theories, spread on Facebook and through other online means, helped spark several rounds of killings of Rohingya, including the 2017 ethnic cleansing. In the run-up to the 2020 election, the prospect of more massive disinformation and hate speech looms large. While Facebook has tried to crack down on the sharing of hate speech in Myanmar, the social media giant could take more steps to fight disinformation in one of the most toxic online environments in the world. The government in Naypyidaw, meanwhile, has little incentive to stop disinformation, and the prospect of a combustible election period is high. This year, disinformation might not necessarily be focused on ethnic and religious minorities—it could instead be used against political rivals—but the results could lead to violence, and could spill over and spark attacks on minorities. As James Gomez of the Asia Center in Bangkok has shown, recent election seasons in Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand have included politicians, faith-based groups and other actors using disinformation to mobilize political supporters. He believes that Myanmar could easily fall into the same pattern. In Singapore, meanwhile, the threat of disinformation comes as much from outside the city-state as from within. Singapore faces a growing threat of Chinese influence in its elections and within Singapore society in general. Prominent opinion leaders such as former Ambassador-at-Large Bilahari Kausikan have warned that the city-state must get much tougher in responding to Chinese influence, including expanding efforts to educate the public about Chinese influence operations. Partly due to growing concerns about Chinese disinformation regionally—China has spread disinformation widely in Taiwan—the Singapore government this year passed an anti-fake news law, officially known as the Protection From Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act. However, the law is not only about China. In an environment as controlled as Singapore, the anti-fake news law, which gives the government broad powers to decide what online information is true or not, raises concerns that it will be used not only against legitimate disinformation but also to silence opposition voices. Such silencing could be particularly relevant in the run-up to the general election. Already, Facebook has complained to the Singapore government that the fake news law must not infringe upon free speech, even as Facebook went along with the law and told users in Singapore that a posting by a Singaporean dissident contained false information.

Lawmakers propose $1 billion to replace Huawei equipment in rural networks; Singapore launches ASEAN cybersecurity research center; governments hold social media platforms accountable for content; DOJ renews fight for access to encrypted messages; and backlash in India over proposed facial recognition plan.

In a recent analysis for the Jamestown Foundation, Russell Hsiao of the Global Taiwan Institute presented a thorough and compelling case of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) influence operations in Singapore. Singapore is a critical state for China in Southeast Asia, given the outsized role Singapore plays in regional diplomacy, the fact that it is the only Southeast Asian state with a majority ethnic Chinese population, and the fact that its leaders have an increasingly wary approach to China’s regional assertiveness. Hsiao notes that Singapore long has been a target of Chinese influence activities, through the United Front, through business associations, through clan associations, through Chinese influence over some Chinese-language Singapore media properties, and through other tools. His documentation is thorough, and it notes that, in recent years, China has utilized its influence at times of high Singapore-Beijing tensions, including, as he notes, one critical recent spat: One example was seen in 2016–2017, in which nine Singaporean military armored vehicles used for training in Taiwan were impounded during passage through Hong Kong. Singapore-PRC relations were strained by the incident, but Singaporean Chinese businessmen, who held ties with government officials through grassroots associations and other channels, reportedly provided ‘feedback’ to the government to avoid stirring up trouble with China by continuing to train in Taiwan. But what Hsiao does not explore is the extent to which, in recent years, Chinese attempts to influence Singapore seem to have grown, even compared to the long history of CCP influence strategies in the city-state. These efforts include both soft and sharp power. Singaporean officials believe that Beijing’s efforts to pressure Singaporean Chinese media, despite tough Singaporean media regulations, have increased in the past decade. They further believe that Beijing is boosting attempts to wield influence over universities and think tanks in Singapore; and, they believe that China is expanding people-to-people exchanges, which are tools of both soft and, potentially, sharp power in Singapore. There are further worries among Singaporean leaders that Beijing could increasingly affect Singaporeans’ news consumption and views of regional relations as WeChat becomes even more ubiquitous regionally as a source of conversation and information. And is Beijing’s approach working? In some cases, like the impoundment of the Singapore armored vehicles, China’s influence approach in Singapore may have worked for China. But overall, it remains unclear whether China’s soft and sharp power approaches to the city-state are actually producing a Singaporean populace with more favorable views of China, an environment in Singapore that would make the city-state more willing to go along with Chinese foreign policy aims, or really any shift in the receiving state (Singapore)’s long-term views because of China’s actions. In fact, Chinese influence activities have sparked Singapore to have a tough, open conversation about Beijing’s efforts, and to increasingly improve Singapore’s defenses against influence operations. Singapore, though, is not unique—and other Southeast Asian states are not as prepared as the city-state to evaluate and combat Chinese soft and sharp power strategies. Chinese influence activities are expanding in other Southeast Asian states, as China ramps up both its soft and sharp power approach to the region. In some Southeast Asian states, like Cambodia, the influence is increasingly obvious; Beijing has helped launch a news outlet in Cambodia that appears to be essentially a pro-regime and pro-China tool, and China may have played a role in manipulating Cambodia’s information environment prior to last year’s elections, where Hun Sen took complete control of the country. In other states in the region, too, Chinese soft and sharp power campaigns have dramatically increased in the past decade. I will examine these soft and sharp power efforts in other Southeast Asian states—and whether they are working—more fully in coming blog posts and other longer publications.

Beginning tomorrow, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is in Asia for a trip to Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, three important U.S. partners in Southeast Asia. In addition to bilateral meetings in these states, he will attend the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting in Singapore this coming weekend. Two of the countries he is visiting are going through dramatic political upheaval; Malaysia’s former governing coalition lost power in May for the first time in history, and in Indonesia politicians are gearing up for next year’s national elections, which could give President Joko Widodo a second term, or possibly lead to a government run by an alignment of populist, military, and Islamist forces. In addition, Southeast Asian states have generally been skeptical of several strands of the Trump administration’s regional policy. Even Singapore, a close U.S. partner, has worried that the White House’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” concept, which Pompeo will discuss in detail on the trip, is too binary an idea. Several have worried that the Trump administration could force countries in the region to choose openly between Washington and Beijing, a move that they say would backfire. (Pompeo spoke in detail about the Free and Open Indo-Pacific idea at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on July 30.) Meanwhile, countries in Southeast Asia are worried about escalating U.S.-China trade disputes, and about the White House’s tough trade policies rebounding against them, too, as the administration harangues Southeast Asian states with trade deficits with the United States. The secretary of state surely will spend considerable time, at the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting this weekend, discussing North Korea, and U.S.-North Korea relations, and possibly about other White House priorities like U.S. relations with Iran. (North Korea’s foreign minister will attend the ASEAN meeting.) Regarding U.S.-Southeast Asia relations, however, several aspects of the trip will be important to watch for. (For an excellent overview of the Trump administration’s response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which Pompeo rolled out before the trip, see Alyssa Ayres’s piece on CNN.com.) How Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad responds. Mahathir, who led the surprising May victory over Malaysia’s former ruling coalition, has announced that Kuala Lumpur intends to scrutinize Chinese state-backed projects in Malaysia, and has expressed skepticism about Beijing’s landmark Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure project. (The Wall Street Journal has reported that the Malaysian government is investigating whether funds from BRI were involved in paying off debts in the massive 1MDB scandal.) He also has announced that Malaysia, which had been relatively quiet on South China Sea issues under former Prime Minister Najib tun Razak, will take a more assertive posture to protect freedom of navigation and its interests in the South China Sea. But Mahathir also historically has had frosty relations with senior U.S. leaders, and at times has been vocally anti-American. Will he be willing to push Malaysia toward closer strategic ties with the United States, and will he really embrace the White House’s nascent Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept? China, after all, remains Malaysia’s most important economic partner. Whether any Southeast Asian states publicly endorse the Free and Open Indo-Pacific idea. Not only Singapore but also other Southeast Asian states generally do not want to be pushed into choosing between Washington and Beijing, but many countries in the region also privately share the White House’s concerns about China’s dramatic militarization of the South China Sea, and also about unfair Chinese trade practices. Vietnam, among Southeast Asian states, has taken the most assertive approach to Beijing’s South China Sea claims, and Vietnamese leaders have recently echoed the White House’s framing of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept, as Derek Grossman of the RAND Corporation has noted. Will Vietnamese leaders support the Free and Open Indo-Pacific idea, solidifying Vietnam’s closer embrace of the United States, as part of Hanoi’s multi-faceted strategy of deterrence in the South China Sea? How will Pompeo address issues of rights and democracy? In Malaysia, Mahathir has made restoring the rule of law, cleaning up corruption, and (at least somewhat) curtailing the repression of previous Malaysian administrations, a priority of his. In addition, Anwar Ibrahim, Mahathir’s probable successor, is a longtime democracy activist, and senior leaders of the Malaysian ruling coalition also are prominent rights and democracy activists. Will Pompeo use the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept to focus on rights and democracy regionally, or is a real focus on rights and democracy impossible given the White House’s own focus on sovereignty and general de-emphasis of rights issues in U.S. policy? Similarly, in Indonesia, Pompeo will have an opportunity to address not only the regional democracy regression but also growing challenges to democracy within Indonesia, including from Islamist groups that have become increasingly active in local and national politics.

Donald J. Trump and Kim Jong Un changed the trajectory of the U.S.-North Korea relationship from confrontation toward cooperation and provided dramatic images of reconciliation with their well-hyped June 12, 2018 summit meeting in Singapore. This meeting has bought time to address North Korea’s nuclear threat and reduced the risk of near-term military conflict. But the four points of the joint statement signed by the two leaders underscored the magnitude and difficulty of the work remaining to be done. The document signed by the two leaders for the first time envisioned a normal relationship between the United States and North Korea and reiterated Kim Jong Un’s commitment first made to South Korean President Moon Jae-in in the April 27, 2018 inter-Korean Panmunjom declaration to “complete denuclearization,” and pledged to renew joint work toward prisoners of war/missing-in-action (POW/MIA) recovery of remains from the Korean War. It also authorized a process of follow-on negotiations to be led by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and a North Korean counterpart. By normalizing Kim Jong Un as an actor on the world stage, by pledging efforts to establish “new U.S.-DPRK relations,” and by pledging to curtail U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises, Trump has moved dramatically in the direction of meeting longstanding North Korean demands to end the “hostile relationship” between Washington and Pyongyang and offering security guarantees as a requirement for denuclearization. But Kim Jong Un does not appear to have reciprocated U.S. concessions. This is concerning given North Korea’s track record of pocketing concessions rather than delivering quid pro quos. North Korea reiterated an aspiration to achieve “complete denuclearization” and pledged to destroy a missile engine test site, but the timeline and scope of such a process are not clear. In this respect, the United States appears to have given more than expected, while there are no concrete North Korean actions envisioned that might validate Kim Jong Un’s seriousness of purpose to denuclearize. Meanwhile, Kim Jong Un is being normalized on the international stage despite North Korea’s status as an illegal nuclear weapons state. The joint statement did not directly address North Korea’s missile development, chemical and biological weapons programs, or human rights situation, underscoring the limited time and progress made during technical negotiations. Likewise, U.S. and UN sanctions will stay in place pending tangible progress toward complete denuclearization, although no additional U.S. sanctions will be added. But the symbolism of the meeting ensures that the maximum pressure campaign has peaked and that, in practice, China and South Korea will push for relaxation of economic pressure on North Korea. Nor did the U.S.-North Korea joint statement provide any sense of linkage to the processes between peace and denuclearization or to inter-Korean commitments outlined in the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom declaration. All these issues must go onto the agenda of the Pompeo-led process to come, but the likelihood of rapid progress is not high given the apparent vagueness of the commitments contained in the joint statement between the two leaders. Despite the drama and historic nature of the meeting, the outcome did not live up to the hype. As a result, Trump faces a huge challenge in selling a turn in U.S.-North Korea relations as an historic accomplishment. The best way to do that will be for Pompeo and his team to roll up their sleeves and get back to work, together with our allies, to make a real peace on the Korean peninsula.

With less than one week to go before the first-ever encounter between an American president and a North Korean leader, there is all manner of speculation about whether the historic Trump-Kim summit can deliver even more meaningful firsts: Voluntary abandonment of nuclear knowhow by a relatively weak and vulnerable state, despite decades of efforts cultivating such a capability, and the melting of "the last glacier" of the cold war — that is, the frozen Korean conflict. The opening positions of both the United States and North Korea are long-standing, well-known, and seemingly non-convergent. The US must hold to its demand for comprehensive denuclearization of North Korea to uphold the validity of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), deny North Korea the ability to use the nuclear threat to intimidate South Korean and Japanese allies, and eliminate risks of nuclear proliferation to other bad actors. North Korea seeks a deterrent against more powerful adversaries to guarantee its regime survival and to establish mutual nuclear vulnerability with the United States — unless the United States abandons its "hostile policy" toward North Korea and engages in mutual nuclear arms reductions — as well as to improve its strategic position and standing as a normal and "responsible nuclear state." But because the realization of a US-North Korea meeting has been so unexpected, unprecedented, and personalized, it will provide a unique opportunity for both sides to test their assumptions about the intentions and motivations of the other. Answers to the following questions can help to assess the likelihood of success or failure of the Trump-Kim summit: 1. Can North Korea accept and reciprocate Trump's gesture of reconciliation? North Korea has a reputation for pocketing rather than reciprocating unilateral concessions. By giving Kim the respect that comes with interaction on an "equal footing," Trump has front-loaded symbolic expressions of his intent to improve relations, end the Korean war, and reduce military tensions on the peninsula — presumably in return for North Korea to indicate their intent to denuclearize. Will Kim Jong Un reciprocate, and if so, how? 2. Will Kim Jong Un finally choose between nukes and economic development? As part of his consolidation of power, Kim Jong Un established a policy of simultaneous pursuit of nuclear and economic development. Subsequently, North Korea announced a series of domestic special economic zones, while also ramping up missile testing to over twenty tests per year in 2016 and 2017. As of April of 2018, the country's party line has been amended to focus primarily on economic development on the rationale that North Korea has achieved its nuclear goals. But without additional North Korean cooperation and involvement in implementing a denuclearization process, it's too soon to say that the country has abandoned nuclear efforts. 3. Will Trump end up tacitly accepting a nuclear North Korea? A delicate aspect of the Trump-Kim summit is that the United States is meeting with a de facto nuclear state that desires détente without denuclearization, while the US wants détente in exchange for denuclearization. There is a risk that leaning too heavily into an attempt to end the Korean war and replace it with a permanent peace might change the relationship without addressing the underlying risk that accompanies a nuclear North Korea. Without defining, in detail, a mutual "action for action" process, the United States could change the window dressing around the threat — without getting at the root of the threat itself. 4. Will Trump offer or accept a reduced US commitment to the defense of South Korea? Bringing the Korean War to an end could call into question the purpose and level of American forces needed on the Korean peninsula to meet its security commitments to South Korea. Trump has already indicated that he expects allies not to be free-riders when it comes to footing security bills. As reiterated by Defense Secretary Mattis at the Shangri-la Dialogue, this is ultimately an alliance issue the United States and the Republic of Korea should manage separately from negotiations with North Korea. At the same time, though, reduced tensions will justify tangible force withdrawals if the inter-Korean border is truly to become demilitarized. As part of this process, it would be reasonable to negotiate with Seoul — not Pyongyang. 5. What role should China play in facilitating peace and denuclearization? Since Kim Jong Un's New Year's speech, which marked North Korea's turn toward diplomacy, China has more often than not stood on the outside, looking in. Xi Jinping is a partner of Trump's in sanctions implementation, but China's role in peacebuilding has not yet been clearly defined, and it is making Beijing nervous. The Korean conflict is multi-sided, with peninsular, global (nuclear), and regional dimensions, and all sides must move in tandem if a real resolution is to be achieved. 6. What will happen if the summit fails? Some analysts suggest that, rather than lead to a US-North Korea confrontation, a failed summit will result in renewed diplomatic efforts by South Korea — and possibly others — to restore stability and maintain North Korean restraint, so as to avoid the prospect of renewed escalation of military conflict. Less than two days after Trump initially cancelled his plans to meet with Kim Jong Un, the second inter-Korean summit was held on May 26, which shows the two Korean leaders are able act together, and limit the prospects of the US considering preventive military action. In the event of a Trump-Kim summit failure, the result may be to enhance North Korean dependency on Seoul and Beijing as safety valves against the prospect of renewal of US-North Korea confrontation. This circumstance in and of itself provides a new buffer against the prospect of military escalation in Korea that was not present at the end of 2017. This post originally appeared on Business Insider.

By Hunter Marston Many analysts have noted the advantages Singapore provides as a setting for the upcoming summit between U.S. President Donald J. Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. As Joshua Kurlantzick recently wrote on this blog, “Choosing Singapore reduces the expectations (slightly) of the summit, making it a (slightly) more low-key affair than if the two leaders had met in the DMZ or North Korea where the summit would have been even more dramatic.” The Singapore location, in this argument, may allow the two leaders more time to hammer out some kind of deal, while Singapore’s skillful diplomatic corps and experience with summit could help prevent any gaffes and possibly bridge any divides. But the location of the summit alone will not significantly impact the outcome of this high-stakes meeting; the choice of Singapore may not even have the modest impact on the summit that Kurlantzick predicts. Indeed, optics given Singapore’s neutral diplomatic position (it maintains diplomatic relations with Pyongyang and has close ties with the United States) are unlikely to dictate the summit’s end result. In fact, rather than lowering expectations for the summit, if anything the location significantly elevates North Korea’s prestige by providing an opportunity for the two leaders to meet on an equal footing. Moreover, Singapore’s openness to international media means that coverage of the event will be far more intensive than if the event had been held at the DMZ or in North Korea, where Kim’s regime would have some control of the optics, along with South Korea. From a logistical point of view, Singapore indeed presents an ideal place to hold such a weighty meeting between two bitter adversaries. In 2015, Singapore successfully hosted the historic meeting between former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou and Chinese president Xi Jinping, the first such face-to-face between Taiwanese and Chinese leaders. The city state has a wealth of experience in organizing high-profile conferences bringing together heads of state. The well-known annual Shangri-La Dialogue, which just wrapped up this past Sunday, this year featured a keynote address by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, as well as notable speeches by U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis and Singaporean Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen. Yet Singapore’s eminent status as an economic and diplomatic hub—enhanced by the rush of international journalists filling the country’s hotels—ups the ante for both sides and shifts the world’s attention onto city-state. Expectations are at a fever pitch this week, as U.S. foreign policy analysts have weighed in with a litany of op-eds outlining the prospects for a diplomatic breakthrough – or failure leading to war. As Bruce Jones of the Brookings Institution warns, “The risks of war are higher now than before the drive to the summit.” As Rosa Brooks of Georgetown Law School points out, by denigrating the efforts of past presidential administrations, Trump has significantly raised expectations that he will secure a better deal and in so doing has reduced the likelihood of an agreement that favors the United States. Moreover, the divide in perceptions between Washington and Pyongyang remains acute: each side insists on its own understanding of what a satisfactory outcome for a summit would look like. The White House has doubled down on its definition of “complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization.” But the North has so far refrained from embracing this point. As such, when the two leaders show up to the negotiating table this week, there are no guardrails for the road ahead. As policy analysts have noted, lower-level meetings typically lay the groundwork for such a meeting to finalize certain details by way of a formal agreement. But without certain parameters for the leadership summit in place ahead of the discussion (not to mention the diligent policy work that must take place behind the scenes in a gutted State Department), Trump and Kim may find themselves with little guidance. If the event were to be held on the Korean Peninsula, it would entail certain tradeoffs. If it took place in Pyongyang, Trump would have to bestow Kim the honor of an unprecedented official visit (Bill Clinton had considered such a trip in 2000 but decided against it). If the event took place on the Demilitarized Zone (or DMZ), the focus would remain on the Koreas as host nations with the United States as a foreign interloper. As laid out above, Singapore presents unique advantages for the meeting: world-class security and intelligence personnel, quality infrastructure and luxury hotels, and above all a neutral political atmosphere. Nevertheless, instead of reducing expectations or lowering the potential for drama, Singapore’s attractiveness as a venue for such a high-stakes meeting only elevates the nature of the summit and intensifies the pressure cooker for high-wire diplomacy. Yet few are more adept at controlling the media spotlight than President Trump. That fact may grant some reassurance of the United States’ advantage. But anything could happen with this unprecedented meeting between two of the most unpredictable personalities in world politics. Hunter Marston (@hmarston4) is an independent Southeast Asia analyst in Washington, DC. He co-authored a chapter on Singapore in a forthcoming volume, Asia’s Quest for Balance: China’s Rise and Balancing in the Indo-Pacific (Rowman & Littlefield, 2018).

Among the possible contenders mentioned for the summit between U.S. President Donald J. Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un—Sweden, the Korean DMZ, Mongolia, Switzerland, as well as much more unlikely possibilities like North Korea itself—Singapore was probably the right choice for the event, and ultimately not such a surprising one. The city-state’s diplomatic corps and security and intelligence personnel are highly respected globally and shown repeatedly that they can host a major summit without allowing any significant security or intelligence slip-ups. The city state indeed has for decades hosted a wide range of regional security summits for Southeast Asian states, and, increasingly summits involving officials from across the world. Singaporean officials also have handled, many high-profile bilateral meetings, like the meeting in 2015 between Chinese President Xi Jinping and then-Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou. The country has an extensive array of hotels and other facilities whose staff are used to preparing for major events with tight security. The wealthy city-state also has said that it will assume some of the costs of the summit, a bonus that some other possible choices like Mongolia would not have been able to add. The city-state also is much closer physically to North Korea than other potential sites like Switzerland or Sweden, which makes it easier for the North Koreans to travel. Yet it is not as remote as Mongolia, which possibly would have struggled to host an event of this potential importance. Just as importantly, Singapore—like a number of countries in Southeast Asia—long has maintained ties with North Korea, as well as close links to the United States. Singapore has had diplomatic ties with Pyongyang for more than forty years, and had trade relations, like many Southeast Asian states, until the assassination of Kim Jong-nam, Kim Jong-un’s half-brother, in Malaysia last year and the Trump administration’s campaign of applying greater pressure on the North through further economic sanctions. Before 2016, North Koreans also could travel to Singapore visa-free, which allowed some North Korean elites, including probably ruling party officials, to visit the city-state for services like medical care and shopping, and give them some familiarity with Singapore. Before that killing, and the ramping up of international sanctions on the North for its nuclear program, many Southeast Asian states appeared to be soliciting greater trade ties with Pyongyang, which was beginning to reform its economy and invite in outside investment. Last November, Singapore suspended trade with North Korea. Still, this history of links may make Kim Jong-un and other North Korean leaders relatively comfortable with a summit in Singapore. China and Singapore also have longstanding, if sometimes wary, relations, and Beijing probably preferred Singapore to a summit in Mongolia, Sweden, or Switzerland. Meanwhile, although Singapore is not an official U.S. treaty ally, it is probably, at this point, the United States’s closest security partner in Southeast Asia, as well as a major trading partner. U.S. officials, throughout multiple administrations, generally have a high degree of trust in Singaporean intelligence, political leaders, and diplomats, and have worked closely with Singapore on a wide range of strategic issues. In addition, as some other commentators have noted, choosing Singapore reduces the expectations (slightly) of the summit, making it a (slightly) more low-key affair than if the two leaders had met in the DMZ or North Korea where the summit would have been even more dramatic.

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