Asia

Pakistan

  • Women and Economic Growth
    Malala and Investing in Pakistan’s Breakthrough Generation, From the Classroom to the Workplace
    Nobel Peace Prize laureate and girls’ education advocate Malala Yousafzai returned to Pakistan this past week, her first visit to her home country since she was shot by Taliban militants in 2012. Returning at age twenty to meet with Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi and announce $6 million in funding for education projects through her Malala Fund, her trip is an important moment for both girls’ education and women’s empowerment in Pakistan. With Malala now graduated from high school and studying for her future career, Pakistan’s government and international donors have an opportunity to similarly support all Pakistani girls and women from the classroom to the workplace. Helping Pakistan’s girls to learn, lead, and one day work Even with laudable increases in education spending and twelve years of compulsory education through age sixteen, Pakistan still has thirteen million girls out of school. On average, girls spend less than four years in school and fare worse than boys in some of the most formative years for future earnings. By the time students get to upper secondary, the out-of-school rate for girls is 61 percent. Even worse regional gender disparities hide in national data, as education budgets and delivery are primarily the responsibility of provincial governments in Pakistan. In Balochistan and FATA, 75 percent of girls are out of school. A common explanation given by Pakistani families in rural provinces as to why they don’t send their girls to school is that both the quality of education and their daughter’s job prospects post-graduation are poor. The problem is they are right. Even when girls are in school, they often aren’t learning. Although global north donors continue to press Pakistan to increase domestic education spending, work by researcher and The Citizens Foundation advisor Nadia Naviwala points instead to the culprits of low educational quality, rote memorization and absentee, inadequately trained teachers whose salaries make up close to 80 percent of Pakistan’s education spending. The result: over 55 percent of women over the age of fifteen in Pakistan are illiterate, unable to achieve their potential and unprepared for their future careers. Improving economic opportunities for Pakistani women after graduation Even if girls like Malala are lucky enough to access a quality education and graduate from secondary school, their prospects for earning a living remain dim. In 2016, the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index ranked Pakistan 143 out of 144 countries on women’s economic participation and opportunity, followed only by Syria. Equity and safety at work and in society remain elusive for the majority of Pakistani women. Released this past week, the World Bank’s 2018 Women, Business and the Law report found that women make up only 22 percent of Pakistan’s total labor force. An Asian Development Bank study in 2016 reported that four out of ten Pakistani women say they cannot work because a male family member will not allow them to do so. These gender norms even affect women who earn university degrees, as only 25 percent of women college graduates in Pakistan work outside the home. And when Pakistani women do work, they aren’t permitted to do so in the same industries as men and they have no legal protection from gender-based discrimination in the workplace. When women attempt to build financial standing or start a business, they face challenges men don’t. From different legal restrictions on registering and operating a business to women not being able to apply for a national identity card the same way as men, a step vital to opening a bank account, the playing field is not level. Only 5 percent of Pakistani women over the age of fifteen have a bank account, compared to South Asia’s average of 37 percent. Women’s empowerment drives economic growth In recent years, Pakistan’s government has made important efforts to improve both girls’ education and women’s economic inclusion. Even as traditions that discriminate against women resist change, there are clear opportunities to better girls’ educational outcomes and economic empowerment when girls become women ready to work. Increased secondary school funding and educational quality for girls will not only ensure their fundamental human right to learn, but also prepare them to be productive contributors to Pakistan’s economy. Laws that treat women differently when it comes to workplace equity and safety, economic access and family law can be changed with political will. Pakistan’s federal and provincial governments should do so. International donors have changes to make too, to both leverage aid funding to push for acceleration of gender equity and direct more funding to organizations that serve and are led by Pakistani women. Due to international non-governmental organization bureaucracy and budget complexities, many of these advocacy and direct service groups are considered “too small scale” for investment.  This is a missed opportunity. Like Malala, Pakistani women have long been fighting for change. Storied lawyer and human rights activist Asma Jehangir founded Pakistan’s first all-woman law firm, AGHS Legal Aid Cell, with her sister Hina Jilani, taking on family law that imprisoned abused women in marriages and societal practices that punished rape victims instead of their attackers. Pakistani family law lawyer and digital rights advocate Nighat Dad founded her Digital Rights Foundation in 2012 to fight for women's rights and protect women from work and online harassment. And Pakistani organizations like Karandaaz focus on overcoming the barriers women face when they try to access financial services needed to better their lives. Should donors have any challenges finding Pakistani women to invest in, Malala easily gathered a large room full of them this week. With increased political will and support of local leaders, Malala and her sisters could well be the breakthrough generation of women in Pakistan.
    Blog Post by Meighan Stone April 4, 2018 Women Around the World
  • Afghanistan
    U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan
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    Panelists discuss current U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan and explore other possible military and diplomatic options to address the ongoing conflict.
    Event with Courtney Cooper, Ronald E. Neumann, David S. Sedney and James Shinn March 12, 2018 What to Do About...
  • Rohingya
    The Top Ten South Asia Stories of 2017
    As 2017 comes to an end, it’s time to assess which stories from South Asia had the most impact. By this I mean which events or ongoing developments shaped a country or the South Asian region, or had an outsized effect on the world. This year, a number of stories from the region drew global headlines, including from countries that do not always make front page news. Here are my top ten South Asia stories of the year: 1. The Rohingya Flee to Bangladesh The Rohingya Muslim minority has faced ethno-religious discrimination in Myanmar for decades. In August, this persecution descended into widely-acknowledged ethnic cleansing, with horrific violence perpetrated by the Myanmar military on Rohingya men, women, and children that has shocked the world. More than 655,000 Rohingya have fled the country since August, adding to the more than 210,000 Rohingya already living in Bangladesh as refugees. The International Rescue Committee has called this the “fastest-growing humanitarian crisis in the world.” The problems inside the refugee camps in Bangladesh have attracted less media attention than the stories of brutal violence in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, and the tragic indifference of Nobel peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi to the suffering. But with nearly 870,000 Rohingya refugees in legal limbo, and surviving under rudimentary conditions in Bangladesh’s Teknaf Peninsula, attention should shift urgently to funding the relief operations there, supporting Bangladesh financially so this lower-income country does not have to shoulder the responsibility for the refugees on its own, and identifying a path forward for the Rohingya to find permanent residency in hospitable third countries. (Myanmar will not be able to guarantee their safety, and Bangladesh is not equipped to handle such a large refugee burden.) I place this story at the top of my list due to the depth of the atrocities committed and the scale of the tragedy. This crisis will last well into 2018. 2. India and China Go Eyeball to Eyeball in Doklam, Bhutan In most years, an event in the tiny Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan wouldn’t rise to near the top of a list of the year’s most important regional developments. But this year, the border between Bhutan and China found itself the site of a military standoff between the armies of the world’s two giants (in terms of population), China and India. In mid-June, following the move of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to extend a road in the Doklam Plateau area of territory disputed between Bhutan and China, the Indian Army stepped in to defend Bhutan’s territory and prevent forward territorial seizure by the PLA. The two armies remained in a tense stalemate for almost three months. The situation was resolved only at the end of August on the eve of the BRICS Summit—hosted by China in Xiamen. (The last-minute agreement ensured that the standoff would not mar the summit.) The standoff showed that India will not hesitate to stand up to China when New Delhi perceives that its vital interests are at stake. We have not heard the last of the Doklam dispute: as of mid-December, press reports continue to emerge regarding a Chinese troop buildup in the same general location. 3. India Implements an Ambitious Goods and Services Tax (GST) It took five years to pass a law introducing a national goods and services tax in India. The national tax replaces a plethora of levies and effectively stitches all of India’s states and federally administered union territories into a single market for the first time in the country’s history. As you would imagine with an exercise of this magnitude, progress was tortuous. The 2011 introduction of a GST bill in parliament during the Indian National Congress–led United Progressive Alliance government did not gain sufficient support, and lapsed with the end of the government’s term in 2014. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government introduced a different GST bill, which eventually secured sufficient parliamentary support to pass into law in 2016, and subsequently received ratification by more than half of India’s states, required in order to bring this constitutional amendment into force. On July 1 this year, marked by a special midnight session of parliament, this hard-fought GST finally rolled out nationwide. It was a complicated debut, with multiple tax bands and a bewildering, non-intuitive assignment of goods and services across them. The complexity dented economic activity as businesses struggled to adjust—but as India irons out the wrinkles, it ought to realize the benefits of a unified domestic market with reduced red tape. In its November note upgrading India’s sovereign rating to Baa2 from Baa3, the first upgrade in fourteen years, Moody’s noted the implementation of GST as the first “key element” of India’s “wide-ranging program of economic and institutional reforms.” Consolidating the world’s seventh-largest economy into a single market bodes well for India’s economic growth. 4. Trump Unveils a New South Asia Strategy for Afghanistan In August, U.S. President Donald J. Trump announced the results of a long-awaited South Asia strategy review. Most notably, the administration shifted to a “conditions-based” rather than a “time-based” approach to the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan, and approved a slight increase in troop numbers—but without disclosing the actual number. The administration also bluntly called for an end to the ongoing presence of terrorist groups and sanctuary for them in Pakistan. Finally, the president publicly praised India’s economic and infrastructure support to Afghanistan, and asked for more. Each of these elements represented an incremental rather than quantum change in Washington’s approach to the United States’ longest-running war. But they could nonetheless have important consequences. 5. Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port Reveals the True Costs of the Belt and Road In July, the Sri Lankan government reached an agreement with the Chinese government to essentially hand over operations of the new Hambantota port to a Chinese state-owned enterprise on a ninety-nine year lease deal that gives the Chinese 70 percent of the equity in the operating company, worth more than $1 billion. The port—built in a strategic but commercially unviable location under the terms of a loan agreement from China inked in 2007—has not been profitable, and the handover at Hambantota marked a debt-for-equity swap designed to reduce Sri Lanka’s debt to China. External observers saw the swap as a sign of what Belt and Road infrastructure development deals extract from countries in the long term. These are not freebies. They come at a significant cost to smaller economies. 6. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif Is Disqualified From Office  In July, a chain of events that began with the Panama Papers (private documents of a secretive legal firm that helped hide offshore wealth, provided to a consortium of newspapers by an anonymous source) reached a political conclusion in Pakistan: Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was deemed ineligible to serve in parliament as he could not be certified “honest” and “truthful” given revelations about an income source he had failed to disclose earlier. Pakistan’s Supreme Court rendered this verdict after receiving the findings of a special “Joint Investigation Team” appointed by the court and which included two members of military intelligence agencies. Sharif resigned. His departure from the top office appeared to observers as one more step toward the consolidation of power for Pakistan’s military. Just four years back, with Nawaz Sharif’s election Pakistan could rightly boast of its first successful transition of power from one elected civilian government to another—an important milestone for the country given its history of military rule. Sharif’s efforts to make peace with India, and assert civilian authority, did not succeed. Pakistanis will again head to the polls to elect another national government in 2018, so expect this storyline to remain relevant. But for now Pakistan’s democracy looks shaky as the country’s generals reassert their power over elected politicians. 7. Islamist Protestors Cow the Government of Pakistan Part two in the existential question of where Pakistan is headed involves the continued rise of Islamic extremists. In late November, after weeks of street protests in Islamabad, the government of Pakistan caved to the demands of a few thousand Islamist protestors, and the country’s law minister resigned. The Islamists had accused him of blasphemy following proposed changes (quickly reversed) to the oath of office taken in Pakistan; the Islamists also accused the minister of being a member of the persecuted Ahmadi minority faith as they viewed the proposed change to the oath as beneficial to Ahmadis. Blasphemy is an explosive charge in Pakistan—those accused of it often face vigilante violence, and the offense itself carries a potential death penalty if convicted. In the end, the army negotiated a “truce” with the protestors. The government climbdown illustrated the level of ineffectiveness of the civilian government, the more visible street power of Islamist extremists, and the army’s willingness to side with the extremists even at the cost of discrediting the Pakistani state. 8. Yogi Adityanath Becomes Chief Minister of India’s Most Populous State  In March, after India’s BJP swept state-level assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh, the party’s selection for chief minister gave an indication of where they plan to pivot: to religious nationalism. Adityanath is a five-time member of parliament from Gorakhpur, where he is a monk and head of the influential Gorakhnath temple. Adityanath is also the founder of the Hindu Yuva Vahini, or “Hindu Youth Brigade,” best known for its vigilante street power, and his public oratory has featured tough talk against Muslims, India’s largest religious minority. The BJP’s election campaign in Uttar Pradesh did not project Adityanath as a potential chief minister, so his appointment came as a surprise to many. Observers see his selection as a sign that, in the absence of faster economic growth and much more robust job creation, the BJP has shifted its emphasis from the development-and-governance mantra of 2014 toward hardline Hindu nationalism.   9. Maldives Signs a Free Trade Agreement With China  In early December, the tiny island nation of the Maldives (population: 417,000) signed a free trade agreement with China, becoming the second country in South Asia after Pakistan to do so. (The Maldives’ major export is fish, which the country hopes to send more of to China, and Chinese tourists are the single largest source of visitors to Maldivian resorts.) The agreement surprised New Delhi, and has sparked yet another round of soul searching in India about its regional influence—and China’s growing visibility across the entire Indian Ocean region. (See Hambantota above, and Nepal below). 10. Communists Return to Power in Nepal Nepal held elections in late November and early December, its first under a new constitution ratified in 2015. When all the votes were counted in mid-December, it became clear that a coalition of two Communist parties (one Maoist, and the other Marxist-Leninist) would oust the centrist Nepali Congress from power. Since emerging from a violent insurgency in 2006, Nepal has had a tumultuous time politically—it has had ten prime ministers since 2008—affecting its governance and its ability to deliver services to citizens, including the still-incomplete rebuilding work from the catastrophic earthquake of 2015. The return of a Communist government in Kathmandu will likely mean a further strengthening of ties with Beijing—yet another arena for concern in New Delhi. A pro-China Communist government in Nepal will likely also be less receptive to the Tibetan refugee community living in Nepal. Alyssa Ayres is senior fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations. Her book about India’s rise, Our Time Has Come: How India Is Making Its Place in the World, will be published in January by Oxford University Press.
    Blog Post by Alyssa Ayres December 29, 2017 Asia Unbound
  • Women and Economic Growth
    Can Tackling Childcare Fix STEM’s Gender Diversity Problem?
    Voices from the Field features contributions from scholars and practitioners highlighting new research, thinking, and approaches to development challenges. This article is authored by Rudaba Zehra Nasir, an employment specialist in IFC’s Gender Secretariat. Nasir works with IFC client companies and partner organizations to advance women’s recruitment, retention, and promotion in the workforce through business case research, advisory services, and partnerships, such as SheWorks and Tackling Childcare. Join the conversation online about #TacklingChildcare with @WBG_Gender and @RudabaNasir.
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Women Around the World November 20, 2017 Women and Foreign Policy Program
  • Pakistan
    A Conversation With Shahid Khaqan Abbasi
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    SANGER: Good afternoon, and welcome to today’s Council on Foreign Relations meeting. It’s wonderful to see all of you here, and particularly to welcome the prime minister—still new Prime Minister of Pakistan Shahid Khaqan Abbasi. I can’t think you enough for coming. People often say that United Nations week here is the closest thing to diplomatic speed dating that there is. (Laughter.) So we’re particularly glad that you’ve been willing to give us nearly an hour here to talk through these issues. I’m David Sanger. I’ll be presiding over today’s discussion. And here’s our plan: We’re going to ask the prime minister to speak. He’s agreed to talk to us for just about 10 minutes. We’re just going to do it informally here from the chairs. And then he and I are going to engage in a conversation for about 20 minutes. And we’ve had a little practice at this, because we had the honor of spending a little bit of time with him earlier today. And then we’re going to take questions from all of you. When that moment comes, there will be microphones that will be distributed around, but we want to make sure that the questions really are questions, and short and pithy, so that we can get as many people as possible in on the conversation. So, Mr. Prime Minister, you’ve been in office now for just about a month and a half, right? A little longer. I’m sure it’s seemed longer than that. So we’re interested in your early observations, and then we’ll get into a deeper conversation. ABBASI: Thank you. Thank you for the opportunity. And let me start with the economy. The Pakistan economy has done well in the last four years. All the macro indicators are doing well. The massive investment in infrastructure—highways, power, dams, gas pipelines, LNG infrastructure. We’ve been able to achieve over 5.3 percent growth. And we’ll be looking at 6 percent sustained growth over the next few years. So stability is critical for us. And that’s what we tend to work on. Pakistan is a large market. And I think it will be—it’ll be a growing market. We are projected to have a middle class of about 100 million people by 2025. There are many institutions out there that predict Pakistan to be one of the top 20 economies in the world by 2030. We are a very youthful population. Sixty percent are less than 30 years old. So it’s a big market, consumer market. And we are looking for investment to come in from all over the world. Democracy has taken root in Pakistan. On July 28th, we—when we had breakfast, we had a government. When we had lunch, there was no government. (Laughter.) So— SANGER: It happens. (Laughs.) ABBASI: So we got to the decision that we do not necessarily agree with, but we honored it, got implemented, the prime minister left office. The party met the next day. They took the decision to nominate me as their candidate, and three days later I got elected, and here I am. So democracy and the stability of policy has taken root in Pakistan. We are already vibrant and free press. Most of us believe they’re maybe too free. But that’s the reality. So that is there. The security situation has improved vastly. We have taken the fight on terror to the terrorists. We have fought them. We have defeated them. We have suffered a lot. We have 6,500 martyrs in the army. We lost over 30,000 civilians, 50,000 injured. So it’s been a massive effort. It has been a very vicious war. And today over 200,000 troops are involved in that war to defeat terror on our own soil. We suffered economic losses because of this war. It’s estimated over 120 billion (dollars) of economic losses happened. We are today fighting active war against terror with our own resources. This impression that any resources came from abroad is not correct. We fought the war with our own resources and we defeated the terrorists. And let me say that nobody wants peace more in Afghanistan than Pakistan. This perception that there are sanctuaries is absolutely not correct. We have defeated the enemy on our own territory. We have destroyed the sanctuaries. And today the cross-border incursions, if they happen, are from Afghanistan into Pakistan to attack our forces. We have suffered the terror described, and we are today implementing border management to control cross-border infiltration. We are also playing host to over 3 million Afghans. We at one time played host to over 5 million Afghans. So we have contributed to Afghanistan’s development. We’ve hosted them. We’ve contributed to economic growth in Afghanistan. The regional connectivity that is there—the pipeline projects, the road projects, the power projects—we are working on them through Afghanistan. And we firmly believe that war is not a solution for Afghanistan. That is very clear to us. And we really want Afghan-led solution in Afghanistan, a negotiated solution. And we firmly hope that the Afghanis can sit together and resolve their differences and defeat terrorism on their soil. The relationship with the U.S. is 70 years old. It’s not a relationship that is defined by Afghanistan alone. We have engaged with the U.S. We continue to engage with them to resolve any differences that come up and move forward. And we intend to partner with the U.S. to defeat terror in the area, to find peace in Afghanistan, and provide stability to the region. So that’s my statement. We can go with the questions. SANGER: Great. Well, thank you very much. And let’s pick up on a couple of the themes. So just last month you heard President Trump give his first detailed speech on Southeast Asia, and particularly the American involvement in Afghanistan. But in the course of that speech, he was pretty harsh about Pakistan—harsher, I think, than I would have heard—did hear before from President Obama, who, of course, knew your country pretty well and had traveled in it as a young man, or even from President Bush, under whom Pakistan became a major non-NATO ally; got that designation soon after 9/11. So I’m wondering first if you could give us your impressions of both the president’s speech and of the American strategy for the region, which seemed to be to keep American troops in Afghanistan as in a training role in relatively modest numbers, but for the foreseeable future. There was no—there was no deadline placed on that. ABBASI: Let me just say that we’ve engaged with the Americans, with the American administration. We intend to move forward. The objective is the same: to fight terror and bring peace to Afghanistan. So that’s our policy, and I think our performance on the ground proves that—that we’ve fought terror, we defeated terror on our soil, and we intend to continue with that. There can be differences on how we move forward, but those are differences that can be resolved. We do not believe that there is a military solution to the crisis in Afghanistan. The Afghans have to sit together and resolve the problems. So that’s how we look at that relationship. SANGER: I had the chance this morning to spend some time with President Ghani of—Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan. The story he tells about the state of terrorist activity, and Taliban activity in particular, is at some variance with what you’ve just described to us. He believes there still are sanctuaries in Pakistan. He believes that the Taliban still move fairly freely over the border, that they still have a good deal of their leadership—not all of it—living in Pakistani territory, that there are other terror groups, not just the Pakistani Taliban, not just the TTP, who are based there. It strikes me just listening to you before that you and the Afghans just have a very different understanding of what the basic situation looks like, where the terrorists are located. How can that be? ABBASI: Well, we’re already clear on the situation, that today the only cross-border penetration is from Afghanistan into Pakistan to attack our troops. We have had six suicide attempts in the recent past. Five were Afghan nationals who crossed over into Pakistan and attacked our people, including the deputy chair of the Senate who survived. Twenty-two people were killed in that attack. And we’ve asked the—we’ve told Afghans that if there is any sanctuary that they can give us coordinates for, we will take action against that sanctuary. As far as we are concerned, today no sanctuaries exist on Pakistani soil from which any activity takes place against Afghanistan. SANGER: Hmm. You know, when we say that to American intelligence officials for example, they point frequently to places like Lahore, where they still see activity that they believe is directed at India and elsewhere. They frequently mention a political candidate who is—has declared, though he may not be able to actually run—Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, a militant leader for whom the United States has a $10 million bounty on his head. He’s been in house arrest in Lahore. But when you travel around Lahore these days, you see his picture on political campaign posters. And so Americans say to us, how can the Pakistani government believe that, or expect us to believe that they have rooted out all the elements of terror if somebody like that, who has evaded American capture all these years, is running for office? ABBASI: If you’re talking about Hafiz Saeed, he belongs to a proscribed organization. We have taken action against him. He’s in house arrest. In the recent by-election, the candidate did use his poster, his picture as an election poster, which is illegal to do, and action will be taken against him by the election commission. But he polled about 4 percent of the vote. So we do not condone such activity, and we will take action where it’s required. And we have taken action in the past. He has been under detention for over two to three years now. SANGER: I mentioned before that you of course have the status of a major non-NATO ally, and yet it strikes me that the degree of engagement that I see now between Pakistan and the United States under the Trump administration seems considerably less than what we’ve gotten accustomed to since Pakistan got that status. There used to be a regular strategic dialogue with Pakistan. It seems to be on that list of strategic dialogues that Secretary Tillerson has cancelled. You used to see fairly senior delegations coming back and forth between the two countries. I think the meeting you had with Vice President Pence yesterday was the most senior meeting that we have seen yet between your government and the Trump administration. So tell us just a little bit about where you believe the Trump administration is in its engagement with you, and where you’d like to see that go. ABBASI: Well, we are engaged with them. We’re engaged at various levels. And our objective is the same, to find peace in Afghanistan, to develop the relationship further. And relationships have their ups and downs. I think our narrative is very clear. Our story is very clear. And I think the engagement will continue. And I think any misconceptions will go away. We remain a partner in the war against terror. That’s the basic issue at hand here. We will continue to engage with the American efforts taken to fight the war against terror, and also to find peace in Afghanistan. SANGER: Now, you mentioned to me earlier today that you’re really not eager to see continued American aid, certainly of civilian aid. In this room back in 2009, 2010, we had extensive discussion of the legislation that then Senator Kerry, later Secretary Kerry, was co-sponsoring. Ultimately went through, for $1.5 billion a year in civilian aid, on top of the military assistance. And the idea was to try to normalize the relationship. As you look back on that period of time, was that aid effort fundamentally a failure? I know you say now that you’re not really that interested in getting the aid. ABBASI: We have really—there’s no substantial aid at the present time. And in fact, if you look at the war against terror, we fought it with our own resources. In fact, as I said, we suffered about $120 billion in economic losses. And I was just checking the record, and found we never billed the U.S. forces for ground logistics or for air logistics across our territory. So any conception that there has been a massive support to the Pakistan armed forces is not correct. SANGER: Mmm hmm. Now, the United States was running operations in—toward Afghanistan, but also against terror groups from Pakistani territory. We had significant drone bases in the past in Pakistan. Is it your view that that is a helpful thing that you would like to see continued, resumed? Or would you rather see the United States not operate from Pakistani territory? ABBASI: Well, we—I think all the forces operating in the region have to respect Pakistani sovereignty. That’s the way it should be. We respect Afghan sovereignty, they should respect our sovereignty. And bases are provided as requested. I don’t think there’s a need for bases anymore on our territory. So that relationship continues to be a supplemental relationship for fighting the terrorists in the area. SANGER: Are you right now hosting any American bases on your territory, any American operations? ABBASI: No, no. SANGER: Regular bases? None? ABBASI: None. No bases at all. SANGER: None. And would you oppose having any resumption of drone strikes, other operations from Pakistani territory if requested by the Trump administration? ABBASI: By U.S. drone? SANGER: Yes. ABBASI: No, no. We cannot condone that. We cannot allow that. I think the sovereignty of our territory has to be respected. And this is a decision that only the parliament can make. SANGER: As we discussed earlier today, you are—in your new position, you sit atop the national command authority, which is the Pakistani name for the grouping of government officials who control your nuclear arsenal. There’s no nuclear arsenal in the world that is growing faster. And there’s no nuclear arsenal in the world, other than North Korea’s, that tends to worry American more, because they worry about the safety of the arsenal. They worry about the command and control of the arsenal. In 2015, there was an effort by the Obama administration to try to get into discussions about beginning to control the arsenal. They were particularly worried about what they referred to as tactical nuclear weapons—and I think you don’t refer to them in that way—that they were concerned would be deployed along and near the Indian border. So bring us up to date on the status of these conversations. ABBASI: We have a very robust and very secure command-and-control system over our strategic nuclear assets, and I think time has proved that it’s a process that is very secure. It’s a process that has complete civilian oversight through the NCA. As far as tactical nuclear weapons, we do not have any fielded tactical nuclear weapons. We have developed short-range nuclear weapons as a counter to the Cold Start doctrine that India has developed. Again, those are in the same command-and-control authority that controls the other strategic weapons. So there is no question of it being not in secure hands. Time has proved, and it’s a very secure environment in which our strategic weapons are controlled and held. SANGER: And in your time as prime minister, have you had a chance to go back, then, and sort of reexamine that system to assure yourself, as your—as I know your two immediate predecessors had to, about the security of both the vetting of the people who have the control, the rehearsal of command and control to make sure that you are in the loop, that it’s not entirely left to the military? Have you had a moment to review all of that? I know you’ve only been in office for seven weeks. ABBASI: I can only share the nonconfidential information with you. We have periodic meetings—periodic meetings to review these processes, and those are held on time and as scheduled. So the civilian oversight on the process remains. SANGER: I want to talk a little bit about India and the state of play with your discussions with India. So, first, give us your assessment of what’s happening up along the Line of Control and whether you think you have managed now what had been some pretty tense time up there in recent times. ABBASI: There is Indian aggression along the Line of Control, mostly to draw attention away from the genuine struggle of the Kashmiri people, who have today risen against the Indian occupation there. And we fully support the right of self-determination. We’ve fully supported that at every forum since 1948, and we continue to support that. And that issue should be resolved as per the U.N. Security Council resolutions. There’s no two opinions about that. So we fully support the self-determination rights of the Kashmiri people, and we ask the world community to honor and defend that. And the Indian occupation forces there have committed atrocities which are really beyond belief, and we expect the world community to take notice of those atrocities. These are very serious crimes against humanity in that region. SANGER: And what are your plans and hopes for discussions, your next steps of discussions with the Indian senior leadership? Each one of your predecessors has usually had an initiative of some kind. Some worked, some fizzled out pretty quickly. ABBASI: Well, I think we need to engage on core issues. Those have to be resolved first, and Kashmir is the basic core issue there. But unfortunately, in the recent past the aggression from India has continued unabated, and that is not acceptable. And we want normal relations with India, but on the basis of trust and respect. SANGER: You saw how the United States a decade ago signed an agreement with India that basically looked past their—the fact that they were not members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and opened the way for greater U.S.-Indian trade. I think many in this room would probably tell you that American companies have been disappointed, by and large, with how that’s worked out. But at the same time, your predecessor, Prime Minister Sharif, said to me last year that he—that Pakistan was still interested in trying to negotiate a similar kind of arrangement with the U.S. to what India got in 2006. Have you pursued that? Did you discuss it with Vice President Pence yesterday? ABBASI: That was not part of the discussion yesterday, but that is something that we always raise at various forums, that there should be equal treatment on such issues. And that’s what we intend to pursue. SANGER: But you did not take it up with him. Did he give you any indication of where he would like to take the relationship—both the economic relationship and the diplomatic relationship? ABBASI: This issue is part of our engagement with the U.S., but yesterday’s particularly meeting it was not discussed. But we have raised it and we intend to raise it again. The economic relationship, we want expanded relationship with the U.S. Like I said, it’s a historical relationship. It’s 70 years old. And it should not be Afghan-centric. It should not be limited to Afghanistan only. It cannot be limited to Afghanistan only. But that’s the way that we view that relationship, that we need to grow it and continue it. SANGER: Now, you come to office with something of an unusual resume for a Pakistani official, because you spent 10 years founding what has been a very successful budget airline. And it has managed to be one of the—one of the bigger entrepreneurial successes in the Indian—in the Pakistani landscape. And it is one that I think many in Pakistan sort of wonder what lessons that you were able to bring from your business relationship to the way Pakistan’s economy can operate. So tell us a little bit about what you—what you believe. ABBASI: That’s a fairly loaded question. (Laughter.) SANGER: Yeah. Well, we’re in an era—we’re in an era where it turns out—business leadership turns out to be considered to be an important prerequisite, so. (Laughter.) ABBASI: No, yes it’s working well so far, I guess. But, no, basically this is a dynamic business. So it helps you—decision-making helps—(inaudible)—and very quick. So I think it’s good training for politics in some ways, although I think Mr. Trump’s airline didn’t do so well. (Laughter.) So we can really learn some lessons there. (Laughter.) SANGER: Well, as I said to you earlier, you know, there is no single qualification that I think a Pakistani leader could have that would win more points with President Trump when you have a moment to go sit down with him than your business experience. But truly, in Pakistan one of the complaints that you frequently hear is that there’s still too much state control of the economy to this day. And I’m wondering what your plans are along those lines. ABBASI: I think those complaints are a thing of the past. In fact, there is probably a need for regulation now that did not exist before. So we have demand in several sectors to have a regulator which can help the industry grow, instead of unregulated expansion. So the government controls are very minimal in Pakistan, and we continue to reduce them as needed. We, for instance, have actually started the process of deregulation in Pakistan, of limiting state controls, back in 1990. And we’ve continued that process. He started privatization in Pakistan, very successful effort at privatization, and that has continued. Only a very few government-owned entities remain to be privatized today. SANGER: Tell us a little bit about the internal politics right now in Pakistan. There was a sense when you were placed in this job that you might be in something of a caretaker role until someone else in the Sharif family got elected—Prime Minister Sharif’s brother—and might be able to run for office. Do you view yourself holding this office and running anew for several years? What’s your own plan? ABBASI: Well, I’m here because my party decided to put me here. So, after the June 4 elections—and we hope to come back to power—the party again will decide. So it’s basically a decision by the party, and we have a very robust working committee of the party where these issues are discussed in detail and decisions taken. So I think this is a decision that lies with a party, not with a person. SANGER: But if you had your way, you would stay in this job for a number of years, do you think? Are you enjoying it— ABBASI: Well, you should never ask a politician that. SANGER: A-ha. (Laughter.) ABBASI: Exactly. (Laughs.) That’s a difficult question to ask. SANGER: Difficult to answer. They’re very easy to ask. (Laughter.) ABBASI: I can tell you I did not aspire for the job at that time. I was a reluctant candidate for the job. I can tell you that. SANGER: Yeah, so I understand. Good. Well, let’s open this up to a discussion with our members here. There are microphones around, so we’ll ask that you wait until a microphone gets to you, because we are livestreaming this so we want to be able to make sure that everybody—I guess we’ll start right here with this gentleman. Q: Hello, Mr. Prime Minister. I’m Ken Roth from Human Rights Watch. And my question concerns Pakistan’s blasphemy laws. I think you know just this past Thursday a Christian man was sentenced to death for a posting of a poem on WhatsApp that was deemed blasphemous. And just two months before that there was a young man who was sentenced to death for blasphemous—allegedly blasphemous content on a Facebook chat. You know, before that a Christian couple sentenced to death for a blasphemous text. And even the interior minister this past March said that blasphemers are enemies of the people, which has fomented some of this mob violence against alleged blasphemers. So my question to you is: As prime minister now, would you speak out against the blasphemy law, and certainly about this harsh application of blasphemy with death sentences and mob violence and the like? ABBASI: The laws in the country are very clear, and it’s only up to the parliament to amend the laws. The job of the government is to make sure that the laws are not abused and innocent people are not prosecuted or prosecuted. So that’s my primary job. There has been debate on this issue in the provincial assemblies and in the national assembly, but it’s only up to the parliament to amend or change the laws. SANGER: If I could just follow up quickly on that question, certainly it is up to the parliament, but you’re in a position of both great political and moral leadership now in your post as prime minister. And I think the core of the question was whether or not the leaders of Pakistan are willing to go stand up to what seems to be, at least through American and Western eyes at time(s), death sentences for what would clearly be protected speech in much of the rest of the world. ABBASI: Well, I cannot comment on what is the law of the country. As I said, the only amendment that can happen to that law can be done by the parliament, and there are two houses to the parliament. SANGER: But you can speak out on this issue. ABBASI: Well, as I said, the law is there. The law is in place. The law is in force. The courts can comment on the law. But until it’s in—it’s in force, it’s the job of the government to enforce the law. SANGER: OK. Right here. Ma’am. Q: Masuda Sultan, Insight Group. I was wondering, you talked a little bit about the role of India, the way that the Trump administration sees it. I was just wondering what you think the role of India should be in Afghanistan. ABBASI: Zero. (Laughter.) India—we don’t foresee any political or military role for India in Afghanistan. I think it will just complicate the situation and it will not resolve anything. So if they want to do economic assistance, that’s their prerogative, but there’s no—we don’t accept or see any role politically or militarily for India in Afghanistan. SANGER: Do you see a business role for them in Afghanistan—as investors, as— ABBASI: That’s up to them. All countries have the right to trade with each other, invest in other countries. So if they want to do that—and India has invested in Afghanistan in the past. SANGER: Ma’am. Q: Carolyn Maloney, Congress. What does Pakistan need to do, and what does India need to do, to achieve peace? ABBASI: I think the basic issue is Kashmir. And we—the implementation of the Security Council resolution will be a great starting point, that that will help address each other’s concerns and provide peace to the region and—between Pakistan and India. That’s the core issue that is just between our two countries. SANGER: Sir. Q: Thank you. Prime Minister, as I listen to you talk about U.S. aid, I began to wonder if you had something else in common with our current president besides a business background, namely also some alternative facts. As I understand it, $23 billion in U.S. aid was spent between—in Pakistan between 2001 and 2013. And my source on this is not the U.S. government, it is the nation, in Pakistan. The money has gone, among other things, in the civil assistance, of which there was $8 billion—just the Benazir Income Support Program and the reduction of maternal and child mortality—two of the successes of your government. What this means, in other words, is money had been going from the pockets of people in this room to the shalwars of people in Pakistan. Now we don’t really begrudge it, but are you telling us that this didn’t happen and are you telling us that you wouldn’t care if it was cut? ABBASI: I think the question— Q: Remember that you’re on the record and that the administration may be listening. ABBASI: Yeah, no, I have no issue with that. The question was on military assistance. So I said the military assistance is very limited at the moment. In the past, if you want to do an accounting of the past, that can also be done. But I’m telling you that today, for example, over a million sorties are flown by coalition aircraft through Pakistan territory, and we never bill for that. Millions of tons of equipment moves through Pakistan territory on the ground. We never bill for that, because we believe in the war against terror. We supported that coalition, we continue to support efforts to bring peace to Afghanistan. So if we want to go back into history and start accounting for how many dollars were spent, Pakistan, as I said, post-9/11, the most conservative numbers: We lost $120 billion in economic growth. So—and that—if you relate to the American economy, it’s probably—it’s close to like $5 trillion in equivalent terms. So these are not small numbers for Pakistan. SANGER: Now you’ve mentioned the military aid, but I think your question also went to the civilian aid programs. Are you saying that you want no more civilian aid as well, or do you want to continue those programs? ABBASI: Well, the civilian aid programs continue. USAID has done tremendous work in Pakistan, and especially in my old ministry, they assisted us with the LNG program, and were very successful. So those programs have worked. But you must also remember that most of the aid was given when there was no democracy in Pakistan, when there was a military dictator, when 9/11 happened, and most of this funding happened at that time. Was it good funding or bad funding? That only history will judge. But the reality is that the people of Pakistan really did not benefit much from those efforts. So I think that’s why we today do not talk about aid. We want the U.S. government to assist where we are able to provide a better future for our people, to assist in programs which are beneficial globally, and to assist in the war against terror. As I said, before the war against terror, we had all these sources. There’s been a tremendous—there’s been a huge effort. It’s not a minor effort. We fought the—we fought the costliest, the longest, and the deadliest war against terror that Pakistan has ever seen. And I—without any doubts today, if there’s one country fighting terror on the ground, it is Pakistan. SANGER: Straight back on the aisle there. Q: Omeed Malik, Bank of America Merrill Lynch. For the benefit of those who don’t follow Pakistani domestic politics as closely, could you distinguish your vision for your country from Imran Khan? ABBASI: I think both the parties have manifestos. We—as you talk about morality in politics—we believe in mutual respect between politicians. We believe in the sanctity of the ballot. And we believe in political change at the ballot box and not through the court system. I certainly hope Mr. Imran Khan and the other politicians of the country will also agree with that. And it’s only the people of Pakistan who will judge. And the people of Pakistan will have the right to judge next summer. SANGER: Young lady in the very back row there. Q: Holly (sp) with FoxNews.com. I just wanted to find out, is there any updates on the progress of releasing Dr. Afridi. And if you can comment at all on his health condition, which has been in the news as not great. SANGER: Just for everybody else in the audience, we’re referring to the doctor who had participated in a vaccination program and was also considered to be perhaps central to the location of bin Laden during the bin Laden raid in 2011. ABBASI: Dr. Afridi is in detention and under trial for violating the laws of the country. And as far as I recall, there’s no health issues with Dr. Afridi. SANGER: Tell us a little more about what— ABBASI: His family has been meeting him, I believe, yeah. MR.     : Yes. No health issues and his family has been meeting him. SANGER: Tell us a little more about what laws Pakistan believes he may have broken and whether you believe in the end the core reason that he is in detention is because he may have aided American forces in identifying bin Laden, who your predecessor said was not on Pakistani territory. ABBASI: Well, we certainly didn’t have knowledge of Osama bin Laden being there. And we only wish that we would have been taken into confidence so that any action would have been mutual. But Dr. Afridi was a practitioner of medicine in the polio program. And he should have been doing his job. If he had any knowledge, and brought to Pakistani security, they would have taken action. SANGER: Can you imagine an alternative scenario in which he might be treated as a national hero? I mean, he helped you rid the country of a known terrorist that you said you were searching for. ABBASI: Well, he was violating many laws in the country. So we have to uphold the law. Like I said, if he had any knowledge, he should have brought it to the knowledge of the Pakistani agencies who were available in that area. SANGER: Also on the back row. Q: Mr. Prime Minister, this is Asid (sp) from Voice of America. I have two short question. First is, you have a very robust suggestion from you of joint monitoring of Pakistan-Afghanistan borders. If Pakistan military is on board on this suggestion, and what is the response from Kabul, as you have met with Mr. Ghani as well? And second question is, you yourself and your top Cabinet members, they are advocating, like, to bring house in order. What does that really mean? What is a problematic area you want to fix? ABBASI: Well, as far as the border is concerned, the border management is concerned, we are putting up a fence in parts of the border. It’s an expensive proposition. We are open to any suggestions with the funds we have. We propose joint patrol. We propose joint posts. Like I said, there’s 350 kilometers of the border today where there’s not a single Afghan soldier. And that has become a safe haven for infiltration by drug lords today who at random cross the border through our territory, move through our territory. We pursue them. But when the border is uncontrolled, it’s difficult to do that. And what is the other question that you had? MR.     : House in order. Q: (Off mic.) ABBASI: Oh, the house, yeah. The house in order means that Pakistan has to come first. That’s what we mean, that we want peace in Afghanistan, we want stability there, but Pakistan’s needs and Pakistan’s security has to come first for us. I think Pakistan has suffered enough in the security efforts in that area, and that has gone unappreciated. At the end of the way, whenever these events have taken place in the region, the people who have suffered the most are the people of Pakistan. I just gave you the numbers, of the number of casualties that we’ve had, and those are not small numbers. So we just ask for appreciation of this by the Afghan people and the world community at large. SANGER: Gentleman right back there. There’s a microphone coming to you. Q: Mansoor Ijaz. Mr. Prime Minister, it’s good to see you again after so many years. My question is, you answered a question about the nuclear program earlier, and you gave a very clear understanding of how the civilian and military compartments in Pakistan take care of the security there. But the world doesn’t worry about it quite in the same way. The world paints a picture of extremists that could get their hands on either nuclear assets or unregulated fissile materials, which are a big problem in Pakistan as well. Could you help us to understand and put our minds at ease as to how you deal with that problem? And secondly, given the frosty relations between the U.S. and Pakistan right now, might it be a moment where you could stand up and help us deal with the North Koreans in some way, shape, or form? ABBASI: As far as Pakistan’s nuclear program is concerned, I made it very clear that the command-and-control systems we have in place are as secure as anybody else’s in the world, and the last 20 years are testament to that. So let there be no doubt that any extremist element or somebody like that can gain control of fissile material or a nuclear weapon. There is just no possibility of that. And it’s time-tested, and it’s a very secure system that has been put in place. And it has civilian oversight, which is very critical, we believe, to the whole process. So Pakistan, I think, is a responsible global citizen, and we’ve shown a responsibility on the ground with this huge war on terror that we’ve been fighting for the last 15 years. SANGER: I think part of his question was about unregulated fissile material. You are now building a fourth plutonium reactor. That’s a very large number of plutonium reactors for a country the economic size of Pakistan. There is a concern that you’ve got the fastest-growing nuclear program and nuclear weapons program in the world. Is there a reason it needs to grow at this pace? ABBASI: We have diversified our power generation to add nuclear to it, and these are the four Chinese reactors that are operating. There are three that are small reactors, 340 megawatts each. So I don’t think it’s a source of major concern for anybody. SANGER: The source of concern is not the addition of the reactors, it’s what you might do with the plutonium waste that comes out of it, which of course can become weapons material. Are you willing to commit that none of the waste coming out of the commercial reactors will be used for the weapons program? ABBASI: No, we do have nuclear capability. There’s no doubt about that. And we know how to handle nuclear waste. We had a nuclear program in the early ’60s, one of the first countries— SANGER: You did, mmm hmm. ABBASI: —in Asia to have a nuclear program. So if we’ve managed it for over 50-odd years, I think we can continue to manage it. SANGER: The question I was asking was not whether or not you’re concerned about—or a concern about the management, it’s whether or not the plutonium waste that comes out of those civilian reactors would then be built in to build a new generation of nuclear weapons. Can you commit that the civilian reactors will not be used for the nuclear weapons program? ABBASI: I don’t have the specific numbers on how much nuclear waste is produced. I think only experts can provide information on that. But we are very responsible in that respect, and time has proved that. SANGER: OK. Right here. Q: Thank you. Robert Scott, Adelphi University. Thanks for being here. My question is about the role and responsibilities of prime minister. In assuming your post, to what degree are you able to fill positions, keep those with important institutional memory, or create new posts responsible for some of these newer issues, whether it’s relations with India or terrorism or nuclear program, et cetera? ABBASI: The authority and the responsibility of the prime minister is defined in our constitution and the subordinate laws and the regulations. And it’s very clear what the prime minister can do. Generally, the prime minister cannot take independent decisions in these matters. They have to be done by the Cabinet itself. It’s government by Cabinet. So that’s how we have operated and we continue to operate. As far as filling positions is concerned, the prime minister does have some authority. But again, there’s a process under which those—the candidates are scrutinized and the positions are filled. SANGER: First you, then we’ll work our way right down the line. (Laughs.) Q: Yes. Mr. Prime Minister, my name is Roland Paul. I’m a lawyer. I was in the U.S. government a couple of times. Would you say a few words about the Haqqani Network in Pakistan, and its relationship, possibly, with the ISI? ABBASI: The Haqqani Network—we’ve heard a lot about the Haqqani Network. But the fact remains that there are no bases from any of these networks to operate. So whether the network is there or not is—can be discussed and debated. But the reality remains that we do not condone any activities by any organization to pose a terrorist threat within Pakistan or to export it to other countries. We do not accept that. We do not condone that. And we will move against any such effort, especially to move across the border to Afghanistan. So I think you can rest assured that such activity is not condoned by the government of Pakistan. Q: Herbert Levin, Council member. In New York, we have a number of Waziri and other people from the tribal areas. And they complain that they are neglected by Islamabad, both in terms of representation in the government and also for budgets for schools and things. What do you think the future is of the integration of the tribal areas into real Pakistan? That’s one question. The other question is, I don’t know if you ever took the bus trip to China, but I really wonder what the future is for Pakistan’s economy over those mountains through China. They’re great railroad builders, but I really wonder how you view that. ABBASI: Well, as far as our tribal areas are concerned, last week we moved the first-ever law in Pakistan to start the integration process for the tribal area into the rest of Pakistan, and to have the laws of Pakistan apply to the tribal areas. We started that process. It has general support within the political community and the people of FATA. The process is not easy. This is a system that has been there for over 100 years. But one of the elements to bring it into force is equalize the tribal area with the rest of Pakistan economically and as far as the infrastructure is concerned. So a tremendous amount of money has been committed for that. That process will start as soon as the parliament approves that bill. So Pakistan today is committing to integrating the FATA, the Federal Administered Tribal Areas, into Pakistan. The CPEC is a major part of our economic development today. Over $60 million have been committed. And as I mentioned earlier, power plants are being built, highways are being built, other infrastructure is being built, industrial zones are being built. And it will evolve. Gwadar is a key part of—port of Gwadar is a key part of that, the CPEC process, and the trade into western China is also a key part of that process. And this is all a part of the One Belt, One Road initiative of the—in fact, today it’s the only visible part of that initiative that the Chinese have undertaken. We have a long economic relationship with China. If you recall Dr. Kissinger, when he visited China for the first time in ’70, Pakistan supported that effort. And it’s part of the history which ties China, the U.S., and Pakistan. SANGER: Gentleman in the back corner there. Q: (Off mic)—from Reuters. I wanted to ask about your meeting with Vice President Pence, and if anything was agreed to during that meeting in terms of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. I also wanted to ask about calls from Afghan President Ghani and for, you know, more integration between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and how that might look or be different from previous attempts. ABBASI: As far as Afghanistan is concerned, we’re open to any proposal, any suggestion which brings peace to Afghanistan. That’s been our bottom line since this whole process started. Yesterday’s meeting with Vice President Pence was actually the first with the U.S. administration, and basically to listen to each other’s viewpoint and find a way forward. And we put out a press statement after that. It was, I believe, a meeting that will allow us to engage each other more constructively and move forward. SANGER: Sir? Right here. Q: Thank you. Jeff Laurenti. I appreciated very much your recycling of a term that President Trump used ad nauseum yesterday in saying that your sovereignty won’t allow you to accept American drone bases in Pakistan. But in rejecting any potential Afghan-Indian political role or cooperation, you seemed to suggest that Afghanistan didn’t enjoy quite as much sovereignty. So I wonder if you could share with us what you think Pakistan’s role is in helping secure and guarantee a peace settlement. And with these Taliban whom American drones keep finding on your side of the border—and often dispatching to their eternal reward—what do you think is keeping those Taliban from being willing to negotiate with the government in Kabul? And how can Pakistan help in bringing them to negotiate seriously on a peace agreement for Afghanistan? ABBASI: I think a basic fact was lost here that the Taliban are Afghans. So it’s up to the Afghan government how to deal with them. And the border is fluid. There’s a lot of cross-border movement. It has been there for centuries. Like I said, we are attempting border management through our own resources. We want the Afghans to also manage their own border. Because, like I said, today there is a substantial amount of cross-border movement by elements who are based in Afghanistan to attack our troops and our installations across the border, and that is not acceptable. And that’s the issue we’ve taken up with the Afghan government at various levels. So we want to work with the Afghan government to find peace for Afghanistan, because peace for Afghanistan means peace for Pakistan. That’s what we—and I think that’s something that is often overlooked. We have 3 million plus Afghanis in Pakistan today. That’s not a small number. SANGER: We are down to just our last few minutes, so we’re just going to take one or two more questions. We’ll take the gentleman right back here. Q: Mr. Prime Minister, this is Azim Mian from Geo TV, Pakistan. And my question is, in the context of President Trump’s new revised Afghan-Pakistan policy announced last month, are you willing to go extra miles to reengage the United States and put your relationship back on the track? Thank you. ABBASI: I think I already mentioned that it’s a partnership against terror. It’s a relationship that goes beyond Afghanistan. It’s 70 years old, and we view it in that context. And we are engaged today. We want this relationship to move forward. And I don’t see any obstacles in that process. SANGER: We have time for just one more. We’ll take the gentleman right back here on the aisle. ABBASI: There’s a lady here with one. SANGER: Oh, is there? ABBASI: Yeah, front row. SANGER: OK. Q: Prime Minister, this is Nassir Kayum (sp) with Channel 24. My question is to you, today you met with the World Bank president on the—and you discussed with the World Bank president on the water issue going on between Pakistan-India. Do you see any breakthrough in the near future on this issue between Pakistan-India? ABBASI: There’s an agreement, consensus, or a solution, (but not released ?) on the technical issues. So there are provisions in the agreement on how to resolve that. So—and that’s been our stance from day one, that the issue should be resolved as per the provisions of the agreement, which are very clear. And I think the World Bank also appreciates our viewpoint. So there’s no—it’s a legal issue now. And it can be resolved within the context of the agreement. SANGER: Truly last question, right here. Microphone’s coming to you. Q: Thank you. Thank you very much, Prime Minister. My name is Lee Cullum. I’m a journalist from Dallas. And we appreciate your taking time to come by today. And, David, thank you for giving us quite a lot this afternoon. About five months before she was assassinated, Minister Bhutto sat on that same stage and pleaded for American help to go home and run for office again. What do you know now about how she was assassinated, and especially the role of then-President Musharraf, who some say didn’t provide the security that might have helped? ABBASI: It’s an issue that unfortunately remains unresolved. The court case continued. Mrs. Benazir Bhutto’s own party came to power. They were there for five years. The issue still remained a mystery. Recently the court, a trial court, has taken a decision, which is questioned by many. So there will be appeals. In fact, Mrs. Bhutto’s party has filed an appeal in the high court against that decision. So it’s a legal process which continues. And it’s our job to implement whatever decisions the court has. It was a very sad incident for Pakistan. She was a political icon. And I think with great respect—she had great respect all over the world. It was a very sad event in Pakistan—(inaudible). So that’s how we view it. SANGER: Well, Mr. Prime Minister, I can’t thank you enough for spending a full hour with us, answering questions from so many on such a range of issues. We hope you’ll come back again on your next trip back to the United States, and appreciate your being here. (Applause.) ABBASI: Thank you. I’d just make one more statement, then— SANGER: Sure. ABBASI: Just a—just an off-the-cuff remark. It’s about the tie. I went to school in California. So in California, the said you only wear a tie on the day you get marry or you die. (Laughter.) So it’s neither of those events, so. (Laughs.) SANGER: If I could be king for a day, that would be my rule. Thank you. (Laughs.) (Applause.) (END)
    Event with Shahid Khaqan Abbasi September 20, 2017
  • U.S. Foreign Policy
    The Not-So-New "New" South Asia Strategy
    President Donald J. Trump outlined last night the much-anticipated strategy his administration will adopt in Afghanistan, now the United States’ longest war. Trump placed Afghanistan in the context of the larger U.S. fight against global terrorism and mentioned the rise of the Islamic State as the result of a political vacuum in Iraq after the American withdrawal. By placing his Afghanistan decision against the chaos that emerged in Iraq, Trump clarified why he had changed his mind from his initial “instinct,” as he put it, to simply pull out. He then offered three “pillars” that would characterize the “new” U.S. efforts, which would include the deployment of an unspecified number of additional troops. These new pillars include: the end of a time-bound commitment to Afghanistan and a pivot to a “conditions-based” evaluation instead; the integration of “diplomatic, economic, and military” approaches; and a changed approach to Pakistan, especially the continued problem of terrorist safe havens there. He then added that the growing U.S.-India strategic partnership would also be a “critical part” of the South Asia strategy, and welcomed greater Indian economic assistance for Afghanistan. These pillars are not so new, actually. To me they suggest a gear shift drawing upon trends already perceptible. While a conditions-based presence differs, for example, from former President Barack Obama’s earlier time-bound troop surge, the deterioration in Afghanistan’s security had already resulted in an Obama administration rethink on a complete withdrawal according to the previous timeline. Second, the integration of diplomatic, economic, and military efforts is decidedly not new—it simply recognizes the reality that military power is just one tool that has to be in support of some political goal. Trump’s indication that “perhaps it will be possible” to find a political solution between the Taliban and the Afghan government—coupled with Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s more direct statement on a path to a political negotiation—again indicates continuity with the Obama administration’s approach. The combination of a more counterterrorism-focused approach in Afghanistan without a stated timeline for withdrawal could, theoretically, prevent the Taliban from just waiting the United States out and could help create conditions more conducive to a political negotiation. The president’s blunt remarks on Pakistan’s terrorist safe havens publicly affirmed a problem that has become increasingly unsustainable. Pakistan has been a victim of terrorism, but that fact does not absolve the country of its selective efforts to go after terrorists on its soil. In early August, for example, a Pakistan-based terrorist group under longstanding UN Security Council designation, active against India and Afghanistan, took steps to register itself as a political party without any previous indication of renouncing violence. Pakistan has not upheld its obligation to prevent all terrorist elements from operating on its soil. U.S. members of Congress and executive branch officials have already begun to call out Pakistan for its terrorist safe havens, and former Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter as well as Secretary of Defense James Mattis have been unable to certify that Pakistan is making “sufficient” efforts to target the Haqqani network. So the Trump emphasis on tightening up on Pakistan marks a stepped-up continuation of a trajectory that has been driven by Pakistan’s choices. The elevation of India to a more prominent position as part of the larger U.S. strategy in the region marks to my mind the most significant departure from the past. But Trump stated up front the role that India has already been playing in Afghanistan—India is and has been the fifth-largest bilateral donor to the country, and has been a supportive partner to Afghanistan over the years. India has been deeply involved in building infrastructure such as roads, hospitals, and the Afghan parliament; training officials; providing food assistance; and contributing other forms of much-needed development support. We should be doing more with India to support Afghanistan, including helping to shore up its challenged government. Questions unanswered in the new Trump administration strategy: At what point, and how, will the diplomatic effort kick in to “support an Afghan peace process,” as Tillerson’s statement put it? How will the State Department, enfeebled by a lengthy restructuring and without a full complement of senior officials to run policy, let alone complex diplomacy, execute the responsibility? What role will the Trump administration see for all of “Afghanistan’s neighbors,” as Tillerson stated, in this peace process? These questions will need answers quickly or the “new” South Asia strategy will be left with a military component in search of its diplomatic partner. My book about India’s rise on the world stage, Our Time Has Come: How India is Making Its Place in the World, will be out in January. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa. Or like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa).
    Blog Post by Alyssa Ayres August 22, 2017 Asia Unbound
  • Afghanistan
    Trump’s Path to Indefinite Afghan War
    President Trump’s much-anticipated Afghan policy rightly avoids troop withdrawal timelines but offers little prospect for progress against the durable Taliban.
    Expert Brief by Max Boot August 22, 2017 National Security and Defense Program
  • Pakistan
    Weak Link in Afghanistan Strategy: Pakistan, Still Not Serious About Terrorism
    Nearly sixteen long years on, the United States still struggles with how to devise a strategy for success in Afghanistan. The Donald J. Trump administration’s ongoing strategic review, according to press accounts, remains in a cycle of developing new options. Those presented so far have not earned the president’s approval. It’s possible to deliberate for months over the right troop levels, clearly. It is also possible to deliberate over the appropriate mix of military strategy, diplomacy, and development, especially given the reduced weight the Trump administration appears to place on the latter two. But in all honesty, it’s hard to see what combination of troops, aid, and statecraft will overcome the continued problem of terrorist safe havens in Pakistan. Pakistan’s strategic location has given it a vital role in the war in Afghanistan, despite the widespread recognition by U.S. officials that it remains insufficiently focused on addressing the many terrorist groups operating from its soil. During his visit to Islamabad in April of this year, National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster said, “…we have hoped that Pakistani leaders will understand that it is in their interest to go after these groups less selectively than they have in the past and the best way to pursue their interests in Afghanistan and elsewhere is through diplomacy not through the use of proxies that engage in violence.” In July, Secretary of Defense James Mattis declined to certify that Pakistan had taken “sufficient action” against the Haqqani network operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Without the certification, Pakistan cannot receive additional coalition support funds from fiscal year 2016. Secretary Mattis’s action mirrors that of former Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter last year, who declined to certify Pakistan’s “sufficient action” against the Haqqani network, thereby limiting the coalition support funds Pakistan could receive. In the White House, the top official on the National Security Council staff managing Afghanistan, Deputy Assistant to the President Lisa Curtis, has deep expertise on Pakistan and, prior to entering the Trump administration, published widely on the country’s terrorism problem. She coauthored a major report last year that argued for strengthening conditions on assistance to Pakistan to “more effectively contain, and eventually eliminate, the terrorist threats that continue to emanate from the country” that threaten vital U.S. interests, including stabilizing Afghanistan. A national security advisor, a secretary of defense, and a deputy assistant to the president with a clear-eyed view of the threat terrorists in Pakistan pose to U.S. interests—you would think officials and generals in Pakistan might take greater, more credible action against terrorists given the high-level concern from senior Washington policymakers. But earlier this week, news emerged from Pakistan that the organization headed by Hafiz Saeed, an individually-designated terrorist on UN sanctions lists, has registered as a political party with the name Milli Muslim League. This group, the Lashkar-e-Taiba, has been under UN terrorist designation since 2005. In 2012, the United States issued a $10 million reward for information leading to the arrest of Saeed, the “suspected mastermind” of the Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008, for which not one single accused has been brought to justice in Pakistan. (Trials have been continually delayed since 2009.) The group is active in Afghanistan—President Ashraf Ghani has named it among the terrorist groups fighting against his government. The fact that despite these designations, Saeed and compatriots continue to operate unfettered in Pakistan is well known. He is presently under house arrest, but that does not seem to have curtailed his group’s activities and ambition. How can a designated terrorist group register itself as a political party and declare ambition to contest in Pakistan’s 2018 national election? The idea that a UN- and U.S.-designated terrorist group long under international sanctions could suddenly march over to the Election Commission of Pakistan and morph into a political party is ludicrous. The Pakistani government cannot expect that anyone will believe claims that it is sufficiently countering terrorism in their country if terrorists under well-known, longstanding international sanctions not only escape justice but shift out of the shadows to the political arena. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa. Or like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa).
    Blog Post by Alyssa Ayres August 10, 2017 Asia Unbound
  • Pakistan
    Is There Any Way to Help Pakistan Improve Governance?
    Last Friday, under a narrow and never-before-utilized clause of the Pakistani constitution, one focused on moral probity, Pakistan’s Supreme Court deemed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif ineligible to be “an honest member of parliament,” and thereby ineligible to hold office as prime minister. He resigned. The decision emerged from processes unleashed by the Panama Papers, in which undisclosed assets held by Sharif’s family members came to light. The Supreme Court decision strangely cited the nondisclosure of income from a company his son owns in Dubai as the reason for the moral probity finding. (Sharif’s lawyers said he did not receive such income). On the surface any effort to rein in corruption in a land that suffers badly and widely from it should be a positive step; Transparency International gives Pakistan a 32 out of 100 (0 is “highly corrupt” and 100 is “very clean”) on their Corruption Perceptions Index, giving it a rank of 116 out of 176 countries. But this convoluted dismissal instead raises questions of why such a process took place at all, and what it means for the country’s still-weak democratic institutions. As former Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States Husain Haqqani tweeted, the decision kept the country “faithful to its 70-yr tradition: No PM ever removed by voters; only by judges, generals, bureaucrats or assassins.” It also raises questions about the selective pursuit of Sharif under this constitutional clause. And it further raises questions, given the relatively quick pace of this probe, about why the trials of the accused perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks remain in a state of constant prolongation for nearly nine years. Is justice never served for terrorists in Pakistan? As analysts within and outside of Pakistan sought to unpack what this unprecedented decision holds for the country, and indeed for U.S. relations with Pakistan, we ought to reflect on the larger picture here. The decision will not improve U.S.-Pakistan ties, so we are left with either a continued status quo of a very difficult, complex relationship, or a further deterioration. Against this backdrop, what should the United States do, if anything can be done, to help Pakistan strengthen its democratic institutions? As is well known, the United States and Pakistan have long had close bilateral ties, even if the relationship has been a roller coaster, including with periods of outright antagonism. Pakistan has been a U.S. ally and presently holds the status of a major non-NATO ally. The U.S. Agency for International Development has been active with Pakistan since the country’s founding, and has provided nearly $8 billion in development assistance alone in the past decade. (That figure does not include security assistance, a separate topic.) I have written previously about the counterintuitive finding that Pakistan now fares worse on most major development indicators than Bangladesh, a country that seceded from Pakistan in 1971. Bangladesh remains poorer and with significant political turbulence, but still has managed to prioritize improving the lives of its citizens. It’s hard to say that Pakistan has placed the improving the lives of its citizens at the top of its agenda, compared with its overemphasis on the military. And despite decades of U.S. government funding to nudge it in a direction of development outcomes, it turns out that the outcomes aren’t that great in the governance and rule of law indicators. The data tool available on ForeignAssistance.gov allows an aggregation of these indicators over time, so there’s a real comparison to be made. To look at the question of corruption and rule of law, I selected three important indicators from the dataset for Pakistan: rule of law, control of corruption, and government effectiveness. I pulled the results from 1996 through 2014, the most recently available year. Here’s what I found: These indicators, drawn from World Bank data, represent a “scaled” score ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, with 2.5 as the “best.” On rule of law, Pakistan fares slightly worse in 2014 than it did in 1996, slipping from -0.67 to -0.78. On control of corruption, it has improved, with its score increasing from -1.15 to -0.81. On government effectiveness, things have grown worse, falling from -0.59 in 1996 to -0.75 in 2014. So over a nearly twenty-year period, Pakistan has fared better fighting corruption—although it still remains below the zero “even” point—and it has gotten worse on overall rule of law and governance issues. It’s harder to download the foreign assistance funding data for the same period, but we can explore on an annual basis the breakdown of foreign assistance funding from FY 2006 through FY 2017. The table below draws from the annual funding (planned) allocations to illustrate the dollar amounts and percentage of U.S. aid that has gone toward strengthening democracy, human rights, rule of law, and governance in Pakistan. For most of these fiscal years, the peace and security category constitutes around half of all U.S. aid to Pakistan. As the table above illustrates, over the last decade, support for democracy and governance at best constituted 10 percent of U.S. funding, but most years it hovers around 6 to 7 percent. It raises the question: how best should the United States allocate its assistance dollars to shape better outcomes in Pakistan? Would a greater degree of support for democracy, human rights, and governance—rather than the heavily peace-and-security-sector focused patterns of the past—help nudge Pakistan toward more improvements where it needs to strengthen its governance and rule of law? There isn’t enough information here to suggest any causation between how Washington allocates assistance dollars and indicator outcomes in Pakistan, but the discussion is worth opening. I would argue that it is high time for Washington to dial up its attention toward these pressing governance problems in Pakistan, since there is plenty of room to dial down the heavily security-centric relationship that has dominated U.S.-Pakistan ties. I base this recommendation on the fact that what we have tried over the years has not succeeded on the security front, nor obviously on the governance front, so ought to be revisited. The Donald J. Trump administration’s initial FY 2018 budget proposed to hold steady the foreign assistance levels for Pakistan. With that in mind, the United States should have a more active debate on the allocation of that foreign assistance funding and the prioritization of programs on which it is spent. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa. Or like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa).
    Blog Post by Alyssa Ayres August 2, 2017 Asia Unbound
  • India
    India Objects to China's Belt and Road Initiative—and It Has a Point
    The grandiose Belt and Road Forum—a symbol of China’s foreign policy stepping-out as a global connectivity visionary—kicked off on May 14 with a notable absentee: India. On May 13, India’s Ministry of External Affairs released its formal response to a question about Indian representation at the Belt and Road Forum, attended by “nearly three dozen” heads of state and dozens of senior officials from around the world. It’s worth reading in full. The statement abandons the typical language Indian officialdom crafts to be as inoffensive as possible to the greatest number of countries. Citing India’s commitment to physical connectivity “in an equitable and balanced manner,” the statement itemizes a series of principles for infrastructure projects that sound like a World Bank investment monitoring report: “must be based on universally recognized international norms, good governance, rule of law, openness, transparency and equality” “must follow principles of financial responsibility to avoid projects that would create unsustainable debt burden for communities” “balanced ecological and environmental protection and preservation standards” “transparent assessment of project costs” “skill and technology transfer to help long term running and maintenance of the assets created by local communities” “must be pursued in a manner that respects sovereignty and territorial integrity” India obviously believes that Belt and Road projects do not meet the above criteria. India’s statement also closes with a kicker focused on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC): “No country can accept a project that ignores its core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity.” India’s objections to CPEC have been repeated and vocal. The crux of the issue concerns the transit pathway that will link western China to the plains of Pakistan and then through to a new deep-water port at Gwadar. The only way to get from western China to the heart of Pakistan is through the Karakoram Highway, a high-altitude transport corridor that in many ways could be called the twentieth-century blueprint for the Belt and Road Initiative. The highway was built by China and Pakistan, beginning back in 1959. It opened in 1979. The highway runs through territory now called Gilgit-Baltistan (earlier termed the “Northern Areas”) that was originally part of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. India and Pakistan both claim the entirety of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, though it is Pakistan’s claims to the Srinagar Valley that tend to occupy international public attention as the “Kashmir Conflict,” not Indian claims to other parts of the territory which Pakistan presently administers. (The history of this territory is complex; for historical details, see Cabeiri deBergh Robinson’s recent book.) This territory and its history explain the objection to CPEC, but India’s public statement also noted concern for “financial responsibility to avoid projects that would create unsustainable debt burden for communities.” Here, too, the China-sponsored infrastructure developments in neighboring Sri Lanka offer an instructive lesson. Numerous infrastructure projects, negotiated in secret by the former Sri Lankan government of Mahinda Rajapaksa, saddled the Sri Lankan treasury with debts to China estimated at some $8 billion. Sri Lanka cannot repay what it owes, so it has negotiated a debt-for-equity swap of the Hambantota Port project. This has led to protests in the country. With other projects financed by China proliferating, under unclear terms and with the prospect of similar bills due down the line, India’s external affairs ministry has a good point. China’s Belt and Road Initiative is not a gift to the world. It is a vision that has a price tag—known to Beijing. That lesson is worth remembering. But whatever the merit in India’s view, the global response to the forum shows that it has few takers for the moment. This post originally appeared on Forbes.com. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa. Or like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa).  
    Blog Post by Alyssa Ayres May 17, 2017 Asia Unbound
  • India
    How India Can Help in Afghanistan
    National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster will head to Afghanistan, and reportedly Pakistan and India as well, this weekend. In the wake of Thursday’s Massive Ordnance Air Blast bomb drop in Afghanistan, targeting Islamic State cave-and-tunnel hideouts on the border with Pakistan, McMaster will have much to discuss with his Afghan interlocutors on the security front. The Donald J. Trump administration will need to reach a decision soon about the size of the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. Worrying trends in Afghanistan, like the fall of Sangin to the Taliban just weeks ago, underscore the need for a reassessment. The presence in Pakistan of internationally-proscribed terrorist groups like the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network undermine efforts to secure Afghanistan. Challenges to political stability, governance, and economic growth make it harder for Afghanistan to deliver opportunities for its citizens. The country could use assistance from all its partners on its economic growth and prosperity agenda. Once he arrives in New Delhi, McMaster should have in-depth discussions with his Indian interlocutors on regional stability. He will likely find that Indian officials view the situation very similarly to American officials, but may have different prescriptions due to their regional position and difficulties with neighbor Pakistan. He should use the opportunity to discuss how India—the fifth-largest bilateral donor to Afghanistan, and a power with deep expertise on governance, development, infrastructure, and commerce—could be a larger part of the international efforts to assist Afghanistan. I have argued previously that India can bring to the table some special strengths in addition to the infrastructure work it has carried out in Afghanistan. India could play a more active diplomatic role with the politically-delicate Afghan government—a unity government that the International Crisis Group has called “shaky.” International observers worry that the possible collapse of the Afghan government could risk its progress on security and development. New Delhi has an opportunity to use its good offices and ties with both President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah to help. As the region’s economic vortex, India and its successful private sector companies can continue to assist Afghan enterprises with markets for their goods and training to manage their businesses. India’s chambers of commerce have been active on this front for years.  Last summer’s Made in Afghanistan trade fair in New Delhi marks just one example. Of course, enabling trade across the South Asian region would bring a commercial boon to Afghan producers, and here Pakistan has a chance to take advantage of its location and enable region-wide trade, not block it as it has continued to do. India’s expertise in the arena of civilian security has been largely overlooked, but the country has capabilities—especially in training and skill development—which could be helpful to Afghanistan. Greater budget support for the Afghan National Security Forces would be welcome. In addition, the kind of training capacity on issues like countering improvised explosive devices, or security support functions like literacy training, logistics and supply-chain management, or military medicine, to name just a few, present possibilities for Indian expertise to help the Afghan security forces. For a more detailed description of how India could help Afghanistan in the civilian security areas, take a look at my Policy Innovation Memorandum on the subject, published in 2015 but (sadly) still relevant to the region today. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa. Or like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa).    
    Blog Post by Alyssa Ayres April 14, 2017 Asia Unbound
  • Politics and Government
    The Deep State Mirage in Turkey
    This article was originally published in the Cipher Brief on Wednesday, March 22, 2017.
    Blog Post by Steven A. Cook March 23, 2017 From the Potomac to the Euphrates
  • Heads of State and Government
    The (Not-So) Peaceful Transition of Power: Trump’s Drone Strikes Outpace Obama
    [Note: This post was updated to reflect additional strikes in Yemen on March 2, March 3, and March 6.] As a candidate, President Donald Trump was deeply misleading about the sorts of military operations that he would support. He claimed to have opposed the 2003 Iraq War when he actually backed it, and to have opposed the 2011 Libya intervention when he actually strongly endorsed it, including with U.S. ground troops. Yet, Trump and his loyalists consistently implied that he would be less supportive of costly and bloody foreign wars, especially when compared to President Obama, and by extension, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. This might be true, but nonetheless the White House is considering deploying even more U.S. troops to Syria, loosening the rules of engagement for airstrikes, and increasing the amount of lethal assistance provided to Syrian rebel groups. By at least one measure at this point in his presidency, Trump has been more interventionist than Obama: in authorizing drone strikes and special operations raids in non-battlefield settings (namely, in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia). During President Obama’s two terms in office, he approved 542 such targeted strikes in 2,920 days—one every 5.4 days. From his inauguration through today, President Trump had approved at least 36 drone strikes or raids in 45 days—one every 1.25 days. These include three drone strikes in Yemen on January 20, 21, and 22; the January 28 Navy SEAL raid in Yemen; one reported strike in Pakistan on March 1; more than thirty strikes in Yemen on March 2 and 3; and at least one more on March 6. Thus, people who believed that Trump would be less interventionist than Obama are wrong, at least so far and at least when it comes to drone strikes. These dramatically increased lethal strikes demonstrate that U.S. leaders’ counterterrorism mindset and policies are bipartisan and transcend presidential administrations. As I have noted, U.S. counterterrorism ideology is virulent and extremist, characterized by tough-sounding clichés and wholly implausible objectives. There has never been any serious indication among elected politicians or appointed national security officials of any strategic learning or policy adjustments. We are now on our third post-9/11 administration pursuing many of the same policies that have failed to meaningfully reduce the number of jihadist extremist fighters, or their attractiveness among potential recruits or self-directed terrorists. The Global War on Terrorism remains broadly unquestioned within Washington, no matter who is in the White House.
    Blog Post by Micah Zenko March 2, 2017 Politics, Power, and Preventive Action
  • India
    Pakistan: Defeat Is an Orphan
    What ails Pakistan? A new book from former Reuters correspondent Myra MacDonald shows how the country’s chronic struggle to somehow best India has instead led to deleterious results on all fronts. I had the chance to interview her by email on her compelling book, and our exchange appears below. 1. You have structured this as an account of multiple defeats in what you term “the Great South Asian War.” Some of these defeats are tactical, such as with the India-Pakistan peace talks, or the Kargil War, but it becomes clear by the end of your book that you mean this as a larger metaphor for a “Great War” that only exists in the minds of Islamabad and Rawalpindi. Pakistan is “blinded,” as you say, to how the world has changed around it. How did you come to see so many episodes—of terrorism, of failed peace talks, the military standoff in 2001–02—as moments in this larger story of a profound defeat? There were two questions here that needed to be untangled. The first is about how well the Pakistani state serves its citizens relative to India. The second is about the domestic power struggle within Pakistan. Since the military has successfully retained its political and economic preeminence within Pakistan, how much does it matter that Pakistan’s external position relative to India has declined? I tried to find yardsticks to assess both: historically, what assumptions were made about how well the Pakistani state would serve its citizens, and what expectations did the Pakistan Army have of the policies it followed? On the first question about the Pakistani state, you have to go back to Partition to set benchmarks about how it was expected to perform relative to India. Implicit in the creation of Pakistan was an assumption Muslims would be safer in a separate country. There was also an expectation that a country run along Islamic principles of social justice would be fairer than one dominated by the Hindu caste system. Those assumptions took a serious hit in 1971 with East Pakistan breaking away to form Bangladesh. But even after 1971, Pakistan was able to retain a sense of superiority over India – its economy continued to perform much better than the Indian state-planned economy. It is only very recently that India began to emerge as a rising economic power. In terms of Indian GDP per capita, this rose above that of Pakistan only in 2009. Such is India’s current trajectory that we can now argue its success relative to Pakistan is irreversible. Thus by the standards Pakistan set itself at Partition—that its citizens would be better off in a separate country, or at least as well off as those in India—the Pakistani state has failed. Not only is it unable to offer its citizens the same promise of economic development, it can’t even offer them security. On the second question about the fortunes of the Pakistan Army within Pakistan’s domestic power struggle, it’s certainly true that the military has come out on top both politically and economically. But I’d argue that the Pakistan Army has fallen well short of its own expectations. This is particularly striking if you look at the period since the nuclear tests in 1998. Among the army’s assumptions at the time were that it would continue to be able to influence events in Kashmir and Afghanistan while managing Islamist militants well enough to keep them from turning on Pakistan. In 1998, Pakistan could still appeal to those Kashmiris who wanted to break away from India, while it dominated Afghanistan through the Taliban. Nowadays, Pakistan is too near to becoming a failing state to act as a magnet to Kashmiris and it is hated in Afghanistan for its role in supporting the Taliban. It has lost control of a sizeable number of jihadis who have turned on the Pakistani state. As such, I don’t subscribe to the argument that the Pakistan Army is a rational actor that has manipulated rivalry with India in order to maintain its own domestic dominance. In numerous episodes, from Kargil to Mumbai, it has suffered from such overreach and miscalculation that it has failed to meet the strategic aims it set for itself. 2. You situate Pakistan, with its sights set on India, as a supporter of jihadists that ultimately grow out of the Inter-Services Intelligence’s immediate control, and whose jihad itself globalizes to open up new fronts. (I had not known of al Qaeda in Iraq founder Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s time as a jihadi in Afghanistan, for example, or the links between North African terrorists and the assassination of Northern Alliance’s Ahmed Shah Massoud.) Why has it been so hard for Pakistan to change direction on this policy of supporting violent jihad? The question of how far Pakistan controls jihadis is subject to an intense debate that will run and run. I disagree with those who imagine the existence of an “on-off switch” that the Pakistani state just needs to flick in order to end the problem of jihadi violence. The different jihadi groups operate along a continuum with some supported by the Pakistani state, some potentially subject to its influence, and others well beyond its purview. Too much thinking is still stuck in the era of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, leading to an assumption that anywhere Islamist militants are active, they must have deliberate state support. But the global jihadi movement has been out of control for years, at least since the 1990s when it flourished in the cracks opened up by the end of the Cold War. Pakistan’s inability to change direction on jihadis stems from several factors. The first is its unwillingness to give up Islamist militants that can be used to counter India, whether in Kashmir or Afghanistan, The second comes from the factor mentioned above – that jihadis are impossible to control fully. The Pakistan Army says it fears that if it turns against all Islamist militant groups at once, they might join forces in a coalition that will threaten the Pakistani state. This fear is partly legitimate, though it also acts as a cover for ongoing support for anti-India groups. It is quite hard to tell where the line lies in Pakistan between unwillingness to disarm militants and inability to tackle them all. I fear that the army itself doesn’t know for sure. This brings me to my third point, which I find the most worrying. The multiple players who make up the Deep State in Pakistan have constructed an ideological environment in which jihadis flourish. The Pakistan Army can manipulate some of these players or deploy them for its own purposes. But I am not convinced it knows how to drain the ideological swamp since that would require a complete rethink of how it defines Pakistan as a state. In other words, even if the willingness to disarm all militants were there, the Pakistan Army doesn’t have the imaginative capacity to know how to get underneath the problem. 3. In a particularly poignant chapter looking at Pakistan’s relations with the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, you observe that Pakistan had “overstated an external threat while underplaying its self-created domestic problems,” leading to the alienation of so many ethnic groups within the country itself. Is it possible, in your view, for Pakistan to rebuild itself domestically if it does not abandon its external focus? It’s going to be extremely difficult for Pakistan to rebuild itself domestically. Rather like the frog in water that is boiled slowly so that it doesn’t jump out, Pakistan has deteriorated relatively gradually on multiple measures from economics to development to security to international standing. The likeliest outlook is that the situation in Pakistan never becomes so bad that it is forced into a paradigm shift, even as it continues to offer less and less to its citizens. On the domestic front, the status quo still benefits enough people, both in the armed forces and among the elite, for them to resist changes that would threaten their own privileges. In an ideal scenario, the democratic process will be allowed to mature to the point that ordinary citizens begin to demand more from the state. But I don’t see that happening for a long time and the country probably needs new political leaders to help it along. We’ll also have to see what happens now that China’s influence is growing in Pakistan with its investment in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. In the past, China has been impatient with Pakistani adventurism against India and it has no ideological sympathy for jihadis. But nor does it have much interest in nurturing democracy. Former Reuters journalist Myra MacDonald’s new book, Defeat is an Orphan, bluntly assesses Pakistan’s myriad woes as a conundrum of its own making. (Photo courtesy of Myra E. MacDonald) 4. Near the end of the book, you make the case that Pakistan’s attempts to “wrest control of the Kashmir Valley had come to nothing….it had sacrificed the interests of its citizens while propping up an overly powerful army and spawning a dangerous collection of jihadis on home soil. The nuclear weapons it had believed would prevent the Valley slipping out of its grasp had instead encouraged a recklessness that drove a Kashmir settlement permanently out of reach.” What, if anything, could lead Pakistan to stop this recklessness and focus on the domestic needs of its own citizens, usually the most important obligation for a state? I’d love to see more critical thinking from the Pakistani elite that focuses on the needs of the country’s citizens. As long as Pakistan styles itself as a champion of the global ummah, you’ll still end up seeing more outrage about, for example, Israel’s behavior towards Palestinians or India’s treatment of Kashmiris, than about human rights abuses and poverty within Pakistan itself. The country also desperately needs to rewrite its school textbooks which currently stress a hyper-nationalist and anti-Hindu view of history. In an ideal world, the media should also be contributing towards a more nuanced understanding of the origins of the Kashmir dispute. I’ve argued in my book that Jammu and Kashmir has been badly served by both India and Pakistan. But given the importance accorded to Kashmir in Pakistan, it’s disappointing that the media continues to parrot a simplistic Pakistani state line that dates back to 1947. As I have argued in the book, no solution on Kashmir is possible, if ever, until Pakistani society is prepared for the possibility of compromise. 5. Washington comes in for some tough criticism in your book—as a “damaging foreign entanglement” for Pakistan during the Cold War, and also as a naïve power willing to believe that General Pervez Musharraf was a bulwark against Islamists all while he undermined secular politics. What would you recommend to Washington policymakers as an alternative approach? There’s no magic bullet. If the carrots and sticks of the past 16 years or so failed to convince Pakistan to change course, nothing will. Nor is there any obvious punitive action that can bring Pakistan to its senses. Don’t forget this is a country that was cut in two in 1971 and responded by becoming more nationalist and developing nuclear weapons. In the recent period, it has been willing to countenance the deaths of thousands of its own citizens in pursuit of its “good Taliban/bad Taliban” policies. India needs to learn this lesson too – if the United States with all its economic and military muscle couldn’t force Pakistan to change, nothing Delhi does will make much difference either. The best the United States can do is to stop expecting Pakistan to change and be realistic. It should not imagine that if it makes itself vulnerable to Pakistani influence, for example by sending more troops to Afghanistan who need to be supplied through Pakistan, that it can expect a different outcome from the one it has seen since 2001. I’m not in favour of cutting aid to Pakistan altogether. Washington needs to maintain just enough aid to retain some influence in the country. It is also going to have to work with China on Pakistan, regardless of tensions between Beijing and Washington elsewhere. Finally, the United States could be less mealy-mouthed about calling out Pakistani support for Islamist militants. The diplomatic cover Washington has given Pakistan since 2001—rarely saying in public what it says in private about Pakistani support for jihadis—has only alienated allies in Afghanistan and India and fed confusion among the Pakistani public. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa. Or like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa).
    Blog Post by Alyssa Ayres February 24, 2017 Asia Unbound
  • China
    Trump and Chinese Investment, Pakistan’s Missiles, Indian Lychee Illness, and More
    Rachel Brown, Sherry Cho, Lorand Laskai, Gabriella Meltzer, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Trump doesn’t like China, but does he like Chinese money? President Donald J. Trump will soon face some important decisions on Chinese investment in the United States. Trump will need to decide whether to approve a plan by Alibaba’s Paypal-like subsidiary Ant Financial to buy U.S. payment processor MoneyGram, or block the acquisition on national-security grounds. On the campaign trail, President Trump indicated that he would block Chongqing Casin Enterprise Group’s planned acquisition of the Chicago Stock Exchange. China bars foreign investment in a number of sectors, such as finance and cultural production, even though Chinese conglomerates in these industries, many of which are partly or wholly state-owned, are aggressively pursuing large acquisitions abroad. A number of policymakers believe the asymmetry is unfair. In its annual report, the bipartisan Congressional-Executive Commission on China wrote that the U.S. government would need to decide whether “market access for Chinese investors in news, online media, and the entertainment sectors [should be] conditioned on a reciprocal basis in order to provide a level playing field for U.S. investors.” Still, there are factors that might lead Trump to soften his tough-on-China approach, not least of which is Trump’s budding friendship with Alibaba founder Jack Ma. In addition, China foreign direct investment in the United States reached a record $45.6 billion in 2016. If Trump wants to stimulate job growth, he might need all the help he can get. 2. Pakistan ramps up missile tests. Last week, Pakistan conducted the first flight test of its Ababeel missile, a nuclear-capable, multiple-warhead, surface-to-surface ballistic missile with a range of 2,200 km (1,370 mi)—far enough to reach most of India, portions of western China, and a number of countries in the Middle East. The trial flight came soon after another test earlier last month of the Babur-III submarine-launched cruise missile, which the Pakistani military called “a major scientific milestone.” Pakistan’s attainment of second-strike capability and a strong nuclear deterrent marks a ratcheting-up of tensions in the region, particularly with India. Though Pakistan cannot match India’s spending on convention arms, notes one Pakistani commentator, it is taking a different route to bolster its ability to deliver a credible response. The fact that the two countries share a contentious land border makes it more likely that a small-scale altercation may spin into a much larger escalation of force. In January, for example, Pakistani officials threatened to use nuclear weapons should India invade Pakistani territory. It is also possible that U.S. President Donald J. Trump may escalate tensions in the region by declaring Pakistan a “terrorist state,” but only time will tell. 3. Researchers solve mysterious illness in Indian children. For over two decades, roughly one hundred seemingly healthy children in the northern Indian state of Bihar each summer suffered seizures and lost consciousness—roughly half of whom died—confounding local doctors. A new study published in Lancet Global Health solves this medical mystery. Researchers from the National Center for Disease Control in New Delhi and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention investigated children admitted to the hospital Muzzafpur in 2014, and discovered that their ailments were caused by eating lychee fruit on empty stomachs. Lychees contain hypoglycin, a toxin that inhibits glucose production in the body. The poor children in this lychee-producing region were consuming the fruit without eating dinner, leaving their blood sugar levels low and vulnerable to the effects of the toxin. As a result of these findings, local authorities have encouraged parents to feed their children evening meals and limit the consumption of lychees. 4. Singaporean activist awaits asylum review. After arriving in the United States in mid-December, teenage Singaporean political activist and filmmaker Amos Yee received a brief court hearing this week, but may remain in detention until March when his full hearing occurs. Immigration authorities have detained Yee near Chicago in the McHenry County Jail since he requested political asylum. He traveled to the United States after being imprisoned twice in Singapore in relation to multiple YouTube videos with inflammatory political and religious content that he produced. In one video entitled “Lee Kuan Yew Is Finally Dead!”, he described the deceased prime minister as “a horrible person” and compared him to the “power hungry and malicious” Jesus Christ. More recently, he produced videos bashing Islam and Christianity. Last year, when he was just seventeen, Yee was convicted for “wounding religious feelings.” His confrontational rhetoric ran antithetical to the Singaporean government’s emphasis on multicultural inclusion. Ironically, when Yee first arrived in the United States, the New York Times suggested his opposition to political correctness would mesh well with the attitudes of Donald J. Trump; now, President Trump’s immigration ban could derail ongoing bids for asylum. 5. Myanmar’s military-commercial complex draws concern. The 2016 lifting of U.S. economic sanctions against Myanmar was hailed as a momentous step in the country’s liberalization. However, critics warn of the Burmese military’s embedded power and sprawling commercial interests in the newly opened economy. Enterprises such as the Myanmar Economic Corporation, an opaque defense ministry-owned conglomerate nominally specializing in strategic sectors like port operations and telecommunications, and Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd., a military-run conglomerate with sprawling interests as diverse as cigarettes and construction, have arguably the most to gain after the return of civilian government. The arrival of international companies, many in consumer industries, has brought in more than $30 billion in foreign investment since 2011. Tempted by the financial prospects under Aung San Suu Kyi’s civilian-led administration, military-affiliated companies have made a public effort at rebranding. Nonetheless, for many who remember the years of profligate corruption, widespread land-seizure, and human rights abuses under the military junta and military-backed government, the continuing role of the military at the very core of the state economy is troubling. There are hopes that the entrance of U.S. multinationals in particular will raise standards for rule of law, accounting, labor rights, and environment governance, but such reassurances do little to allay criticism of the continuing influence of military-linked companies and their ties to troubled industries such as those for jade, rubies, and drugs. Bonus: Gold goes green for 2020 Tokyo Olympics. Organizers of the 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games in Tokyo announced this week that award medals will be sourced completely from recycled consumer products. The Japan Environmental Sanitation Center has partnered with NTT Docomo, the country’s largest mobile phone operator, to place collection bins in 2,400 Docomo stores throughout Japan to solicit donations of cell phones, cameras, laptops, and other e-waste. Organizers estimated that millions of old devices—around eight tons’ worth—will be required to gather enough metal to craft the 5,000 medals. In the past, including at the 2016 Rio Games, medals have only been partially sourced from recycled materials. The 2020 medals, according to one Japanese gymnast, “will be made out of people’s thoughts and appreciation for avoiding waste.” The strategy is not only a nod to Japan’s commitment to recycling, but also a move to cut costs: by one recent calculation, the Games could cost up to 2 trillion yen ($18 billion), or 2.5 times the initial estimate. And despite the good intentions, the eight tons is only a drop in the bucket of the millions of tons of e-waste produced in Asia every year.
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Asia Unbound February 3, 2017 Asia Unbound