Asia

Pakistan

  • India
    Former N.Y. Times Correspondent in South Asia Says Indian Prime Minister Hoping to Resolve Kashmir Dispute Before Term Ends
    Celia W. Dugger, a former co-bureau chief for The New York Times in South Asia, says that Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s surprise move to ease tensions with Pakistan— like India, a nuclear power— suggests that he is trying to resolve the Kashmir crisis before stepping down next year. Dugger, the Edward R. Murrow Press Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, says that Vajpayee is likely to be replaced as prime minister by a much more hawkish successor, and so “I think the only window of opportunity here— and my guess is this is part of India’s calculation— is that the Pakistanis have to know that Vajpayee will be gone in a little over a year.” But she adds that she is not optimistic that an agreement can be reached. She was interviewed by Bernard Gwertzman, consulting editor for cfr.org, on May 5 and 6, 2003.   Other Interviews   Prime Minister Vajpayee surprised everyone last week by restoring both full diplomatic relations and air travel between India and Pakistan after months of tension. Why did this happen now? It’s hard to say with India and Pakistan what their motivations are. Sometimes they’re rather cryptic. But I think there are several possible reasons. One is that the Indian prime minister is now 78 years old. He’s nearing the end of what will be his final term. There’ll be national elections next year. He’s always wanted to leave a legacy of better relations with Pakistan, and has been foiled in two efforts in which he regarded General Pervez Musharraf, the military dictator of Pakistan, as the betrayer. So he now has somebody in Pakistan he can deal with— the new Pakistan prime minister, Zafarullah Khan Jamali. Does Jamali have the authority to make a deal? No. In Pakistan, when it comes to the central foreign policy question, which is Pakistan’s relations with India and the [disputed territory of] Kashmir, the military regime’s views are decisive. What do you think will come of Vajpayee’s initiative? Four years in the region disabused me of any facile hopes for peace. There are no real signs that either side had changed its fundamental position on Kashmir. The one slightly hopeful note is that in a statement on Tuesday by Jamali, which must have been approved by General Musharraf, Pakistan has indicated it is willing to discuss nuclear confidence measures with India, but it is still not clear that Pakistan will not continue to hold talks on the nuclear issue hostage to the Kashmir issue. Why is that important? Because the world’s greatest fear about India and Pakistan is that there might be a nuclear war between them, and at a minimum, they must take steps to ensure that this does not happen by accident or miscalculation. I gather that Jamali invited Vajpayee to a meeting in Pakistan after Vajpayee made his announcement, but he politely refused. Right. He’s not going to make the mistake he made in Agra [at a 2001 India-Pakistan meeting], which is to go without a deal already clinched. I think he’ll only go to Pakistan if they can agree to something substantive. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage is making a trip to the region. Will he try to mediate? Inevitably, the United States ends up playing a role of message-carrier [between the two sides] and, of course, pressuring each to try to be more reasonable. Is there a short-term solution in sight? No, and I think the only window of opportunity here— and my guess is this is part of India’s calculation— is that the Pakistanis know that Vajpayee will be gone in a little over a year. They’re likely to end up with somebody more hawkish, meaning Lal Krishna Advani. He is the home minister— who is also the deputy prime minister— and he’s believed to be much more hawkish on Pakistan. So the Vajpayee camp’s hope is probably that Pakistan will seize this opportunity and make some compromises that it wouldn’t otherwise make. Why does Vajpayee consider Musharraf a betrayer? There were two betrayals. The first happened in February 1999, when Vajpayee took a very unusual step— he took a [ceremonial] bus [ride] to Lahore, Pakistan, [at the invitation of then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to restart bus service between the two countries]. This was the first visit of an Indian leader to Pakistan in a decade, and it followed the May 1998 nuclear tests both countries conducted and the heightened tensions those tests provoked. There were very public talks with Nawaz Sharif, and they agreed to this elaborate set of things they were going to do to try to bring peace between the two countries. Well, it turned out that, even as they were speaking, General Musharraf [then the army chief of staff] was planning the [May] Kargil invasion of Indian territory in Kashmir, which torpedoed [the peace initiative]. And then there was the October 1999 coup, when the general took over. Then, in the summer of 2001, there were talks in Agra, where the prime minister of India took a risk again. Musharraf came to India, and the talks were a disaster. The general outtalked Vajpayee; he made a public presentation to a bunch of editors in which he destroyed any chances of there being an agreement with India. So, for the second time, Vajpayee felt he had been personally betrayed by Musharraf. Now there’s newly elected Prime Minister Jamali, so at least there’s somebody else Vajpayee can deal with. There’s another factor motivating Vajpayee. I think the military strategy had reached the point of diminishing returns— it was getting nowhere. The current crisis began with the shootings outside the parliament in New Delhi? Right, that was in December of 2001, and then India began this massive military build-up, and last spring there were 1 million troops along the border. You were stationed in Delhi then. Did you think there’d be a war there? I thought it was certainly a very strong possibility. We were all bracing for another spectacular terrorist attack, which, given that the two sides were nose-to-nose, could have led to some kind of military action by India and then, Lord knows what would have happened. But fortunately that didn’t happen, and Armitage came through and got a pledge from General Musharraf to rein in the Kashmiri militant groups that had been tormenting India and Kashmir and which India considered terrorists. That sort of calmed things down for a while. But the terrorism, or as Musharraf would call it, freedom fighting, in Kashmir has not ceased. The real conditions on the ground haven’t fundamentally changed. Is Kashmir a popular issue with Pakistanis in general? It is a popular issue, and it’s an issue that gives Pakistanis a sense of national identity— it’s one of the few national issues. Is Kashmir an issue where India is at fault? No, it’s a tangled historical conflict, not unlike a custody battle or a bitter divorce, where people are dividing the property and there’s this crown jewel that they can’t figure out what to do with, and that’s Kashmir. This has festered for many years. The assumption by many is that the natural solution would be to turn the so-called Line of Control [that currently separates the two sides], after some minor changes, into the international border. But Pakistan has never felt that was acceptable. Pakistan wants the whole province of Jammu and Kashmir? What they really want is the valley, the Kashmir Valley, which is the majority-Muslim part of the state. But India has vowed, and there are certainly no signs of compromise on this, that they will never give up the Kashmir Valley. What is so important about the Kashmir Valley? It’s the most beautiful part of Kashmir, and it’s the overwhelmingly Muslim part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan was founded on the idea that it was a homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent, that it was an Islamic nation, and so Pakistanis feel that by rights this area of Kashmir that’s contiguous to them should be part of Pakistan. Did the Iraq war play into Vajpayee’s actions? His initiative came soon after hostilities ended. My guess is that it didn’t play a very big role. But I think it will undoubtedly play a role in how India presents this situation to the United States— the foreign minister of India [Yashwant Sinha] even made this case himself, suggesting that India had a better case for invading Pakistan than the Americans did for invading Iraq. Indians have long felt that the United States had a double standard on terrorism. The way they saw it, the Pakistanis were sending terrorists to attack them every week, and the Indians had been tremendously restrained. The Indians have demanded that the United States use its influence over General Musharraf to rein in the militants based in Pakistan and not be bought off by the fact that Musharraf is helping with al-Qaeda and so look the other way at the terrorism they believe he directs against India. So they’ll use Iraq as yet another example of what they see as American hypocrisy. How did India react when, after 9/11, Pakistan became friendlier with the United States? It was upset. Because India had a pretty good relationship with Bill Clinton? The relations were really on the up and up. Pakistan was on the outs. When President Clinton visited India [in March 2000], he stopped for a few hours in Pakistan and devoted most of the speech he delivered to scolding the general. And he spent almost a week traveling all over India effusively praising the country. All of that changed with 9/11, and that was a shock to the Indians. But they tried to use it to their advantage, because suddenly the Americans had a lot of influence with Pakistan whereas they hadn’t before, and they were able to wrest from Pakistan a commitment to crack down on some terrorist groups and reduce militancy. It’s happened some, but it’s crept back.
  • Pakistan
    International Relations of an Islamist Movement
    Overview There is much written about the impact of Islamist forces on international politics. Comparatively little is known about how Islamist forces conceive of the international arena, understand their interests therein, and formulate policies to serve those interests. It is the aim of this paper to elucidate Islamist thinking on international affairs by exploring the directives that are inherent to the Islamist ideological discourse, as well as the imperatives that confront Islamism in the political arena, by examining the case of the Jama'at-i Islami (Islamic Party) of Pakistan. The Legacy of Pan-Islamism Islamist thinking about international issues begins with the vision of the larger Muslim world. Islamism since the time of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897), the forerunner of modern Islamist activism and a prime advocate of Islamic unity, has possessed an international, pan-Islamic dimension. Revivalists have aspired, in varying degrees, to give meaning to the Islamic notion of umma (holy or virtuous community), and even to reconstitute the caliphate as a transnational institution of authority. Such efforts as the Khilafat (caliphate) movement in India from 1919-1921. Or the Muslim congresses that convened in the Middle East after World War I have sought to put into practice the universalist claims of revivalism. The symbolism of the umma and the caliphate have since been used by activists to construct an ideal International Relations vision of sociopolitical change and to gain legitimacy and strength in politics. The central role that the desire for unity plays in Muslim politics has led some observers to view Islam and those who advocate its participation in politics as fundamentally at odds with both the spirit and reality of the nation-state system. Such characterizations are not supported by empirical evidence. Islamic universalism has been kept at bay by the reality of the nation-state. The rhetoric of universalism withstanding, Islamist organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood or the Jama'at-i Islami, have divided up along national lines and developed as national political organizations. In the same vein, the Islamic Republic of Iran has failed to break out of its Iranian mold, and over time its foreign policy has been decided by national interest. Still, based on the rhetoric of Muslim groups and especially of Islamist movements and parties, many continue to view revivalists as internationalists bent on overrunning national boundaries in their attempts to construct an "Islamdom."
  • India
    After the Tests
    The spring 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests made South Asia and the world a more dangerous place, says this independent Task Force report. It recommends that the immediate objectives of U.S. foreign policy should be to encourage India and Pakistan to cap their nuclear capabilities at or near their current levels and to reinforce the global effort to stem the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and advanced delivery systems. At the same time, the Task Force emphasizes that the United States has important interests in South Asia in addition to those relating to proliferation. Those include preventing conflict, promoting democracy, expanding economic growth, trade, and investment, and cooperating with India and Pakistan on global challenges. In addition to arguing for a reduction in U.S. economic sanctions, the report outlines steps India and Pakistan should take to defuse the situation in Kashmir, the issue with the greatest potential to trigger a conventional or even nuclear war. The report also suggests an agenda for China and other nations with a stake in the region’s stability. Noting that India has the potential to be a major Asian power and that Pakistan can have a significant impact in Central Asia and the Persian Gulf, the report calls upon current and future U.S. presidents to assign a higher priority to both countries.
  • Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and Disarmament
    A New U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan
    Executive Summary Fifty years after gaining independence, India and Pakistan remain at odds. Given both countries’ de facto nuclear capabilities, their continued rivalry flirts with disaster. Yet to date Indo-Pakistani nuclear competition has remained within limits, direct war has been avoided for a generation, and both countries have experienced significant economic growth. U.S. interests in South Asia, although not vital, are important and increasing. These interests include preventing major war and further nuclear proliferation; expanding economic growth, trade, and investment; promoting robust democratic institutions; and cooperating on issues ranging from enhancing stability across Asia to combating terrorism and drug trafficking. The end of the Cold War should permit a substantial improvement of bilateral relations between Washington and both New Delhi and Islamabad, as well as between the two principal South Asian states. But seizing this opportunity will require more creative thinking and skillful diplomacy than has been the norm. It is long since time to end the relative U.S. neglect of these two countries and the fifth of humanity they represent. A number of specific findings and recommendations emerged from Task Force deliberations. On several matters—notably those involving nuclear proliferation, U.S. arms sales, and Kashmir—there was considerable debate and disagreement. Readers are encouraged to weigh the full rationale for the Task Force’s conclusions offered in the text below, as well as the additional and dissenting views offered by some Task Force members that are presented at the end of the report. Together, though, the recommendations of the Task Force constitute a bold new U.S. approach toward India and Pakistan, one that could be reinforced by working in parallel with European and Asian governments. For this to become the actual policy of the United States, however, the administration would have to make South Asia a foreign policy priority and be willing to expend substantial effort negotiating among India, Pakistan, other countries in the area, and Congress. We urge the second Clinton administration to make such an effort along the lines described here. Nuclear Issues During the last few years, U.S. policy toward India and Pakistan has focused primarily on deterring and reversing the nuclear weaponization of the subcontinent. Congressional actions have subordinated other aspects of both bilateral relationships to the nuclear issue, most notably in the case of Pakistan. The Clinton administration, like its predecessors, has chafed at these legislative restraints and sought expanded bilateral relationships and a more realistic approach to nonproliferation issues. It has worked with members of Congress to mitigate certain existing sanctions. Still, it has not invested substantial political capital in bringing congressional and executive policies fully into line. Despite U.S. nonproliferation efforts, both India and Pakistan have become de facto nuclear weapons-capable states and show no sign of changing course. Such behavior has triggered U.S. sanctions, which in turn have constricted U.S. bilateral relationships with both countries. This is unfortunate, because the current situation calls for more, rather than less, U.S. engagement. For increased engagement to occur, however, there needs to be an understanding across both the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government that reversing these countries' de facto nuclear weapons status is currently extremely unlikely. In the nonproliferation arena, U.S. policy should focus instead on establishing a more stable and sustainable plateau for Indian and Pakistani nuclear relations. This would involve concentrating on persuading both countries to refrain from testing nuclear explosives, deploying nuclear weapons, and exporting nuclear weapon- or missile-related material, technology, or expertise. The United States should also urge both countries to refrain from missile deployments and cease unsafeguarded production of fissile material. U.S. Bilateral Relationships The United States should significantly expand its bilateral economic, political, and military ties with India and Pakistan simultaneously. It is both possible and desirable to delink the two bilateral relationships and transcend the zero-sum dynamics that have often plagued the region (and U.S. policy) in the past. The time is ripe, in particular, for the United States to propose a closer strategic relationship with India, which has the potential to emerge as a full-fledged major power. The relationship would be based on shared values and institutions, economic collaboration including enhanced trade and investment, and the goal of regional stability across Asia. Consistent with these interests, the Task Force recommends that the United States adopt a declaratory policy that acknowledges India's growing power and importance; maintain high-level attention including regular reciprocal visits of cabinet members and senior officials; loosen unilateral U.S. constraints upon the transfer of dual-use technologies; increase military-to-military cooperation; cooperate on elements of India's civilian nuclear power program and other energy-related issues; and undertake limited conventional arms sales. The United States should also support India’s entry into Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and consult with India regarding its interest in membership in other regional and global institutions. At the same time, the United States should work to restore normal and close working relations with Pakistan. This should include providing credits for trade and investment; cooperating on energy-related issues; helping in debt reduction or forgiveness; and providing aid to support social welfare, economic modernization, privatization, and the reform of tax, electoral, and development mechanisms, all of which will promote Pakistan's political and economic stability. The United States should also maintain its links and channels of communication to the Pakistani military, both assisting it with training and encouraging it to support the development of a more firmly rooted democratic political system. International Military Education and Training (IMET) should be extended to help keep Pakistan’s armed forces professional and linked to the West. The United States should also be prepared to resume limited conventional arms sales to Pakistan. Military equipment sales should not contribute to Pakistan’s (or India’s) nuclear weapons programs or delivery capabilities, nor, in accord with established U.S. policy, should they be undertaken to alter the military balance in the region. Some of these measures should go forward unconditionally, since they promote U.S. interests regardless of other circumstances. In certain areas, however, the desire and ability of the United States to expand relations will clearly be affected by Indian and Pakistani behavior. In this vein, India's recent decision to impede progress on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), as well as disclosures of Pakistan’s continuing work (with Chinese help) on a plant to manufacture ballistic missiles, are demonstrably unhelpful. Destabilizing moves by either country would almost certainly restrict the possibilities for cooperation and might even result in the reintroduction of selective, preferably multinational sanctions. Any such decision, however, should be made by the executive branch, after consultation with Congress and other governments and only if sanctions make sense in light of the full range of U.S. national security interests. U.S. Policy Instruments Rigid, narrowly focused legislative mandates are in general a poor way of addressing the complex problems involved in making foreign policy. In the case of nuclear proliferation in South Asia, such constraints have achieved modest success at best while holding a diverse range of U.S. interests hostage not merely to one issue area but to specific requirements in that area that have been overtaken by events. Unconditional sanctions that cannot be waived or adjusted by the president deny policymakers the ability to design and execute a foreign policy that could help stabilize Indo-Pakistani nuclear competition and promote other U.S. interests. Nevertheless, there was disagreement within the Task Force over how much of the legislative framework currently constraining U.S. policy toward India and Pakistan needs to be altered in order to implement the Task Force’s general recommendations regarding nonproliferation policy and improved bilateral relations. Views ranged from repealing the legislation to maintaining it as is. A majority of the Task Force, however, coalesced around the option of expanding relations as much as possible within the existing legislative framework while simultaneously working to modify relevant legislation as necessary in order to support the full range of initiatives described below. Kashmir Kashmir is a principal, but not the sole, cause of tensions between India and Pakistan. It is also a reflection of their general state of animosity. If the Kashmir dispute were resolved tomorrow, relations between the two countries would still be somewhat sour. Still, Kashmir remains a possible casus belli. Unfortunately, there is no “right” or plausible solution to the conflict in sight. The U.S. government does not have a great deal of leverage on this issue, and the time is not ripe for Washington to launch a major new initiative. U.S. interests in both India and Pakistan are best served by working with other governments on a step-by-step approach toward a series of practical interim, rather than “final status,” objectives. Such an international “contact group” ought to pursue mainly quiet, multilateral diplomacy in this area, promoting modest incremental steps to ease tensions, reduce friction between the protagonists, and restore political normalcy in Kashmir. Economic Liberalization The United States should strongly support Indian and Pakistani internal economic reforms, which themselves will be the most important factor in promoting growth and development in the region over the long term. Because U.S.-Indian economic relations are likely to expand significantly in years to come, potential sources of economic friction should be handled whenever possible through multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). Regional Cooperation Almost half a century after independence, Indo-Pakistani relations are less extensive than were those between the United States and the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War. The United States and other interested governments and organizations should encourage regular, sustained, and multifaceted contact between India and Pakistan in a wide variety of areas including trade, energy and resource development, education, cultural exchanges, travel freedom, commercial projects, telecommunications, and sports. Outsiders should also promote informal regional interactions, “Track II” diplomacy, and a “regularization” of intercourse at every official level. U.S. Government Bureaucratic Reorganization Separate divisions dealing with South Asia should be created in major U.S. agencies, with standing interdivision task forces used to address the region's ties to other areas. Bureaucratic arrangements alone, however, cannot substitute for the development of a larger body of competent and committed individuals with South Asian expertise. Nor can they substitute for a basic decision to accord the region a higher priority in years to come, something the Task Force, based on its appraisal of U.S. interests, supports unanimously and unequivocally.
  • Development
    India, Pakistan, and the United States
    In India, Pakistan, and the United States, Dr. Shirin R. Tahir-Kheli points out that the end of the Cold War and the rise of a new generation of Indians and Pakistanis willing to break with the past and concentrate on economic development provide opportunities for all three countries. Sustained American involvement in South Asia—previously the United States has tended to focus on the region only during periods of international crisis—could both generate major economic opportunities for the United States in one of the world's largest markets and help solve the difficult issues of Kashmir and nuclear proliferation.