North Korea

TikTok sues U.S. government; New Zealand stock exchange disrupted by cyberattacks since Tuesday; India to phase out Chinese equipment from telecommunications networks; and Federal agencies release advisory on North Korean targeting of banks.

Without Paik’s herculean effort, South Korea as we know it today—a vibrant, capitalist, and liberal democracy—wouldn’t exist.

The Korean War had hybrid origins as a civil war, a regional conflict, and a flashpoint in the global bipolar competition. The peninsular, regional, and global dimensions of the confrontation pointed to and reinforced the impulse toward division and military conflict by the summer of 1950. The replacement of the Korean armistice with a stable and permanent peace regime will require that these peninsular, regional, and global factors align so that they form the conditions necessary to achieve peace. At present, it appears unlikely that all three dimensions which contributed to the division of the Korean Peninsula will come into an alignment favorable to peace by 2025. On the peninsula, the first president of South Korea, Syngman Rhee, and the founder of North Korea, Kim Il-sung, shared conflicting but equally burning passions for Korean unity. The clash of these passions, which were channeled into and magnified by competing ideologies, sparked a fierce competition for legitimacy between rival states that has sustained Korea's political division to this day. The embers of inter-Korean rivalry continue to burn bright and are fed by North Korea's recent demolition of inter-Korean relations. Hopes for inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation generated two years ago by the commencement of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's overtures at summit diplomacy have evaporated and will take time to rebuild. At the regional level, miscalculation driven by the perceived geopolitical and geostrategic value of the Korean Peninsula brought Chinese and American soldiers into direct military conflict during the Korean War. Korea's division has for decades contributed to regional stability because China and the United States had their own respective spheres of influence on the Korean Peninsula. But rising Sino-U.S. rivalry threatens to subsume and deny the limited common interest Washington and Beijing share in cooperating to achieve North Korea's denuclearization. Though Sino-U.S. cooperation is a prerequisite for integration and eventual unification of the Korean Peninsula, Washington and Beijing are unlikely, in the current environment, to achieve the level of cooperation necessary to adequately support a transition from armistice to a sustainable and enduring peace on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. Bipolar U.S.-Soviet competition during the Cold War brought the Korean War to center stage as a global flashpoint in 1950, but, after the Korean armistice and subsequent failure of the Geneva Conference to achieve a political resolution in 1954, the Korean conflict then receded from the center of global attention for decades. Now, North Korea's nuclear and missile development has returned the peninsula to the epicenter of global concern. North Korea's nuclear expansion renders it a global security concern that can only be overcome through collective action and a deal that guarantees North Korean security in exchange for its disarmament. But the failure of U.S.-North Korea summitry to generate a space for political compromise has reinforced the North Korean leadership's instinct to rely on its nuclear capabilities as its only source of security. Only a major disruption that shakes up peninsular, regional, and global trend lines will open the way for the end of the Korean conflict by 2025. But the primary source of disruption these days is North Korea, which desires to use its role as disruptor not to end the Korean conflict but rather to enhance its prospects for power and survival. Until this changes, prospects of a sustainable and durable Korean peace remain slim indeed. This article was originally published here by The National Interest.

Tensions rocketed on June 16 when North Korea demolished a liaison office that had stood as a symbol of hope for improved communications.

This week, North Korea’s Kim family dynasty imposed a new test of loyalty on its southern neighbors and found them lacking. 

In North Korea, all authority flows from Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un. He has reinstated the party as the central hub to consolidate his power and bring elites to heel.

On June 12, North Korea’s Foreign Minister Ri Son-gwon issued a highly unusual commemorative statement to mark the second anniversary of the first-ever meeting of U.S. President Donald J. Trump and North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un. The statement laid bare North Korea’s disappointments, rejected Trump’s declarations of success in his diplomacy with North Korea, and predicted an enduring confrontation backed by North Korea’s nuclear development as the main pillar of deterrence against U.S. hostility. The statement reiterated months of North Korean expressions of frustration and underscored the fragility of the U.S.-North Korea relationship and the risks that a renewed escalation of tensions could bring.  Ri’s statement echoes the change in direction North Korea first announced last December: that the strengthening its nuclear development to deter the U.S. nuclear threat would be its main strategy for dealing with the United States. Kim Jong Un reinforced that message last month at an expanded meeting of North Korea’s Central Military Commission when he pledged to bolster his country’s nuclear deterrence capabilities in response to an undiminished nuclear threat from the United States. Two years after the drama of a diplomatic reality TV moment in U.S.-North Korea relations, the fundamental conflict between the United States and North Korea over denuclearization remains as intractable as ever. The global security risk posed by a nuclear North Korea has not diminished, and the task of dealing with a North Korea that has redoubled its commitment to nuclear deterrence remains a potential flashpoint for escalation between nuclear-capable adversaries. In a new CFR Contingency Planning Memorandum, I discuss the risk that a renewed escalation of tensions in the U.S.-North Korea relationship could bring and provide recommendations for how the United States can rebuild international consensus in opposition to North Korea’s nuclear development. Following the presidential elections in November, either President Trump or Vice President Biden will face an even more difficult challenge posed by the growing entrenchment of North Korea’s continued nuclear development. U.S. leaders should start by revitalizing the role of the UN, improving sanctions implementation, restoring U.S. and allied military exercises to the 2018 pre-Singapore summit exercise schedules, and updating preparations for instability in North Korea. This article was originally published by Forbes.

On June 12, North Korea’s Foreign Minister Ri Son-gwon issued a highly unusual commemorative statement to mark the second anniversary of the first-ever meeting of U.S. President Donald J. Trump and North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un. The statement laid bare North Korea’s disappointments, rejected Trump’s declarations of success in his diplomacy with North Korea, and predicted an enduring confrontation backed by North Korea’s nuclear development as the main pillar of deterrence against U.S. hostility. The statement reiterated months of North Korean expressions of frustration and underscored the fragility of the U.S.-North Korea relationship and the risks that a renewed escalation of tensions could bring.  Ri’s statement echoes the change in direction North Korea first announced last December: that the strengthening its nuclear development to deter the U.S. nuclear threat would be its main strategy for dealing with the United States. Kim Jong Un reinforced that message last month at an expanded meeting of North Korea’s Central Military Commission when he pledged to bolster his country’s nuclear deterrence capabilities in response to an undiminished nuclear threat from the United States. Two years after the drama of a diplomatic reality TV moment in U.S.-North Korea relations, the fundamental conflict between the United States and North Korea over denuclearization remains as intractable as ever. The global security risk posed by a nuclear North Korea has not diminished, and the task of dealing with a North Korea that has redoubled its commitment to nuclear deterrence remains a potential flashpoint for escalation between nuclear-capable adversaries. In a new CFR Contingency Planning Memorandum, I discuss the risk that a renewed escalation of tensions in the U.S.-North Korea relationship could bring and provide recommendations for how the United States can rebuild international consensus in opposition to North Korea’s nuclear development. Following the presidential elections in November, either President Trump or Vice President Biden will face an even more difficult challenge posed by the growing entrenchment of North Korea’s continued nuclear development. U.S. leaders should start by revitalizing the role of the UN, improving sanctions implementation, restoring U.S. and allied military exercises to the 2018 pre-Singapore summit exercise schedules, and updating preparations for instability in North Korea. This article was originally published by Forbes.

While the United States has turned inward, focusing primarily on domestic challenges, history has not stopped.

Regardless of whether the global novel coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic is an accelerant of existing global trends or a historical turning point, the pandemic and its consequences have constituted a major stress test for international institutions, including the U.S.-ROK alliance. In addition to grappling with longstanding external challenges such as North Korean aggression, the alliance now faces accelerated Sino-U.S. rivalry, fanned nationalism, and exacerbated economic tensions over cost-sharing in a transformed budget environment. The possibility that the alliance might fail its stress test will stimulate South Korean debates over its strategic options in the event the alliance crumbles from within. The biggest issue that has drawn South Korean public concern is the growing political animosity and competition between the United States and China that threatens to hobble the World Health Organization at its moment of greatest need. Pandemic-era Sino-U.S. rivalry has accelerated economic decoupling trends by raising costs of U.S. investment in China, sensitized the American public to dependency on a China-based supply chain for provision of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies, and catalyzed a global vaccine development race. But the nascent U.S. proposal to form an Economic Prosperity Network among like-minded countries with possible interest in diversifying global supply chains away from China has drawn particular attention because it links economic and security issues, directly challenging South Korea’s choice avoidance strategy between the United States and China. The internal wedge issues dividing the United States and South Korea are even more poisonous to the future of the alliance. The rise of “America first” right-wing nationalism in the United States is particularly worrisome to the extent that it signals the possibility of alliance fatigue and U.S. retrenchment from international leadership. In combination with the potential emergence of a “Korea first” left-wing nationalism that would seek greater independence and aim to decouple inter-Korean economic cooperation from shared U.S.-ROK denuclearization objectives, nationalist-driven frictions would constitute the most corrosive solvent to the U.S.-ROK alliance. Against this backdrop, U.S. President Donald J. Trump’s transactional approach to military cost sharing within the alliance appears particularly damaging, particularly in light of the enormous budget pressures facing governments globally as a consequence of pandemic response. Ironically, the transactional approach Trump has taken is self-defeating. A reaffirmation of the intangible values undergirding the alliance would be more likely to induce a generous South Korean response to U.S. burden sharing requests, but Trump’s intimation that the bargain is about money rather than U.S. national interest has fed greater doubts about the credibility of U.S. commitments to the alliance.  I hope that it doesn’t come to this, but if the alliance finds itself failing its pandemic-era stress test, what are South Korea’s most compelling strategic options and priorities that would minimize the risk of victimization resulting from the resurgence of great power politics in Northeast Asia? I believe an ideal-type South Korean foreign policy designed to survive possible alliance failure would need to have the following characteristics: Be Omnidirectional—Without a U.S. security guarantor, South Korean foreign policy will have to manage potential threats and develop diplomatic ties in every direction. Threats and opportunities may come from any direction without the alliance as a framework for shaping the regional security theater. If the United States no longer has South Korea’s back, it will be necessary to use diplomatic and military strategies wisely to address and neutralize potential threats and to define safe zones along South Korea’s periphery. A 360-degree combination strategy of diplomacy, defense, and deterrence will be necessary to enhance South Korean national security. Be Outward Looking—For South Korea post-alliance, neutralization of the North Korean threat by obtaining peaceful coexistence might be a high priority. But the task of tempering North Korea’s aspirations to take advantage of a South Korea that is no longer under U.S. protection will not be easy. At the same time, a seemingly exclusive preoccupation with North Korea will be a luxury that South Korea may no longer be able to afford. In balancing inter-Korean relations with broader diplomatic and security imperatives, an independent South Korea will have to walk and chew gum at the same time. Be Future-Oriented—The U.S.-ROK security alliance framework has inadvertently enabled South Korean polices toward Japan to be defined by the past. But in the absence of a U.S.-led security framework that has helped Japan and South Korea cooperate while preserving and nurturing historical grievances, both countries will no longer have the luxury of allowing history to define the relationship. Instead, both sides will have to take stock of their respective needs and overlapping interests with an eye to future cooperation to reduce risk and manage cooperative relations. Be Network-Embedded—South Korea has long aspired to promote cooperative security networks in Northeast Asia to ease major power rivalries in the region and provide a benchmark for promoting adherence to norms among major powers, but the alliance has provided a stronger means by which to gain security assurances than multilateral cooperative security networks, which rely on voluntary participation and peer pressure to manage tensions and encourage restraint. To hedge against continued Sino-U.S. adversarial relations and to balance against domination by major power neighbors, South Korea should look to draw in extra-regional actors including ASEAN and the EU/NATO to be engaged in Northeast Asia. Be Unified—Perhaps the most precious, important, and elusive quality likely to define a successful South Korean post-alliance foreign policy will be the imperative for domestic unity behind a coherent South Korean diplomatic strategy. Historically, factionalism-ridden Korean politics has made achievement of such unity elusive, but the complexity of geopolitics in Northeast Asia may make domestic political unity in support of a coherent South Korean diplomatic strategy an essential prerequisite for survival and success.   This article was originally published in Korean by Munhwa Ilbo.

An update of the Council on Foreign Relations' Cyber Operations Tracker for the period between January and March 2020.

Determination of the transfer should be driven by a hard, thorough diagnosis of military capabilities against emerging threats.