North Korea

On Thursday, the White House canceled the highly-anticipated June 12 summit between President Trump and Kim Jong-un. Despite will on all sides for the summit to proceed, a fundamental disagreement on the roadmap to denuclearization looms large.

Sungtae (Jacky) Park is a research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations. A version of this piece was first published on CSIS PacNet here. As the top-level summit between the United States and North Korea nears, policy analysts have been expressing skepticism about the Trump administration’s goal of complete denuclearization of North Korea and calling for tempered expectations and objectives. They argue that North Korea is unlikely to give up its nuclear weapons program that Kim Jong Un sees as critical to the survival of his regime and that Pyongyang will use the summit and negotiations to buy time and loosen sanctions while making limited concessions. While I am a pessimist myself, I worry that cognitive bias is leading to excessive pessimism. An outcome that experts might find satisfactory, while falling short of complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID), might be possible. Cognitive bias #1: Bad guys do it better The first factor that affects analyses of North Korea is a belief that the North Koreans are brilliant manipulators and strategists, while U.S. officials are incompetent and regularly being duped. The notion that “bad guys do it better” seems to be ingrained in every aspect of the U.S. policy community’s view of the world, whether in discussions about North Korea, Russia, China, or Iran. Consistent with this view, the Washington policy establishment has accused Donald Trump of being manipulated into a summit with Kim and pursuing the unrealistic goal of complete denuclearization. Ironically, Trump himself has accused previous U.S. presidents of being “outplayed” by the North Koreans and has pledged to be different. Is this perception true? Many analysts have argued that the United States has had an increasingly dysfunctional national security decision-making process since the end of the Cold War, but a working process does exist. The separation of powers in the U.S. government often leads to confusion and delays in policy implementation, but Congress also brings a level of oversight to the executive branch. The shift in power at the White House from one party to another sometimes brings changes in policy, but it also prevents foreign affairs from being dominated by a single school of thought. North Korea’s policy process remains a black box, but it is hard to imagine that it functions properly in a setting where officials risk being purged if they say the wrong thing. Moreover, while North Korean officials have access to outside information, they do not have the same level of information freedom that exists in the United States and are working in an ideological framework into which they were indoctrinated as children. North Korea’s intelligence apparatus is brutal, but North Koreans do not have intellectual and technological resources to match those of the U.S. government. There is also no accountability in North Korea, and Kim makes decisions with his close associates and sycophantic advisors. While North Korea has a clear strategy in negotiations with the United States, it is dealing with as much uncertainty as the United States. As a result, diplomacy with North Korea is not necessarily a rigged game in which Kim Jong Un is pursuing an exceptionally clever strategy. Both sides are playing the game partially blindfolded and a satisfactory, if not ideal, outcome that includes North Korea’s denuclearization in some form should not be discounted. Cognitive bias #2: Attributing the current situation to a single, fixed intent The second cognitive bias is the belief that North Korean leaders have made and stuck to a single, fixed choice, instead of having kept as many options available (hedging) or having made disparate decisions at multiple inflection points throughout the history of the U.S.-North Korea nuclear conflict. Korea watchers generally believe that the current crisis reflects North Korea’s unwavering desire to obtain nuclear weapons. However, no one will know what happened with all previous nuclear agreements with North Korea until archives on both sides are open to researchers. Counterfactuals are impossible to prove, and no one can be sure what would have happened if the United States and North Korea had made different choices at different junctures in the nuclear conflict. Yet, the fact that the complex and never-ending debate over how and why the Agreed Framework and later agreements failed exists suggests that North Korean decision-making has been far more complicated than understood in the United States. The assertion, then, that Kim Jong Un will never give up his nuclear weapons program and will inevitably cheat on any agreement is flawed, as it is not clear that North Korea has always had a single fixed position on nuclear weapons. With the right incentives and disincentives, the United States might be able to sway Kim’s decision-making. A counterargument could be made that Kim Jong Un is coldly rational and does hold a single, fixed position because he views nuclear weapons as the key to his survival, especially after witnessing the fall of Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, who completely gave up his nuclear weapons program, only to be killed in 2011 in a rebellion protected by a Western no-fly zone. Yet, if Kim were truly rational and faced with “the existential choice between survival and nuclear status,” as noted by Scott Snyder, due to internal and external pressure of varying nature, then a satisfactory level of denuclearization, by logic, should not be discounted. Cognitive bias #3: Past patterns must continue The final cognitive bias is the tendency to conclude that past failures with North Korea mean that current diplomacy is also unlikely to lead to a satisfactory outcome, even though a number of factors are different this time. To begin with, leader-to-leader diplomacy has never been tried. Conventionally, diplomats lay the groundwork, prepare the details, and then have top leaders meet and sign relevant documents at a summit. But the North Korean political system is uniquely centralized and personalized, meaning that only the top leader can exercise true flexibility on policy issues. Kim Jong Un likely is also cautious about airing his true intentions because even the most brutal dictator has to consider the effects of his words and actions on domestic legitimacy, particularly among elites. Hence, leader-to-leader diplomacy might be the only way to gauge Kim’s inner thinking and reach a solution. In terms of regime security, Kim Jong Un is facing far more pressure compared to his predecessors. Kim would like to remain in power for decades, perhaps for more than half a century. Yet, he is facing rapid marketization of the North Korean economy and increased information flow within the country that he has managed to co-opt, but not halt. This comes at a time when an unprecedented level of sanctions has hurt Pyongyang (despite some recent signs that the Chinese might be loosening their grip). In addition, the North Koreans seem to fear that the Trump administration might launch a military strike, particularly in light of talk about a “bloody nose” strike. At the elite level, Kim and his generation are more aware of the outside world compared to their predecessors. North Korea’s first generation of leadership under Kim Il Sung consisted of revolutionaries who believed they were on the winning side of the Korean conflict. The second generation under Kim Jong Il was indoctrinated in socialism but saw the socialist world collapse, along with its model of development. They did not have the right education and skills to adapt North Korea to changing circumstances. The current generation under Kim Jong Un was educated in Western schools and is the most aware when it comes to the West. This generation likely is the most willing to offer nuclear weapons as bargaining chips for aid and Western technology that might be necessary to sustain the regime for decades. In terms of alliance policy coordination, this is the first time the United States and South Korea are truly in lockstep on North Korea. During the 1994 crisis, Bill Clinton clashed with South Korea’s hardline president, Kim Young-sam. Clinton was briefly in sync with the dovish Kim Dae-jung administration from 1998, but South Korea’s progressive governments and the Bush administration clashed from 2001, while there was minimal diplomatic opening under Barack Obama, Lee Myung-bak, and Park Geun-hye. Unlike previous diplomatic phases, U.S. and South Korean leaders are coordinating well. Take all precautions, but be on the lookout for creative possibilities The United States and South Korea should not embrace North Korea with open arms or buy everything that Kim Jong Un is trying to sell. The Trump administration should take all precautions in negotiations that might follow the summit with Kim. Even if a deal emerges, it could be an imperfect one with much ambiguity. Nevertheless, diplomats and Korea watchers should be open to creative diplomatic possibilities, lest they fail to be noticed due to excessive pessimism.

North Korean authorities issued two separate statements on May 16, 2018, that have been reported to cast doubt on prospects for the Trump-Kim summit scheduled to occur in Singapore on June 12. The statements accuse South Korea of disregarding the newly-minted Panmunjom declaration by allowing U.S.-South Korea joint air drills including nuclear-capable aircraft to go forward on the peninsula and challenge the characterizations and objectives of U.S. senior officials regarding prospective U.S.-North Korea nuclear talks in advance of the Trump-Kim summit. The statements declare the terms upon which North Korea perceives that it is entering into the summit and threaten to walk away from summit talks if the United States pushes for North Korea’s unilateral denuclearization without meeting Pyongyang’s conditions for pursuing “complete denuclearization.” The timing of the first Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) statement occurred on the eve of the first ministerial-level talks scheduled to occur following the April 27 inter-Korean summit at Panmunjom. North Korea had proposed the ministerial talks a day prior and canceled at the last minute the night before the two sides were to meet. The timing of the announcement appeared designed to maximize impact on South Korea’s Moon Jae-in administration by underscoring that his achievements were premised on North Korean cooperation and that North Korea intended to utilize the ambiguously worded Panmunjom declaration to suit its purposes and pursue its objectives. The timing of the statement and the temporary interruption of inter-Korean contacts was probably designed to induce caution by the Moon administration and to press South Korea to utilize the Panmunjom declaration as an instrument for inducing restraint and curbing the scope of U.S.-South Korea joint exercises. It was probably also to influence Moon to show solidarity with the spirit of the declaration only days prior to his arrival in Washington for a preparatory May 22 summit designed to enhance U.S.-South Korea coordination and facilitate Trump’s preparation for his own highly anticipated June meeting with Kim Jong-un in Singapore. The statement criticizing the air drills was almost exclusively targeted at South Korean authorities’ will to adhere to the Panmunjom declaration. But it did include a vague reference linking the fate of the Trump-Kim summit to North Korea’s desire that the United States and South Korea show greater self-restraint in their conduct of joint military exercises. North Korea’s second May 16 statement was issued in the name of the country’s Vice Minister Kim Kye-gwan, a senior North Korean official with deep prior experience in U.S.-North Korea negotiations, who had been virtually invisible to the public up to now under Kim Jong-un. The statement was primarily aimed at taking issues with public comments by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Advisor John Bolton that characterized North Korea as having been coerced into a summit meeting by sanctions pressure and rejected expansive U.S. objectives for North Korean denuclearization based on the Libyan model or based on a compensation model that would reward North Korea economically for denuclearization. This statement was likely designed to publicly set conditions and limits around North Korea’s initial position on denuclearization and to reject Bolton’s Libyan model in favor of a negotiated process in which North Korea engages with the United States on an equal footing as a nuclear state. Most importantly, North Korea reiterated its longstanding view that its return to denuclearization dialogue is rooted in North Korean strength and is conditioned on expectations for tension-reduction and diplomatic normalization with the United States. Kim Kye-gwan’s statement provided a useful public illustration of the extent of the gap between the United States and North Korea over the definition, scope, and duration of a denuclearization process. These are huge issues that arguably should be resolved prior to a high-profile summit meeting between the leaders of the two countries. Kim Kye-gwan’s statement underscores Pyongyang’s sensitivity to the Trump administration’s messaging surrounding the summit and attempts to highlight gaps between Bolton and Pompeo as a means of preemptively deflecting a good cop-bad cop approach that might be used to maximize pressure on North Korea in the context of summit negotiations. The North Korean statement is not designed to end a process of preparation for a summit, but rather reiterates North Korea’s longstanding opening position in anticipation of further negotiations with the United States. It attempts to rule out some recent U.S. statements as off-limits and suggests that North Korea is prepared to drive a hard bargain at the same time that Trump must deal with increasingly inflated expectations for what he is likely to realistically accomplish toward the stated goal of complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement. It is likely that that there will be further volatility, contradictory statements, and brinkmanship on both sides in the run-up to a U.S.-North Korea summit. The date of the Trump-Kim meeting could even face temporary postponement. But, in the end, the summit is likely to happen since both leaders will likely find a mutually acceptable basis upon which to proceed. In the meantime, the magnitude of the task of closing the gaps in understanding between the two sides and the all-critical task of fashioning an agreed-upon denuclearization process that would follow on the event of a Trump-Kim meeting will likely require additional high-level meetings between the two sides. Although there are rumors that intelligence officials may have stayed behind in Pyongyang to continue working out a modus operandi, the more likely scenario is that Secretary of State Pompeo will have to make yet another visit to Pyongyang for follow-on talks designed to sketch out the framework for the Trump-Kim summit and the implementation process that would follow. In the meantime, rhetoric on both sides will continue, despite the accompanying risk that misstatements will result in delays. In the meantime, the two North Korean statements will have also had near-term impact on how Moon approaches Trump in their White House meeting on May 22. North Korea will no doubt evaluate the results of that meeting and assess whether this week’s statements have had the desired effect on Moon and Trump as part of their preparations for next steps toward the Trump-Kim summit.

To work toward peace, the White House will need to lead a tightly coordinated balancing act to deter Kim Jong-un’s worst intentions while leveraging his desire for economic development.

The rapid pace of North Korean diplomacy makes it crucial that Japan and South Korea coordinate more closely on potential changes to Northeast Asian security. But they must first overcome some deep-rooted grievances.

Against the backdrop of China’s mounting influence and North Korea’s growing nuclear capability and expanding missile arsenal, South Korea faces a set of strategic choices that will shape its economic prospects and national security. In South Korea at the Crossroads, Scott A. Snyder examines the trajectory of fifty years of South Korean foreign policy and offers predictions―and a prescription―for the future. Pairing a historical perspective with a shrewd understanding of today’s political landscape, Snyder contends that South Korea’s best strategy remains investing in a robust alliance with the United States.

Kim Jong-un walked across the line dividing the two Koreas at Panmunjom on cue into the international media spotlight and the warm welcome of South Korean President Moon Jae-in. They chit-chatted like good neighbors at a location that has been for decades the symbolic epicenter of inter-Korean confrontation. They planted a tree together and took a tea break when they were not declaring inter-Korean peace and unity in the Panmunjom declaration. The mood was evocative of the June 13-15, 2000, first-ever inter-Korean summit between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang, which opened an era of inter-Korean cooperation but did not ultimately address military tensions between the two sides or halt the North’s nuclear weapons program. How will this opening be different, and why? The answer lies in the motives of the two Koreas and the circumstances they face. Kim Jong-un’s Coming Out Party As was the case with his father Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un has effectively utilized an opening with South Korea to present a human face to the world in contrast to the usual narrative of Kim defined by growing threats and ruthless demand for political loyalty from his population. Kim emphasized in his oral remarks with Moon national unity rather than unification and was surprisingly forthcoming on his country’s economic shortcomings in line with his priority on national economic development. Kim Jong-un presented a more flexible and pragmatic face than his father despite many shared motives. Motivations for Kim to dramatically ease tensions with South Korea are manifold: To evade the massive U.S.led pressure campaign To reopen economic flows that can assist North Korea’s economic development To use South Korea as a shield against possible escalation of a military conflict with the United States Moon Jae-in’s Bid for Peace Moon Jae-in has used the summit to hit restart on peace and reconciliation with North Korea. He has tried to draw out Kim Jong-un and to bind him to an institutional process for making progress on security. The Panmunjom declaration reaffirms the contents of all major prior inter-Korean declarations, including ambitious economic pledges contained in the October 4, 2007 inter-Korean declaration between Moon’s former boss, Roh Moo-hyun, and Kim Jong-un’s father, Kim Jong-il. The Panmunjom meeting builds on prior declarations in seeking to bind North Korea by institutionalizing processes for improving inter-Korean relations. Through the Panmunjom declaration, South Korea has sought to regularize inter-Korean exchanges through resumption of family reunions and the establishment of an inter-Korean liaison office at Kaesong and to jumpstart implementation of an ambitious timetable toward establishment of a permanent peace. Although North Korea has traditionally reserved denuclearization as an issue for the United States, the Panmunjom declaration mentions denuclearization as a way of teeing up preparations for the Trump-Kim summit, which Moon desperately needs if his efforts to establish peace on the Korean peninsula are to succeed. Perhaps the most serious litmus test of whether Moon’s initiative will have immediate and lasting impact involves pledges of the two Koreas to reduce military tensions. Efforts to establish confidence-building measures through a maritime peace zone in the West Sea will turn on progress in inter-Korean military talks set for the coming weeks, which in turn will require support from the U.S. forces in Korea (USFK) to implement effectively. In addition, negotiations to replace the Korean armistice with a permanent peace regime will require close coordination with the United States and possibly also with China. Setting Up for Trump and Kim The Moon administration stressed in its pre-summit briefings the importance of simultaneous progress in inter-Korean relations and U.S.-DPRK relations. By setting the ambitious goal of declaring an early end to the war, Seoul has increased the pressure on North Korea and the United States to set an ambitious schedule for denuclearization. But the comprehensive inspections and verification process needed to assure North Korea’s denuclearization will likely take much longer than the Panmunjom declaration’s aspiration to conclude peace negotiations by the end of the year. There is a need to calibrate these two processes to ensure that they do not become a source of tension between Washington and Seoul. As attention shifts to preparations for the Trump-Kim meeting, there is considerably less experience and good will between the United States and North Korea that can be used to build atmospherics for such a meeting than exists between the two Koreas. Just as Kim Dae-jung found himself exposed by a dramatic shift in U.S. policy during the transition from the Clinton to Bush administrations in early 2001, no one can say for sure where Donald Trump may go. Although Trump and Kim will both be tempted to go along with sweeping statements that mark an historic moment in relations, the two sides will have little to work with in the absence of further dramatic commitments by Kim Jong-un to embrace a process that expeditiously leads to denuclearization. For North Korea, any such steps are tied to improvement of relations with the United States, which will involve far more than just a meet and greet with President Trump. U.S. skepticism about Kim and distrust of North Korea runs deep, and will only be reversed in the context of tangible and concrete steps toward denuclearization. Moreover, the human rights issue would also likely emerge as an obstacle in Congress to full normalization of U.S.-North Korea relations that might provide North Korea with a pretext to renege on denuclearization and create fissures within the U.S.-ROK alliance.

The first inter-Korean summit in ten years could be stage-managed by Kim Jong-un, but look for South Korea’s leaders to assert a role shaping the process for denuclearization talks. Kim Jong-un will play the starring role in a self-orchestrated diplomatic drama when, on April 27, he becomes the first North Korean leader to cross into South Korean territory. The decision to go south, a bid to ease inter-Korean friction, followed the near total absence of North Korean outreach for more than seven years. Kim’s opening act came in the form of a 2018 New Year’s speech in which he proposed working with South Korean authorities to reduce peninsular tensions for the sake of a successful Pyeongchang Winter Olympics in February. The opening of inter-Korean dialogue was accompanied by Kim’s pledge to abstain from further nuclear and missile testing during negotiations. This shift from provocation to dialogue has been a hallmark of North Korean diplomacy, but so too will be a pivot back to provocation, if the North Korean leader decides to do so. Still, on the sidelines of the Olympics and in the weeks that followed, a flurry of informal talks between North and South Korean delegations allowed the countries to translate goodwill into diplomacy that moved faster than many anticipated. Kim Yo-jong hand delivered a personal invitation from her brother, Kim Jong-un, for a summit to South Korean President Moon Jae-in while attending the Olympics opening ceremony. Two South Korean special envoys, National Intelligence Service Director Suh Hoon and National Security Advisor Chung Eui-yong, then visited Kim on March 5–6 in Pyongyang, where Kim pledged his willingness to pursue denuclearization and conveyed an invitation for a summit with U.S. President Donald J. Trump. On March 8, Suh and Chung announced in front of the White House that Trump had accepted Kim’s invitation to meet. The Third Inter-Korean Summit: Goals and Prospects Kim’s second act will be the upcoming inter-Korean summit, which will be the third: his father met in Pyongyang with South Korea’s Kim Dae-jung in 2000 and Roh Moo-hyun in 2007. This summit will set up the highly anticipated third act, a summit between Kim and Trump, now slated for June. In the meantime, Moon administration officials have been hard at work prepping for the Panmunjom meeting, including setting the conditions for a Trump-Kim meeting. The stakes are huge: failure could mean the return to a trajectory leading toward military conflict between the United States and North Korea (also known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK).    The Moon administration hopes that Kim’s first visit to southern territory, even if only a day trip and a few dozen feet across the demilitarized zone, will generate South Korean public support for a warmer relationship with the North. Seoul will claim that this moment represents a rare, if limited, step toward reciprocity in inter-Korean relations. This is notable because inter-Korean relations under other liberal South Korean governments have been criticized as one-sided, occurring exclusively on North Korean terms and turf, and involving substantial economic subsidies just to secure North Korea’s participation. But with strict UN sanctions in place, Kim can expect no immediate economic reward for his presence at Panmunjom. A second objective of the Moon administration is to regularize inter-Korean summits and normalize peninsular dialogue. Establishing the first hotline for Korean leaders, which presumably will enable direct communication between Kim and Moon, was a symbolic move and could be particularly valuable to defuse crises. Third, Seoul is coordinating closely with Washington because it recognizes that improvements in inter-Korean relations are ultimately tied to progress in the U.S.-DPRK relationship. Moreover, North Korea has traditionally reserved denuclearization as an issue to be exclusively broached with the United States. This means that South Korea can support dialogue on denuclearization with North Korea but can never lead such a dialogue. It also means that if Moon achieves an inter-Korean summit but is unable to set the stage for a Trump-Kim summit, his efforts to reach out to North Korea will have been foiled. To achieve peaceful denuclearization, Moon needs Kim to accept a path in which the North will dismantle its nuclear program and hand over its nuclear weapons, and he needs Trump to pursue direct dialogue with Kim. A U.S.-DPRK summit will be high-risk, high-reward for both Kim and Trump, because failure could entrench their opposing stances on the nuclear issue and lead to confrontation, with no alternative pathways that could defuse it. The risk of confrontation is also the motivation for Moon’s exertions to bring Kim and Trump together, but in betting on such a summit, Moon proven to be the biggest gambler of all. The Panmunjom Agenda The agenda for the inter-Korean summit has been organized into three main areas: inter-Korean relations, denuclearization, and the establishment of a permanent peace between the two Koreas. The go-to areas for cooperation between North and South Korea involve family reunions, humanitarian work on communicable diseases, and the expansion of inter-Korean cultural and sporting exchanges, based on the model of recent inter-Korean pop concerts and sports exhibitions. However, the revival of past inter-Korean economic cooperation, including large-scale projects, such as the Kaesong Industrial Zone and the Mount Kumgang tourism project, has been blocked by UN Security Council resolutions and will remain off limits until there is tangible evidence of North Korea’s commitment to denuclearization. The Moon administration has sought to link denuclearization to the establishment of a permanent peace regime to replace the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement, which ended hostilities on the peninsula without ending the Korean War. More importantly, the Moon administration appears to have secured buy in from Trump, as demonstrated by recent statements by the president that the exploration of permanent peace arrangements has his blessing and that he intends to do something very big to solve the North Korea problem. At the same time, Seoul has been coaxing Kim toward denuclearization by insisting that a “step-by-step and comprehensive solution is required.” Moon’s goal will be to tee up a convergence of interests and a successful meeting between Kim and Trump. To achieve progress, Moon desires to institutionalize a process that reopens the pathway toward peaceful denuclearization that had been closed by escalatory rhetoric, military posturing, and rising risk of conflict in the waning months of 2017. More specifically, the Moon administration seeks to be the axle that keeps the wheels of inter-Korean and U.S.-DPRK relations moving forward, quickly and in concert, toward a comprehensive settlement of peace and denuclearization. Or the wheels could hit a pothole or boulder and suffer a breakdown. How Historic Will the Summit Be? South Korean officials have played the roles of intermediary and supporting actor behind two larger-than-life personalities, one of whom is starring in his coming-out story as a nuclear-armed power, while the other wants to show his deal-making acumen by doing what no other U.S. president has done. Kim has used nuclear and missile development to expand his impoverished and isolated country’s strategic weight and meet his country’s long-standing adversary on equal footing. Trump has embraced Kim’s top-down approach by drawing him out and agreeing to meet with North Korea’s only consequential decision-maker, a first. Yet even if a huge deal, involving the resumption of steps toward denuclearization in exchange for moves toward a more normal U.S.-DPRK diplomatic relationship, is struck, there will remain many unanswered questions about how it will be implemented and how long it will take to do so. In addition, as recent U.S.-China and U.S.-Japan summits have shown, other actors and interests could either upend or abet Kim’s story line. A U.S.-DPRK deal of the sort that Trump and Moon have in mind would de-escalate future crises and avert a trajectory that leads toward military confrontation. With continued economic pressure and sustained diplomatic resolve, such a process could eventually bind Kim to a different formula for preserving security, replacing nuclear weapons with diplomatic assurances as the basis for the regime’s survival, though this would come at a high cost if it also sacrifices opportunities for North Korea’s citizens, who would remain hostages to Kim’s rule. There is also the possibility, however, that Kim will merely use this diplomatic initiative to buy time, outlast his democratic counterparts in the South, and wriggle his regime off the denuclearization hook once again, only to return in an even more costly and destabilizing form down the road. Since Kim has staged his turn toward diplomacy, this could be the ending he has in mind, but both Moon and Trump have an ending in mind in which North Korea’s nuclear threat is ultimately defanged.  The outcome will depend not only on how the well the game is played, but more importantly, on who is writing the script. This post originally appeared as a CFR expert brief here.

The first inter-Korean summit in ten years could be stage-managed by Kim Jong-un, but look for South Korea’s leaders to assert a role shaping the process for denuclearization talks.