North Korea

The third summit between Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong-un, held in Pyongyang on September 18–20, resulted in the signing of two declarations designed to build on the foundations laid by the April 27 Panmunjom Declaration. The first declaration broadly addresses tension reduction, inter-Korean cooperation, and denuclearization. The second focuses more narrowly on tangible steps to be taken in the military arena to reduce tension and build confidence between the two Koreas.  Both declarations mark a deepening of momentum toward inter-Korean reconciliation and peaceful coexistence, with “complete denuclearization” as a byproduct of autonomous Korean efforts to establish this basis for peace, co-prosperity, and eventual unification. The declarations envisage changes that will produce new challenges and require management of potential gaps in the alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK). The primary structural driver for change in inter-Korean relations that will affect the U.S.-ROK security alliance revolves around, in the words of President Moon, the effort to “eliminate all risks that could lead to war from all parts of the Korean peninsula.” The inter-Korean military agreement is designed to achieve that task by ceasing “hostile acts against each other in every domain,” including land, air, and sea. Both sides agree to cease military activities aimed at each other in areas adjacent to the Military Demarcation Line between the two sides, to turn the Demilitarized Zone into a peace zone, to implement measures to prevent accidental military clashes, and to establish an inter-Korean joint military committee to oversee implementation of these agreements. The inter-Korean military agreement develops concepts and practices originally envisaged in the 1992 inter-Korean Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges, and Cooperation (known as the Basic Agreement) that were never implemented. Now, North Korea has finally demonstrated a willingness to adopt inter-Korean confidence and security building measures for the first time. This is a necessary first step to establish conditions of peace on the Korean Peninsula, and, as a practical matter, these measures are essential prerequisites for the end-of-war declaration identified as a mutual goal in the Panmunjom Declaration.  It is hard to imagine that the ROK Ministry of National Defense would make such an agreement without engaging in close consultations with U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). In fact, USFK Commander Vincent Brooks, in his July 21, 2018, Aspen Security Forum discussion on the challenges facing the Korean Peninsula, referred to USFK as an “enabler of dialogue” and stated that in response to possible changes in direction in North Korea, “in many ways, the lack of trust is the real enemy we have to defeat.” Brooks acknowledged that “there has to be some risk taking in order to build trust, and that’s really where we are right now.”  The implementation of the inter-Korean military agreement will likely necessitate adjustments in the ways in which the United States and South Korea operate to achieve the defense of South Korea. The agreement will generate pressure to reduce the profile and scale of joint U.S.-ROK military exercises on the peninsula. A more relaxed threat environment from North Korea would enable an easing of USFK’s military posture but would not reduce the readiness requirement or the watchfulness necessary to ensure transparency and verify the North’s adherence to the measures in the inter-Korean agreement. The inter-Korean agreement may also increase opposition within South Korea to the amount of funding that the ROK agrees to provide in support of the U.S. troop presence, potentially undermining current U.S.-ROK negotiations on the Special Measures Agreement at a time when both sides need to strengthen bilateral cooperation. The second source of tension that may emerge between Washington and Seoul following the Pyongyang Declaration revolves around the balance between the application of sanctions as a means by which to pressure North Korea into denuclearization and the potential relaxation of sanctions and promotion of inter-Korean economic cooperation as an incentive by which to lure North Korea into denuclearization. The Pyongyang Declaration leans forward on inter-Korean cooperation projects, such as the reconnection of railways, resumption of economic cooperation projects at the Kaesong Industrial Complex, and creation of a permanent venue to support the reunion of divided families at Mount Kumgang. The United States, however, will be wary of the premature relaxation of economic sanctions in the absence of tangible progress by North Korea on denuclearization. South Korea cannot assume that an inter-Korean process by its nature justifies a waiver of UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea in the absence of North Korea’s tangible commitments to denuclearization. If mismanaged, these tensions could become a serious source of contention between the United States and South Korea that North Korea will exploit to its advantage. A third critical area of potential difference between the United States and South Korea arising from the Pyongyang Declaration will revolve around the question of whether North Korea has truly made the strategic decision to denuclearize. The Pyongyang Declaration states that “the Korean Peninsula must be turned into a land of peace free from nuclear weapons and nuclear threats” and formally acknowledges denuclearization as an issue for inter-Korean discussion for the first time, rather than treating it exclusively as an issue for discussion with the United States. But North Korea’s agreement to international inspections of the dismantling of the Dongchang-ri missile engine test site and launch platform and the permanent dismantlement of the Yongbyon nuclear test site goes only partway toward meeting the U.S. demand for North Korea’s complete denuclearization and eventual inspection and removal of nuclear and missile facilities.  The debate over how much denuclearization is enough and on what timeline it should proceed is one that the United States and South Korea should jointly have with North Korea, not with each other. The traditional pattern of triangular interaction among the United States, South Korea, and North Korea has involved North Korean efforts to play one ally against the other by warming to one while spurning the other. But this time, there appears to be a different dynamic at play in which North Korea attempts to use South Korea as a bridge to improve relations with the United States, while also using South Korea as a shield against the most strident U.S. demands. This dynamic is one in which collective U.S.-ROK efforts to achieve denuclearization—backed by the promise of sanctions relaxation and the lure of co-prosperity—might achieve more than an approach based strictly on coercion. But that will only be the case if the United States and South Korea are able to stick together and maintain a united front, while ensuring that Kim Jong-un understands that the benefits of economic integration and co-prosperity are truly attainable if, and only if, he moves toward denuclearization.  

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South Korea's President Moon Jae-in has had more success than many expected in Pyongyang for his third summit with North Korea’s Chairman Kim Jong-un.

South Korean President Moon Jae-in has doubled down on efforts to prevent U.S.-North Korean negotiations from careening off course. After Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's August visit to Pyongyang was canceled, Moon sent a team of special envoys to the North Korean capital to jump-start the diplomatic process between North Korea and the United States by securing Kim Jong Un's public reaffirmation of his commitment to denuclearization. Starting Tuesday, Moon is set to meet Kim in Pyongyang to push forward inter-Korean reconciliation and help get the U.S.-North Korea dialogue back on track. As part of his talks with Kim, Moon must insist on denuclearization in coordination with the United States, even at the risk of renewed inter-Korean tension. Moon's main task in Pyongyang will be to draw North Korea into cooperation with South Korea and the United States without succumbing to North Korean calls for unity against interference from "external forces." The United States has pressed, without success, for early, significant North Korean gestures as a way to ascertain North Korean seriousness of purpose regarding denuclearization. National Security Advisor John Bolton has referred to a North Korean denuclearization process that would take only one year, and Pompeo is reported to have requested that North Korea send at least 60 percent of its nuclear warheads and fissile material out of the country as evidence of commitment to denuclearization. North Korea called this approach "gangster-like" and appeared to reject the proposal in its entirety, following Pompeo's July 6-7 visit to Pyongyang. North Korea has emphasized the order of the items contained in the statement from the June Singapore summit between Kim and President Trump, insisting that the establishment of peace arrangements and a new U.S.-North Korea relationship must come before Pyongyang makes moves toward complete denuclearization. Pyongyang has appealed directly to Trump to fulfill his promises in Singapore and make an end-of-war declaration prior to taking steps on denuclearization. Following the Singapore summit, North Korea met its pledges on the POW/MIA issue by returning 55 caskets of remains to the United States for further identification, in addition to unilateral (and reversible) shuttering of some nuclear and missile testing facilities. But these steps have neither reduced the North Korean threat nor diminished U.S. skepticism about Kim's declared openness to eventual denuclearization. In this week's meeting with Kim, Moon will explore the possibility of linking an end-of-war declaration to a North Korean declaration of nuclear and missile facilities. But he will also face pressure from North Korea to move forward with inter-Korean cooperation, despite the ongoing impasse with the United States. Prior to the Moon-Kim summit in April in Panmunjom, Moon's administration acknowledged that a critical failure of past South Korean efforts to promote engagement with North Korea was that inter-Korean relations failed had to move in tandem with U.S.-North Korea relations to make real progress on peace and denuclearization. Moon cannot lean too far forward on inter-Korean reconciliation without repeating past mistakes and playing into Pyongyang's hands by weakening the U.S.-South Korea alliance. The Moon administration's eagerness to reopen economic exchange with North Korea risks opening a rift between Washington and Seoul. Moon envisions economic cooperation with Pyongyang as a solution to South Korean economic woes, even as the United States continues to emphasize sanctions enforcement as the primary lever by which to pressure North Korea into denuclearizing. So while Moon must bridge the U.S.-North Korea trust gap, he must also maintain U.S.-South Korea trust. The gap on sanctions has grown with revelations that South Korean companies violated U.N. sanctions by importing North Korean coal. The U.S. is suspicions that Moon's pledge to open a liaison office at Kaesong and rebuild railways in North Korea will blow a hole in the sanctions regime, leaving Kim with both economic benefits and a nuclear arsenal. Meanwhile, Chinese President Xi Jinping has reopened North Korea's economic lifeline and tilted from economic coercion to geostrategic partnership with Pyongyang. This came partly in response to anxiety that a combined inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korean rapprochement, symbolized by the Singapore summit, might come at China's disadvantage. Beijing's shift in focus from denuclearization to geopolitics and the emergence of a Sino-U.S. trade war have come at Seoul's expense, at a moment when U.S.-South Korea alliance coordination is crucial. It is reasonable for Moon to take on additional risk to avert the perceived dangers of the "fire and fury" from a U.S.-North Korean confrontation. But the success of his efforts will continue to depend on the ability of the United States and South Korea to coordinate effectively. If Moon sticks exclusively to the role of good cop toward North Korea, Trump will continue to be cast as the bad cop. A bit more "bad cop" from Moon might provide Trump with space to show flexibility with North Korea, while insisting on the bottom-line interest of both countries that Kim fulfill his pledge to work toward complete denuclearization.

Can South Korea’s Moon Jae-in broker a process for North Korean denuclearization acceptable to both Washington and Pyongyang?

South Korean President Moon Jae-in dispatched a special envoy delegation composed of the same members that met Kim Jong-un in March to discuss arrangements for an inter-Korean summit planned for Pyongyang later this month. The delegation, led by National Security Advisor Chung Eui-yong, traveled to meet with Kim Jong-un on September 5 in Pyongyang, and Chung briefed the Korean public the following day.  Chung announced  that the Pyongyang summit, to be held on September 18-20, would examine the outcome of the implementation of the April 27th Panmunjom Declaration, the measures to achieve “the permanent settlement of peace and common prosperity” and the “practical measures to denuclearization on the Korean peninsula.” Second, Chung announced that “Kim Jong-un reconfirmed his determination to completely denuclearize the Korean Peninsula and expressed his willingness for close cooperation not only with the South but also with the United States.” Chung also announced that the Pyongyang summit would pursue agreement on “concrete plans to establish mutual trust and prevent military clashes” and that the two Koreas would establish a joint liaison office in Kaesong in advance of the inter-Korean summit. The special envoy delegation succeeded in pushing forward specific preparations for the Pyongyang summit and secured both Kim Jong-un’s public reiteration of a commitment to turn the Korean Peninsula “into the cradle of peace without nuclear weapons and free from nuclear threat” and a significant acknowledgment that the two Koreas “should further their efforts to realize the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” directly recognizing denuclearization as a legitimate topic for inter-Korean discussion. This is good news because the United States needs South Korea’s help in pressing for North Korea’s denuclearization, but the bad news is that the formulation used by the North Korean media leaves open the possibility that North Korea has plans to press for weakening of U.S. commitments to the defense of South Korea. In his statement, Chung reaffirmed South Korea’s commitment to work closely with the United States.  Inter-Korean summit preparations will now turn to building on the Panmunjom Declaration, which has shown success in implementing tangible commitments made in the declaration to develop inter-Korean steps toward “co-prosperity and unification,” including the resumption of cultural and sports exchanges, divided family reunions, and the establishment of a liaison office at Kaesong. But implementation of tension-reduction and peace-building efforts outlined in the declaration have lagged, so it is natural that the main agenda for the next inter-Korean summit should focus on implementing those sections of the Panmunjom Declaration. The Moon administration will place the following issues on center stage as South Korea coordinates with the United States to prepare for an imminent summit in Pyongyang:  The Moon administration anticipates that Kim Jong-un’s renewed commitment to denuclearization is sufficient to unstick U.S.-North Korean talks on the topic that stalled with the cancellation of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s planned visit to Pyongyang. Resumption of U.S.-North Korea talks is important to the Moon administration’s view that inter-Korean relations and U.S.-North Korea relations should go together;  South Korean summit preparations should include close cooperation with the United States on efforts to negotiate and implement practical steps to achieve inter-Korean tension-reduction and security/confidence building measures. Progress on these fronts will help create conditions that justify an exchange of an end-of-war declaration with a North Korean declaration to shutter nuclear and missile facilities. An exchange of declarations based on tangible steps toward establishment of inter-Korean peace would affirm the shared U.S. and North Korean aspiration to achieve peace and denuclearization reflected in the Singapore statement and start parallel processes to achieve those objectives; President Moon’s vision of building a single economic community on the Korean peninsula can only be realized through North Korean steps toward denuclearization, the achievement of which is a prerequisite for relief from existing UN and U.S. sanctions. South Korea and the United States should step up coordination to insure that South Korean requests for waivers on the application of economic sanctions on North Korea do not undermine the essential leverage necessary to keep North Korea moving toward denuclearization. 

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The commemoration marking the anniversary of the end of World War II is always a bittersweet moment in South Korea. It marks a day of euphoria on the Korean peninsula that carries with it both the legacy of the past and the burdens of the future. As Korean War historian Sheila Miyoshi Jager observes, “Korea was not liberated by Koreans, and so Korea was subjugated to the will and wishes of its liberators.” Moon Jae-in’s speech marking the seventy-third anniversary of the end of World War II is particularly fascinating in its bold effort to challenge that assertion. This can be seen both through Moon’s efforts to redefine South Korea’s fraught diplomatic relationship with Japan and for the insight the speech provides into Moon’s audacious and potentially risky effort to redefine inter-Korean relations and reshape the geopolitical landscape in Northeast Asia. Moon’s efforts to come to terms with Korea-Japan relations are particularly conflicted. Moon begins his speech by asserting that “The history of pro-Japanese collaborators was never a part of our mainstream history.” Instead, Moon defines a liberation narrative that celebrates South Korean agency by drawing on South Korea’s impressive post-war accomplishments as the only former colony to “succeed in achieving both economic growth and democratic progress.” But the examples Moon uses in his speech to demonstrate Korea’s desire for liberation in his speech all involve resistance to Japanese colonial rule. In addition, Moon’s rejection of the terms of the December 2015 comfort woman agreement made by his predecessor led the Moon administration to establish August 14 as a new holiday, Comfort Women Memorial Day, and to launch a new think tank devoted to comfort woman research, the Women’s Human Rights Institute of Korea.  Moon stated his Comfort Women Memorial Day address his view that the comfort woman issue cannot be solved diplomatically, but rather should be addressed through global consciousness-raising about sexual violence against all women. Unfortunately, Moon’s message was badly undercut domestically since it coincided with the South Korean judicial acquittal of former South Chungcheong provincial governor Ahn Hee-jung on charges of raping his secretary. Rather than helping to marginalize Japan’s historical legacy as part of Korea’s liberation narrative (and thus reducing its salience as a diplomatic stumbling block), the steps Moon has taken thus far appear more likely to perpetuate it, just as Japan’s establishment of Takeshima Day (to mark Japan’s claim to the island that South Korea effectively occupies and refers to as Dokdo) strained Korea-Japan relations over a decade ago during the administration of Roh Moo-hyun in which Moon previously served.   These developments have contributed to a hardening of public opinion over the comfort woman issue within the past year in both Japan and South Korea, as shown in the 2018 annual Genron NPO-East Asia Institute (EAI) Joint Poll on Japan-Korea relations and other polls. (Interestingly, the Genron-EAI shows that a plurality of Japanese and a majority of South Koreans support strengthened trilateral security cooperation among the United States, Japan, and South Korea.) Under Moon and Abe, Japan-South Korea relations appear cordial, but fragile. The centerpiece of Moon’s speech on the future of the inter-Korean relationship turns on the phrase “taking responsibility for our fate ourselves” as a way to overcome historic divisions that have hobbled Korea’s autonomy. Moon outlines his administration’s efforts to win international support for his efforts to promote regional peace and prosperity, including agreement with President Donald Trump to “resolve the North Korean nuclear issue in a peaceful manner.”  Looking forward to a third inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang, Moon declares the objective of the meeting as “an audacious step to proceed toward the declaration of an end to the Korean War and the signing of a peace treaty as well as the complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.” Moon then presents a bipartisan vision of Korean peninsula-centered Northeast Asian economic integration, beginning with his proposal to establish an East Asian Railroad Community. This is a concept that has been endorsed under various names by every South Korean president since Kim Dae Jung. It is evocative of the same elements contained in the Eurasian Initiative and Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI) launched by Moon’s discredited predecessor, Park Geun-hye. The key to unlocking a new way forward, according to Moon, is Korean leadership as “the protagonists in Korean peninsula-related issues. Developments in inter-Korean relations are not the by-effects of progress in the relationship between the North and the United States. Rather, advancement in inter-Korean relations is the driving force behind denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” It is a bold approach that places South Korea at the crossroads of Northeast Asia and crystallizes Moon Jae-in’s efforts to manage the conflict between South Korea’s desire for autonomy and its need for alliance. The coming weeks and months will test whether Kim Jong Un—and President Trump—accept Moon’s proposition that a Korean peace will catalyze regional and global stability.

Take this quiz to test your knowledge of North Korea, including its nuclear buildup, the Kim dynasty, and more.

The weeks following the Singapore summit have thus far not delivered a clear public roadmap or timeline for how and when it will be possible to achieve peace or denuclearization following the Kim-Trump summit meeting. Rather, the days prior to and following the summit have been full of signs that the Trump administration is following the North Korean model rather than the Libyan model for denuclearization. Since the North Korean model is the pathway the Trump administration is on, it is worth examining North Korean statements about where that pathway will lead. As U.S. Forces Korea Commander Vincent Brooks correctly diagnosed to the Aspen Security Forum, a major challenge facing both sides is the absence of trust, and the North Koreans have shown themselves to be nothing if not distrustful of American intentions. This has been the case despite reaping significant prestige benefits from the Singapore meeting in addition to Trump’s unexpected pledge to cancel summer U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises. Trump walked away from his historic meeting with Kim Jong Un saying: “I think he trusts me, and I trust him.” But Kim Jong-un was reported in KCNA following the summit to have noted “that many problems occurred due to deep-rooted distrust and hostility existing between the two countries,” and that “two countries should commit themselves to refraining from antagonizing with each other out of mutual understanding, and take legal and institutional steps to guarantee it.” In other words, Trump says “trust”; Kim says “verify.” The North Koreans appear to have taken Trump at his word by expecting the Trump administration to trust that its unilateral measures to dismantle its nuclear and missile testing sites are significant enough to count as sincere moves toward the goal of “complete denuclearization” pledged by Kim to Xi Jinping, Moon Jae-in, and Donald Trump. But North Korea’s unilateral measures of destroying its nuclear test site at Punggye-ri in May and dismantling its missile engine testing site at Sohae have been implemented without adequate external verification, in a manner that requires the Trump administration to trust rather than verify the credibility of North Korea’s actions. On the other hand, the parts of the Singapore declaration that North Korea most distrusts and therefore most want to verify are related to the U.S. commitments to a “new U.S.-DPRK relationship” and the U.S. commitment to “peace.” As a result, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo received a stiff arm from the North Koreans during his July 6-7 visit to Pyongyang as part of Trump administration efforts to secure a rapid and concrete timetable for denuclearization. The July 7 North Korean foreign ministry statement on the occasion of Pompeo’s visit detailed its proposal of simultaneous actions, including “realizing multilateral exchanges for improved relations between the DPRK and the U.S., making public a declaration on the end of war first on the occasion of the 65th anniversary of the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement to build a peace regime on the Korean peninsula, dismantling the test ground of high thrust engine to make a physical verification of the suspension of ICBM production as part of denuclearization steps and making an earliest start of the working-level talks for recovering POW/MIA remains.” Although POW/MIA (prisoners of war/missing-in-action) remains recovery would appear to be an easy humanitarian confidence building step completely unrelated to American denuclearization demands, working-level communication regarding the handover has become an example of the depth of distrust between the two sides. North Korea’s foreign ministry statement makes clear that from their perspective, the missing piece is a Trump administration declaration of the end of war, deliverable by this Friday. This step would undoubtedly facilitate the return of POW/MIAs, and it is a step that the Moon Jae-in administration has eagerly supported, including through the Panmunjom Declaration, which envisaged an aspirational statement of the end of war by the end of the year. In fact, South Korea’s unification minister, Cho Myoung-gyon, stated at a South Korean National Assembly policy briefing: “I think we can declare the end to the war . . . before the North achieves complete denuclearization.” Cho specifically stated that such a declaration could be possible “if the North takes sincere measures” toward denuclearization, including North Korea’s dismantlement of nuclear and missile testing sites at Punggye-ri and Sohae. According to the North Korean road map, the next step would involve a Trump administration declaration of intent to replace the armistice with a permanent peace, likely accompanied by the return of some POW/MIAs via Panmunjom. Beyond these steps, the looming question over the North Korean model is not just whether the decades-long distrust of the United States by the North Korean leadership can be overcome, but also whether North Korea can build a track record of accomplishment necessary to overcome American distrust fueled by North Korea’s record of broken promises and commitments. According to Pompeo, the North Koreans recognize that the key to bridging that distrust is the achievement of a “final, fully-verified denuclearization.” But it does not mean that the North Koreans are committed to achieving that objective. Thus far, the North Korean model seems to envision a one-sided verification process in which North Korea performs on the honor system while the United States makes tangible concessions in an effort to overcome North Korea’s mistrust. But American mistrust will not dissipate just because Trump declares his trust in Kim. Rather, both sides must embark on a sustained effort to defuse tensions by building a tangible joint record of accomplishment necessary to make both the end of war and North Korea’s denuclearization a reality, not simply a declaration. In this respect, the biggest challenge to building trust on the American side will be long-term consistency beyond a single administration, while the biggest challenge to confidence building on the North Korean side will be reciprocity (i.e., offering of tangible and irreversible quid pro quos rather than pocketing concessions or breaking agreements.

Navigating the geopolitical domain surrounding energy is always difficult, but in the lead-up to the U.S.-Russia summit in Helsinki, it is particularly complex. While energy is unlikely to be a first order item for the summit, a number of topics likely to be raised could intersect with energy issues. Senior Russian officials have been vocal about energy related items in the run-up to the July 16 meeting, perhaps hoping that recent oil market volatility will give Moscow a leg up to make the usual pitch about the positive role its energy trade can have in the bilateral relationship. Several energy related topics are likely front of mind for the American team traveling to Helsinki with U.S. President Donald Trump. Here are a few examples: 1. The United States would like Moscow’s help to restrain Iran’s expansive role in the Mideast because it believes that this would help U.S. regional allies and better enable the United States to exit costly conflicts in the region. The subject of the ongoing conflicts in Yemen and Syria is bound to come up at the summit, especially if the United States and Russia seek to open better lines of military to military communication between top U.S. and Russian military leaders. This consultative approach is considered critical to avoiding an accidental escalation of military conflict, the dangers of which have risen in recent years. For its part, Russia will argue it has offered some accommodation on the Iran issue and would like something back in return. First, Russia’s top diplomats announced Moscow wanted to see the withdrawal of all non-Syrian forces from Syria’s southern border areas. That move was taken as a betrayal by some in Iran where MPs accused Russia of being an unreliable partner that would willingly sacrifice Iran to bolster relations with the United States. Then Russia backed an agreement with Saudi Arabia and other oil producers including the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to increase oil supplies. Iran was unhappy that Moscow showed its support for the oil producer agreement, especially given the context of the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions against Iranian oil export sales. President Trump made no secret that a Saudi-Russian agreement to raise oil production was the firm wish of the United States. But paving the way for the U.S. summit wasn’t likely the main reason Russia wanted to see oil prices stabilize at a lower level. Moscow had its own reasons to want to prevent a surge in oil prices. High oil prices make it harder for the Russian government to prevent ruble appreciation which would be bad for the Russian economy. 2. Arms control will be top of mind for the summit. The United States wants to signal its steadfast support for East Europe allies. This topic will trigger mutual accusations of violations in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) treaty. While arms control will be a high priority topic, the back drop to any discussion of the INF and missile deployment will circle back to U.S. diplomatic support for Eastern Europe. That, in turn, could trigger a tangent to the United States’ open opposition to Russia’s Nordstream 2 direct natural gas pipeline expansion to Germany. Germany favors the expanded line to enhance its ability to bypass other gas pipeline transit countries like Poland, Belarus, or Ukraine, saying this will promote Germany’s energy security. The United States argues that the pipeline project, which would benefit Germany economically and strategically, could raise Europe’s dependence on Russian energy and weaken the Eastern European countries’ status vis-à-vis Russia as well as potentially shift needed income from the smaller Eastern European economies to to Germany. 3. The United States would like Russia to play a helpful role in negotiations for the denuclearization of North Korea. If past efforts are any indication, energy could be a piece of the economic package North Korea can hope to achieve through a peace treaty. Russia stands to be an important beneficiary of any energy deal that is part of the North Korean negotiations since one obvious option to North Korea’s energy problems could be a natural gas pipeline that would carry Russian natural gas via China to both North and South Korea. It’s not new for Russia to figure energy could be a constructive force to any U.S.-Russia relationship reset. Energy has been part and parcel of several U.S. attempts to improve relations with Russia in the past, as far back as 1993. At that time, the U.S.-Russia summit led to the creation of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission to promote economic and technological links, including energy. As part of that diplomatic process, the United States offered up American know how to help Russia revitalize its oil sector. ConocoPhillips was an early mover with its Polar Lights venture, but eventually it and other U.S. oil companies that entered Russia at the time found a host of legal, regulatory, and logistical barriers that turned profitable ventures into losing propositions. The failure of U.S. oil investing in Russia mirrored similar setbacks in U.S.-Russia arms control agreements. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States and Russia revived their bilateral energy dialogues, after Vladimir Putin signaled that Russia was ready and able to help diversify global energy supplies away from the Middle East. In May 2002, President George W. Bush and President Putin initiated a new high-level dialogue on energy that led to several energy specific summits and new deals for American oil and gas companies in Russia. But soon after billions of dollars of fresh U.S. investment began flowing to Russia, the Kremlin began to renationalize its energy sector, and by 2005, U.S. companies not only faced difficult renegotiations of their oil and gas deals but in some cases, outright arrests of partners and the taking of assets. Obama era proposed resets similarly ran aground after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014. The United States and Europe imposed sanctions on Russia in response, creating problems anew for the few U.S. oil companies that were still remaining on the ground in Russia. This time around, sanctions are top of mind when it comes to energy relations between the United States and Russia. Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak visited U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin during his visit to Washington D.C. in late June. Reports say the meeting focused on sanctions, which for obvious reasons, the Russians would like removed, and the Nordstream 2 pipeline which Washington has threatened with possible new sanctions. Treasury, at the urging of Congress, has played a pivotal role in showing the Kremlin that it is not out of U.S. reach when it comes to economic levers. The United States targeted Russian aluminum firm Rusal and others with sanctions back in April to punish Moscow for malign activities, such as interference with U.S. elections, and amid suspicions that the Kremlin was behind the murderous use of nerve gas in the United Kingdom. The U.S. imposed April sanctions against Russia caused $12 billion in losses for Russia’s fifty wealthiest oligarchs. With both of Russia’s largest state-controlled energy companies, Rosneft and Gazprom, carrying huge corporate debt loads, further sanctions against those entities could be a major hassle for the Kremlin, which would be forced to intervene, possibly triggering more acrimony and rivalry inside President Putin’s inner circle.    From its side, Russia is likely to argue that it has been accommodating to U.S. priorities on Iran and oil prices and try to leverage those actions as evidence that the United States should offer concessions to its concerns. That means the United States will have to think carefully about how energy intersects with other priorities ahead of the summit because it will be tricky to both discourage Moscow from an aggressive posture on U.S. hacking, on military positioning in Eastern Europe, and on arms control and still reap the benefits of its cooperation in the Middle East and oil markets. Keeping items compartmentalized and in different buckets might seem feasible at first glance. The United States still achieved successful détente with the U.S.S.R. during the Cold War, for example. But as the U.S. summit with Russia approaches, better definition of priorities when it comes to energy will be necessary. Some items are already creating inconsistent messaging; for example, asking European nations to veto the Nordstream 2 pipeline to avoid over-dependence on Russia while at the same time, encouraging Russia to sell more oil to Europe to replace Iranian barrels and elsewhere to lubricate the oil market. Backing a Russian natural gas pipeline to the Korean peninsula could also seem untoward both to European advocates of Nordstream 2 as well as to U.S. exporters of American liquefied natural gas (LNG) who have been making headway lining up long term supply contracts to South Korea. The U.S. advance team to the summit will have to align competing interests to prepare more consistent messaging for Russia on these various energy elements, even if energy isn’t going to be in the top three topics for deeper discussion. Lack of clarity could muddy U.S. effectiveness in discussions or worse, leave Russia with geopolitical advantages it has shown it will exploit to divide the United States from its allies. Russia is likely hoping that energy exigencies will create an opening for it to gain concessions from the United States in other areas. The fantasy that Russia could somehow provide the United States a big lever against Iran in Syria and elsewhere may have initially clouded U.S. judgement over what is possible. Iran is unlikely to go quiet into the night, as it has made clear recently with threats against international shipping, regardless of how Moscow plays it. The United States needs to seek substantive discussion on other areas that don’t involve Iran, to avoid having the summit success reduced to empty promises on cooperation between the United States and Russia regarding Iran, when in reality, Moscow cannot likely impose sustainable constraints on Iran’s military actions, even if it wanted to. When discussing the topic of Europe, the United States should keep in mind China’s massive energy and other critical industry investment expansion into the continent. That could be a more fruitful topic that is putting Russian leaders on a back foot. To date, the real challenge to marketers of Russian oil and gas to Europe has not been U.S. LNG exports which are only just starting (U.S. energy sales to Europe are still a negligible volume compared right now to Russian natural gas sales which have been on the rise). It is renewable energy which is the bulwark of Europe’s energy independence from Russia. China could become the major actor in Europe’s clean energy future and that will influence both long run U.S. and Russian links to the continent as it has in Central Asia. The United States has been downplaying expectations for the Helsinki meeting, noting the fact that it is taking place is an improvement to escalating tensions. Preparations for a summit will likely force U.S. policy makers to square the circle on apparent inconsistencies in U.S. international energy diplomacy. Given the wary eye of Congress, the Trump administration is unlikely to offer Russia any sanctions relief until when and if Russia demonstrates substantive results on the ground. The United States should also be cautious about trying to orchestrate future participation of American oil and gas companies in Russia as a possible diplomatic carrot. The history of such initiatives is spotty at best, and it only takes one reckless unexpected action by Moscow to force Washington to press companies yet again to cut back on any progress on energy cooperation that could be made in the short run. A cautious approach to talk of energy cooperation would be wise at this juncture until more progress is made on higher priority issues.

President Trump prides himself on being a "dealmaker." In one of his biggest deals yet, he brokered a joint statement between the United States and North Korea. To what extent did he use his eleven-step method from The Art of the Deal?

The Singapore summit lessened the chances of conflict in the short term, but the ultimate legacy of the summit could still be a march toward war.