Myanmar

There is plenty of blame to go around for the current humanitarian crisis in western Myanmar’s Rakhine State, the worst in East Asia. Both the United Nations’ human rights chief and U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson have now affirmed that Myanmar’s security forces are engaged in ethnic cleansing in Rakhine State, attempting to wipe out the Muslim, ethnic Rohingya group. Myanmar’s top generals, still in control of the security forces, bear the ultimate responsibility for the bloodshed, but de facto head of government Aung San Suu Kyi, who has done nothing to stop it, bears responsibility as well. Outside powers, too, are accountable. Yet one group’s responsibility for the Rakhine crisis has not been as fully explored: nationalist Buddhist leaders in Myanmar. In my new review for the Washington Monthly, I examine the new book by Francis Wade, Myanmar’s Enemy Within: Buddhist Violence and the Making of a Muslim “Other”.

There was no way that Pope Francis’s trip to Myanmar and Bangladesh last week was going to be uneventful. The trip came in the midst of a massive spasm of violence in western Myanmar’s Rakhine State—one that the UN’s human rights chief, many rights organizations, and U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson have all called ethnic cleansing. The pope has built a reputation as a defender of the poor, of the powerless, and of refugees and migrants, and so it seemed natural that, in Myanmar and Bangladesh, he would speak out on behalf of the Rohingya. Not only have over 600,000 Rohingya fled into Bangladesh since August, but conditions in the refugee camps inside Bangladesh are increasingly dire. In a recent report by the Inter-Sector Coordination Group on conditions inside Bangladesh for the Rohingya refugees, it noted that: One of the camps [where Rohingya are living] has become the largest and fastest growing refugee camp in the world, where approximately half a million people are living extremely close to each other without access to basic services such as toilets or clinics. The pope also reportedly was pressured, before the trip, by Catholic leaders in Myanmar not to openly criticize the Myanmar government’s handling of Rakhine State or even use the word Rohingya. They may have done so for fear that, if the pope did criticize the country’s military and civilian leaders for their roles in the ethnic cleansing, Catholics in Myanmar would be targeted for violence because of the pope’s words. In addition, some Catholic leaders may have feared that anything the pope did to upset Myanmar leaders could threaten relations between the Vatican and Naypyidaw; the two sides only established diplomatic relations last May. Pope Francis is politically savvy, but this was always going to be a very delicate trip. Pope Francis ultimately did not issue any open criticism of the Myanmar government, or even use the word Rohingya, until he had left Myanmar for Bangladesh to meet Rohingya refugees and discuss the crisis with Bangladesh leaders. (Myanmar military and civilian leaders refuse to even use the word “Rohingya,” as a means of denying the existence of targeting the Rohingya as supposed outsiders in Myanmar.) Amidst international criticism, the pope then defended his approach to the trip on his way back to Rome and suggested to reporters that he was frank in private with Myanmar leaders about the nature of the Rakhine crisis and their responsibility for it. He further suggested to some reporters that he did indeed use the word Rohingya in private discussions with Myanmar leaders. He may well have been frank in private. Surely, in dealing with civilian, military, and even some religious leaders in Myanmar, the pope must have faced the biggest obstacle all foreign leaders, rights activists, and diplomats address in addressing the Rakhine crisis: the vast majority of Myanmar people either seem to support the government’s approach to Rakhine or are untroubled by it. This is not a reason for outsiders, including the pope, to avoid criticism of Myanmar for the crisis in Rakhine or sanctions for leaders abetting ethnic cleansing. But, the fact that a majority of Myanmar citizens seem to support the brutal campaign that has driven as much as two-thirds of the Rohingya from Myanmar into Bangladesh means that outsiders’ words and actions seem to be pushing most Myanmar leaders and citizens into a bunker mentality. Increasingly, Myanmar citizens seem to be supporting the Myanmar military, no matter how abusively it acts in Rakhine State. Many Rohingya already seem to accept that they have been ethnically cleansed, and have no future in Myanmar, even if Naypyidaw and Dhaka eventually forge some real agreement on repatriation of Rohingya to Myanmar. (Dhaka and Naypyidaw reportedly have agreed on a memorandum of understanding about some kind of repatriation, but it is hard to imagine repatriation going forward while conditions for Rohingya inside Rakhine State are still so dire.) “The Rohingya are finished in our country,” Kyaw Min, a Rohingya man living in Yangon, told the New York Times in a story published over the weekend. “Soon we will all be dead or gone.” In addition, although Pope Francis has said that he is a strong supporter of Myanmar’s democratic transition—and there is no reason to doubt that he indeed supports the transition—his decision to go along with commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing’s demand that the pontiff meet the top general before meeting civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi is not helpful to the democratic process. (In the meeting, the general reportedly told the pope that there is “no religious discrimination” in Myanmar.) Min Aung Hlaing already has been bolstering his power, and the military’s popularity, through a series of high-profile visits to foreign countries and through the brutal campaign in Rakhine State. Getting the pope to meet him first sends another signal to the Myanmar populace that Min Aung Hlaing wields the power in Myanmar, and that foreign leaders should treat him as the country’s real ruler. To be sure, on his return to Rome, the pope indicated to reporters that he did not see his meeting with the top Myanmar general as akin to his meeting with de facto civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi, whom he had sought out and who he actually wanted to meet. In response to a question on his plane about his meeting with the top general, the pope noted: I would distinguish between the two meetings, two types of meetings. Those meetings during which I went to meet people [i.e, with Suu Kyi] and those in which I received people. This general asked me to speak. And I received him. I never close the door. Yet, few people in Myanmar will have read this press conference transcript, while many will have read or heard about Pope Francis meeting with Min Aung Hlaing and then, only later, with Aung San Suu Kyi. The pope was his usual forthright self again with Rohingya refugees he met in Bangladesh. Again, he showed his humble, human touch by apologizing to the refugees for the “indifference of the world” to their plight and appearing to hold back tears hearing their stories.

By now the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Myanmar’s Rakhine State has resulted in more than 625,000 Rohingya refugees fleeing into Bangladesh just since August 25. Last week, I wrote about Pope Francis’s visit to Bangladesh, and his public interaction with eighteen Rohingya refugees, which helped focus attention on their plight, if briefly. This week I want to provide a sense of how challenging the state of affairs is for the Rohingya refugees. Bangladesh has opened its border to them, and they at least have a literal place of refuge. But the scale of the influx in such a compressed period of time has overwhelmed relief agencies. As of December 3, the Inter Sector Coordination Group reports that with the new influx of refugees since August, the total number of Rohingya refugees now in Bangladesh is more than 838,000. Crowding and poor sanitation create the perfect storm for waterborne disease outbreaks. Reuters reported contamination of 60 percent of the camps’ water supply. The head of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies told Agence France-Presse in November that the risk of cholera was a “ticking bomb.” To prevent the worst, the World Health Organization (WHO) and UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) began a mass cholera immunization drive in October, targeting some 900,000 people. The UNICEF representative in Bangladesh called it the “second largest largest oral vaccination campaign in the world after Haiti in 2016.” The WHO indicates that the available oral cholera vaccines can provide around 65 percent protection—clearly helpful, but not an impenetrable shield. Just three weeks back, the World Food Program warned of “high malnutrition rates among Rohingya refugees.” Its news release stated that “one in four Rohingya children” are malnourished. The International Rescue Committee (IRC), in a November call to action, expressed concern that another influx of Rohingya “new arrivals” could be coming, which would push the total to more than 1 million refugees in Bangladesh. (This is already one of the most densely populated countries in the world, with more than 160 million people packed into an area roughly the size of Iowa.) The IRC termed the present situation an “unimaginable humanitarian crisis.” On top of all this, the refugees, who fled Rakhine State to escape brutal violence, remain vulnerable in the refugee camps. The International Organization for Migration has warned of “human trafficking, labor exploitation, and sexual abuse.” Children separated from their families are particularly at risk. Reports of child labor and forced child marriages are emerging. So are reports of sex trafficking and sexual slavery. Against this backdrop of human suffering, the funds needed to continue providing nutrition, better sanitation and housing, and continued health care and vigilance against infectious disease—not to mention ongoing protection and education for children—remain utterly inadequate. To date, the fundraising appeal remains just under 35 percent of its goal of $434 million.  No wonder the IRC called this the “world’s fastest growing humanitarian crisis.”  My book about India’s rise on the world stage, Our Time Has Come: How India is Making Its Place in the World, will be out in January. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa. Or like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa).

Earlier this week, Pope Francis visited Myanmar. During his visit there, he did not mention the word “Rohingya” publicly, despite the fact that since August 25, world attention has been focused on the Myanmar military’s ethnic cleansing of more than 600,000 Rohingya Muslims from Rakhine State. That’s why, when the pope mentioned the Rohingya by name today in Bangladesh, it captured attention. Pope Francis—arriving at a cathedral in an open cycle rickshaw, totally unlike the bulletproof “popemobiles” of his predecessors—participated in an interfaith gathering in Dhaka, and then interacted with sixteen Rohingya refugees who had been brought to Dhaka from refugee camps near the border with Myanmar. As the BBC reported, Pope Francis said in a remark departing from his planned speech that “the presence of God today is also called Rohingya.” He asked for their forgiveness “in the name of all those who have persecuted you.” Recognition from the pope does help raise global awareness of the continued humanitarian catastrophe the Rohingya have experienced, but it unfortunately does very little to address the big questions about their future. With much fanfare, Bangladesh and Myanmar reached an agreement on the repatriation of the Rohingya on November 23. As my colleague Josh Kurlantzick wrote on Monday, there are some big questions to ask about how this agreement would work in practice. Specifically, Josh asks: how would repatriation occur with ongoing violence still in Rakhine State? Where would the Rohingya live in Rakhine State—would they be forced into camps? What rights would they have, if not citizenship rights? And how can their safety be guaranteed? The questions Josh poses are some big ones, and they illustrate how difficult it will be to effect an actual repatriation of any scale. Is this agreement actually implementable? Despite a relatively successful repatriation effort in the 1990s, I am personally doubtful, and would like to be proved wrong. It is entirely possible to imagine this agreement running aground if, for example, Rohingya refugees are refused entry to Rakhine based on a lack of identity documents, or they are told they will have to live in camps once again, or there is no way to guarantee their safety in the end. Meanwhile, what of the present situation and the immediate future for the Rohingya refugees? To date, the total number of Rohingya arrivals to Bangladesh since August 25 has increased to 625,000. The UN mounted a humanitarian funding appeal to support the extensive needs of such a large refugee population in Bangladesh, and the total appeal amount through February 2018 is $434 million. According to the most recently available figures from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, only 34.8 percent of that total has been funded so far. The financial shortfall will obviously affect the ability of aid organizations to deliver relief. And the Bangladesh government, which should be commended for its open door to the refugees in this terrible moment, has begun taking steps to move refugees from the Teknaf Peninsula to an island in the middle of the Bay of Bengal. Reuters reported that the Bangladesh government this week approved a plan to develop this island, known as Thengar Char or Bhasan Char, so refugees could be shifted there. The island, as Reuters notes, is “two hours by boat from the nearest settlement…has no roads or buildings and it regularly floods during the rough seas of the June-September rainy season.” So, despite the good news of an agreement to repatriate the Rohingya, it strikes me that bigger questions still remain about what will happen to them in the next several months. I am afraid all the mercy Pope Francis can muster will not help with the answers. My book about India’s rise on the world stage, Our Time Has Come: How India is Making Its Place in the World, will be out in January. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa. Or like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa).

In an earlier post today, I noted that there remain many questions about the memorandum of understanding that Dhaka and Naypyidaw have supposedly negotiated, allowing at least some Rohingya to return to Myanmar, after years of a scorched earth campaign in Rakhine State. As I noted in my earlier post, the memorandum of understanding remains vague. It does not answer important questions like how the Rohingya would be protected if they returned to Myanmar, what types of legal and civil rights they would enjoy back in Myanmar, and whether they would be moved into camps in Myanmar once they crossed back across the border. On Pope Francis’s visit to Myanmar and Bangladesh this week, perhaps the most politically charged trip on the pontiff’s career, the pope is walking a fine line in his meeting with senior Myanmar and Bangladesh officials. He has already apparently met with Myanmar commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing, though he may meet with the general again. He also plans to meet with de facto civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi, top political leaders in Bangladesh, and prominent religious leaders as well. The Pope is reportedly trying to be careful to highlight the suffering of Rohingya refugees—the result of a massive, military-managed campaign in Rakhine State—while not taking any actions that might turn the rage of Myanmar’s Burman, or Bamar, majority, against Christians as well. Several questions should be raised about the trip. Here are some questions to ask to assess how Pope Francis has handled his trip: Is Pope Francis actually going to call the Rohingya “Rohingya,” or will he use some kind of compromise terms—like “they refer to themselves as Rohingya.” Calling the group “Rohingya,” without qualifications, would send a powerful message of how Pope Francis views the Rohingya, and how they should be treated in Myanmar. Will Pope Francis push both Dhaka and Naypyidaw to present a clearer, more obviously feasible plan for how Rohingya could actually ever return to Myanmar without facing the threat of renewed violence against them, or being confined to camps within Myanmar itself? Right now, the repatriation plan is only sketchily detailed, and likely would not protect returning Rohingya from a wide range of abuses if they returned to Myanmar. Will the Pope actively rebut obvious falsehoods by top Myanmar leaders? Commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing today apparently told the Pope that there was “no religious discrimination” in Myanmar, which is clearly false. How forcefully will the Pope highlight continuing discrimination against Christians in Myanmar, which has been overshadowed by the ethnic cleansing in Rakhine State? Christian minorities, especially outside of central Myanmar, often face discrimination and even violence, according to extensive reporting including a report released last year by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom.  

Last week, it was reported that the governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh signed a memorandum of understanding for a plan to eventually repatriate large numbers of Rohingya from Bangladesh back to Myanmar. Over 600,000 Rohingya reportedly have fled into Bangladesh since August 2017 alone. In August, Rakhine violence—which has been severe in Rakhine State for five years now—spiked once again. That number of refugees in camps inside Bangladesh does not include the many Rohingya who had fled into Bangladesh before August 2017. Reporting about the details of the memorandum on return remain sketchy. CNN reported that “So far, no official details have been released on the agreement, what it would entail and under what circumstances the Rohingya would return.” The New York Times reported that “Neither side [Dhaka or Naypyidaw] gave many details, apart from a vague commitment to beginning a repatriation process within two months’ time.” Still, before any Rohingya return to Myanmar, both countries would need to adequately answer several questions. First, is it really safe for Rohingya to return? There is little evidence that the campaign of ethnic cleansing in Rakhine State, reportedly overseen by the security forces and encouraged by many hard-line Buddhist nationalist religious and political leaders, has even stopped. Human rights organizations are still recording details of refugees fleeing into Bangladesh saying that ethnic cleansing remains underway in Rakhine State. Much of the northern part of the state is still often inaccessible to monitors and journalists. Who will determine that it is safe for Rohingya to leave Bangladesh and go into Myanmar? According to some reports, Dhaka and Naypyidaw have agreed to allow UNHCR to oversee repatriation of Rohingya back to Myanmar. But how can UNHCR do so while violence is still going on in Rakhine State? What’s more, the Myanmar government reportedly has not agreed to allow UNHCR full access to Rakhine State. Second, where would Rohingya who returned to Rakhine State be housed? Many have not only been driven out of their homes by a campaign of violence but also witnessed their dwellings burnt to the ground or seized by local police or Buddhist residents. It seems highly unlikely that the Myanmar army, Rakhine politicians, and the national government would allow Rohingya to return to their homes; Naypyidaw seems uninterested in some kind of program to resettle Rohingya elsewhere in Rakhine State. Instead, as Amnesty International has warned, Rohingya who did return into Myanmar could wind up in camps that are already established in Rakhine State. Those camps, which have held Rohingya since the violence first broke out five years ago, have been condemned by rights organizations as little more than open-air jails or concentration camps. Third, even if international monitors were allowed to travel in Rakhine State freely, and there was a real opportunity for Rohingya to return and rebuild communities in Rakhine, what rights would they have—and who would pay for their resettlement? As it currently stands, most Rohingya are disenfranchised, and are viewed by most national, ethnic Bamar politicians as aliens to the Myanmar state—as people who are not one of the state’s recognized groups and thus do not enjoy the rights of Myanmar citizens. Meanwhile, hard-line Buddhist nationalism is on the rise in Myanmar, and no prominent politician, including Aung San Suu Kyi, will risk alienating Buddhist nationalists. If the Rohingya return, to Rakhine State or other parts of the country, but they do not have citizenship rights, they will remain complete outsiders to the Myanmar state-building project, and will live outside the rule of law. They will have few legal protections, and no protectors in government If Rohingya return to Myanmar without getting such legal rights, what guarantees will they have that there won’t be pogroms against them in the future? This is a question that Pope Francis, who is visiting Myanmar and Bangladesh this week on one of the most difficult trips of his papacy, should raise with Myanmar’s military and civilian leaders.

During his meeting today (Myanmar time) with senior Myanmar leaders including the head of the military and de factor civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson struck some important themes. Tillerson declared that there were “credible reports of widespread atrocities committed by Myanmar’s security forces and by vigilantes who were unrestrained by the security forces during the recent violence in Rakhine State.” He did not try to downplay the credibility of such reports. He also called upon the military and Myanmar’s civilian leaders to allow investigators full access to Rakhine State, including northern Rakhine State. He did not call the violence “ethnic cleansing,” but left open the possibility that Washington would indeed label it that. Tillerson also suggested that the crisis in Rakhine State should be met with targeted individual U.S. sanctions, probably on military leaders involved in overseeing atrocities. As I have noted, the threat of targeted sanctions would have been a more effective deterrent in October 2016, before this latest round of violence began in August 2017. Such a threat against the Myanmar military’s top leadership might indeed have served the purpose as a deterrent. But still, Tillerson is right to consider targeted sanctions now. He did not, however, give any timetable for targeted sanctions. The visit also included several important missed opportunities. First, the joint appearance allowed Aung San Suu Kyi to (again) basically say nothing about the severe rights abuses in Rakhine State. Instead, she once again deferred, telling reporters in a press conference, “It’s important to bring peace and stability to this country and that can only be done on the basis of rule of law and everybody should understand that the role of theirs is to protect peace and stability, not to punish people.” It was yet another missed chance for Suu Kyi to make any kind of tough public statement on the crisis and the role of the military in it. Other top members of the NLD have, in recent weeks, offered similar stonewalling about the crisis in Rakhine State, publicly supporting the military’s theories that no abuses have gone on there. Suu Kyi went on to praise Tillerson for “keeping an open mind,” a phrase that seems to appear like the Myanmar leader was praising him for not condemning the Myanmar military more harshly. The New York Times further reported that: At the news conference on Wednesday, Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi defended her statements [in which she has said little about Rakhine State], saying, ‘I don’t know why people say I’ve been silent’ about the Rohingya, and suggesting that perhaps what she has said was not ‘interesting enough’ or ‘incendiary.’ In addition, Tillerson used the visit to call for what Reuters called a “credible investigation” of human rights abuses in Rakhine State. This formulation suggests that there has not already been a credible investigation, which is hardly the case—and it potentially gives Naypyidaw the chance to buy more time. Tillerson did not specifically call for a UN-led, fully independent investigation into the situation in Rakhine. And in reality, multiple rights organizations, as well as the United Nations, have completed extensive investigations and concluded that severe rights abuses, even ethnic cleansing, are taking place in Rakhine State. (In response, on Monday the Myanmar military put out its own “investigation” into the situation in Rakhine State and basically absolved itself of all blame.)

The Five Questions Series is a forum for scholars, government officials, civil society leaders, and foreign policy practitioners to provide timely analysis of new developments related to the advancement of women and girls worldwide. This conversation is with Skye Wheeler, an emergencies researcher in the women’s rights division of Human Rights Watch, who in October interviewed over 50 Rohingya women and girls living in and around the Kutupalong Refugee Camp in Bangladesh, after fleeing violence in Myanmar.

Today, a bipartisan group of U.S. senators introduced a bill that would not allow certain types of military cooperation with the Myanmar armed forces, and would place sanctions and travel restrictions on top members of the Myanmar military linked to the Rakhine State violence. These restrictions would continue as long as the violence continued. The bill is an important, although belated, first step in pushing the Myanmar military to end the violence in Rakhine State, and to demonstrate that foreign countries will demand a degree of accountability from the Myanmar government for actions toward the Rohingya, which the United Nations has called “ethnic cleansing.” It also puts back on a U.S. ban on jade and rubies from Myanmar, a sanction that had been lifted. The crisis in Rakhine State shows no signs of abating; refugees continue to pour into makeshift camps in Bangladesh, while military actions appear to be continuing. De facto head of government Aung San Suu Kyi this week made her first visit to the center of the violence, northern Rakhine State, but she barely said anything about the crisis at all. Medicins Sans Frontiers and other aid organizations are warning that there is a high risk of major disease outbreaks in the understaffed and overcrowded camps in Bangladesh. It would have been better if the Senate, other parts of the U.S. government, and other key foreign actors like the European Union, had taken action sooner—such as by imposing such restrictions on the Myanmar military after an earlier round of violence that began in October 2016. Earlier action might have served a warning, a deterrent effect, to top Myanmar leaders that foreign countries would not stand by and do nothing if the Rakhine violence continued. This deterrent effect would have been multiplied if other foreign actors, from whom the Myanmar army seeks recognition, training, and possibly arms deals, had imposed such restrictions and sanctions in October 2016 as well. But they did not. As I noted in a recent Atlantic article, Myanmar commander in chief Min Aung Hlaing in 2016 and much of 2017 was a welcomed visitor in Europe and Japan. He made high-profile visits to Austria, Germany, Belgium, Italy, and Japan. On several of his stops, Min Aung Hlaing apparently made side visits to defense and aerospace companies. Still, the senators’ action is a step. Now, other parts of the U.S. government, and other important actors with leverage over Myanmar, should take action as well. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who has expressed concern about the situation in Myanmar but has not been as prominent a voice on the crisis as UN Ambassador Nikki Haley, plans to visit Myanmar this month, according to the Associated Press. He should use his trip to warn top military leaders of tougher, multinational sanctions on the Myanmar military if the violence continues, and to warn the NLD as well that civilian leaders are not necessarily exempt from a re-imposition of targeted sanctions either. In addition, Tillerson should press the Myanmar government to allow aid workers, journalists, and UN monitors real access to the most devastated parts of Rakhine State. He also should warn top Myanmar officials that, ultimately, the United States and other actors could push for the United Nations to refer the Rakhine crisis to the International Criminal Court (ICC), a move called for by Fortify Rights and other rights organizations. The ICC could potentially investigate the Rakhine crisis for evidence of crimes against humanity. Other international actors can play a role as well. They could hold a major aid conference to help refresh funding for camps in Bangladesh, to improve the quality of conditions there and prevent major disease outbreaks. The European Union also should impose a travel ban and targeted sanctions on all top members of the Myanmar armed forces, until the violence is resolved and there is some path forward to reconciliation and peace in Rakhine State.

A new report from the Women and Foreign Policy program and the Center for Preventive Action, launched this week, highlights the global security threat posed by conflict-related sexual violence and outlines policy steps that the U.S. government should take to prevent and respond to such violence. Armies and armed groups in conflicts around the world often subject noncombatants—particularly women and children—to sexual violence, such as rape, sexual slavery, and forced marriage. Despite international recognition of this devastating abuse as a crime against humanity, sexual violence continues to plague conflicts from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to Syria. The practice has also proliferated among extremist groups, including Boko Haram in Nigeria and the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, who use sexual violence as a tactic of terror and a form of currency in a shadow economy. And most recently, Burmese government forces reportedly have committed ethnically motivated rape and gang rape against women and girls amid escalating conflict in the Rakhine State. Rights groups assert that this sexual violence is not random or opportunistic, but is rather part of a systematic attack against the Rohingya minority.  Sexual violence in conflict is not simply a gross violation of human rights—it is also a security challenge. Wartime rape fuels displacement, weakens governance, and destabilizes communities, thereby inhibiting postconflict reconciliation and imperiling long-term stability.  Combating conflict-related sexual violence thus merits a higher place on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. Although the U.S. government has taken modest steps to address sexual violence in conflict under successive Republican and Democratic administrations, more action is needed.  The new report suggests that the current administration should require training on conflict-related sexual violence in U.S. security cooperation efforts; expand the number of women serving in militaries, police, and peacekeeping forces around the world; increase accountability for the crime of sexual violence; and undermine terrorist financing streams raised through the abduction of women and children. These steps will help the United States and its allies respond effectively to the security threat posed by conflict-related sexual violence and advance U.S. interests in peace and stability. Read the full report here >>  

At the United Nations last month, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley called for a tough international response to alleged atrocities against Rohingya by security forces in Myanmar’s western Rakhine State. Haley, who said that “We cannot be afraid to call the actions of the Burmese authorities what they appear to be: a brutal, sustained campaign to cleanse the country of an ethnic minority,” demanded that all nations stop sending arms to the Myanmar military. Congress was on the same page. A week earlier, Senator John McCain had already declared that he would pull language in the annual defense authorization bill that would have boosted military to military ties with the Myanmar army. Other countries, too, have laid into the Myanmar military in recent weeks, as the horrific exodus from Rakhine State continues—over 500,000 Rohingya have reportedly fled into Bangladesh since late August. But the tough words today about the Myanmar army leadership are a sharp reversal for most developed democracies.  For more on how countries have recently—and perhaps unwisely—courted the Myanmar military, see my new piece in The Atlantic.

The Bangladesh press highlighted yesterday that Myanmar once again has declared willingness to repatriate Rohingya refugees who have fled to Bangladesh—after a “verification” process. According to the Daily Star, the verification should be “in accordance to Joint Statement of April 1992,” a statement issued by the governments of Bangladesh and Myanmar concerning procedures for Rohingya refugees to return to Myanmar in the 1990s. (As I wrote earlier, the exodus of Rohingya from Rakhine State during September is one more chapter in a long-running tragedy.) A copy of the original Joint Statement is available via the Forced Migration Online digital library. The central problem with the Joint Statement can be easily seen on item iv on page four, which states that Myanmar will be willing to: …repatriate in batches all persons inter-alia: carrying Myanmar Citizenship Identity Cards/National Registration Cards; those able to present any other documents issued by relevant Myanmar authorities and; all those persons able to furnish evidence of their residence in Myanmar, such as addresses or any other relevant particulars. As countless press reports illustrate, the more than 500,000 Rohingya who have fled violence in Myanmar to safety in Bangladesh over the past month—carrying whatever little they could—in all likelihood do not possess extensive formal documents. Indeed, the Daily Star goes on to note that, “If any refugee is stripped of documents prior to crossing over, as is the case common to majority of the 507,000 refugees, he or she will lose eligibility to return back to Myanmar.” Reuters, reporting from Cox’s Bazar, found Rohingya refugees “skeptical” about ever returning home. One interviewee explained, “I don’t believe the government. Every time the government agrees we can go back, then we’re there and they break their promise.” As I noted on September 20, it is true that in the late 1990s a repatriation of Rohingya refugees occurred. But thousands of Rohingya have remained officially in refugee camps and unofficially in makeshift settlements in Bangladesh. Another wave of refugees in 2012 raised the issue again, as more Rohingya escaped violence into stressed Bangladesh without any clear future. In 2014, Human Rights Watch and others raised concerns about the Myanmar government’s process for “citizenship assessment” of the Rohingya. The census carried out by the Myanmar government in 2014 did not allow Rohingya to identify themselves as Rohingya. Denied citizenship in Myanmar, chased out by violence that UN representatives have termed “a textbook example of ethnic cleansing” and that “may amount to crimes against humanity,” and with Bangladesh overwhelmed and unwilling to offer a pathway to permanent residency, the next question central to this humanitarian crisis will be how to find a future for the refugees. Where will they go? Bangladeshi authorities have developed a plan to resettle some Rohingya on an island in the Bay of Bengal. The island, named Thengar Char or Bhasan Char, is subject to regular flooding, the vagaries of monsoons, and unclear effects of climate change. It’s hardly a viable solution for hundreds of thousands of the world’s most vulnerable people. And it’s worth noting as well that over in India, a case before the Supreme Court concerns whether 40,000 Rohingya refugees already in India should be deported. The Indian government has said they are “illegals” and should return to Myanmar. That the Donald J. Trump administration proposes to cut by around half the number of refugees the United States will accept does not help, and sets a poor example at a time when the question of refugee resettlement has become a global humanitarian emergency. For the moment, Bangladesh should not have to bear the burden of this crisis without greater support. The United Nations issued an urgent fundraising appeal yesterday for a Humanitarian Response Plan, for an overarching amount of $434 million to cover shelter, food, relief sites, water and sanitation, health, education, logistics, and other emergency operations through February 2018. The amount reflects efforts underway by several UN agencies as well as national and international relief organizations working in Bangladesh. Bangladesh needs the help. The Myanmar government’s signals about allowing “verified” Rohingya to return to their homes seem unlikely to help more than a few refugees, based on recent patterns. It will take concerted political negotiation after the emergency phase ends to resolve the question of what comes next for the Rohingya. But don’t hold your breath for a solution from Myanmar. My book about India’s rise on the world stage, Our Time Has Come: How India is Making Its Place in the World, will be out in January. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa. Or like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa).

Since late August, when attacks by Rohingya insurgents on police posts in Myanmar led to a massive reprisal by the army and other security forces in Rakhine State, the country has witnessed some of its worst violence in years. The armed forces, and apparently local vigilantes, have driven over 400,000 Rohingya out of Rakhine just since August. The plight of the Rohingya has captured significant international attention. It has been covered in major news outlets and at the top of the agenda at the United Nations, but the discussion has focused on Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s de facto head of government—and not on the top generals. Suu Kyi has come in for withering criticism (including from me here) from other Nobel laureates, rights groups, and foreign officials for downplaying the crisis in Rakhine State. Suu Kyi is hardly without blame, but not nearly enough focus has been placed on the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. To read more on Min Aung Hlaing and his role, see my new article in The National.