Myanmar

As Aung San Suu Kyi travels the United States, and President Thein Sein arrives for the United Nations General Assembly, U.S. relations with Myanmar are expanding at a pace so rapid no one would have predicted it even a year ago, let alone five years ago. Suu Kyi, naturally, has been welcomed as a hero, including in Congress, and offered insight to many audiences. She now has gone along with many Burmese people’s view that sanctions on Myanmar are outdated and should be removed, giving Myanmar a chance to develop and putting the onus for democratization in the country firmly on Burmese people themselves. But one aspect of the rapprochement should be worrying to rights activists, the many in Congress who care about Myanmar, and the Burmese people themselves. According to a story last week in the Financial Times, by the FT’s excellent Southeast Asia reporter Gwen Robinson, the Obama administration is considering restoring full military-military links with the Myanmar military, including training the Myanmar military and having regular exchanges. One source quoted in the piece suggests that as soon as 2015, Myanmar could become a major regional partner for the United States, receiving a comprehensive partnership agreement, perhaps similar to the one signed by the Obama administration with Indonesia. Although the White House’s engagement with Myanmar thus far has, in my opinion, been successful, and Myanmar clearly is changing rapidly, it is too soon to establish full military-military ties like trainings. (I suspect, too, that Myanmar advocates in Congress also will have grave concerns about this idea.) Yes, Myanmar could be important strategically.  Yet even compared to some of the other regional militaries with whom the Pentagon has ties, like Thailand or Vietnam, Myanmar’s armed forces plumb a new low. They have been implicated in more severe rights abuses than the Thai, Vietnamese, or Filipino forces, and even compared to a place like Thailand, where the army staged a successful coup just six years ago, the Myanmar military still operates with minimal civilian control, particularly in regional commands. There is considerable suspicion in Myanmar that military men were responsible for helping stir up the renewed conflict in Rakhine State, which has allowed the armed forces to play a greater role there; even by the low standards of Thailand, it would be far harder to conduct any sort of independent inquiry into military abuses in Myanmar. What’s more, though there are skilled and more open-minded younger officers in Myanmar (as shown by the career of President Thein Sein, who came from the military), the armed forces is more heavily dominated by older and harder-line types than in other forces in the region —which I believe would make it harder for the Pentagon to try to identify officers to work with in Myanmar who truly had not been implicated in past abuses. For now, then, this should be a step too far. The United States has always had a military attaché in Yangon, even during the period of sanctions, and the Pentagon and Ambassador Mitchell should continue to explore the future prospect of mil-mil ties both with the Burmese and with Congress, as well as Myanmar analysts. But for right now, the idea should be put on hold

Although Myanmar opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi has attracted numerous biographers over the past twenty years, the new biography of her by longtime British journalist Peter Popham is surely the most thorough and, in some ways, most critical of Suu Kyi, who is now making the transition from longtime opposition leader to member of Parliament and leading ally of the Myanmar president. The switch has not been easy for Suu Kyi, a challenge many former opposition leaders, from Lech Walesa to Nelson Mandela, have faced before. With Suu Kyi on the eve of her landmark visit to the United States, I have a long review of the biography in Democracy. You can read the review in its entirety here.

News this week that Myanmar president Thein Sein had reshuffled his cabinet, removing several key ministers, seems to suggest that Thein Sein is for real, that he is indeed committed to the long-term economic and political reforms the country desperately needs. All of the appointments to the posts in the president’s office are reformers and at the same time he seems to have demoted hard-liners in this reshuffle. Thein Sein’s moves, and his commitment, do not mean that Myanmar might not regress; just because he is committed to reform, the military still remains a critical player, and as we have seen in other countries in the region, such as Thailand, if democratization coincides with weak growth or the alienation of critical interest groups (i.e., the Thai upper class), these interest groups can wind up turning against the democratic process altogether. But even despite these obstacles, the reshuffle is impressive, and suggests that the president strongly believes he not only enjoys public support but also is in a strong enough position with the military and other interest groups to sideline hard-liners from his government. Most notably, Kyaw Hsan, who was replaced as Information Minister, will not be missed by any Burmese journalists; he was decidedly old school, convinced that the press should serve as an organ of the state. His removal, and being given a less important post (as Cooperatives Minister), was one of the top talking points many reformist journalists from inside and outside Myanmar have brought up with close aides to Thein Sein. Yet Kyaw Hsan had support among some of the harder-liners,  so Thein Sein must have decided his position was consolidated enough to bump Kyaw Hsan, more consolidated than at any time in the past year, since reformers have been complaining about Kyaw Hsan for a long time.  In the wake of also removing Tin Aung Myint Oo as one of the vice presidents, Thein Sein seems to be going from strength to strength.  Will he now have the strength to take on military privilege, and to seriously grapple with ethnic divides?

Over at Bangkok Pundit, BP has a fine summary of complaints by some Burmese bloggers and writers that the foreign media has covered the ethnic strife in western Myanmar poorly and, in some cases, allegedly in a biased manner. Some Burmese bloggers cited there argue that the foreign media, such as the New York Times, overhypes divisions between Buddhists and Muslims in Myanmar and sensationalizes Burmese citizens’ dislike for Muslims, and argue that in some cases the media seems to be taking the side of the Muslim Rohingya against Buddhists living in western Myanmar. Some of these critiques echo tired complaints about foreign reporting heard in recent years in China and Thailand, where some pro-Democrat royalists inveighed against CNN and other foreign media, largely because the foreign media actually took the time to travel outside Bangkok and get a broad, richer view of the country’s citizens. Here, again, are complaints that foreign media cannot understand Myanmar, or that the foreign media are sensationalistic. Again, I don’t think these critiques hold true. The New York Times’ reporting on the strife in Myanmar was been, in my opinion, fair and thorough and, even to many Southeast Asia experts, extremely revealing. I had seen little coverage of western Myanmar in the past, and knew far less about Rakhine State than anywhere else in Myanmar. What’s more, foreign media coverage of the strife in western Myanmar has, I think, been more revealing about some of the deep divisions in Burmese society than the domestic coverage. Of course, the state media in Myanmar has downplayed the riots, praised the security forces’ response, and generally minimized severe cleavages in Burmese society or obliquely blamed the violence on the Rohingya Muslims. But even Burmese non-state media and bloggers have often presented a relatively one-sided view, affixing blame (sometimes in vicious ways) to Muslims, offering little background to the disputes in Rakhine State, and minimizing the Rakhine disputes compared to other ethnic conflicts. And unfortunately, as BP discusses, even many pro-democracy, longtime opposition Burmese activists have been offering up charged, and sometimes stereotypical views of the Rohingya Muslims —views that might come as a surprise to many outsiders who know only the Burmese opposition’s progressive views on many other issues.

Over the past week, Aung San Suu Kyi has been on a global tour, finally accepting the accolades she won but was unable to receive in person, meeting with longtime supporters in Europe, and giving what is said to be the first speech by a foreign woman to both Houses of Parliament. Yet when she returns to Myanmar, she will have to continue her struggle to reconcile her longstanding role as opposition leader and conscience of democracy with her new role in helping, along with President Thein Sein, promote the reform process. It is not an easy balance to strike, and for a thorough understanding of Suu Kyi’s life and philosophy, Peter Popham’s new biography The Lady and the Peacock is invaluable. In a new review in The National, I discuss Popham’s book, Suu Kyi’s life, and Myanmar’s prospects for democracy.You can read the piece in its entirety here.

In a recent blog post for Asia Unbound, I noted that among Myanmar’s many challenges in the reform process, the country faced the possibility that political opening would unleash ethnic and religious tensions that had been, to some extent, held in check by many long years of harsh authoritarian rule. In the past week, we have seen some of these tensions explode in western Myanmar’s Rakhine State. The Irrawaddy today reported that the death toll has now passed twenty in the Buddhist-Muslim violence in Rakhine State, and that some 1,600 houses have been burned down throughout the state. The killing started last week, with its origins still sketchy, but it certainly does not help that both state media and even some liberal, pro-democracy Burmese, have described Rohingya Muslims as “terrorists,” blamed them for all the violence, and simply called on them to adapt to Buddhist-dominated social mores or leave the country. And the Burmese government has for years refused to accept the Rohingya as Burmese even though they have lived in the country for generations. Just as bad is that the government of President Thein Sein cannot declare a state of emergency and put more power in the hands of local forces, as it did this past week, without potentially sabotaging the entire reform effort. The clashes in Rakhine State remain a local and isolated affair —though there have been protests in other parts of the country over rising prices and other issues— but the issue of giving the security forces more power concerns the entire reform effort. Can Thein Sein hand over more power to the security forces, thus giving the military control of all administrative functions in Rakhine State, without potentially compromising his own fragile position in helping spearhead reforms? Can he really trust that security forces which, for decades, have responded to any protests or unrest with only one method —brutal force— are not going to respond that way now, potentially inflaming the problem in Rakhine State and even helping it to spread? Can he assume that regional commanders will even listen to his orders, given that they appear not to be doing so regarding the conflict in Kachin State? Thein Sein’s position has always been fragile, and the situation in Rakhine State is only going to make it more tenuous.

Over the past two weeks, there have been a number of signs that Myanmar’s fragile reform process, first put on track about a year and a half ago, is facing serious obstacles that, at times, have been papered over. None of these problems alone should derail the reform process, and they are not all exactly linked, but together they could prove significant burdens. The over-personalization of politics. Shifting from an era when one man, Than Shwe, dominated the country, it is not exactly surprising that politics in the reform period would be highly personalized. Even among many highly educated Burmese working for reformist think tanks and NGOs, I have heard arguments that the reform process depends largely on the relationship between President Thein Sein and National League for Democracy (NLD) leader Aung San Suu Kyi. And indeed, their relationship is critical. But for the reform process to really take flower, Myanmar needs institutions, and politicians need to begin investing in institutions, so that reform is not totally dependent on the relationship between two people. This past week, Suu Kyi’s speech to the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Bangkok and her hastily arranged trip to a Burmese refugee camp in Thailand seemed to have angered the president’s office, as Thein Sein abruptly canceled his visit to the WEF and Suu Kyi was not allowed to speak with a microphone at her refugee camp appearance. These events suggest that friction is developing between the two paramount Burmese leaders, and Suu Kyi’s speech, which sounded a (reasonable) note of caution to investors, seems to have further alienated the president’s office. That might not be such a big deal in another country, but in Myanmar, where these two personalities dominate the reform effort, it’s a problem. The uncorking of the bottle. In such an ethnically diverse country, and one in which certain ethnic groups have long been discriminated against, the reform period seems to be unleashing pent-up sentiments, with police and security forces now unsure how to handle these problems —at times, they resort to their cracked-heads thuggery of the past, while at other times they simply seem to ignore simmering interethnic tensions. Case in point: This week anti-Muslim rioters killed at least ten people in Rakhine State, and the situation there reportedly remains extremely tense. Is Myanmar prepared for the kind of centrifugal tensions that often erupt with democratization? If it is going to be, it will need far better trained, and far less brutal, police. The influx of outsiders. In just a short few months since Western nations began relaxing sanctions or ending them completely, Yangon and Naypyidaw have been swamped with potential foreign investors, foreign academics and policy experts, foreign diplomats, and NGOs. Many, indeed most, of these people are well-meaning, and certainly Myanmar’s long isolation means that it has enormous needs in almost every area. But as Lex Rieffel of the Brookings Institution has argued compellingly, the country is poorly equipped to handle all this incoming money and advice. There is the threat that a future government could, as in Hun Sen’s Cambodia, use all of the competing donors and investors and play them off of each other to consolidate a new type of authoritarian rule. Or, as in many emerging markets, the incoming donors and investors could soon dominate the economy, causing inflation and creating an entire sector of the economy just for catering to them.

In a speech today at the World Economic Forum, Myanmar opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi warned potential investors to the country, which is opening up to business, that the country faced a severe unemployment crises, utterly useless legal protections for investors, severe political problems, and weak infrastructure. She did not exactly tell investors not to come —she hopes that well-informed investment can help boost the economy and slow down the youth unemployment crisis. But she did not exactly sound like one of the many exuberant cheerleaders for Myanmar’s potential, such as the Asian Development Bank and many investment fund managers. In a piece in the Financial Times several months ago, I echoed several of Suu Kyi’s main concerns, and I continue to believe that Myanmar is being wildly overhyped as a business destination, at least for now. You can read the piece in its entirety here.

The dramatic political reforms underway in Myanmar have lead to readmission of the one-time pariah into the international community, and the suspension of sanctions by Western governments such as the European Union and Canada. The result is an inundation of foreign investment, which brings with it both opportunity and cause for concern. There is a wealth of new material being published on Myanmar’s once opaque economy. Here are some of the best pieces: “Myanmar: Staff Report for the 2011 Article IV Consultation” from the International Monetary Fund “Myanmar Economy: Open for Business?”  from the Economist Intelligence Unit “Dividing the Spoils” by Jared Bissinger “Burma Gold Rush” by Joshua Kurlantzick “The Threats to Myanmar’s Economy” by Simon Roughneen “Gold Rush to Burma” by the Washington Post Editorial Board

Thus far, Ban Ki-moon’s trip to Myanmar has proven surprisingly productive, and the UN chief has been far more vocal than on previous visits, when he deferred too readily to the then-military regime, and at times even seemed unprepared for the complexities of dealing with Burmese politics, including the tricky ethnic issues. Of course, a lot is changing in Myanmar, opening up room for the UN to play a larger role, and the apparent retirement of former senior general Than Shwe, who appeared to have a visceral disdain for international institutions and outside interlocutors, also plays a role. But Ban seems better briefed, more comfortable, and clearer in his view on Myanmar’s progress. For one, prior to his trip his staff clearly enunciated the enormous potential of Myanmar as a destination for investment, talking it up (over-talking it, in my opinion) in a way that surely pleased both the business community and allies of President Thein Sein, who need results from the reforms in order to stave off hard-liners. Then, in the country, Ban ki-Moon struck a solid, thoughtful compromise position that, while hardly letting the government off the book, pushed the National League for Democracy (NLD) and Aung San Suu Kyi to begin moving away from being an opposition party in (internal) exile and toward becoming a working political party. Suu Kyi seemed to understand this, and gave up her protests over swearing in to the current wording of the Myanmar constitution, thus allowing Parliament to open and the NLD to take its places and launch its agenda. “Politicians sometimes will continue to have differences of opinion, but real leaders demonstrate flexibility for the greater cause of people and for the country,” said Ban. In addition, rather than simply praising Myanmar’s reforms while ignoring the continuing severe human rights abuses in areas like the Kachin State, Ban ---who did call for all countries to end or suspend sanctions ---talked in a speech to Parliament of the need for further serious shifts in the Tatmadaw, as well as (somewhat obliquely) the need for a more federal, representative government that is not heavily Burman dominated. Although Burmese insiders say that Suu Kyi does not yet have a warm relationship with the UN head, who was too willing to defer to the generals in the past, their interactions appear to be improving, which will be critical for a future in which UN agencies, the UN itself, and, potentially in the long-term, peacekeepers, play a growing role in Myanmar.

The UN secretary general is shortly headed to Myanmar to observe the country’s reforms, and ahead of his visit his special advisor on Myanmar, Vijay Nambiar, told the press that the country had the potential to be the next Asian tiger, as it emerges from its hibernation and begins to attract significant investment. But Ban, who in the past has taken a relatively meek approach to the Myanmar government and military, should be coming in this time more empowered, able to go where he wants, and able to try and answer some of the big questions about the reform process. During his visit, he should try to address the following themes: Who is in charge of the conflict in the Kachin area? While the government has worked effectively and promisingly toward ending, for good, many of the conflicts in ethnic minority areas, the conflict in the Kachin area continues to spiral downhill toward full-scale war. Some Burmese officials suggest that the president does not support the way the military has handled the Kachin conflict. Is this true —which would suggest that the military has an enormous amount of freedom still in its regional commands? Is it false, and is Thein Sein just being used as reformist cover? Either way, some clearer answers need to emerge, as well as a comprehensive policy for handling Kachin refugees. Is the international community going to have any coordination in how it handles the reforms, as well as new investment going into Myanmar? During the past two decades, most major democracies, including the United States, Japan, Australia, Europe, and Canada operated relatively cohesively in dealing with Myanmar. Sure, there were divisions on Myanmar policy —Japan often wanted to engage more, and at times so did Australia and several European nations. The types of sanctions differed somewhat; the type and nature of aid differed among democracies. But overall, a general consensus held. Now, with reforms happening quickly, sanctions being suspended or lifted, and aid and investment beginning to flow in, any consensus seems to have been lost. The problem could arise as has happened in Cambodia, where savvy prime minister Hun Sen has learned to play different donors off of each other, with the result of him almost always getting his way —to the detriment of Cambodia’s rule of law and approach toward corruption. Some more effective consensus needs to arise on Myanmar among the major Western democracies, in order to avoid aid duplication, provide channels for effective investment, coordinate policies on refugees and rights, and other issues. The UN would be the obvious player to lead that coordination. What are the new red lines in Myanmar for civil society? Until two years ago, the red lines were pretty clear: There was basically no freedom of the press, assembly, speech, etc, and there was no allowed opposition to government. Now, the red lines have become blurrier — and in some ways, harder for Myanmar civil society to interpret. The press is freer, and yet officials are still pushing editors to censor some publications, and still arresting some journalists. As a result, as in China, journalists in Myanmar now do not know what will or won’t get them in trouble. The same blurriness applies to union protests, political campaigning, NGO work, and other types of civil society actions. How engaged will China be with the leading democracies during the reform process?  In some other countries, China has participated in donor groups, even if it has not been willing to coordinate its aid with other countries. China also has an enormous stake in Myanmar’s stability and prosperity, more so than any other country except Thailand; I do not believe that China necessarily prefers an authoritarian government in Myanmar, especially if that authoritarian government pursued policies that led to poverty and conflict. A stable, democratic government would, I think, be fine with China, but in the period between authoritarian rule and a stable democracy (a period which could be a long, long, long time) will China be a net positive actor pushing toward that democracy, even if that push leads to instability for a period of time? Or will it prove nostalgic for the more closed, authoritarian Myanmar during the reform period, and its instability?

Pretty soon everyone you know will have been to Myanmar, so you better get there fast. The UN Secretary General is headed there, Canada just suspended sanctions (following the EU earlier this week), and Japan is gearing up for sizable investments in the country, as are many European businesses. In the new issue of Prospect, I explore Myanmar’s looming gold rush. You can read the entire piece "Burma Gold Rush" here.

Over at New Mandala, there have been a series of excellent posts on the continuing conflict between the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Myanmar military. Several have suggested that, as the Kachin area is increasingly covered in the state press in Yangon, it suggests that the government may no longer be trying to downplay the conflict, and may instead be trying to wins hearts and minds both in the Kachin area and among the majority Burman population for its handling of the fighting, in order to isolate Kachin regions from the broader reform effort and possibly split them from sympathy in the National League for Democracy (NLD). Of course, a recent report by Human Rights Watch  suggests that serious abuses by the government forces continue in the Kachin area, and it still seems unclear whether Thein Sein’s government even has total control of military policy in the Kachin area, or whether regional commanders are making policy on the ground. This lack of control would be a highly disturbing trend but not surprising, given the fact that Thein Sein is not respected by all field commanders and that field commanders have a long history of being able to run regional commands with sizable autonomy. No matter what the truth of the government side’s command structure, the conflict has now risen as the biggest obstacle to reform, permanent peace, and the creation of some new federal structure, a Panglong II. In addition, as New Mandala rightly notes, the claimed high casualty figures in the Kachin conflict —KIA sources claims 3,000 Burmese soldiers have been killed in recent fighting—means that, even if the war is ended, it is becoming harder and harder for an effective post-war settlement to be crafted, since both sides are losing so many people that acrimony could keep any real peace from emerging.