Malaysia

Rachel Brown, Sherry Cho, Gabriella Meltzer, David O’Connor, Gabriel Walker, and James West look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. In western Myanmar, a lockdown by security forces. Reports that thirty people have been killed by official Myanmar security forces in reprisal for the October 9 border post assaults that left nine police officers dead have increased fears of mounting violence in western Myanmar’s Rakhine state. Rakhine state, bordering Bangladesh, has long been troubled by unrest, and was the site of conflict between Buddhists and Muslims in 2012 that left hundreds dead. These killings have provoked accusations from Rohingya activists of an official security force campaign targeting Rohingya civilians. The Rohingya are denied citizenship by the Myanmar government, which views the group as Bangladeshi migrants, and suffer human rights violations such as denial of health care and education, forced labor, and sexual violence due to their outcast status. Neither version of the killings has been independently verified; however, an advocacy group recently stated that it had interviewed witnesses who described what seemed to be extrajudicial killings by military forces. The Myanmar government has attributed the October 9 attacks to an organized Muslim militant group, though no solid evidence has been provided and the government has since backtracked somewhat from the charge. 2. Hospital blaze in India kills over twenty. A fire at the private SUM Hospital and Medical College in the eastern city of Bhubaneswar killed twenty-two and critically injured forty people on Monday evening. The fire, which broke out in the hospital’s intensive care unit, was reportedly caused by a short-circuit in the central air conditioning unit that spread to the ICU and dialysis unit. The over twenty victims likely perished from inhaling carbon monoxide. Following the fire, the National Human Rights Commission issued a notice to the state government of Odisha, stating that “the callous attitude and lapses of the authorities, if any, amounted to violation of right to life of the patients.” This is demonstrated by the fact that recommended changes based on a 2013 fire safety audit were not implemented. In addition, the hospital is facing allegations that during the evacuation of roughly 500 patients, those in critical condition were taken off life support, leading to their deaths. Manoj Ranjan Nayak, the owner of SUM Hospital and trustee of its managing Shiksha O’Anusandhan Charitable Trust, was arrested along with four other officials. This incident is only one of many similar in India, which has poor public safety regulations. Prime Minister Modi said on Twitter that he was “deeply anguished” by the loss of life. 3. Two Americans killed by Afghan service member. On Wednesday, a gunman opened fire on several Americans at a military base near Kabul, killing a U.S. service member and civilian contractor while wounding three others. The gunman, who was killed in the ensuing firefight, was reportedly wearing an Afghan military uniform—if confirmed as an insider attack, or a so-called “green-on-blue” incident, it would mark the first such attack on American service personnel in more than a year. The attack is the latest event in a series of concerning news from Afghanistan: the Taliban once again threaten Kunduz in the north, the city they briefly seized in late September 2015; more than one hundred Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) personnel were killed earlier this month in an ambush near Lashkar Gah, the capital of Helmand province in the south that has been nearly completely surround by Taliban forces; and the ANDSF continue to suffer near-record-high casualties as the Taliban continue multiple operations in provinces across the country. 4. Australia doubles down on blocking Chinese bids. Over the past two months, Australia has blocked two high-profile investment attempts by Chinese companies in the country: one $7.6 billion bid by State Grid Corp. of China to purchase a majority stake in Ausgrid, a major electricity distributor, and another $277 million bid in part by Shanghai Cred Real Estate Stock Co. to purchase S. Kidman & Co., Australia’s largest cattle farm that covers over 1 percent of the continent. The bids were nominally vetoed because of “national interest” and “security concerns,” but Beijing pushed back, urging for Australia’s openness, transparency, and nondiscrimination. Opinions toward Chinese investment within Australia have been mixed, with some advocating for more leniency in foreign investment and others for greater transparency on the investor’s part to allay local concerns. Former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans stressed the importance of taking national security concerns seriously, but also stated that the Australian government must “come up with some clear ground rules soon” for foreign infrastructure investments, or “a great deal of damage will be done,” likely to international ties. 5. China cracks down on Crown Resorts. Eighteen of the Australian casino company’s employees were detained last week in connection with efforts to stop the promotion of gambling in China, where it is a crime outside of Macau and Hong Kong. Among those arrested is Crown’s vice president of VIP international affairs, who is tasked with attracting high-level clients to the company’s Australian casinos, where a majority of the top players are now from mainland China. The fallout of the arrests is not limited to Crown, but is expected to have wider consequences for the casino industry, spelling trouble for Macau’s already beleaguered economy. Bonus: A hot dog by any other name… Calls by the Department of Islamic Development Malaysia for the U.S. chain Auntie Anne’s to change the name of a snack known as the “pretzel dog” sparked a brouhaha in Malaysia this week. The head of the department suggested that the items sold at Malaysian outlets should be renamed “pretzel sausages” to receive halal certification, since dogs are deemed unclean. This isn’t the first time such a change has been proposed. For example, at some restaurants, root beer is labelled as “RB” to avoid confusion with an alcoholic beverage. Many Malaysians criticized the recent decision as making them look naïve or unsophisticated, but as halal food becomes a bigger market worldwide, this may not be the last we hear of these debates.

Over the past year, as the Islamic State (ISIS) has suffered multiple losses in Syria and Iraq, the group has clearly been looking to widen its impact, taking the fight to countries outside of the Middle East. Increasingly, ISIS leaders have used social media to call on Islamic radicals to stage attacks in countries in the West like France and the United States, where the Orlando gunman, the San Bernardino gunmen, and the Nice attacker, among others, have publicly identified themselves with ISIS. In most of these cases, the attackers were lone wolves (or duos) who had not received any training or funding from ISIS, and often had not even traveled to Islamic State-controlled territory to train and fight. (To be sure, some recent attackers in Western nations had traveled to ISIS-controlled territory and fought with the group.) At the same time, ISIS leaders also have stepped up their campaigns to train, advise, and influence potential radicals in South and Southeast Asia, which are home to the largest number of Muslims in the world. As coalition forces advance on ISIS centers like Mosul in Iraq and, eventually, Raqqa in Syria, this campaign to win over South and Southeast Asians is likely to intensify. South and Southeast Asia are home to the majority of Muslims in the world, but ISIS is not looking to the region just because it has a potentially large pool of recruits to draw from. These countries might seem like environments conducive to ISIS for several reasons. For more of my analysis of how South and Southeast Asia may be turning into ISIS’s new recruiting grounds, see my new piece for the Carnegie Council.

Two days ago, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib tun Razak told reporters that he would not call national elections until 2018, when his parliament’s term runs out. As The Diplomat recently reported, some Malaysian observers thought that Najib would hold elections earlier---even as early as the middle of next year---because his party’s grip on power will wane in the face of a newly emboldened opposition. As The Diplomat noted, “The idea of holding early elections rests on the idea that Najib and his supporters perceive his political position as being stronger now than it will be within the next year or two.” It is true that, in recent months, Malaysia’s opposition seems to have been invigorated. Former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, who has been inveighing against Najib for over a year, announced that he and Najib’s ousted Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin are forming a new opposition party. It could presumably attract some supporters of the ruling party who have become disgusted by Najib’s ongoing corruption scandals, and possibly by the government’s growing intolerance of dissent. Mahathir and Anwar Ibrahim, decades-old foes, shared a handshake in full view of the media, and some of Mahathir’s allies have begun publicly raising the possibility that his new party, Anwar’s opposition party, and other opposition parties would form a new alliance that would be a strong contender in elections against the UMNO-led governing coalition. But the opposition only seems to have been invigorated, and there is little evidence, right now, that it can seriously challenge Najib’s rule---which is perhaps why the prime minister is willing to wait two years to call elections. It remains unclear who Mahathir’s party would attract; Malaysians angry at Najib’s supposed corruption and repression already would probably be aligned with Anwar’s party. And despite the Anwar-Mahathir handshake, many in Anwar’s party rightly do not trust the former prime minister, who after all oversaw Anwar’s purge from the government two decades ago and subsequent first sodomy trial. Mahathir also has no clear platform other than removing Najib, and he hardly makes a compelling spokesperson for combating the growing suppression of civil society. Under Mahathir, Malaysia’s civil society was also frequently harassed and even jailed. Meanwhile, other divides are appearing among opposition parties that would further complicate the possibility of a successful alliance in 2018. Besides the distrust of Mahathir, Anwar’s party members do not want Muhyiddin Yassin to be the opposition’s choice as a prime minister candidate. Anwar’s opposition coalition also no longer has most of the Parti Islam se-Malaysia within its ranks, costing it significant appeal with conservative Malays. Meanwhile, Najib and the ruling coalition have maneuvered to win that conservative Malay support, in part by allowing a bill to move through parliament that would set a precedent for applying religious law in areas now governed by secular law. In the longer run, Najib may hope to form an actual alliance before the 2018 elections with the members of the Parti Islam se-Malaysia who left the opposition coalition; such an alliance would command a vast share of Malay support and would probably be unbeatable. The divides within the opposition, the successful politicking by Najib---add to these challenges Malaysia’s usual electoral gerrymandering, vote buying, and outright fraud. Taken together, it seems an election in 2018, or even next year, will be a tough task for any opposition coalition.

Having already launched a grim, brutal war on drugs that has reportedly led to thousands of deaths and hundreds of thousands of arrests, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte is now turning his eye to southern Philippines, where a collection of insurgent groups/terrorist organizations/bandits have wreaked havoc for decades. (Southeast Asia is also now home to more piracy attacks than any other region of the world, and the waters of the southern Philippines are part of this massive piracy problem.) In recent days, Duterte has, in his usual tough guy style, vowed to step up the government’s war against the Abu Sayyaf, which in the past year has allied itself with the Islamic State group, increased its number of kidnappings, and appeared bolder in its ability to stand toe-to-toe with Philippine army troops in gunfights in the deep south. Duterte now has promised to have the army totally destroy the Abu Sayyaf militarily. In early September, the president vowed that he would “eat [the Abu Sayyaf] alive,” and declared that the Abu Sayyaf were trying to build a caliphate in the southern Philippines. But destroying the Abu Sayyaf, a wily group with havens in some of the most remote and lawless areas of the southern Philippines and the waters between the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia, is going to be very difficult. For fifteen years, Philippine presidents, and the Philippine army, have tried and largely failed with various strategies to destroy the Abu Sayyaf. These have included all-out wars (including plans by the Aquino administration to declare martial law in the deep south), special operations designed to kidnap the top Abu Sayyaf leaders while pressuring their followers to surrender, and putting feelers out to the Abu Sayyaf for a negotiation that would lead to a permanent ceasefire. Duterte has not explained how his war on the Abu Sayyaf will differ from those of previous administrations, and the Philippine armed forces face the same challenges in their battle now as they did during the Aquino or Macapagal-Arroyo administrations. The army has limited intelligence about the Abu Sayyaf’s strongholds. Graft remains a huge problem in the Philippine armed forces, as is keeping details about impending maneuvers secret. Meanwhile, the Abu Sayyaf is widely reviled in the deep south, but the army’s history of brutality in the south---and its inability to protect informants---badly undermines its chances of effectively tracking the Abu Sayyaf’s movements. The Duterte administration has shown few signs that it has a new approach that could comprehensively eliminated the Abu Sayyaf, or lead to some kind of negotiation in which the Abu Sayyaf would join other southern groups in accepting a peace deal for Mindanao and the deep south. It doesn’t help matters that Duterte’s brusque, wild style could alienate many of the regional partners whose support he needs in the fight against the Abu Sayyaf. Duterte has, in recent weeks, condemned the United States for criticizing the abuses that have become common in his war on drugs, but U.S. assistance and training has been crucial in helping Philippine troops learn modern counterinsurgency strategies and develop battle plans for combating the Abu Sayyaf. It will be challenging for the Duterte administration to take the fight to the Abu Sayyaf if Duterte is serious about reducing U.S. assistance for the Philippine army and coast guard. In addition, although the new president has not yet alienated Malaysia and Indonesia and Singapore, whose cooperation he needs to improve the quality of patrols in the lawless Sulu Sea, don’t count out the possibility. Duterte needs Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur’s cooperation to implement a deal the three nations made in August to allow their navies to pursue Abu Sayyaf members who have taken hostages into each others’ territorial waters. But earlier this year, Duterte slammed Singapore publicly. Given his personality, it is probably only a matter of time before he says something that alienates leaders in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur, further undermining cooperation in combating the Abu Sayyaf and piracy in general.

Rachel Brown, Sherry Cho, Theresa Lou, Gabriella Meltzer, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. North Korea conducts fifth nuclear test. Pyongyang celebrated the sixty-eighth anniversary of the country’s founding today by conducting its fifth and largest nuclear test. The Nuclear Weapons Institute of the DPRK claims that the nuclear warhead “has been standardized to be able to be mounted on strategic ballistic rockets,” and that the DPRK can now produce “a variety of smaller, lighter and diversified nuclear warheads of higher strike power.” South Korean President Park Geun-hye has condemned Kim Jong-un’s “fanatic recklessness,” and U.S. President Barack Obama says that Pyongyang’s actions will have “serious consequences.” China, North Korea’s major economic partner and ally, firmly opposes the nuclear test and urges Pyongyang to refrain from further provocative activities. When asked whether Beijing will take specific measures in response, the Chinese Foreign Ministry reiterates its commitment to denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and preserving regional stability. The UN Security Council has announced an emergency meeting to address the nuclear test. 2. Zika debuts in Southeast Asia. Malaysia confirmed its first case of the Zika virus in a twenty-seven-year-old pregnant woman on Wednesday. The Malaysian health ministry is uncertain how exactly she acquired the virus, given that her husband works in neighboring Singapore and the two live in a city close to the border. It is possible that the woman was either bitten by an infected mosquito in Malaysia or that the virus was transmitted sexually by her husband, who has also shown symptoms of Zika. Roughly 200,000 Malaysians make the daily commute to Singapore, which has reported 292 cases in a span of just over one week. The Singaporean government initially responded by isolating Zika-positive patients, but decided to terminate the practice since roughly 80 percent of cases are asymptomatic. Singapore’s warm and humid climate, along with its high population density, make it an ideal locale for the Zika-spreading Aedes aegypti mosquito. The outbreak will likely take a serious toll on Singapore’s economy as officials anticipate a downturn in tourism and local consumption. 3. China pledges to respond to Kyrgyz embassy attack. New information has emerged on last week’s car bombing at the Chinese embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyz State Committee for National Security identified the attackers as Uighurs linked to the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, and said the bombing had been called for and supported by people linked to the Nusra front, which operates in Syria. The driver of the car was a Uighur who held a passport from Tajikistan, and an Uzbek national was also implicated. In addition, five Kyrgyz nationals were detained and warrants have been issued for two Turkish residents. Responding to the updates on the attacks, foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying noted that the East Turkestan Islamic Movement had previously conducted attacks against China, and vowed to “firmly strike against them.” As Hua implied, the bombing will likely accelerate China’s counterterrorism efforts. The attack also renews concerns about the security of Chinese nationals and investments in Central Asia, including new projects under the Belt and Road initiative, as well as connections between Uighur groups and terrorist organizations in Syria or other parts of the Middle East. 4. Japan to provide patrol vessels to Philippines. In a meeting on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Vientiane, Laos, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte announced an agreement for Tokyo to provide more ships to Manila. Japan had previously supplied the Philippines with ten ships, the first of which were delivered in August. The recent announcement includes two ninety-meter vessels—comparable to the largest ships in Japan’s own coastguard fleet—and a loan of up to five used TC-90 surveillance planes. As the Philippines continues to wrangle with China over disputed maritime claims, the Tokyo-Manila deal illustrates the Pacific trend toward increasingly bigger coastguard vessels—valuable additions to more traditional naval vessels due to their ability to deter rivals with lesser risk of military escalation. The new deal could also be construed as an attempt by Japan to increase security cooperation with Southeast Asian countries and their aggregate naval resources to better counterbalance Chinese strength in the Pacific. Despite no direct stake in the South China Sea disputes, which has embroiled China and many Southeast Asian nations, Japan remains largely reliant on trade dependent on free passage through the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. Japan and China also still remain at odds over the ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and continue to have stand-offs between Japanese coast guard and Chinese fishing vessels. By supporting the Philippines and other regional states, it is possible that Japan hopes to build a unified front against Chinese actions and thus fortify its own security. 5. U.S. covert war legacy troubles Laos. Laos, a country of around 7 million, faces continued strife from unexploded ordnance (UXO) left over from Washington’s covert war in the region. In the years since Laos was pounded by B-52 bombers in the 1960s and 1970s, the damage from accidents involving UXO illustrates how history might prove to be a stumbling block for U.S. attempts to “pivot to Asia.” Laos, a poor country with little international recognition, is estimated to have suffered the heaviest per capita bombing in history due to the U.S. covert war against the North Vietnamese–backed Pathet Lao communists. President Obama, in his visit to Laos this week, stated that the United States “did not acknowledge” the war in Laos “at the time.” In his speech, Mr. Obama also declared that the United States would contribute an extra $90 million for ordnance clearance in Laos and assistance for victims over the next three years. U.S. aid over two decades of around $100 million has lessened bomb casualty rates from a high of hundreds a year, but a significant number of Laotians continue to be killed or injured by UXO. The additional U.S. funding will hopefully facilitate a closer look at how pervasive the problem of UXO is across the nation. This, however, is a daunting task: mine-clearing agencies estimate that over 270 million bombs were dropped on the country between 1964 and 1973, and approximate that as many as a third did not explode. Bonus: Luxury comes to Myanmar. Six years ago, one newspaper editor described Yangon, the former capital of Myanmar, as a “crumbling colonial relic.” Today, luxury brands are creeping in to peddle their wares to the city’s wealthy tourists and emerging upper class. Since 2012, when the government relaxed automobile import regulations, Jaguar, BMW, and Mercedes opened up showrooms. Swiss watch boutiques sprang up in upscale hotels, and retail space blossomed. But the Burmese economy is one of contradiction: well-heeled drug lords and former military leaders control a $30-billion-a-year jade trade while per capita GDP is below $2,000 and half of the rural population lives in poverty. As political and economic reforms begin to reshape the country in the coming years, the size of its economy and number of ultra-rich are both predicted to skyrocket—and those with newly greased palms are eager to show off their wealth. But will Myanmar’s citizens at large enjoy the riches, or will a resource curse beset them first?

Harvard’s inimitable Matthew Stephenson this week published a thought-provoking blog post comparing anticorruption efforts in Asia and Latin America. Crudely summarizing Stephenson’s argument, a few years ago many looked to Asia as the gold standard in anticorruption efforts, in part because of the success of independent and effective anticorruption agencies (ACAs) in the region. But recent news of political meddling with Hong Kong’s ACA, brazen kleptocracy in Malaysia’s state development fund, and efforts to water down reform in Indonesia all suggest that the pendulum is swinging in a less positive direction. By contrast, Stephenson is optimistic about the important gains made in recent years in Latin America, including by Guatemala’s International Commission Against Impunity (CICIG), Brazil’s Car Wash investigation, elections in Peru and Argentina that highlighted voter frustration with corruption, and Mexico’s “3 out of 3” reforms. As Stephenson was careful to note, it is dangerous to generalize across regions. The on-the-ground details in each country get in the way of blanket statements about how regional anticorruption efforts are playing out. I agree, and I would go further. An additional caveat that the anticorruption community should keep in mind—even while celebrating successes—is that the effectiveness of anticorruption efforts is only really evident over the long haul. This is in large part because by their very nature, anticorruption reforms tend to generate significant pushback. Anticorruption reforms are never really complete: even independent and well-functioning institutions can decay over time, under pressure from the powerful interests that benefit from, and are empowered by, corruption. Incipient anticorruption reforms are even more vulnerable to regression. Latin America has indeed been making enormous strides forward in recent years, under a remarkable set of homegrown anticorruption campaigners, but resistance appears to be building against those who would reform the system. In recent years, a cautiously optimistic story could be told about Brazil, in light of the incremental anticorruption gains of the past generation. But recent developments suggest that these gains are under threat. Clientelistic parties and opponents of reform in both the Rousseff and Temer administrations have introduced proposals—both via decree and through legislation—that would weaken prosecutors and judges and considerably undermine the transparency of court cases, institute a tax amnesty law for repatriation of foreign holdings, restrict corporate leniency agreements, and limit plea bargaining. Although some of these proposals are framed as a seemingly reasonable effort to block the “abuse of authority,” they would have a chilling effect on the nascent—and still very uncertain—efforts to tackle corruption in Brazilian politics. Equally important, a set of necessary anticorruption reforms pushed forward by prosecutors, and placed on the legislative agenda with the support of 2 million citizens, has been stymied by congressional foot dragging. Acting president Michel Temer, who has now been mentioned twice in the Car Wash investigation, has adopted what is at best an ambiguous attitude toward anticorruption efforts, appointing a cabinet that is staffed by a number of unsavory characters, and failing to exert even an ounce of energy in support of reform. In Guatemala, the UN-backed CICIG is in danger of becoming a victim of its own success. The easy criticism is that due to the presence of an international body like CICIG, Guatemalan institutions have not been under pressure to reform themselves. This is too facile, if only because there was never any sign that Guatemala’s institutions would be able to reform on their own, and CICIG’s presence seems to have empowered Guatemala’s prosecutors. The remarkable former attorney general, Claudia Paz y Paz, moved against some of the most powerful figures in Guatemalan history, and the prosecutorial service has gained new staff, prestige, and resources. Yet the genocide case against former president Efraín Ríos Montt was overturned by the high court, and there are fears that the court might be similarly timid in addressing corruption charges against former President Pérez Molina and his vice president. Meanwhile, President Jimmy Morales has been slow to build on anticorruption successes, and in fact, the early days of his administration have been marked by a surprising willingness to compromise with questionable elites. One of the few barriers to regression has been the mobilization of the Guatemalan public, which has encouraged the appointment of a few reformers in the Morales administration, and which will be essential to ensuring the success of a planned judicial reform package to be drafted later this year. In Mexico, the “3 out of 3” reforms were a huge deal, not least because for months they seemed to be destined for the trash bin, after Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) legislators delayed their consideration and then attempted to sink them with a poison pill. As my colleague Shannon O’Neil pointed out, voter concern with corruption was one of the driving forces behind the PRI’s historic loss in the June gubernatorial elections, and the effort to move forward on the reforms may have been the PRI’s attempt to get out ahead of the corruption issue before the 2018 presidential elections. Yet just this week, news has emerged of the Mexican first lady’s luxurious vacation digs in Key Biscayne, which it now turns out are owned by a company that will be bidding for Mexico’s port business. This after another contractor sold the first lady her $7 million Mexico City mansion in a controversial transaction two years ago. Old habits die hard, even though public asset disclosure requirements in “3 out of 3” were aimed at curbing exactly this type of abuse. There is no reason to be a sourpuss. Latin Americans should be justifiably proud of the remarkable gains of recent years, and Stephenson is right to point out their relative success compared to the current backsliding in Asia. But the common thread running through the recent Brazilian, Guatemalan, and Mexican country experiences is the importance of citizen engagement: without public pressure, politicians tend to revert to old practices. Before he became one of the most famous judges of all time, Sérgio Moro wrote an academic paper on the Mani Pulite investigations of corruption in Italy, which noted that “judicial action against corruption is only effective with democratic support.” He concluded this after observing that when public attention turned away from the corruption investigations in Italy, politicians did all they could to make prosecutors’ lives more difficult: they strengthened evidentiary protections, decriminalized accounting fraud, reintroduced parliamentary immunity, and reduced statutes of limitations in corruption cases. It is probably unrealistic to expect Latin American publics to remain engaged on anticorruption: at some point, there may just be too much bad news, or the news may be too destabilizing to everyday governance, or the corruption effort will be seen as a partisan crusade, or the news that there is corruption in high places will no longer galvanize a weary public. Efforts to eradicate corruption will always be a game of inches, and the politicians who would like a return to the old status quo in Latin America have only just begun to fight.

Rachel Brown, Lincoln Davidson, Bochen Han, Gabriella Meltzer, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Justice Department announces action against 1MDB. The ongoing scandal surrounding Malaysian state investment fund 1MDB took a dramatic turn this week when the U.S. Justice Department announced plans to seize $1 billion in assets as part of an investigation into money laundering and funds improperly taken from 1MDB. While the fund was intended to boost Malaysia’s development, some of the money appears to have instead gone toward enriching Prime Minister Najib Razak, his stepson, and other associates. Among the activities undertaken with siphoned money are financing of the movie The Wolf of Wall Street and the purchase of a private jet as well as properties in New York, California, and London. Overall officials believe that more than $3.5 billion was stolen and this action is the largest pursued under the Justice Department’s Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative. Although Najib is only alluded to as “Malaysian Official 1,” this still marks the first time he has been officially linked to the case. He denies that the money was stolen and rather attributes the new wealth in his accounts to a personal donation given by the Saudi royal family. The Malaysian attorney general has previously said Najib did not obtain the funds through corruption, but Najib’s press secretary said Malaysia would participate in “any lawful investigation.” Other nations have also gotten involved with Switzerland seizing a Van Gogh and two Monet paintings and Singapore announcing that it had taken assets valued at $177 million. These actions against 1MDB come amidst a broader international debate about money laundering and ownership disclosure set off by the Panama Papers leak. 2. Beijing backs the Philippine’s grisly war on drugs. In a statement released on Tuesday by the Chinese embassy in Manila, Beijing professed its willingness to cooperate with the Philippines in its fight against drugs, calling narcotics a “common enemy of mankind.” Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte, who has vowed to end crime within six months of taking office on June 30, has taken a brutal tack: “If you know of any addicts, go ahead and kill them yourself,” he said in a speech earlier this month. Since May, more than two hundred suspected drug traffickers have been killed in confrontations with law enforcement officers, whom Duterte has offered to pardon if human rights advocates accuse them of abusing authority. He claims that many of the unclaimed bodies were Chinese nationals, and questioned why “most of the guys who come here [from China] do drugs.” Though China executes more drug offenders than any other country overall, drug cases most likely involve seizures and arrests rather than extrajudicial killings. Though the director-general of China’s Ministry of Public Security’s narcotics control bureau has stated that “we are willing to take all kinds of measures to combat drugs together,” just how far is China willing to go in its support of Duterte’s gruesome offensive? 3. Pakistani hotlines outdo hospitals in targeting dengue. A recent Science Advances study in Pakistan reveals that triage hotlines are far more effective than hospitals in forecasting outbreaks of infectious diseases such as dengue. Dengue, a mosquito-borne tropical virus, is typically found in urban and semi-urban areas and causes flu-like symptoms that occasionally lead to fatal complications, particularly among children. While there is no treatment, early detection and access to care reduces fatality rates to under 1 percent. The Pakistani researchers observed 300,000 calls to a health hotline in Lahore over a period of two years, where patients were asked to provide their symptoms and addresses. Using this information, epidemiologists were able to accurately predict dengue patient numbers in ten municipal sub-regions two to three weeks in advance of an outbreak. They then dispatched mosquito-control teams to targeted neighborhoods, rather than randomly dispersing them across the city of ten million people. This research will prove particularly helpful following a 2011 outbreak of dengue in Punjab that caused 21,000 infections and 350 deaths. 4. Bangladesh court charges forty-one in Rana Plaza case. Three years after a garment factory collapse in Dhaka that resulted in over 1,100 deaths, a court formally charged thirty-eight people with murder and three with helping the factory owner, and principal accused, escape after the incident. Bangladesh, the world’s second-largest garment exporter, relies on garments for about 80 percent of its exports and four million jobs. The collapse of the eight-story complex sparked demands for greater workplace safety across the globe and put pressure on foreign companies importing from Bangladesh to act. The industry has since recovered following a period of factory closures and reassessments, but the terrorist attack in Dhaka’s diplomatic enclave earlier this month has reignited concerns over the industry’s future. Questions also remain over the progress made to improve worker safety and rights. 5. Baidu again under investigation. Following an investigative report published last weekend, sponsored search results at Baidu, China’s largest search engine provider, have again come under scrutiny. According to the Beijing News, illegal ads for online gambling sites appear in Baidu search results late at night, but not during the day. The paper claims that Baidu has received nearly $45,000 in revenue for these ads, which were registered through third-party advertising agencies and spoofed real companies which do not provide gambling services, and are thus legally allowed to advertise online (gambling is illegal in China). China’s top internet regulator is investigating the incident and state media issued a flurry of articles condemning the company. Baidu has been under scrutiny since earlier this year, when it was revealed that ads on the service for a shady state-run medical clinic offering fake treatments played a role in the death of a college student. Bonus: KFC at center of dispute over disputing South China Sea dispute decision. As Chinese media ramped up criticism of last week’s decision on the status of South China Sea features by a United Nations tribunal and claimed the whole incident had been orchestrated by the United States, protests targeting Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) outlets as a symbol of the United States appeared in several Chinese cities this week. However, authorities were quick to shut down the demonstrations, arresting organizers, blocking the term “KFC” on social media, and ordering news outlets to “not hype… illegal rallies and demonstrations.” State media also criticized the protesters, calling them unpatriotic and pointing out that KFCs in China employ Chinese people. And the Communist Youth League urged patriotic youth to stay home and post anti-U.S. memes online rather than demonstrating in the streets.

I could write a six hundred word blog before getting to the point here, but I will get right to it: The 1MDB asset seizure is likely to have minimal impact on Malaysian domestic politics. To recap … the U.S. Justice Department this morning announced it was filing “civil-forfeiture complaints against more than $1 billion of assets allegedly acquired using funds misappropriated from a Malaysian economic development fund,” known as 1MDB, according to the Wall Street Journal, which has extensively covered the 1MDB saga. This is believed to be the largest asset seizure in U.S. history, and the Justice Department has targeted a wide range of purportedly 1MDB-related assets that were supposedly bought with misappropriated money from the state fund---classy art, a private jet, the rights to the movie “The Wolf of Wall Street,” luxury real estate in New York and Los Angeles, and more. It’s an impressive list of potential seizures, and an important case showing the power of the Justice Department’s Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative. Expect authorities in other countries that are still investigating 1MDB, like Singapore and Switzerland, to eventually make other demands for asset recovery. But as for the impact on domestic Malaysian politics? Don’t expect the case to lead the Malaysian government to fold, the way that investigations of FIFA triggered reforms in that institution. The impact on the administration of Najib Tun Razak will be virtually none. Yes, Attorney General Loretta Lynch said at a press conference today that, “Unfortunately and tragically, a number of corrupt officials treated this public trust as a personal bank account.” Yes, Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak is believed to be the “Malaysian Official 1,”---which the New York Times says is a “high-ranking government official who oversaw the fund and is a close relative of Mr. Aziz,” Najib’s stepson, who was one of the people served with complaints by the Justice Department. Yes, the perception within Malaysia (and probably globally) is that Najib played a central role in 1MDB’s funny business, his denials to the contrary. Yes, Najib is probably very unpopular with urban Malaysians, although no poll has been taken in recent months that quantifies his support---or lack thereof---in urban areas. Yes, Najib and his family are perceived by many Malaysians to live lavishly, with little evidence of where the money comes from. But Najib also has proven a masterful and tough politician throughout the 1MDB scandal, and Malaysia’s opposition, which was close to winning parliament in 2013, has fallen apart even as the 1MDB investigations mushroom. Over the past two years, Najib has overseen a dramatic crackdown on civil society, forcing or prompting the closure of several independent media outlets, overseeing a suspicious sodomy case that put Anwar Ibrahim back in jail, and presiding over the arrests of many other civil society leaders on vague sedition charges. He has purged the governing coalition of opponents and stacked his cabinet and the Malaysian bureaucracy with loyalists. He has installed as his top deputy a man, Ahmad Zahid Hamdi, even less liked by both members of United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and younger Malaysians; his deputy serves basically as a kind of insurance against getting rid of Najib. Meanwhile, the opposition coalition---if it can be called that now---has fragmented with Anwar in jail, the government cracking down on civil society, and fissures emerging among the parties that made up the 2013 coalition. It was always a coalition held together with scotch tape, but last year the Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), the Islamist party, left. It had long argued with other members of the coalition over social issues, including whether state and federal governments could implement Islamic law on a range of criminal issues. The new coalition that has emerged, which includes some small remnants of PAS, is weaker; it lost two by-elections to the ruling coalition in Selangor and Perak in June. Anti-Najib politicians and civil society activists are in such disarray that some belatedly have come around to seeing former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad as their champion. Mahathir, who is 91 and was hardly known for his democratic style as prime minister, has indeed been harshly critical of Najib for more than a year now, and has derided the prime minister over 1MDB. Now, Mahathir says he is forming a new party to reinvigorate Malaysian politics. He probably will populate with some leading critics who were fired from Najib’s cabinet and other senior levels of UMNO. It’s not likely to restore Malaysia’s opposition to the level of being able to challenge, nationwide, for control of parliament.

Rachel Brown, Lincoln Davidson, Theresa Lou, Gabriella Meltzer, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. China releases ambitious plan to clean up polluted soil. In 2014, the Chinese government disclosed that approximately 20 percent of its arable land was contaminated, primarily with heavy metals and agricultural chemicals from industry and farming. This Tuesday, the central government released a long-awaited action plan as a first major step to control and remedy the widespread problem, known as the last of the “three big campaigns” in Chinese environmental protection along with air and water pollution. The plan aims to stabilize and improve soil quality so that 90 percent of contaminated sites are safe for use by 2020, and 95 percent by 2030. It also includes provisions for improving the transparency of soil quality data and emphasizes more severe penalties for polluters. One Greenpeace expert praised the proposal as “pragmatic,” in that it would take steps to ensure that soil pollution would not “lead to major problems” for the millions affected. Since the cost of cleaning up all of China’s polluted soil will top $1 trillion, the plan may prove to be a lucrative opportunity for companies offering soil remediation services in the coming years. 2. Malaysia’s hudud law sparks controversy. Malaysia’s Prime Minister Najib Razak backed a bill originally put forth by the Parti Islam se-Malaysia to strengthen Islamic courts and introduce hudud, a system of punishment under Islamic law. The punishments included under hudud can be severe including stoning and amputation, although the prime minster said that Malaysia will not permit anything that will draw blood or cause injury. While the new punishments would apply just in the nation’s syariah courts, which are only for Muslims, the proposal has nonetheless launched considerable debate. Members of parties such as the Malaysian Indian Congress have said the bill violates Malaysia’s constitution and notions of a secular government. Additionally, two non-Muslim ministers in the cabinet, Liow Tiong Lai and Mah Siew Keong, announced they will resign if the bill passes after debate in October. Two east Malaysian states, Sarawak and Sabah, have also threatened to split with the rest of the country over the bill. Some speculate that the prime minister, who is tainted by the 1MDB corruption scandal, views the bill as a way to firm up support among Muslim voters before upcoming by-elections. A proposal that is already sowing discord among members of the ruling coalition and that threatens to inflame ethnic tension hardly seems like the path to success though. 3. Death of environmentalist sparks reflection on police brutality in China. Beijing city authorities are investigating the death of a young environmental official in police custody last month. The man, Lei Yang, was arrested by plainclothes police outside of a Beijing massage parlor on the evening of May 7 on suspicion of soliciting prostitutes. Less than an hour later, police took him to a hospital, claiming he had suffered a heart attack and died. The story is disputed by Lei’s family and friends, who say there is no history of heart disease in his family, claim he was on his way to the airport to receive relatives, and question why police took several hours to notify his family of his death and deleted messages from his phone. In response to these claims, police took to the press, trying to clarify their story, only to have public opinion flare up in anger against them after netizens began questioning inconsistencies in the official report of the incident. The debate over Lei’s death has raised questions about how commonly individuals die in police custody in China and if this incident would have gotten a full investigation if Lei had not been young, a new father, and a graduate of one of China’s best universities. 4. Number of internally displaced Afghans on the rise. Amnesty International reported on Tuesday at a press conference in Kabul that the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) in Afghanistan has doubled since 2013 to roughly 1.2 million.  Despite the fact that these are people living in camps lacking sufficient health, food, or water facilities, the financial resources allocated to the fifteen-year crisis are at their lowest point since 2009. The United Nations requested $393 million in humanitarian funding for 2016, but, as of May, has only been able to raise a quarter of this request. The majority of civilians have fled their communities in recent years due to a flagging economy with only 1.9 percent growth and continuing violence carried out by the Taliban. In fact, the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan has said that 2015 “was the most dangerous year on record for civilians since 2009” with at least eleven thousand casualties, one-fourth of whom were children. Although the Afghan government endorsed the "National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons" in 2014, corruption-ridden institutions and a state lacking capacity and expertise have been unable to deliver on promises made to IDPs and forced evictions are a daily threat. 5. Bangladesh conducts first census of Rohingya. The census, which began this week, will not only allow the Bangladeshi government to gain a more accurate count of how many Rohingya  live both inside and outside of refugee camps, but will also give greater insight into the group’s economic circumstances. Estimates of the number of Rohingya in the country range from three hundred thousand to five hundred thousand. A significant number of Rohingya began fleeing from Myanmar to Bangladesh beginning in 2012, and have continued with renewed cycles of violence. While Myanmar agreed to repatriate 2,415 people from Bangladesh in 2014, this has not yet occurred. Some expressed concern that the current census, conducted with assistance from the International Organization for Migration, would serve as preparation to deport Rohingya from Bangladesh. Censuses have proved difficult for the Rohingya in the past; during the 2014 census in Myanmar, the government did not allow individuals to identify as Rohingya and said they should register as Bengali instead. Bonus: North Korea says “Vote Trump, not that dull Hilary.” Presumptive Republican nominee Donald Trump’s latest endorsement came from a surprising source: North Korea. Two weeks after Trump’s speech, during which he declared he would have “no problem speaking to [Kim Jong-un],” a North Korean state media published an op-ed praising Trump as a wise and far-sighted presidential candidate. This is not the first time Trump has expressed unconventional ideas related to U.S. foreign policy on the Korean Peninsula. In a previous interview, Trump stated that he would be willing to withdraw U.S. forces from Japan and South Korea unless they pay more for U.S. military presence. He also suggested that it might not “be a bad thing for [the United States]” for Japan to develop its own nuclear deterrent. Though a senior North Korean official has called Trump’s willingness to engage with Kim merely an insincere gesture for the presidential election, U.S. allies are increasingly worried about Trump’s “America first” agenda.

Ashlyn Anderson, Rachel Brown, Lincoln Davidson, and Gabriella Meltzer look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Duterte ahead in Philippine pre-election polls. Leading candidate Rodrigo Duterte is currently the mayor of Davao city on the southern island of Mindanao, where he is considered to have effectively cracked down on crime and improved the local economy. Duterte has pledged to do the same for the nation if elected and and to act decisively as president. He leads in current opinion polls with roughly 32 percent of the vote, and is trailed by Senator Grace Poe with 25 percent, and Interior Minister Mar Roxas with 22 percent. In the vice-presidential race, Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the son of the nation’s previous dictator, leads in polls. Duterte has stirred up considerable controversy during the campaign, however, earning him comparisons to Donald Trump. The Economist magazine called Duterte’s candidacy “downright alarming.” Among his questionable remarks were a joke about the rape of an Australian missionary (for which he subsequently apologized), a proposal to jet-ski to territory reclaimed by China in the Spratly Islands and plant a Philippine flag, and a threat to declare a “revolutionary government.” Duterte has also proposed bilateral negotiations with China over joint resource exploration. The Philippines’ over fifty four million registered voters head out to the polls on Monday, May 9. 2. Chinese agriculture authorities meddle as pork production plummets. Pork prices in China have climbed 35 percent year-on-year, responding to a 5.9 percent decline in production. Local governments, hoping to ease the burden on Chinese consumers—the country consumes more than half of the world’s pork—have released stocks of subsidized pork. It’s not likely to have much effect: they’re only adding 3,050 metric tons of pork over the course of two months to a market that consumes fifty seven million metric tons annually. That may be a good thing, though. Like so much instability in the Chinese economy, the rise in pork prices can be partially attributed to regulators tinkering. Analysts have pointed to the shutdown of many small pig farmers by authorities as a contributing factor in the production decline. There’s hope for Chinese bacon lovers, though. Chinese regulators are taking baby steps towards liberalizing grain markets, and feed prices are dropping in response, with corn down 19 percent from this time last year. 3. Fight against tobacco takes center stage in India. This week, India’s Supreme Court ordered tobacco companies in India to comply with regulations to cover 85 percent of cigarette packages with pictorial and text health warnings, making India one of the world’s strictest countries on label regulations. With more than one million smoking-related deaths in India each year, the ruling was welcomed by India’s public health advocates. ITC Limited, India’s top cigarette company, shut down manufacturing on May 4 until “the company is in a position to comply with the interim requirements.” Not everyone has welcomed the move, however. Despite the health warnings, India’s tobacco industry is valued at $11 billion and employs millions of workers. Moreover, legal cigarettes only make up 11 percent of tobacco consumption in India. Much of the tobacco smoked in India comes from a largely unregulated market in the form of “bidis,” crushed and dried tobacco rolled in tendu leaves. Bidi production employs five million people in India, mostly women. Farmers employed by big tobacco, makers of bidis, and the Tobacco Institute of India have all voiced their disapproval of the regulations. Others have pointed to the need for a comprehensive tax policy to regulate the sales of cigarettes and bidis, arguing that tax increases are a better deterrent against smoking. 4. Domestic abuse alive and well in China. Two months ago, Li Hongxia, a twenty-four year old woman from Henan province, was strangled to death by her husband in her hospital bed while recovering from a post-miscarriage surgery. Li’s parents have refused to bury the mangled body in an effort to raise awareness about a silent epidemic that impacts at least one out of every four Chinese women, according to estimates from the state-affiliated All-China Women’s Federation. Since coming to power in 2012, Xi Jinping’s administration has made a concerted effort to prioritize domestic violence in its social policy agenda and characterize it as a unified, legal issue to address in courts, rather than simply a familial, private phenomenon. China’s first official anti-domestic violence legislation came into effect on March 1 (two days prior to Li’s murder). Despite these advances, anti-discrimination groups such as Yirenping argue that the law is still “far from enough” to curb the pervasive culture of domestic violence, as it fails to address sexual violence, as well as domestic violence between same-sex couples. 5. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia commit to joint patrols. The three nations announced plans for joint patrols in the Sulu Sea at a trilateral meeting in Yogyakarta, Indonesia this Thursday. They also plan to establish domestic crisis centers and a coordination hotline. The decision comes after multiple recent incidents of piracy and kidnapping. Over the past two months, four sailors from Malaysia and fourteen from Indonesia were taken from ships; many believe the abductions were the work of Abu Sayyaf, a militant group operating from the southern Philippines. Ten Indonesians kidnapped by Abu Sayyaf in March were recently released, but the Indonesian security minister expressed concerns that continued piracy would revive an image of lawlessness for the sea routes in question and affect shipping traffic. Details have not been finalized, but one model the new trilateral effort could follow is that of patrols in the Malacca Straits conducted by Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and Thailand, which include both marine and aerial surveillance. Bonus: PLA enters the rap scene. In the latest in a series of musical forays by the Chinese government, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) released a recruitment video this week. The video, titled “Battle Declaration,” includes patriotic lyrics chanted as images of China’s newest military hardware and of soldiers in action flash by. Lyrics include “kill, kill, kill" and “responsibilities are always upon a soldier’s shoulders / passion always in his chest / war can break out any time / are you ready for it?”. While the PLA does not actively need to recruit more soldiers (in fact 300,000 troops are being cut), it does need to boost morale, especially as the military comes under closer scrutiny in the anti-corruption campaign. The video’s mixed reception among Chinese netizens suggests additional approaches may still be required.

Three new annual reports, from the U.S. State Department, Freedom House, and Reporters without Borders, add further evidence to worries that much of Southeast Asia is experiencing an authoritarian revival. Released this week, Freedom House’s annual Freedom of the Press report (for which I served as a consultant for several Southeast Asia chapters) reveals that in nearly all the ten ASEAN nations, press freedom regressed significantly last year. Freedom House’s findings are similar those of Reporters Without Borders annual Press Freedom Index, which was released earlier this month. In it, the scores of Thailand, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and other Southeast Asian nations dropped, as compared to their scores in 2015. Like Freedom House’s report, RSF’s analysts use a range of indicators to reflect the overall level of press freedom in each nation. These falls are not surprising---Malaysia has shuttered major publications that have reported on the 1MDB scandal swirling around Prime Minister Najib tun Razak, Thailand’s junta is proving increasingly intolerant of dissent, Brunei has promulgated harsh new sharia-based laws, and other Southeast Asian nations like Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam remain highly intolerant of independent reporting. And these declines in press freedom are indicative of a broader trend. As I have written, much of Southeast Asia has regressed from democratic transition over the past decade; its retrenchment is symptomatic of a broader, global authoritarian revival. Finally, the State Department’s annual country reports on human rights provides more evidence of the democratic downfall of a region that was once touted as an example of political progress. While Myanmar made significant strides toward democracy in 2015, and Indonesia and the Philippines remained vibrant democracies, the country reports show that most of the rest of the region regressed in terms of rights and freedoms. Thailand came in for a particularly harsh assessment, with the State Department noting, “The interim [Thai] constitution remained in place during the year, as did numerous decrees severely limiting civil liberties, including restrictions on freedom of speech, assembly, and the press.” The country reports further noted that in Malaysia, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, and Brunei, among other Southeast Asian nations, there were signs of growing repression in 2015. In the coming months, Southeast Asia’s political trajectory will become even clearer. The NLD-led government in Myanmar is beginning to develop a policy agenda, and its actions will clarify how successfully it can manage a difficult transition from military rule---whether Myanmar becomes more like Thailand, where the armed forces never really returned to the barracks, or like Indonesia, where the power of the armed forces has been curbed significantly. Thailand will hold a referendum, in August, on a new constitution midwifed by the junta. The Thai coup government has essentially barred any open discussion of the new constitution, which contains clauses that could perpetuate the military’s influence and drastically weaken the power of elected members of parliament in the future. However, it seems unlikely that the coup government will resort to outright rigging the constitutional referendum, though it will try its hardest to sway Thais to vote for the draft. The junta has cracked down on most types of dissent, so Thais may use the referendum to voice their frustrations. If the new constitution passes by only a small percentage of the vote, or is even defeated, it would suggest that there is sizable antigovernment sentiment bubbling up in Thailand. Finally, there are the upcoming elections in the Philippines, to be held next week. Some Philippine civil society activists worry that strong popular support for vice presidential candidate Ferdinand Marcos Jr, son of the former dictator, and for presidential candidate Rodrigo Duterte, who allegedly oversaw brutal anticrime strategies as mayor of Davao, marks a rising popular frustration with the difficulties of democratic government---a longing for a strongman who can just get things done, ignoring institutions or checks on power. Since the Philippines is the most established and vibrant democracy in the region, the results of its presidential election will be another powerful signal of regional trends.

In late April, I spent several days in Taiwan as part of a Council on Foreign Relations delegation. We met with a wide range of officials from the major political parties, including President Ma Ying-jeou, President-elect Tsai Ing-wen, President of the Legislative Yuan Su Jia-Chyuan, and Kuo Chang-huang, a first-term legislator. It is a period of political transition from eight years of Kuomintang (KMT) leadership under President Ma to a government led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) with Tsai at the helm. And waiting in the wings is the brand new New Power Party (NPP), which was born out of the 2014 Sunflower Movement, and earned itself five seats in the most recent Legislative Yuan elections. Our meetings made three things clear to me. First, officials from each party have their own distinct set of priorities, but all share a finely-honed pragmatism. For Ma and the KMT, the priority is preserving and extending the legacy of cross-strait peace and stability that it believes derives from its success in enhancing ties with Beijing.  Even as it begins the process of winding down, the KMT is still committed to seeing through agreements with Beijing on issues such as trade in goods and services.  The road ahead will be tough given its losses in both the executive and legislative branches. The DPP and Tsai, in contrast, were all about domestic politics—pushing forward on grand-scale job training and affordable housing programs, and seeking to tap into the energy and capabilities of the island’s young people.  Reinvigorating Taiwan’s economic presence on the global stage is also front and center for the next administration, although, here too, the path forward is somewhat murky. The New Power Party was represented by a trio of young, dynamic, and edgy politicos, seeking to consolidate and expand their gains, while pushing for greater independence of action from Beijing. No one is calling for Taiwanese independence tomorrow. Second, China is succeeding in its aim of influencing politics in Taiwan during the transition, but not in the way it desires. Beijing began the year by reversing its eight-year tacit understanding to not establish diplomatic relations with countries that recognize Taiwan (thereby giving the island nation a semblance of sovereign international status) and resuming ties with Gambia. Next, it successfully pressured Kenya to deport as many as forty-five Taiwanese (the number is in dispute) to the mainland as part of a larger set of arrests of suspects in a telecom fraud ring. Despite Taiwan’s vehement protests (and a previous agreement between Taipei and Beijing to manage their own citizens in such cases), Beijing has not relented. Taiwan has sent a ten-member delegation to Beijing to try to negotiate their release. (Notably, Malaysia, which faced a similar demand from Beijing, repatriated the Taiwanese citizens back to Taiwan not to the mainland.) Beijing may think that it is firing a warning shot across the bow to Tsai by demonstrating just how much Beijing can take away if the president-elect doesn’t toe the line. Instead, however, Beijing’s actions are undermining its best partner in the Taiwanese government, President Ma, making it nearly impossible for him and his team to claim that under KMT rule Taiwan made real and sustainable progress in its relationship with the mainland. After all, if the presumed gains of the past eight years can be wiped out in the space of three months, it only reinforces the sense among many in Taiwan that Beijing cannot be trusted. Finally, after falling off the American radar screen over the past eight years, Taiwan is quickly edging its way back on. The next administration needs to keep its eye on the final objective—“that cross-Strait differences be resolved peacefully and according to the wishes of the people on both sides of the Strait.” This means we don’t help stir the pot on Taiwan and we don’t sell-out Taiwan for some ephemeral grand bargain with Beijing. Taiwan may be small but it is not a small matter. At stake is not only our relationship with Beijing but also American values and principles, which are exemplified by Taiwan’s vibrant and determined democracy.

Earlier this month, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter visited the Philippines, an increasingly important U.S. security partner. In the Philippines, where he observed the annual Balikatan (shoulder-to-shoulder) exercises, Carter made several important announcements. He revealed that the United States and the Philippines are, and will be, conducting joint patrols in the South China Sea. Carter also offered specifics on new U.S. assistance to the Philippines as part of the new U.S. Maritime Security Initiative for Southeast Asia, a program conceived by the Senate Armed Services Committee and designed to provide U.S. aid to Southeast Asian nations to bolster their maritime capabilities. The Diplomat reported that “much of the [Initiative’s] funding goes to support for a maritime and joint operations center; improvements in maritime intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR); maritime security and patrol vessel support and sustainment; search and rescue operations support; and participation in multilateral engagements and training.” The majority of the 2016 Initiative funding will go to the Philippines, which, along with Vietnam, is one of the two Southeast Asian nations most aggressively trying to combat potential Chinese militarization of areas of the South China Sea. The concept of the Maritime Security Initiative seems to dovetail perfectly with the rebalance to Asia, and also to respond to growing demands by the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia for a more assertive response to China’s activities in the South China Sea. In fact, the rebalance to Asia has, since its inception, made bolstering bilateral security ties in Asia a centerpiece of the strategy. In addition to the Maritime Security Initiative, the White House signed a new, ten year enhanced defense cooperation agreement with the Philippines last year, the Obama administration has overseen closer defense ties with Malaysia and Vietnam, and the White House inked an enhanced defense cooperation deal with Singapore late last year as well. Yet have closer defense ties under the rebalance, cemented with cooperation agreements, joint exercises, port calls, and other programs, actually led to greater overall outlays of U.S. security assistance to Southeast Asia? As a new CFR Infographic shows, at least until the Maritime Security Initiative was announced, the answer is no. In fact, between 2010 and 2015, U.S. security assistance to most Southeast Asian nations actually fell, and it remains unclear how the Maritime Security Initiative will alter that trend. For more details on U.S. security assistance to Southeast Asia under the rebalance, check out the new CFR Infographic.

After the attacks in Jakarta in January, in which a group of gunmen, apparently overseen by a man affiliated with the self-declared Islamic State, shot and bombed their way through a downtown neighborhood, Southeast Asian governments began to openly address the threat of Islamic State-linked radicals. The region’s intelligence agencies, and especially Singapore intelligence, had been warning for at least two years that Southeast Asian men and women were traveling to Islamic State-controlled territory for training and inspiration, and that the region’s governments had no effective way to track these militants’ return. According to estimates by several regional intelligence agencies, between 1,200 and 1,600 Southeast Asians had traveled to Islamic State-controlled areas and possibly returned to their homelands. Other estimates put the figure even higher. The Islamic State clearly recognizes the potential for radicalizing Southeast Asians, one of the largest pools of Muslims in the world. The Islamic State has released a series of videos, posted on the Internet and social media, appealing directly to people speaking Bahasa (Malay or Indonesian.) The group has created a brigade of fighters in Syria for incoming Malaysians and Indonesians, a brigade known as Katibah Nusantara, or “Malay archipelago.” The brigade reportedly has been involved in battles with Kurdish forces, capturing territory from the Kurds last year. Returning to the region, Islamic State-trained militants may plan attacks to demonstrate their devotion and establish themselves as leaders to be feared. The Jakarta-based Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) wrote in early February that in the coming months, “more terrorist attacks in Indonesia are likely as local ISIS leaders compete at home and abroad to establish their supremacy.” Following the Jakarta blasts, Indonesian authorities arrested at least two dozen people (the exact number remains unclear) suspected of possibly planning future attacks. Sensing that the number of Islamic State-inspired radicals was higher than original estimates, in March the Indonesian National Intelligence Agency drew up plans to hire roughly 2,000 more intelligence agents focused on counterterrorism. The Jokowi administration, and the Indonesian parliament, also is considering passing “preventive detention” laws that would allow the authorities to hold terror suspects for up to six months without charging them. Yet the Jakarta attacks did not send Southeast Asian governments most vulnerable to the Islamic State threat---Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand---into a total panic. After all, the Islamic State, though a danger, is not as much of a threat to Southeast Asia as the group is to countries in the Middle East, Africa, or Europe. For one, many regional leaders and intelligence analysts understand that, compared to regions like Europe and the Middle East, the number of Southeast Asians who have traveled to Syria or Iraq to receive training and funding is relatively small. This number remains small in part because of the openness and democracy of countries like Indonesia, which allows Islamists to air their grievances heard through the political system. Even if 2,000 or 2,500 Southeast Asians have made the journey, as some Malaysian intelligence officers believe, this figure pales in comparison to the number of Tunisians or French and Belgian citizens who have traveled to join the Islamic State. For more on my analysis of why the Islamic State does not pose a great threat to Southeast Asia, see my new piece on Southeast Asia and the Islamic State in The Diplomat.