Japan

Erin Gallagher is a research associate for Japan studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.   On March 17, three couples in Hokkaido won a landmark case in the Sapporo District Court. Thousands, in Japan and across the globe, joined in the celebration as the district court ruled that the refusal of the Japanese government to recognize same-sex marriages violates Article 14 of the constitution, which guarantees equality under the law for all Japanese citizens. The lawsuit in Sapporo was one of four filed by thirteen same-sex couples across Japan on February 14, 2019. One of the couples, known by pseudonyms Ms. E and Ms. C, had sought to register their marriage in their home city of Sapporo, but were rejected because they were both women. The Sapporo city government argued that Japanese national law does not recognize same-sex marriage, though it is not specifically banned. The pair joined with twelve other same-sex couples from across Japan to challenge the constitutionality of government refusal to recognize them as legal partners. This recent decision marked a shift in the legal framing of the LGBTQ+ cause. By basing her decision on Article 14, Sapporo District Court Judge Takebe Tomoko highlighted a far more powerful argument for LGBTQ+ rights. To date, LGBTQ+ activists have often based their argument for the constitutionality of same-sex marriage on Article 24, which states that marriage is “based only on the mutual consent of both sexes.” Judge Takebe has shifted the discussion away from a conversation over gender to a debate over equality. This ruling was not the first victory for LGBTQ+ equality in Japan. Other court cases have ruled in favor of various issues of importance to Japan’s LGBTQ+ activism, including a ruling from 1997 in which the Tokyo High Court said that the Tokyo Metropolitan Government could not legally deny the use of city run youth hostels to the LGBTQ+ group “Occur.” In a more recent decision from March 2020, the Tokyo High Court heard a case in which the judge ruled that same-sex couples should have the same rights as heterosexual married couples. This ruling provided  legitimacy to the plaintiff’s same-sex relationship despite its lack of legal standing, allowing the plaintiff to sue her female partner of seven years for infidelity in a move that was previously restricted to heterosexual spouses. Local governments have also played an important role by recognizing same-sex relationships. In 2015, two municipal governments in Tokyo, Setagaya-ku and Shibuya-ku, began issuing special partnership certificates for same-sex couples. Since then, more than sixty local governments in Japan have done the same, from small municipalities of less than 100,000 people such as Kijo-machi in Miyazaki prefecture to cities as large as Osaka. These certificates, which provide a proof of partnership, can help same-sex couples to rent apartments together or visit one another in the hospital. In 2017, the city of Osaka allowed the first same-sex couple in Japan to act as foster parents. Yet even in municipalities where special partnership certificates are available, the inability to get married means that same-sex couples still cannot enjoy the same rights as heterosexual couples. For example, LGBTQ+ couples cannot parent children together. Moreover, there is no legal obligation on landlords or hospitals to honor their rights even if presented with a certificate. In cities where partnership certificates have not been adopted, same-sex couples have even less chance for recourse. In short, while these gains at the local level have done much to help same-sex couples, increased rights in one city do not necessarily guarantee similar rights in others. These smaller, local steps have done much to lay groundwork for the LGBTQ+ community but have not created widespread change at the national level. Like many other areas of citizen activism, there is little incentive for national legislators to advocate for this issue. The governing coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party and Komeito are socially conservative parties that have no interest in progressive marriage laws. Even among more progressive opposition parties, marriage equality is not a priority. For instance, Otsuji Kanako, a member of the opposition Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan and Japan’s first openly gay Diet member, makes no secret of her activism and worked with a small group of like-minded peers from the Japanese Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party to introduce a bill to legalize same-sex marriage in June 2019. Their efforts, however, have thus far gained little traction in the Diet as the governing coalition has refused to discuss it. The Sapporo District Court ruling, however, may indicate an important opportunity for the LGBTQ+ community in Japan. By decoupling the issue of same-sex marriage from the politically challenging task of constitutional revision, the ruling opens the way for a broader conversation about legal discrimination against Japan’s LGBTQ+ community. This past week, editorials in major Japanese newspapers are disavowing the discrimination LGBTQ+ people face under Japanese law and calling for further action from the Japanese government. One editorial in the Asahi Shimbun praises the ruling for respecting “the basic human rights of minorities,” and notes that Japan is the only G7 country which doesn’t allow same-sex marriage. Another editorial in the Mainichi Shimbun calls the decision 画期的 (kakkiteki) or “groundbreaking,” and urges the national government to develop legal protections for same-sex marriage. Moreover, most news sources have been quick to point out that public opinion seems to be changing. While in decades past there was an unspoken expectation on LGBTQ+ citizens to stay quiet about their sexuality, social acceptance of same-sex couples has been growing, especially among more progressive and younger Japanese. An Asahi Shimbun poll from this week revealed that 65% feel same-sex marriage should be legal. Of those aged 18-29, the number jumps to 86%. This growing national support has been joined by international attention. News sources and activists around the globe have lauded the decision. After decades of small wins and local solutions, the wave of support for the Sapporo ruling suggests that the moment for significant social change for Japan’s LGBTQ+ community may finally have arrived.

Japan's constitutional debate is about not simply the document's past but also the nation's ability to respond to twenty-first-century challenges.

Prime Minister Suga will keep working to upgrade Japan’s military amid increasing pressures from China, North Korea, and Russia.

President-Elect Biden and his team come at a critical time for Japan-South Korea relations.

James Gannon is the executive director of the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE/USA). For decades, the United States and Japan have touted their bilateral partnership on global health as a means to help the world’s poor and vulnerable. Inexplicably, though, almost all meaningful U.S.-Japan cooperation has vanished during the greatest global health threat of the century—the COVID-19 pandemic. Our dual transitions—both to the Biden administration and to a new phase of the pandemic with the rollout of effective vaccines—provide a golden opportunity to build back this partnership. Japan and the United States have incentives to beat back the virus around the world. Shutting down borders may help in the short run, but no victory is sustainable if reservoirs of infection are left to fester elsewhere. Strategically, meanwhile, competitors like China and Russia have realized that the way in which we approach the next phase of the pandemic will have profound implications for international relations. If the United States and Japan are perceived as only caring about their own citizens, disregarding those suffering in poorer countries, the resentment will rightfully linger for decades. A revival of the U.S.-Japan partnership should build on existing foundations at the bilateral level. It is rarely discussed, but there is a vibrant constellation of fellowships, exchanges, and collaborative research programs connecting Japanese and American medical researchers and health specialists. In the past year, for example, the US National Institutes of Health has supported 487 projects with Japanese institutions and hosted 134 Japanese fellows. Some of these collaborations have been harnessed for COVID-19, but still there are many areas that are ripe for a modest investment—research funding and high-level encouragement. For instance, Americans can learn from Japan’s use of artificial intelligence in COVID-19 research, while Japanese doctors can learn about treatment methods from Americans who have extensive firsthand experience with sick patients. People-to-people exchange is central to these bilateral collaborations, but it has dwindled during the pandemic. When the pandemic wanes and things settle into a “new normal,” we should not default to a lower level of exchange. Rather, 2020 should emphasize the importance of not just reinstating previous programs, but also investing in expanding people-to-people exchanges on medicine and healthcare. Beyond the bilateral, there is much more that Japan and the United States should do to coordinate on their global approaches. Arguably the most meaningful global initiative to combat the pandemic, the Access to COVID Tools (ACT) Accelerator has largely been driven by the European Union, with the World Health Organization (WHO) leading. The ACT-Accelerator relies on a core group of global health organizations, which have recalibrated their operations to provide COVID-19 aid to low- and middle-income countries. Japan has provided some funding for the ACT-Accelerator, but it has yet to fully commit itself. The United States has been AWOL. The dual transitions give the United States and Japan an opportunity to “reset.” They should take on a larger role with the ACT-Accelerator, shifting it from a largely Europe-led venture toward better reflecting the G7 leadership. This would involve coordinated American and Japanese support for its mission, a major infusion of cash, and work to advance WHO governance reform—a shared concern for both countries—paired with a recommitment to the WHO and its mission. The WHO estimates that the international health organizations central to the ACT-Accelerator’s operations need $38 billion to develop and deliver COVID-19 tests, treatments, and vaccines equitably around the world. However, only $5 billion has materialized so far, primarily from Europe. Japan has committed $228 million to Gavi and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) for the COVAX effort to provide vaccines for low-income countries, plus another $1 million for Unitaid to distribute therapeutics. It has not yet come up with any new money for the diagnostics initiative led by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and FIND. The United States, meanwhile, has failed to provide a single penny; its funding for the global response is hostage to Congressional negotiations on a broader COVID-19 stimulus package. Japanese policymakers typically look to the United States when considering how much to pledge for international initiatives; the failure of the United States to step up on COVAX this summer played a role in Japan’s decision-making process. Meanwhile, US appropriators feel more comfortable when other leading countries put up funding as well, lending a self-reinforcing dynamic to American and Japanese support for international efforts. Loosely coordinated American and Japanese pledges to the initiatives outlined above could capitalize on this dynamic and demonstrate U.S.-Japan solidarity with the rest of the world. U.S.-Japan leadership would also make a difference at the regional level in Asia. Many Asian countries have been remarkably successful at limiting the spread of the disease. But as the focus shifts to widespread vaccination, the United States and Japan must be more engaged in supporting the region, especially while China targets ASEAN with its vaccine diplomacy. Even the COVAX Advanced Market Commitment, which guarantees poor countries access to vaccines, can only provide enough doses to cover 20 percent of participating countries’ populations. Joint U.S.-Japan financial and technical support for a regional facility that supplements efforts to provide testing, treatment, and vaccinations in Asia’s poorer countries would advance Japan’s aims and help the United States make good on the rhetoric of its “Rebalance to Asia” and the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” Ideally, this would be done under the banner of the East Asia Summit in a way that welcomes support from other regional powers. This will work best if paired with U.S.-Japan leadership on medical supply chain efforts and expanded investments to strengthen regional surveillance systems to better spot emerging diseases. Concerted joint efforts on these three levels—bilateral, global, and regional—would be an important first step in reviving the US-Japan partnership on global health. The incoming Biden administration has been echoing the catchphrase of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe as it declares “the United States is back.” Working in partnership with Japan to reassert international leadership against COVID-19 provides a golden opportunity to make this a reality.

Worsening Japan-South Korea relations have unprecedented ramifications for the economic and security fields.

Prime Minister Abe Shinzo will resign on September 16, two days after the LDP elects the next president of the party. His long tenure in office gave Abe the opportunity to leave his mark on his party, on his country, and indeed on the globe. So, what’s next? What can we expect post-Abe? Abe left his party in a good position politically, and thus his successor as party president will step into the prime minister’s office with a strong legislative foundation from which to govern. The LDP, in coalition with Komeito, maintained its two-thirds majority in the Lower House through three elections, 2012, 2014 and 2017. By October 2021, the LDP will again have to ask Japanese voters to support them. Abe’s immediate successor, therefore, needs to keep a steady hand on governing while ensuring the LDP is well positioned to maintain its advantage in the Diet. The field is small for an LDP party leadership race. Three well-known candidates, all of whom had significant policy responsibilities under Abe, are in the running. Kishida Fumio, former Foreign Minister in the Abe Cabinet, currently serves as the head of the LDP Policy Research Council. Ishiba Shigeru, meanwhile, has perhaps the most experience governing Japan. He was Defense Agency chief under Prime Minister Koizumi and Minister of Defense under Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo. He then assumed the position of Agriculture Minister in the Asō Cabinet, and served as Secretary-General of the LDP from 2012-2014, presiding over two of three electoral wins for Abe. Abe gave Ishiba a cabinet post for regional revitalization, a new post designed to mitigate the impact of Japan’s population decline. Suga Yoshihide, current Chief Cabinet Secretary, was Abe’s right hand man throughout his almost eight years in office, and highly regarded for his adept management of Japan’s complex bureaucracies. The rules of this party election are important to note. Rather than a full vote, Secretary General Nikai Toshihiro organized an abbreviated process designed for when a party president unexpectedly steps down. Abe’s health issues led to his abrupt resignation, and the COVID-19 pandemic provides ample reason to argue for continuity in government. LDP Diet members (394) will have the largest voice, with only 141 members from Japan’s 47 prefectures weighing in to represent party rank and file. Factional politics aligned early on in the race and fell in quickly behind Suga. Already, Japanese and global media have dedicated considerable space to introducing him as the man likely to succeed Abe, and many of us have made the case that the policy agenda laid down by Japan’s longest serving prime minister is likely to be continued. Who is not running in next week’s leadership race may be just as important to understanding the post-Abe era, however. A second election hovers just over the horizon in Japan. The stability of the Abe Cabinet was due to two factors:  the desire within the LDP to maintain unity after their party’s three-year stint in the opposition, and the ability of the Abe-led LDP to create and maintain a two-thirds majority in the Lower House of parliament. Thus, party unity is necessary to steady government, but it is perhaps even more important to the LDP’s fortunes at the polls. While this managed succession process may be suited to coping with Abe’s sudden departure, it may not over time serve the cause of party unity. There are others in the LDP who would like a shot at the top post. The party’s next generation of leaders are popular, smart, and policy-savvy; the current Minister of Defense Kono Taro easily comes to mind, as does the current Minister of Environment Koizumi Shinjiro. (In the days following Abe’s resignation, Koizumi publicly cast his lot with Kono Taro rather than Ishiba Shigeru, his pick in 2012.) Japan’s current foreign minister, Motegi Toshimitsu, who negotiated Japan’s bilateral trade deal with the Trump Administration, is also seen as a future contender in Kasumigaseki. While party seniors may have managed this first transition to the post-Abe era, the LDP will want to take full advantage of this next generation’s appeal to younger voters if it wants to remain in power. The conspicuous absence of women being cultivated for leadership in Japan’s conservative party remains puzzling. In policy terms, the burden Japanese women will have to bear in the transition to an aging society also seems underappreciated. Today, 28.4% of Japanese are 65 or older. A decade and a half from now that proportion rises to 33.3%. Younger Japanese will face a far different set of social and economic expectations, and this is especially true of women. Structuring Japan’s economy to attract and sustain full female participation was a critical piece of Abe’s economic agenda. But there are a host of concerns about the future of Japanese society (such as shared responsibility for raising a family, health care, and social welfare of the elderly) where younger Japanese women and their partners see work-life balance differently. Where are the women in the LDP who can help think through how their society can thrive? One obvious example is Noda Seiko, a 9-term representative who has led the Policy Research Council and has been the Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications, the Minister in charge of Women's Empowerment, and the Minister of State for the Social Security and Tax Number System. She has run for the presidency before, but her inability to garner support within her party suggests that the LDP cannot yet see their way to offering a seasoned social policy advocate a chance at the helm. Finally, the general election will reveal whether Japanese voters see any alternative to the LDP. In the past two House of Representatives General Elections, the LDP garnered approximately 48% of eligible votes, yet not all of these voters were party members. There is a broad swathe of Japanese voters who are not aligned with any party. Those were the voters that gave Koizumi Junichiro his win in his 2005 reform election, and who four years later gave the Democratic Party of Japan their impressive victory. These largely urban voters also turn out for LDP alternatives, such as the former governor and head of the Osaka Isshin no Kai, Hashimoto Toru, and the current highly popular governor of Tokyo, Koike Yuriko. In preparation, Japan’s opposition parties, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan and the Democratic Party for the People, have merged in an attempt to rebuild a center left reformist party to contend with the LDP. Japanese politics may not be ready for realignment, and Japanese voters have many reasons to be risk averse when it comes to choosing who should govern. Beyond the structural challenges that attend its demographics, there is plenty to worry about. Japan’s strategic setting seems increasingly threatening, repeated natural disasters have ravished the countryside, and the world seems more unpredictable. Even the U.S. seems less reliable these days. The danger for the LDP is that they once again rest on their laurels. In polling after Abe’s resignation announcement, the majority of Japanese saw his time in office as positive for Japan (Yomiuri, JNN, Asahi). If Abe’s time in office suggests anything for those who follow in his footsteps, it is that the Japanese people want stable government, but even more, they want innovative and bold ideas for the way forward. In the post-Abe era, it will be important to deliver on this need for hope.

The question of how the United States should respond to the rise of China has dominated the foreign policy debate in recent years. Democrats and Republicans alike agree that the days of cooperative engagement have passed and that Washington should take tougher steps in dealing with Beijing, even as they disagree between and among themselves on where the dividing line lies between “tough” and “reckless.” As that debate proceeds—and it could heat up as Election Day approaches—it’s worth remembering that this is hardly the first time a president has had to decide on how to respond to a rising Asian power. Indeed, one hundred and fifteen years ago today, President Theodore Roosevelt, facing the emergence of a different power in Asia, signed off on a document known as the Taft-Katsura Memorandum that opted not for confrontation but for accommodation. To understand the Taft-Katsura Memorandum, some context is necessary. By the start of the twentieth century, U.S. foreign policy had begun to turn outward, and especially toward Asia. During the Spanish-American War—the “splendid little war” as Secretary of State John Hay called it—the United States took the opportunity to annex Hawaii and seized control of the Philippines from Spain. Instead of giving Filipinos their independence, Presidents William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt saw the archipelago as a foothold from which to project and protect U.S. interests in the Western Pacific. To ensure U.S. control, they pursued a bloody counterinsurgency campaign that lasted three years, killing 4,000 Americans and more than 220,000 Filipinos. Nor did U.S. interests in Asia stop at the Philippines. In 1900, McKinley dispatched several thousand U.S. troops to China as part of an international effort to put down the so-called Boxer Rebellion. As the U.S. presence in the Western Pacific was surging, so too was Japan’s. In May 1905, the Japanese Navy sank thirty Russian ships at the Battle of Tsushima Strait, giving Tokyo the upper hand in the Russo-Japanese War. Roosevelt had initially applauded the Japanese surprise attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur in February 1904 that began the war. By the time of the Japanese victory at the Tsushima Strait, Roosevelt’s thinking had changed. Japan’s naval prowess and reach now threatened not just Russia but potentially also the United States. Looking to head off the threat, Roosevelt dispatched his secretary of war, William Howard Taft, to Tokyo. Taft happened to be sailing to East Asia that summer to lead a congressional delegation on a goodwill tour. (Ironically, by this time, the Japanese, worried about their ability to sustain their war against the Russians, had asked Roosevelt to mediate the conflict. The parties met in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in August 1905. For his efforts in negotiating what became the Treaty of Portsmouth, Roosevelt was awarded the 1906 Nobel Peace Prize.) Taft’s charge was to sound out the Japanese on their attentions in the Western Pacific and to do what he could to dissuade them from casting a covetous glance toward the Philippines. Taft’s delegation arrived in Japan on July 25. Two days later, Taft met with the Japanese prime minister, Count Taro Katsura. According to the memorandum summarizing the discussion, their conversation had three parts. The first dealt with Japan’s interest in the Philippines. Taft asked for assurance that Japan’s sole interest in the islands would be “to have these islands governed by a strong and friendly nation like the United States.” Katsura “confirmed in the strongest terms” that was in fact the case, adding that “Japan does not harbor any aggressive designs whatever on the Philippines.” The conversation then shifted to conditions in East Asia. Katsura said the only way to maintain peace in the region was to “form good understanding between the three governments of Japan, the United States, and Great Britain.” Taft responded that President Roosevelt could not enter into such an agreement without the consent of the U.S. Senate. That said, the secretary of war noted: without any agreement at all the people of the United States were so fully in accord with the policy of Japan and Great Britain in the maintenance of peace in the far East that whatever occasion arose appropriate action of the Government of the United States, in conjunction with Japan and Great Britain, for such a purpose could be counted on by them quite as confidently as if the United States were under treaty obligations to take [it]. The conversation concluded with a discussion of Korea. Katsura said it had been the “direct cause” of the Russo-Japanese War and that he saw Japan’s oversight of Korea as the “logical consequence” of Japan’s military success in the war. He continued: If left to herself after the war Korea will certainly draw back to her habit of improvidently resuscitating the same international complications as existed before the war. In view of the foregoing circumstances Japan feels absolutely constrained to take some definite step with a view to precluding the possibility of Korea falling back into her former condition and of placing us [Japan] again under the necessity of entering upon another foreign war. Taft “fully admitted the justness of the Count's observations,” and said that “in his personal opinion the establishment by Japanese troops of a suzerainty over Korea” was justified, but cautioned that “his judgment was that President Roosevelt would concur in his [Taft's] views in this regard …he [Taft] had no authority to give assurance of this.” After the conversation concluded, the “agreed memorandum” on what had been discussed was drafted, most likely by Katsura. On July 29, Taft wired the memorandum to Secretary of State Elihu Root. The memorandum was then forwarded to Roosevelt, who was at his home in Oyster Bay, New York. On July 31, Roosevelt responded: “Your conversation with Count Katsura absolutely correct in every respect. Wish you could state to Katsura that I confirm every word you have said.” The upshot of the discussion was that Roosevelt had signaled that he would not oppose Japanese designs on Korea. That fact would be codified in the Treaty of Portsmouth, which recognized the legitimacy of Japanese claims in Korea and South Manchuria. When Korea in November 1905 cited its 1882 treaty of amity and friendship with the United States in asking for diplomatic help in fending off Japanese pressure, Roosevelt declined. By mid-November, Japan had taken control of Korea’s foreign policy. Two weeks later, the United States closed its legation in Korea and placed “Korea” under the heading of “Japan” in the State Department’s Record of Foreign Relations.  Although Taft acknowledged to Katsura that no agreement could be binding on the United States without the Senate’s consent, Roosevelt never informed the Senate, or Congress more broadly, of what Taft and Katsura had discussed. (Roosevelt’s attitude toward the Senate on such matters was best summarized by his response three years later when he was asked if the Senate should be informed of another secret agreement he negotiated with Japan: “Why invite the expression of views with which we may not agree?”) The Taft-Katsura Memorandum also wasn’t covered in the press. For nearly two decades it remained unknown and forgotten. Then in August 1924, Tyler Dennett, a professor of history at Johns Hopkins, revealed its existence. He had stumbled upon it while going through Roosevelt’s papers at the Library of Congress. He asked Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes if he could make the document public. The document had never been classified as secret, so Hughes said yes. The memorandum was subsequently published in Current History with the title “President Roosevelt’s Secret Pact with Japan.” Dennett argued that the memorandum amounted to a binding agreement between Japan and the United States wherein Japan would leave the Philippines alone if the United States let Japan oversee Korea. Historians have been debating that claim ever since. Some argue that Taft-Katsura was not an agreement at all, let alone one with a quid pro quo. In this view, the memorandum merely constituted an exchange of views that the two sides had previously shared. Others argue that it was a quid pro quo agreement precisely because Taft “expressed United States approval of Japanese control over Korea in return for Japanese respect for United States presence in the Philippines.” Some go further and argue that the Taft-Katsura Memorandum served as a precedent to the division of Korea nearly a half-century later. And these arguments generate their own counter, namely, given the isolationist sentiment of most Americans at the start of the twentieth century, would any American president have done anything to oppose Japan’s colonization of Korea beyond issuing a stiff, and ultimately inconsequential, diplomatic note? Regardless of which side of the historical debate you fall on, the geographic settlement outlined in the Taft-Katsura Memorandum lasted for thirty-six years, until December 7, 1941.