Japan

Committee deliberations on the Abe cabinet’s new security legislation erupted into a spectacle of contention today as the ruling coalition used their majority to move their bill to the floor of the Diet’s Lower House. Opposition members rushed the dais of the special committee chairman, Yasukazu Hamada, calling for an end to “Abe politics” and accusing the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)-Komeito coalition of ramming through legislation that the Japanese people do not support. In a press conference after the vote, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe himself acknowledged that he has not succeeded in gaining the public’s understanding for a legislative package that would allow Japan’s military greater latitude to work alongside others. In a cabinet decision last July, the prime minister announced he would change the government’s interpretation of the constitution to allow for the right of collective self-defense. Implementing legislation, presented to the Diet last month, allows the Self Defense Force (SDF) to operate in concert with the United States and other forces to “protect the lives of the Japanese people and the survival of Japanese nation.” On June 22, Abe extended the Diet session to September 27 to ensure passage of the new laws. In practical terms, the Abe government was seeking to clarify the legal basis for three types of military operations. The first was operations providing for Japan’s own security, largely designed to improve the ability of U.S. and Japanese militaries to plan for a variety of contingencies. The second was to allow the SDF to provide logistical support to others who were fighting elsewhere if that conflict threatened Japanese security interests. Included was the provision of ammunition and fuel to the U.S. military during a conflict. Finally, the legislation clarified the ability of the SDF to participate in coalition efforts, including those sponsored by the United Nations, in humanitarian and disaster relief. In short, none of the contingencies publicly presented here involved scenarios that Japan has not confronted to date. This legislation is critical to the implementation of recently concluded U.S.-Japan defense cooperation guidelines. Indeed, part of the political challenge for Abe was his public promise to the U.S. Congress that he would get the laws passed. Coming back to Tokyo, Abe faced an incensed opposition in the Diet that claimed he had no right to commit to Washington before they had time to deliberate his government’s bill. Criticism of Abe’s agenda only worsened from there. On June 4, the Lower House special committee convened to deliberate the bill called in three constitutional scholars. To the amazement of all, the expert called by the ruling LDP, Yasuo Hasebe of Waseda University, testified that the Abe cabinet’s 2014 decision to reinterpret the constitution was in fact unconstitutional. Hasebe’s testimony lit a smoldering fire of protest. Constitutional scholars and other legal communities convened public meetings, and across Japan, local assemblies passed resolutions in protest to the Abe cabinet’s position on collective self-defense. A total of 9,766 Japanese scholars, artists and other public intellectuals, including Nobel laureate Toshihide Masukawa, signed a petition opposing the new security legislation. As the deliberations in the Diet continued, protestors took to the streets outside with “no war” and anti-Abe slogans on their placards. On July 12, about 750 members of Gambare Nippon!, a conservative activist group, lodged a counter protest. The following night, two hundred supporters of Article Nine responded, and then on the evening of July 14, the media reported twenty thousand protesters including students, NPO groups, and older Japanese gathered in Hibiya Park to demonstrate their opposition to the new bill. Inside the Diet, Japan’s new legislative balance was on full display. Opposition parties, including the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the Japan Communist Party (JCP), and the much smaller parties (including the Social Democratic Party, the People’s Life Party and Taro Yamamoto and Friends) all stood against the security bill. But the focus was on what the new Japan Innovation Party (JIP) would do. Many thought the JIP would align with the ruling coalition in support of the legislation, but ultimately the party president, Yorihisa Matsuno, rejected the government bill, and instead offered up his own parliamentary bill on July 8. The JIP bill, with some support from the former ruling party, the DPJ, took on the core principles of the Abe cabinet’s legislation. Two were obvious deal breakers: first, the JIP bill rejected the need for a reinterpretation of the right of collective self-defense, instead relying on the existing right of self-defense inherent in the SDF’s established missions; and second, the JIP bill also rejected the idea that the SDF should be deployed anywhere near an area where combat was taking place. In short, committee deliberations revealed there was little room for compromise between the ruling coalition and the JIP-led counterproposal. Today’s committee passage of the government bill thus ended Abe’s short-lived effort at seeking compromise. Tomorrow the ruling coalition will call a full vote in the Lower House, using its majority to conclude this first round of the Lower House deliberation. From there, the bill will move to the Upper House, which has sixty days to deliberate before taking its own vote. The ruling coalition has a majority in the House of Councillors, with 133 of 242 seats, but may need the cooperation of smaller opposition parties to gain the necessary votes for it to pass. With the JIP now firmly against the government’s version, it is likely that the bill will return to the Lower House for passage. All of this must be complete by the new September 27 deadline for the current Diet session. Today’s vote to move the bill out of the committee demonstrates that the Abe cabinet plans to use its supra majority to conclude the process. As tempers flare in this first round of committee deliberations, however, there is some concern within the LDP that this could take a political toll as they look ahead to the fall and to the next Upper House election next summer. This summer will test the LDP and its coalition partner, the Komeito, whose supporters seem more at ease with the sentiment of the opposition than with the LDP. The prime minister’s support rating has been dropping by the week, and today it falls two points lower than his disapproval rating. Abe has faced this drop in polling before when he pursued a new government secrecy law in late 2013 and when his cabinet announced the new policy on collective self-defense last summer. Opposition parties were vociferous in their criticism then, and media commentary warned of the need for consensus and popular support. But this time feels different. Citizen activism against the prime minister’s policies is spreading, and on the streets and in town halls across Japan, there is a push to build a coalition of opposition to Abe’s effort at defense policy reform. Abe’s leadership has been questioned largely by his critics but now increasingly by members of his own party. The NHK, Japan’s public broadcasting station, and the Yomiuri Shimbun, a strong supporter of the new security legislation, report in their polling that the majority of Japanese believe the discussion on this critical policy change is insufficient, noting 56 percent and 80 percent of their respondents, respectively, felt dissatisfied. Today’s Diet drama is just the first of many steps in the two months of Diet debate to go. There is plenty of time for this newfound appetite for opposition to the Abe government to grow. It is too early to tell if this political fracas will have a lasting impact on Abe’s political capital. Additional hurdles between now and the end of September are politically sensitive for the Abe government. The government remains locked into a standoff with the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture over a new base for the U.S. Marines there, with construction expected to begin in August-September. Another flare-up with Seoul over the UNESCO world heritage sites has also prompted backlash against the government. In addition, the prime minister will issue his much anticipated statement on August 15 commemorating the seventieth anniversary of the end of World War II. Ironically his success in rekindling diplomacy with Beijing may also be playing into the domestic debate over Japan’s military preparedness. A protracted contest over Japan’s defense reforms weakens the prime minister’s hand. Having publicly promised the United States that he will complete the legislation, Abe will be hard pressed to step back. But a deeply divided Japanese public over alliance cooperation is not the outcome U.S. policymakers hoped for. Moreover, there is a growing agenda for maritime cooperation in Asia, even as both Washington and Tokyo seek to reduce the risk of inadvertent clashes between their militaries and China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Abe is reportedly considering a visit to China in September to meet with Xi Jinping, after the Chinese president hosts his own commemoration of Japan’s defeat and end of the war on the continent on September 3 but before Xi arrives in Washington later in the month. The Diet uproar signals a tough road ahead for Japan’s prime minister. Abe must be aware that some of the decisions he has taken would promote controversy, but he has in many ways styled himself after his grandfather, former Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, who did not step back from domestic opposition when it came time to revise the U.S.-Japan security treaty over half a century ago. But today’s strategic quandary for Japan is far different than the late 1950s, and popular sentiment about Japan’s own military option is far more complex. As his diplomatic skills are tested in the months ahead, so too will be Abe’s ability to gauge domestic sentiment on Japan’s military and its constitution. If he pushes too far, too fast, the backlash could seriously impair Japan’s ability to provide for its security in a rapidly changing Asia. On the other hand, stepping back from the defense agenda he has nurtured so carefully could complicate his ability to promote the array of other reforms he has proposed. At the very least, Abe must regain his public’s confidence if he is to complete his task.

At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit late last year, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Xi Jinping began to restore their nations’ relations, attempting to overcome differences over islands in the East China Sea. Again this year, the leaders of Asia’s two largest powers met at the Bandung Conference, demonstrating a slightly more relaxed and encouraging demeanor, suggesting that the maritime talks between their two governments were bearing some fruit. But it is not the territorial dispute itself that threatens improvement in the Japan-China relationship; it is their deep skepticism of each other’s ambitions in the region. Chinese officials have not been shy in suggesting that the changing balance of power between their nation and Japan is the root cause of their diplomatic difficulty. The most recent statement of China’s perception of the change in regional influence comes from Foreign Minister Wang Yi. After his speech at Beijing’s World Peace Forum last week, China’s foreign minister was asked about the prospects for Japan-China relations, and Xinhua quoted him as follows: “the crux of China-Japan relations is whether Japan can sincerely accept and welcome China’s revival and rise.” Wang was further quoted as saying, “China’s development has brought important benefit to Japan, but Japan is not fully prepared in its mindset for an increasingly powerful China.” The solution, from Wang’s perspective, is simply that the Japanese have to accept China’s growing power. Wang is not off the mark about Japan’s concerns about Chinese ambitions, and this too was amply demonstrated last week in Tokyo. Japan’s chief of the Joint Staff of the Self Defense Force, Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano agreed to an interview with the Wall Street Journal, and openly acknowledged his concerns about China’s behavior in the South China Sea. Admiral Kawano noted that China’s program of island building in the disputed islands of the South China Sea created serious concerns for Japan because of its dependence on the sea lanes through the Malacca Straits. “Of course, the area is of the utmost importance for Japanese security,” he said. “We don’t have any plans to conduct surveillance in the South China Sea currently but depending on the situation, I think there is a chance we could consider doing so.” In Tokyo, there is a profound sense that China could be positioning itself to challenge Japan’s strategic interests, and a new willingness to work closely with others to improve maritime stability. Both perceptions are important, but they should not prevent leaders on both sides from recognizing the need for bolder diplomacy in the service of Japan-China cooperation in Asia. If China simply wishes for others to accept its rise, then it will be disappointed. As I argue in my new book, Intimate Rivals, the pace and scope of change being felt in Japan by the increasing impact of a transforming China have challenged successive governments in Tokyo. Granted, not all Japanese support an increased role for their military, but the majority of Japanese worry about how effective their government is and will be in protecting their interests —economic, maritime, and diplomatic— in the face of a far more assertive China. Beijing should not sit back and wait for acceptance; it should actively seek to find ways of ensuring that its interests will not challenge and weaken those of its neighbors, including Japan. Japanese worries about Chinese behavior, especially in its expansive maritime claims of late, are important indicators of just how close Beijing is coming to pushing Japan into a far more active regional military role. For the past seventy years, Japanese leaders – virtually all of whom were conservatives, by the way – were comfortable that their security and their nation’s prosperity were not challenged in Asia. Even Washington seemed unsuccessful in fundamentally altering Tokyo’s preference for imposing limits, both in terms of capabilities and in geographical range, on its Self Defense Force. Geostrategic change creates deep worry – not only about the policy challenges of the day but also about the perceptions of what is to come. Instead of insisting that Tokyo acknowledge its new power, Beijing would be better served by demonstrating what Foreign Minister Wang says it wants to do with it: creating a foundation for regional stability and peace. Open and free sea lanes are, of course, in the interests of all Asian nations, including China’s. A collaborative approach to ensuring they remain open to all would go a long way to ensuring the peace that Foreign Minister Wang so eloquently spoke of in his speech at last week’s forum. Building bases on islands close to those vital sea lanes will only cause others to fear China, and think the worst of its ultimate ambitions. What caught my eye, however, was Wang’s use of the verb accept, and the attendant suggestion in his remarks that Japan had no choice but to come around. As China’s most respected diplomat and arguably the most effective of China’s former ambassadors to Japan, I wonder if he is truly unaware of how that word rankles policy elites in Tokyo. Few regional policymakers are in a position to simply accept the way Chinese power translates into policy consequences for their society. Across Asia, domestic interests will simply not allow acceptance of Chinese power if the exercise of that power undermines those interests. Of course, there are some who already think that it is wiser to balance or even contain Chinese power. As I point out in Intimate Rivals, however, the story of Japan’s response to a rising China over the past decade or more has been to develop new frameworks of cooperation as well as to adopt new regulatory protections for Japanese citizens. Tokyo policymakers have largely sought to adjust to the complex currents of changes that accompany China’s transformation. Japan must continue to adjust to China’s newfound power. But it would be a mistake for Beijing to assume that policymakers will inevitably come around to accepting all that China does in the region. Interests will diverge, and the mechanisms that will allow Beijing and Tokyo to find common cause will need to be negotiated. In short, Beijing has significant influence over how Tokyo responds to its growing influence. No one knows this better than China’s foreign minister: China’s disdain and Japan’s edginess are a sure recipe for a tense, contested Asia. Ultimately, it is Beijing’s behavior that will shape the direction that Tokyo’s adjustment takes. Rather than asserting its power, it would be wiser for China to consider what kind of neighbor the Chinese people want across the East China Sea.

This post was co-authored with Brad Glosserman, executive director of Pacific Forum CSIS. The Japan-South Korea relationship has been steadily improving in the run up to yesterday’s fiftieth anniversary of normalization.  In recent weeks ministerial–level bilateral contacts have resumed between economic and defense ministers. The relationship has essentially normalized (and the U.S. State Department spokesperson wasted no time in welcoming these developments), but President Park Geun-hye and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe have yet to schedule a formal summit (although they have held informal encounters at the November 2014 APEC meeting in Beijing and on the occasion of Lee Kwan Yew’s funeral in Singapore earlier this spring). The improvements have culminated in parallel events held to commemorate normalization in Tokyo and Seoul at which Prime Minister Abe and President Park both made positive comments about the future of the relationship.  In an interview two weeks ago with the Washington Post’s Lally Weymouth, President Park suggested that progress was forthcoming on how to deal with the “comfort women” issue involving fifty living survivors of wartime sex slavery in Japan.  But even if a bilateral Japan-South Korea summit meeting becomes possible, what can South Korea and Japan do to break the cycle of rapprochement and rupture that makes the relationship so volatile? Recent polls sum up the good news-bad news picture of the relationship, affirming public support for the upturn in the relationship between the two countries while suggesting that the climb toward a truly stable and positive relationship is only getting steeper.  The third annual Genron NPO-EAI (East Asia Institute) poll on Japan-South Korea relations released last month shows that large majorities in both countries have an unfavorable impression of each other, with 52 percent of Japanese viewing South Korea as unfavorable while 74 percent of South Koreans view Japan unfavorably.  This result reveals a slight decrease in unfavorable views by the Japanese public toward South Korea and a slight increase in unfavorable views by the South Korean public toward Japan. However, the Genron NPO-EAI poll also shows that at least two-thirds of the public in both countries perceive the worsening Japan-South Korea relationship to be “undesirable” or a “problem.”  A recent Asan Institute poll of South Koreans concurs with this view and shows strong South Korean public support for a bilateral summit regardless of whether there is progress on history issues.  The emergence of a pragmatic view of the need for a stable South Korea-Japan relationship despite continued differences on history has provided space for steps toward stabilization of relations. Unfortunately, the Genron NPO-EAI poll also shows a hardening of public opinion on critical issues in the relationship.  When asked what constitutes the greatest hindrance to development of the relationship, 88 percent of South Koreans and 62 percent of Japanese point to disputes over the disputed Dokdo/Takeshima island, while 63 percent of Koreans and 58 percent of Japanese identify the comfort women issue.  While many Japanese pay less attention the island dispute (according to a Japanese Cabinet Office poll in late 2014), the territorial dispute between the two countries still looms as a major sticking point that the two governments have no clear way of addressing.  Moreover, the level of Japanese awareness of the island dispute is growing, suggesting that it will be harder for the government of Japan to make concessions on this issue than before, even though Japan’s claim to the territory has been a longstanding source of public irritation in South Korea that is seen as a tangible symbol of Japan’s past territorial claim to the Korean peninsula. In this respect, the Genron NPO-EAI polling results represent a potential setback to the viability of the bold “grand bargain” that Brad Glosserman and I have outlined in our book, The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash, for steps that would be necessary to provide long-term stability in relations between Japan and South Korea. Certainly, it means that South Korean and Japanese leaders will have a harder job if they decide to embrace the sort of joint partnership arrangement that we argue is manifestly in the interests of both countries as well as the United States.  But in the absence of steps by both leaders to put the bilateral relationship onto a new footing, the current cycle will continue, and the relationship will be doomed to repeat the cycle of rising tensions, temporary rapprochement, and parallel rather than joint celebrations of the accomplishments between the two sides.

Ashlyn Anderson, Lauren Dickey, Darcie Draudt, William Piekos, and Ariella Rotenberg look at the top stories in Asia today. 1. Plight of migrants in Andaman Sea continues. As many as three thousand refugees, mostly Rohingya minority Muslims fleeing state-sanctioned persecution in Myanmar and Bangladeshi economic migrants, remain stranded in the waters in the Andaman Sea off the coast of Myanmar and Thailand. An estimated seven thousand refugees were abandoned by human traffickers during the past week without food or water in overcrowded boats; as many as fifty thousand attempt the trip each year. A Thai crackdown on smuggling routes led to the disruption. Southeast Asian countries have been hesitant to offer refuge to the “boat people,” but international pressure has forced several countries to accept migrants at least on a temporary basis. Indonesia, Malaysia, Gambia, and the Philippines have stepped forward, and the U.S. State Department has said the United States is willing to lead a multinational effort to rescue stranded refugees. 2. The United States charges six Chinese citizens for theft of trade secrets; one arrested. Six Chinese citizens were indicted for economic espionage after U.S. authorities claimed that the group infiltrated U.S. universities and tech firms with the intent to deliver trade secrets to the Chinese government and Tianjin University. One man was arrested upon arriving in Los Angeles to speak at a conference. The ordeal underscores growing concerns in the United States over espionage threats from embedded insiders with access to confidential information, as well as the ongoing conflict between the United States and China over innovation and intellectual property rights. In China, the indictments are considered evidence of “Washington’s growing paranoia,” and Tianjin University officials denied the charges. 3. Japan takes South Korea to the World Trade Organization. Japan brought a complaint against South Korea to the World Trade Organization (WTO) over Fukushima-related food import restrictions. The trade complaint challenges Seoul’s import bans and additional testing requirements for Japanese food after the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster. Japan says existing measures violate the WTO’s sanitary foods agreement, and that South Korea has failed to justify its trade restrictions. Under WTO rules, South Korea has sixty days to deal with Japan’s concerns before the WTO adjudicates the matter. The trade dispute is the latest source of tension in the already fraught relationship between the two countries. 4. Former Thai prime minister declares her innocence; current military-led government delays democratic elections. Yingluck Shinawatra, the former prime minister of Thailand, declared her innocence as her trial began on Tuesday that could result in a ten-year prison sentence. Yingluck is accused of negligence for her role in a multibillion dollar rice subsidy that authorities allege was plagued with corruption. The court agreed to grant her bail on the condition that she remain in the country. On the same day that Yingluck’s trial began, the Thai cabinet agreed that a referendum should be held on a new constitution—a move seen by many as a mechanism to delay the return to democracy from the current military junta that overthrew Yingluck’s government nearly a year ago. Current Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha remarked that if such a referendum is held, it would inevitably push back elections until next calendar year. 5. North Korea claims it has technology to miniaturize nuclear weapons. On Wednesday, the North Korean military announced it has developed the ability to miniaturize nuclear weapons, reports DPRK state media. This would be the first step needed to demonstrate North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is a credible threat; also necessary are long-range missiles capable of delivering a payload to enemy targets. North Korea claims it has long-range missile technology, but has yet to demonstrate its viability via tests. (North Korea has tested mid-range missiles capable of hitting Japan.) While acknowledging the DPRK has advanced its nuclear technology and the likelihood that Pyongyang possesses up to twenty nuclear weapons, U.S. officials remain skeptical of Pyongyang’s claim. National Security Council Spokesperson Patrick Ventrell said the Obama administration emphasizes the need to return to Six-Party Talks for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Chief nuclear envoys from the United States, South Korea, and Japan are set to meet next week in Seoul to discuss these and other concerns related to North Korea’s growing nuclear capability. Bonus: Raining spiders in Australia. Arachnophobes, beware. Millions of tiny spiders fell from the sky in the Southern Tablelands region of Australia this week, a phenomenon known as “spider rain” or “angel hair.” The small town of Goulburn was shrouded in silken webs as the spiders used their webs as parachutes to move in large colonies through the sky, covering both buildings and people.

Ashlyn Anderson, Lauren Dickey, Darcie Draudt, William Piekos, and Ariella Rotenberg look at the top stories in Asia today.1. Mass graves of human trafficking camp unearthed in Thailand. Police exhumed twenty-six bodies at a mass grave located in the jungles of Songkhla province this week. Most of the migrants once held at the now abandoned site were Rohingya Muslim refugees from western Myanmar and Bangladesh. According to reports, this camp was made up of “bamboo cages, watchtowers and what Thai police described as a torture room.” Even as the grave was discovered, more than fifty Thai police officers were punished over suspected links to human trafficking networks. The mass grave was hardly the first indicator that Thailand has a booming human trafficking business and it remains to be seen if the Thai government can successfully undertake steps necessary to combat human trafficking.2. China gets serious about environmental protection. China’s cabinet released a thirty-five clause guideline document on Tuesday vowing to achieve “major progress” in improving its environment by 2020. The document defined a “red line” stating that there was to be no further deterioration of air quality, soil quality, or water quality. The document stated that by 2020 China would aim to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 40 to 45 percent from the 2005 level, and increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 15 percent. China has promised to impose stricter consequences on officials whose decisions are found to cause serious environmental damage. The State Council announced that those officials found guilty, would be held accountable for their lifetime. Officials who fail to improve water, air, and soil pollution levels will no longer be eligible for promotion. This adds an important dimension to evaluating the performance of cadres who were previously only graded on their ability to stimulate economic growth.3. Thirteen years later, Bollywood superstar faces consequences for his reckless actions. In 2002, Bollywood actor Salman Khan drunkenly drove his car over five sleeping homeless people, killing one man. Khan fled the scene, and has escaped charges for thirteen years due to the bottle-necked court system in India. He was sentenced to five years in prison this week; however Mumbai’s high court suspended the sentence—a rare move—pending his appeal. The Bollywood community and loyal fans were quick to defend the famed actor who has starred in more than eighty films. Police complaints were filed after a Bollywood singer and jewelry designer made remarks on Twitter that placed the blame on the homeless people for sleeping in the roads in the first place.4. Joint Philippine-Japanese anti-piracy drill shakes up Asian waters and draws China’s criticism. Philippine and Japanese coast guard teams staged an anti-piracy drill on Wednesday in the Manila Bay. The exercise, which featured the storming of a cargo vessel after a mock hijacking, showed growing cooperation between these two nations as tensions rise in Asian seas. The two countries share a joint concern for increasing Chinese assertiveness in the East and South China Seas due to its continued dispatch of coast guard and fishing vessels into disputed waters. Witnessed by the heads of seventeen Asian coast guards, including China, this is the first time that Japan and the Philippines have conducted a joint exercise since signing a 2012 agreement to strengthen bilateral ties. In response, China called for peace and stability in the region.5. Noise from North Korea on its capabilities and intentions. After claiming that the South Korean Navy entered North Korean waters in the Yellow Sea, Pyongyang warned that it will “strike without any prior warning at any warship of the South Korean Navy intruding” into its waters.  A South Korean official called the warning “insane,” asserting that its naval ships did not cross the maritime line of demarcation. Also this week, in a rare interview with CNN, a senior North Korean official spoke about its nuclear capabilities and Pyongyang’s intention to use them if the United States “forced their hand,” as well as human rights allegations in North Korea. Separately, a New York University student currently in North Korean custody spoke to CNN saying that he wanted to be arrested in order to bring peace between North and South Korea.Bonus: Jackie Chan named Singapore’s first celebrity anti-drug ambassador. Months after his son finished serving a short prison stint for drug offenses in China, Jackie Chan has been named Singapore’s first celebrity anti-drug ambassador. Jackie told journalists that drugs hurt young people and offenders should be punished with the death penalty.

This post was co-authored with Brad Glosserman, executive director of Pacific Forum CSIS. A version of this post also appeared as a Pacific Forum CSIS PacNet publication, and can be found here. Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s trip to the United States last week was about as productive and positive a state visit could hope to be. The trappings and status of the visit were second to none. It affirmed the importance of the U.S.-Japan partnership. It produced critical, forward-looking documents to chart the course of the U.S.-Japan relationship. Abe delivered remarks to enthusiastic and approving audiences. Significantly, there were no gaffes to muddy the message or the image he sought to present to the United States, Japan, and the rest of the world. Prime Minister Abe and his entourage should be delighted with the results. The atmospherics were outstanding. The weather was good, Abe landed on the White House lawn to stand side by side with President Obama for his press conference, and most of the questions addressed relevant issues. Abe became the first Japanese prime minister to address a joint meeting of Congress and was given a state dinner with all of the associated buzz. All statements, both scripted and informal, emphasized how the United States and Japan are in sync strategically and view the region and the world through the same lens. Both frame security challenges in the same way, are focused on the same sources of instability (without singling out any particular country), and back the same solutions to these problems. So, for example, Abe and Obama seek a strong international legal regime and protection for the international commons. They also see the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as not just a trade deal, but as a strategic tool to shape the Asia Pacific region in both economic and security terms. The visit produced landmark documents for the alliance. They include a Joint Vision Statementfor the two countries that explains their desire “to build a strong rules-based international order, based on a commitment to rules, norms and institutions,” and that rests upon an “unshakeable Alliance that is the cornerstone of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region and a platform for global cooperation.” It lays out a global agenda whose realization will more deeply integrate the two governments and their nations. That same desire for deeper integration and partnership animates new U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, the first re-articulation of those guidelines in eighteen years. The guidelines help modernize the alliance, reinforce deterrence, and better prepare the two countries for new security challenges. They also call for an integrated whole-of-government approach to alliance cooperation and reaffirm the U.S. commitment to a long-term presence in Japan. Abe took particular pleasure when Obama repeated his statement last year that the Senkaku Islands fall under the ambit of the Mutual Security Treaty. While alliance issues consumed much of Abe’s visit (and are likely to have the most significance over time), his treatment of historical issues generated the most scrutiny. Abe is a conservative nationalist; some consider him to be historical revisionist, sympathetic to the Imperial Japanese regime. His speech in Washington, along with his address in Canberra earlier this year, is a window on his thinking about history. His remarks to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II may well define his administration and the way that history assesses him. His speech to Congress was personal and sympathetic. Abe spoke “with deep repentance in my heart,” to “offer with profound respect my eternal condolences to the souls of all American people that were lost during World War II.” He didn’t say he was sorry but he noted that Japan’s “actions brought suffering to the peoples in Asian countries. We must not avert our eyes from that.” That formulation suggests that he understands a connection between Japan’s actions and the suffering that resulted; it implies responsibility. In addition, he explicitly said that he “will uphold the views expressed by the previous prime ministers in this regard,” a vow to honor the Murayama Statement and the Kono Statement that cannot be fudged. The speech was frequently interrupted by applause and Abe received a standing ovation more than ten times. Some were not happy with the remarks; worryingly they spoke for groups that had the most at stake. Lester Tenney, a 94-year-old survivor of the Bataan Death March, acknowledged Abe’s comments about the deceased but dismissed as “disgraceful” the failure to address the feelings of those still alive.  Jan Thompson, president of American Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor Memorial Society, decried the speech as “so vague. He didn’t give us one definitive sentence to send that message to us that he does know the true history." Those who had hoped that he would address the comfort women issue were also angered. Abe noted that, “Armed conflicts have always made women suffer the most. In our age, we must realize the kind of world where finally women are free from human rights abuses,” a statement that is both correct and anodyne. Reaction in South Korea in particular was bitter as he made no reference at any point–and he was asked directly about this in an appearance in Boston—–to Japanese state responsibility for the comfort women. That silence reflects a larger failure by Abe, one of three clouds on an otherwise spotless horizon. Abe didn’t take up Japan’s relations with South Korea in any substantive way during his visit. Of course, this visit was supposed to focus on the U.S.-Japan relationship, but this partnership is increasingly the cornerstone of a larger network of U.S. relations with the region. In the new U.S.-Japan defense guidelines, the two countries promise to “promote and improve trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation.” Japan’s first National Security Strategy [pdf], published in December 2013, acknowledged Seoul as a potential strategic partner to Tokyo. Abe shouldn’t have devoted his speech to U.S.-Japan-ROK relations, but he missed an opportunity to transform this vital framework and lay the groundwork for a more substantial address later this summer. In advance of Abe’s arrival in the United States, National Security Council Senior Director for Asian Affairs Evan Medeiros said to reporters that “we always stress that it’s important to address history questions in an honest, constructive and forthright manner that promotes healing but also in a way that reaches a final resolution,” an unmistakable signal that the United States places importance not only on Japan’s steadfastness as an alliance partner, but also on Japan’s ability to work effectively with other allies including South Korea. A more forward-leaning approach by Abe would have given momentum to efforts underway tostrengthen Japan–South Korea cooperation during this sensitive anniversary year, since a strong relationship between Japan and South Korea willstrengthen Japan’s strategic position in Asia while bolstering the effectiveness of the U.S. rebalance to Asia.. The second potential cloud is the reaction Abe’s words generate in Japan. Will there be explanations, qualifications, and clarifications by Abe or his entourage that undercut his message? This should not happen given the significance of his remarks—and the fact that all involved know that every word will be closely scrutinized—but even before Abe had returned home, the Asahi Shimbun reported that the statement to Congress, “I will uphold the views expressed by the previous prime ministers”—a key phrase—was rendered in Japanese as “I feel exactly the same way as the previous prime ministers.” The difference is striking. Finally, there is the largest problem of all: Will there be continued attention to the alliance from now on or will last week prove to be nothing more than a blip on Washington schedules and a high-water mark on Abe’s travel schedule? The biggest issue for Abe, one that he acknowledged during his trip to Washington two years ago, is whether Japan will be a “first-tier country.” If he and his government make the joint vision statement real, the answer will be yes. The trick is turning the fine words and photo ops in to something more concrete. And that demands effort from both leaders, both governments, and both publics.

Ashlyn Anderson, Lauren Dickey, Darcie Draudt, William Piekos, and Ariella Rotenberg look at the top stories in Asia today. 1. Shinzo Abe visits the United States. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited the United States this week to discuss the future of U.S.­-Japan relations. Increased security cooperation as well as relations with China topped the agenda. Abe delivered the first-ever speech by a Japanese prime minister to a joint session of Congress. In his speech, Abe described his vision for a stronger alliance between the United States and Japan and expressed his condolences for Japanese behavior in World War II. He announced his determination to “take more responsibility for peace and stability in the world.” U.S. President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Abe both made apparent their determination to see the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) through to the end despite significant competing domestic pressures in their respective countries, but so far neither have indicated that their differences in opinion on the specifics of the TPP were resolved. Abe’s visit also includes stops in San Francisco and Los Angeles with the hope of building momentum for economic and military growth in Japan. 2. Nepal devastated by earthquake. Nepal was hit by a 7.8-magnitude earthquake on April 25; aftershocks have followed. There are now over six thousand confirmed deaths; the final total is predicted to exceed ten thousand, as an untold thousands remain missing. The region, which sits on a fault line between the India and Eurasia plates that have formed the Himalayas, was due for an earthquake, but for various reasons, including rapid urbanization, corruption, and a lack of land-use controls, buildings in the capital of Katmandu were vulnerable to seismic disasters. Rebuilding in stricken areas could cost as much as $10 billion. Rescue efforts are ongoing, though hope is fading as more time passes, and only now is aid reaching more remote villages. The New York Times has put together a list of some of the groups soliciting donations for relief efforts. 3. Indonesian firing squad executes eight for drug-related crimes. Despite appeals from foreign governments, Indonesia carried out the death sentences of seven foreigners and one Indonesian. The execution of two Australians, purportedly the ringleaders of the ‘Bali Nine,’ led to the recall of Australia’s ambassador to Indonesia. Among those executed was also a Brazilian diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, apparently unaware of his impending execution up until the last minute. A migrant worker from the Philippines was unexpectedly granted reprieve at the last minute following claims that she unknowingly smuggled heroin into the country. Indonesian President Joko Widodo is seemingly committed to a zero-tolerance stance on drug trafficking, and the majority of the Indonesian public believes the death penalty to be an appropriate punishment for the crime. 4. Divisions over the South China Sea continue. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit was held in Malaysia this week. The ASEAN chairman’s statement, while not directly mentioning China, highlighted reclamation work as eroding trust and confidence and undermining stability in the South China Sea. At the summit, the Philippines pushed Southeast Asian countries to take a stand against China’s expanding footprint in the South China Sea, even as Malaysian representatives made clear their aspirations for China to take the initiative to “stop [island-building] work and sit down with ASEAN member states.” Meanwhile, the U.S. military presence in the region is set to expand with access to eight or more Filipino bases for rotational deployments, two of which will be located near contested territory; Japan is also weighing joint air patrols with the United States over the disputed waters. China’s naval chief has tried to alleviate concerns, suggesting that the artificial islands might in the future be used for joint rescue and disaster-relief operations. 5. North Korea allegedly sentenced fifteen senior officials to be executed in 2015, says South Korea intelligence. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has allegedly ordered the executions of the officials for challenging his authority in the first four months of 2015, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) told a closed-door parliament meeting this week. A member of South Korea’s intelligence committee said the NIS official indicated the vice minister for forestry was sentenced for disagreeing with the forestry program, and the vice chairman for the State Planning Commission was executed for objecting to the shape of a science and technology hall. Kim Jong-un, a young leader, has previously used such deadly purges to consolidate power; in December 2013 he infamously executed his uncle, Jang Sung-taek, on charges of attempting to overthrow the state. Bonus: Katy Perry’s dress sparks controversy with China. This week, pop singer Katy Perry touched a nerve with China when she wore a glittery green dress covered in sunflowers to perform in Taipei, Taiwan. The sunflower happens to be the emblem used by Taiwan’s anti-China protestors last year. Perry also took a Taiwanese flag from an audience member and wore it as a cape as she sang her song, “Unconditionally.” Importantly, the now-infamous sunflower dress is not new to her concert wardrobe; Perry has sported those sunny yellow petals several times since she kicked off her tour in May.

With hundreds of well-wishers at his side, President Barack Obama welcomed Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the White House this morning. It was a beautiful, sunny spring day, and smiles were in abundance for this first of many meetings during Abe’s official visit. In private, the president and the prime minister had a full agenda of alliance priorities to discuss, and afterwards, issued a new Vision Statement for the alliance, suggesting that the U.S.-Japan partnership was turning an important corner. Much of the energy comes from reforms within Japan, reforms Abe has championed for economic revitalization and for enhancing his country’s security. But the Obama administration’s “rebalance” to Asia has also raised the bar for the U.S.-Japan alliance agenda. The alliance transformation envisioned by Obama and Abe also reflects a changing Asia. In the decade and a half since the Cold War ended, the region has been influenced by new security challenges, such as the nuclear and missile proliferation of North Korea, and has begun to be reshaped by complex economic and political currents that accompany an emerging China. Obama and Abe have a broad spectrum of initiatives to cope with this changing region. In the security realm, the two governments have completed a revision of their military cooperation that takes into account these new regional challenges. Yesterday, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter met with Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Fumio Kishida and Minister of Defense Gen Nakatani, and they announced the revision of their bilateral guidelines for defense cooperation. Maritime concerns featured conspicuously in the guidelines, but so too did the announcement of U.S.-Japan cooperation in the new domains of cybersecurity and space. Japan’s concern with its island defense mission has been heightened since its tensions with Beijing over the Senkakus in the East China Sea, but broader considerations of how to upgrade alliance readiness were also part of the guidelines discussions. Most important was the announcement of upgraded crisis management mechanisms for the alliance, enabling Washington and Tokyo to be in close communications 24/7, and allowing not only for deterring aggression but also for coordination in preventing the escalation of incidents and accidents into conflict. Obama and Abe have an even larger vision of how to move regional economic relations forward—the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The twelve-nation TPP, a novel trade agreement that raises the standards on environmental and labor protections, has become a shared initiative with Tokyo. During Abe’s first visit to Washington, DC, in February 2013, they began their bilateral effort to lead the TPP, and today, while they cannot announce the job is completely done, the negotiators have come most of the way on agreeing on difficult—and painful—market access issues. His itinerary is full today and tomorrow. Prime Minister and Mrs. Abe will spend their time today with the executive branch of the U.S. government, including lunch with the vice president and secretary of state and a state dinner at the White House. Tomorrow will be another big day with a speech to the joint session of the U.S. Congress in the morning, a public speech in the afternoon hosted by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, and a gala evening at the Smithsonian’s Freer Gallery. Abe’s speech to Congress tomorrow morning has been a focal point of commentary for months. It is the first time a Japanese prime minister will address a joint session of Congress, and this provides him with ample opportunity to reintroduce his country and his vision for its future not only to our legislators but also to the American people. A recent Pew Research Center poll notes that almost 70 percent of the American people trust the Japanese, and a similar percentage of Japanese feel the same away about Americans. However, in this seventieth year since the end of World War II, the U.S.-Japan relationship also must remember the road we have traveled from adversaries to allies. Celebrating this accomplishment is an important part of Prime Minister Abe’s week in the United States, but so too is exploring how we can support and encourage reconciliation and peace across the Asia Pacific. Sheila A. Smith’s latest book is Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China.

This post was co-authored with Brad Glosserman, executive director of Pacific Forum CSIS. Since taking office in December 2012, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has shown himself to be a strong political leader and a keen strategic thinker. Agreement on new U.S.-Japan defense guidelines, scheduled to be reached next week, and a deal with Washington on the Trans-Pacific Partnership will further strengthen his reputation and standing. But Abe’s most prudent geostrategic move is the one that he has not yet made: reconciliation with America’s other close ally in Northeast Asia, South Korea. The most important factor in Abe’s geopolitical calculus is the rise of China. He, along with many other Japanese, fears that Japan will suffer if China becomes the preeminent power in Asia. In the run-up to the Sochi Olympics in 2014, Abe toyed with the Russia card as a geostrategic game changer that would enhance Tokyo’s strategic position vis-à-vis Beijing. But Russian President Vladimir Putin’s Crimean land grab and the international backlash against Russian meddling in Eastern Ukraine made this move both unfeasible and unlikely, while increasing Putin’s dependence on China as Russia’s only alternative to western isolation. Abe has touted values-based ties with a “democratic diamond”of like-minded partners such as Australia, India, and the United States as a way to shape China’s rise. This strategy also may have its limits; China successfully objected to and blocked quadrilateral cooperation when Abe pursued the idea during his first term as prime minister in 2007. This leaves South Korea as Abe’s best strategic move. Japan’s first National Security Strategy published in December 2013 acknowledged Seoul as a potential strategic partner to Tokyo. As a “dagger pointed at the heart of Japan,”the Korean peninsula has always been essential to Japan’s security. But the legacy of Japan’s colonial and wartime past continues to hold back Korea-Japan relations even though the two countries share interests, values and Washington as their ally and main strategic partner. The shadow of that legacy looms larger in this year that marks both the seventieth anniversary of the end of World War II and the fiftieth anniversary of the normalization of ties between Japan and South Korea. China has sought to capitalize on Japan’s incomplete reckoning with history to woo South Korea. Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed to South Korean President Park Geun-hye last July a joint commemoration of the end of World War II, which Park politely declined despite her efforts to improve Sino-South Korean relations. Instead, South Korea has increasingly turned to the United States as it grows more disturbed by Japan’s perceived backsliding on issues such as upholding past apologies or questions regarding the involvement of the Japanese military government in organizing sex slaves during World War II. The United States, while taking a clear position on specific war atrocities, insists that it cannot mediate between allies over history. That hands-off policy is increasingly untenable as the rebalance to Asia anticipates greater cooperation among U.S. allies, and a strong and stable Japan-South Korea relationship is key to the rebalance. Plainly, what Abe says and does on his upcoming trip to the United States, and especially his speech to a Joint Session of Congress, will have profound implications for not only Japan, but the United States and much of Asia as well. Park and Xi will be listening to his remarks as closely as the assembled members of Congress. The speech must lay out a vision for the U.S.-Japan relationship and need not be consumed with history. If it does more, however, and provides a basis for strengthening Japan-South Korea cooperation during this sensitive anniversary year, then it will strengthen Japan’s strategic position in Asia and burnish Abe’s credentials as a farsighted strategist capable of protecting his country’s national interests. Glosserman and Snyder are co-authors of the forthcoming book The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the United States.

Ashlyn Anderson, Lauren Dickey, Darcie Draudt, William Piekos, and Ariella Rotenberg look at the top stories in Asia today. 1. Japan court blocks reopening of nuclear reactors. A Japanese district court issued orders for two nuclear reactors in western Fukui prefecture to stay offline, rejecting regulators’ safety approval of the planned restart later this year. The court criticized the Nuclear Regulation Authority’s lax safety standards, particularly in the wake of the March 2011 Fukushima crisis. Kansai Electric, the operators of the reactors in Fukui, plan to file a protest asking the court to reverse its decision. With all forty-eight commercial reactors in Japan still offline, the decision may further delay Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s plans to restart nuclear reactors. Abe has said the shutdown damages the struggling Japanese economy, forcing Japan to import expensive fossil fuels to compensate for the existing energy deficit. 2. China registers slowest economic growth rate in six years. Chinese economic growth slackened to 7 percent in the first quarter of 2015, its slowest pace since 2009. A number of economic indicators suggested such a downturn: industrial production increased at its slowest pace since late 2008; retail sales grew at the slowest rate in nearly a decade; and land purchases by developers fell 32 percent in the first quarter. At a conference before the data was released, Premier Li Keqiang stated that “economic data in the first quarter are not pretty,” but also that “our toolbox still has many policy tools, and the biggest tool is reform.” Many economists expect Beijing to counter the slowdown with interest rate cuts to encourage more lending. Economic growth remains in line with the government’s goal of “around 7 percent” growth for 2015; for its part, the Economist sees the slowdown as “not a cyclical blip but a structural downshift.” 3. South Korean bribery scandal and Sewol anniversary shake Park Geun-hye’s approval rating. Sung Wan-jong, chairman of a construction firm that allegedly was a graft recipient, claimed he paid bribes to leading Park administration officials, including Prime Minister Lee Wan-koo. Following his admission, Sung committed suicide, adding further scrutiny to the investigation. President Park Geun-hye has sought to distance herself from the scandal. Speaking through New Frontier Party Leader Kim Moo-sung, Park has promised to put an end to suspicion, indicating openness to a possible independent investigation. Park this week is also dealing with closer criticism for her handling of the one-year anniversary on Thursday of the Sewol ferry sinking, including even the victims’ families’ protest at the memorial service. She currently faces multiple hits to her ever-declining approval rating (now at 34 percent, down five points from the week prior) following a variety of scandals since the 2012 presidential elections. While the first scandals did not seem to affect her administration’s approval rating, since the Sewol ferry sinking her administration and governance has been object of close scrutiny. 4. Concerns echo over China’s activities in the South China Sea. This week, Philippine President Benigno Aquino emphasized that the world--not just countries in the region--should be concerned about Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea, citing threats to global trade. New satellite images revealed that China is making significant progress on an airstrip for possible military use in one area of the contested Spratly Islands, which are claimed in part or whole by China, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. At a Group of Seven meeting this week, foreign ministers released a statement opposing attempts to unilaterally change the status quo in the East and South China Seas, words clearly intended for Beijing. Meanwhile, Japan logged its second-highest number of jet scrambles this year since 1958. The recent uptick is partially due to tensions with China in the East China Sea, but also a land dispute with Russia. 5. Narendra Modi jet sets to France, Germany, and Canada. This week, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi completed his longest foreign tour to date: nine days to France, Germany, and Canada. The purpose of Modi’s trip was to promote India as a stable location for foreign investment and new business development. In particular he focused on his government’s “Make in India” initiative and allayed concerns about the ease of doing business in India. In France, Modi met with President Francois Hollande and several key French chief executive officers. One significant outcome of the meetings was India’s purchase of thirty-six Rafale fighter aircraft in fly-away condition “as quickly as possible.” In Germany, an important step was taken with Modi’s promise to set up a formal mechanism to ease German investment in India—a measure previously only taken for Japan and the United States. In Canada, Modi was the first Indian prime minister to visit in a stand-alone bilateral capacity in forty-two years; he and Prime Minister Stephen Harper came to agreement on a wide array of issues including energy policy and health investment. Bonus: Indonesia looks to criminalize alcohol consumption. Introduced first by Islamic parties in 2012, lawmakers from Indonesia’s secular political parties have added their voices in support of a bill prohibiting the consumption of alcoholic beverages in Indonesia. The bill, if fully enacted, would prohibit the sale, production, distribution, and consumption of all beverages containing more than one percent alcohol. According to the draft text, any person consuming alcoholic beverages will face between two and ten years in prison, or a fine up to one billion rupiah ($77,059). Convenience stores have already pulled alcohol from their shelves, sparking fears that the new regulations will hurt tourism in Bali and elsewhere. Corrections: An earlier version of this article misstated the current month--we are happy to confirm that it is April, not March still--and the title of Francois Hollande of France. He is president, not prime minister.

In this post, I look at recent events in Japan-China relations, and explain how they relate to my argument in my book, Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China. This post originally appeared on the Columbia University Press blog and can be found here. Adjusting to the rise of China is not simply a task for diplomats or strategists. Rather, the adjustment to new centers of global economic and political influence involves a broad array of social actors. Today, many in Japan worry about how to manage this complex task. Fishermen, scientists, oil and gas interests, and coast guards all converge on the East China Sea, and today, for the first time since World War II, their interactions could prompt an escalation of tensions to include the Japanese and Chinese militaries. But there are also interests across Japanese society that feel the impact of this transforming China, and Intimate Rivals introduces the variety of advocacies that now shape Japan’s China policy. Today more than ever, popular perceptions are shaping Japan’s interactions with a transforming China. In polling conducted over the past decades by Genron NPO and the China Daily, Japanese respondents reveal a gradually deteriorating view of China. In the 2014 poll, 93 percent of respondents had a negative view of China. Even more striking is the more recent evidence in the poll of a growing concern of the possibility of military conflict with China. Of course, Japanese and Chinese political leaders hold the key to crafting a positive relationship. Last November, after yet another extended period of diplomatic standoff, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and President Xi Jinping met at the Asia Pacific Economic Community meeting in Beijing, opening the way for a resumption of a host of other government meetings that manage this relationship between Asia’s two largest nations. The two governments must address the growing interactions between their societies, solving problems from criminal prosecution to fisheries management and facilitating the travel of millions of citizens that travel back and forth between the two countries. The photo taken of President Xi and Prime Minister Abe last fall did not suggest that this most recent round of reconciliation will be easy, but it did bring to a close an extended diplomatic estrangement that compounded the danger of maritime conflict. In the months since, Japanese and Chinese officials have begun to address the risk of unintentional incidents in the East China Sea escalating into a much more difficult crisis, and the hope is that the two nations can build a sustainable mechanism for crisis management for the maritime space between them. While this effort to build cooperation between Tokyo and Beijing resumes, however, the legacy of this new era of contention in their relationship is most conspicuous at home. New generations of political leaders in both countries now see greater opportunity in exploiting the tensions between them. Chinese nationalism has often been seen as a function of the Chinese Communist Party’s effort to legitimize its continued leadership of an increasingly diverse and contentious society. But in Japan too the domestic balance of interests in support of a cooperative approach to problem solving with China has shifted as Beijing and Tokyo have increasingly failed to come to agreement over their differences. This is particularly important for those issues that highlight perceived vulnerabilities. My book looks at four policy issues where this matters most for Japan’s relations with China over the past decade or so: war memory, maritime boundary management, food security, and island defense. Contention has become more frequent in Japan’s relations with China, but upon closer inspection of these policy challenges, I find a number of reasons for the declining confidence in Japan that their government can succeed in solving problems with China. On the surface, it would seem that many Japanese see China’s rise as eclipsing Japan’s role as Asia’s leading power, and thus anxiety about Japan’s future is part of the answer. But the more important impact has been the growing belief in Japan that China is not interested in a peaceful negotiation of their differences, not only with Japan but with others as well. The intense confrontation over their island dispute seemed to bring Japan and China close to conflict, and has revealed that the longstanding political channels of communication and confidence that had grounded the relationship in the past no longer existed. The growing worry in Tokyo is that China’s leaders are more interested in undermining the global order upon which Japan has based its postwar foreign and economic strategy. Demonstrating that Chinese and Japanese leaders are capable of building a different kind of partnership will be crucial in the years ahead. Intimate Rivals suggests that the most important task for policymakers will be to build a track record of success in finding common ground. While there is no national consensus in Japan that organizes around the strategy of confronting China, it is clear that confidence in a cooperative relationship has suffered. Rebuilding popular confidence in the governments’ ability to protect their citizens’ interests will be a challenge. Designing new approaches to building trust between the two governments is one crucial first step. Just a few weeks ago, the head of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its coalition partner, the Komeito, visited Beijing with the express interest of building party-to-party ties. In fact, these two Japanese political parties have had longstanding ties, but today they must forge new institutional arrangements with the current generation of China’s political leaders. Earlier generations of Japanese and Chinese political leaders negotiated the terms of their countries’ postwar peace, but today, a new generation of leaders must renew their commitment to finding common ground. Beyond their bilateral ties, however, Japanese and Chinese leaders will also need to consider how they can work together to build regional institutions that will embed their relationship in a more stable and reliable pattern of cooperation. For all of the other Asian nations that have watched the growing tensions between Tokyo and Beijing, the past several years of contention have been alarming. Instead of investing in a future of competition, Chinese and Japanese leaders should begin to articulate and invest in pathways for cooperation that will create and sustain confidence in the region’s future.