Asia

Indonesia

  • Democracy
    Indonesia’s Lessons for Egypt
    Egypt’s post-Mubarak transition parallels Indonesia’s post-Suharto, argues CFR’s Karen Brooks. Indonesia’s example indicates the Muslim Brotherhood should be incorporated into Egyptian politics rather than marginalized, she says.
  • China
    Beware the Strategic Consequences of Slashing International Climate Assistance
    The Obama administration budget request for FY2012 is out. The contrast with the House Republican alternative is stark. Nowhere is this more clear than in funding for international climate change activities, where the administration has scaled back its request modestly from its FY2011 submission (but is still asking for considerably more than was appropriated for FY2010), while the House Republican proposal envisions eliminating almost all U.S. spending. I’m not going to dwell for now on the merits of each piece of the spending request: I have no doubt that some money is being wasted; I’m also sure that there are places where additional sums could be valuably spent. It behooves everyone, though, to think a bit about the bigger picture. Slashing international climate spending could have far reaching strategic consequences for the United States, all while saving less than a billion dollars a year. Set aside arguments about competitiveness, worries about climate change induced security problems, and even the consequences of cutting aid for U.S. leverage in the global climate talks. The United States is competing for allegiance in the 21st century, particularly as it faces a rising China. Slashing climate assistance could severely hurt that cause. I was reminded of this dynamic while reading Robert Kaplan’s engrossing new book, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power. (You might not guess it from the title, but it’s one of the most insightful books on energy security and climate change of recent years.) Kaplan reminded me that many of the countries that we tend to think of as abstract players in global climate diplomacy are actually of enormous geopolitical importance. The Maldives aren’t simply a set of resort islands with a charismatic leader – they occupy a strategically important location in the Indian ocean, astride oil shipping routes from the Persian Gulf to China. It’s no accident that, after the Copenhagen debacle, Chinese leaders quickly visited the island chain to make amends. Indonesia abuts crucial shipping lanes, serves as a source of timber and coal that fuels Chinese economic growth, and is home to more Muslims than any other country in the world. It’s also a key recipient of support under the Forest Investment Program, which the alternative budget would eliminate. And then there’s Bangladesh. Here’s Kaplan: “The linkage between a global community on the one hand and a village one on the other has made Bangladeshi NGOs intensely aware of the worldwide significance of their coutnry’s environmental plight…. To some degree, this is a racket in which every eroded  embankment becomes part of an indictment against the United States for abrogating the Kyoto accords…. Nevertheless, for the United States to strictly argue the merits of its case is not good enough here. Because it is the world’s greatest power, the United States must be seen to take the lead in the struggle against global warming or suffer the fate of being blamed for it. Bangladesh demonstrates how third world misery has acquired—in the form of “climate change”—a powerful new political dimesntion…. The future of American power is related directly to how it communicates its concern about issues like climate change to Bangladeshis and others.” The modest $40 million request for the Pilot Program for Climate Resiliance would be zeroed out under the alternative budget request. One of its biggest beneficiaries – you guessed it – is Bangladesh.
  • Indonesia
    Is Egypt the Next Indonesia?
    An opposition supporter flashes the victory sign as he holds an Egyptian flag atop a lamp post near a mosque in Tahrir Square in Cairo February 7, 2011. (Yannis Behrakis/Courtesy Reuters) As the chaos in Cairo builds to a climax, some outside observers are comparing a potential transition in Egypt to Indonesia in the late 1990s, after the end of longtime dictator Suharto amid massive street protests in Jakarta and other cities. As Thomas Carothers notes in the New Republic, in Indonesia the Clinton administration stuck with the dictator Suharto until long after his sell-by date, and then seemed confused about how to handle the post-Suharto situation. And as Carothers notes, despite its initial post-Suharto chaos, Indonesia eventually navigated a transition to democracy, and did not cut off its ties with the United States. In fact, today the Obama administration is building a close partnership with Jakarta. Egypt should be so fortunate as to wind up where Indonesia is today. A little more than a decade after the fall of Suharto, Indonesia no longer looks like a chaotic and ungovernable state, potentially on the verge of disintegration. Instead, it is one of the democratic success stories of the past decade. Decentralization has led to greater local involvement in the political process; greater freedoms have birthed a vibrant media and civil society; the country has held several free and fair elections in a row; and it has resolved many of its outstanding insurgencies and territorial conflicts, such as Aceh. (Though not all – Papua remains a serious conflict.) The Indonesian military has gradually withdrawn from the center of power and from many businesses that it occupied under Suharto. Responsibility for some important tasks, such as counterterrorism, have been turned over to the police. Yet to suggest that Egypt could follow in the footsteps of Indonesia seems in many ways unlikely. It’s true, as Carothers notes, that Egypt could potentially follow Indonesia’s example and institute a wide swath of legal and political reforms, and its interim leadership could potentially open up political space for all parties, but don’t bet on it. For one, Indonesia, though a large nation and important regionally, does not hold the sort of global strategic influence that Egypt does. The United States’ relations with Indonesia in the late 1990s ands early 2000s were weak and frayed, which actually allowed Indonesian politicians to chart their own course, while in Egypt, the U.S., Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other regional powers all have major stakes in the game. No matter what they say, none of these powers really wants a totally open and inclusive political system in Egypt, one in which the Muslim Brotherhood could wield outsized influence. In Indonesia, outside powers were content to offer some assistance to the transition, but not to closely guide Indonesia’s democratization. They will not be so hands-off with Egypt. Secondly, in Indonesia there were potential liberal political leaders waiting in the wings after Suharto’s exit. Even before Suharto’s demise, Megaawti Sukarnoputri, daughter of independence leader Sukarno, had established herself as a leader of a powerful secular opposition movement; she eventually became Indonesia’s president. In addition to her, Abdurrahman Wahid and other liberal clerics guided large national religious organizations, which could be converted into votes. Wahid, too, ultimately became president of Indonesia. No obvious post-Mubarak leader with such a large and liberal national following exists in Egypt. Mohammed El Baradei could become this person, but right now he does not enjoy a deep national following. This lack of such a figure will make Egypt’s transition much harder, and more likely to be chaotic. Finally, in Indonesia the army had hurt its own image far more than in Egypt. It had done so by participating in massacres in the 1970s, and 1980s, and 1990s, and also by allegedly being involved with the Suharto family’s web of business holdings. The fact that the Indonesian army had lost much of the public’s respect made it easier for politicians, over time, to reduce the role of the army in public life. This will be far harder in Egypt.
  • Malaysia
    The Curse of Nepotism
    Members of an Indonesian military honour guard participating in a state dinner are pictured in Jakarta. (Jason Reed/Courtesy Reuters) Over the past two weeks, several interesting articles have emerged on politics in Indonesia and Malaysia, which are supposedly two of the more democratic nations in Southeast Asia. In one Asia Sentinel piece that also has been discussed endlessly in Jakarta circles, the author speculates that the wife of current president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) may well run for the presidency in the next election. In a well-drawn New York Times profile, the paper chronicles the rise of Nurul Izzah Anwar, the daughter of opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim. She has recently been elected to the leadership of Anwar’s party, despite the fact that she is extremely young and politically inexperienced. Nepotism has been and remains one of the biggest curses of political development in South and Southeast Asia. Though the region has elected a large number of women leaders, in places as diverse as Bangladesh and the Philippines, almost all of these women were the daughters or wives of former leaders, many of whom were killed for their beliefs. Many powerful political men, too, are largely known for their names, even though some of them have skills of their own. Today, Corazon Aquino’s son runs the Philippines, Benazir Bhutto’s son is being prepped to run Pakistan, and the daughter of Bangladeh’s founding leader currently serves as prime minister. And while the United States is hardly immune to nepotism (who’s our Secretary of State again?), the fact is that a country like the United States, or India (which, of course, worships the Gandhi dynasty) is large and diverse enough that nepotism does not dominate the political scene. Ms. Clinton, after all, was defeated in the 2008 presidential primaries, and despite the Gandhi worship, powerful politicians have emerged in Indian states, in lower-caste Indian parties, and even within Congress itself. Malaysia or the Philippines or even Indonesia—which still has a very small political class—is not diverse enough to weather this kind of nepotism. With such a small political class, nepotism crowds out fresh blood, new ideas, and real change. Anwar and SBY have positioned themselves as reformers, as harbingers of real breaks from their country’s past. Allowing such potential nepotism suggests that they are not the reformers they sometimes appear to be.
  • Indonesia
    My Complaints About Obama’s Homecoming
    Overall, I thought that President Obama’s short “homecoming” visit to Indonesia went well. He charmed Indonesians, offered some funny reminisces about his youth, didn’t give his opponents too much more ammunition to claim he’s a Muslim, and set the agenda for the U.S.-Indonesia comprehensive partnership. But you don’t want to hear that; it’s more interesting to focus on what went wrong, at least in my opinion. I have written this several times before, but I do not understand why the White House insists on highlighting Indonesia as a moderate “Muslim democracy,” as Obama did again Wednesday while in the country. It is certainly true, as anyone who remembers Jakarta in the late 1990s knows, that Indonesia has made impressive democratic strides, even though President Yudhoyono sometimes can be too willing to compromise with anti-reform politicians. And it’s also true that Indonesia has the most Muslims of any country in the world. But highlighting Indonesia as a moderate Muslim democracy, to be emulated, has many flaws. For one, it’s viewed by many in the Middle East as peripheral to the debates and currents of thoughts in the Arab-Muslim world; as a result, few Arabs look to Indonesia for guidance on critical social, political, and religious issues. Secondly, this view of Indonesia basically excludes the country’s non-Muslims, when there are important groups of Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, and other religions in the country. There are certainly religious extremists in Indonesia who would love the country to be viewed as a Muslim state exclusively, and they have in recent years attacked Christians, heterodox Muslims, and others they consider non-believers. Third, and most important, viewing Indonesia in this way trivializes and ignores its many democratic accomplishments, subsuming them to the idea that it’s a success story simply because it is free and Muslim. Since the late 1990s, Indonesia has solved several thorny autonomy disputes, federalized a great deal of political and economic power, reined in the army (to some extent), made strides toward greater involvement of women in politics, and taken other critical steps. These should be recognized, but they have little to do with the religion of most Indonesians. (Photo: Jason Reed/courtesy Reuters)
  • Indonesia
    Things to look for in Indonesia
    Of course, President Obama’s trip to Indonesia is going to seem like a success. Having canceled two times before, the president built up anticipation in the country, and a large range of celebrations have been organized to mark his “return home.” Obama and Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono formally inaugurated the multifaceted “comprehensive partnership” designed to upgrade relations between Jakarta and Washington on a wide range of issues. Obama also gave a well-received speech admitting that the U.S. needs to do much more to improve its ties to the Muslim world. But as Obama leaves, how can we tell if the visit was more than a high-profile photo op? Here are some ways: Real change in Indonesia’s investment environment. Despite Indonesia’s size, it has been largely ignored by U.S. companies other than natural resources firms. Many U.S. companies complain about the lack of coordination between Indonesian economic ministries, the high level of corruption, which actually has gotten worse since the fall of Suharto, and the poor quality of interaction between the central government and local governments. Any real spike in U.S. investment can only come if the investment environment improves significantly. Obama sees Indonesia as more than an example. The White House still continues to feature the idea of Indonesia as a model “Muslim democracy.” The speech yesterday in some ways touched on these themes again. But many Indonesians do not like being viewed that way, and the description in many respects belittles the country’s accomplishments since the end of Suharto. A broader and more nuanced view of Indonesia would be an accomplishment Jakarta plays a bigger role in addressing ASEAN’s key issues. Despite growing engagement with ASEAN, Washington still easily tires of the organization’s languid, consensual style. As Indonesia continues to regain its former strength, Washington would like it to take a more proactive role in addressing issues like the continuing political stalemate in Myanmar, ASEAN’s role in Asian integration, and regional environmental challenges. The U.S.-Indonesia military-military relationship grows substantially. Before the visit, the Pentagon agreed to resume ties to Kopassus, the Indonesian Special Forces, as a kind of carrot for Jakarta. But many Pentagon officials still have enormous concerns about the Indonesian military’s human rights record, and recent reports of abuses in Papua don’t exactly help. Real, substantially upgraded mil-mil ties in the future would show a much higher level of comfort from the Pentagon, and from Congress, and would cement the strategic relationship. (Photo: Jason Reed/courtesy Reuters)
  • Indonesia
    President Obama’s Asian Agenda
    What will Obama focus on during his upcoming Asia trip? CFR experts Evan Feigenbaum, Joshua Kurlantzick, Scott Snyder, Edward Alden, and Sheila Smith discuss the agendas for India, Indonesia, South Korea, G20, and Japan.
  • Thailand
    While you Weren’t Paying Attention
    Southeast Asia is a much broader and more diverse region than Northeast Asia or (obviously) China, so it can be hard to keep up with events, particularly when there is so much going on in North Korea, Japan, China, and back here in Washington. So here are a couple recent events worth noting. 1. Indonesia resumes using the military for counterterrorism operations. There is a fine summary of this in the New York Times today.  This was anticipated after Jakarta created a new counterterrorism agency in August. However, it has serious risks, and I don’t really understand the upside. The military in Indonesia, even more than a decade after the fall of Suharto, remains poorly trained, corrupt, and persistently abusive. It also has limited counterterrorism skills, as compared to the elite police units that have been used for counterterrorism, quite successfully, throughout the 2000s. 2. Malaysia continues its crackdown on bloggers. Contrary to Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak’s speech at the United Nations General Assembly touting Malaysia as a model of moderation, in recent months his government has launched crackdowns on bloggers and cartoonists known for poking fun at government agencies and the prime minister himself. In early September, for example, the executive editor of the Malay Mail was charged with lying by making fun of Malaysia’s biggest power company through an obvious parody. The crackdown comes at a time when Malaysia is upgrading its ties to the United States, in part because of Najib’s admittedly progressive economic and trade agenda, and his skill at public relations. But this economic progressivism conceals a decline in political freedoms, and also conceals the fact that Najib is hemmed in by his own political position: He may want to promote an all around more liberal environment, but he needs the votes of power brokers in the ruling coalition, and the Malay majority, in a free election. 3. The Philippines announces that, despite a recommendation by a fact-finding panel of charges against several top police officials after the bungled bus hijacking in Manila in August, no one will actually face charges. Powerful people in the Philippines escape punishment for their (alleged) mistakes and illegal actions? I’m shocked, shocked. 4. Four people were killed in drive-by shootings in the south of Thailand earlier this week. While bombings in Bangkok get some international attention (see my post earlier this week), the killings in southern Thailand, which has become one of the deadliest conflict zones in the world, are almost totally ignored, since they dribble out a few at a time, don’t seem to impact Bangkok or the tourist hubs of Thailand, and (despite some claims to the contrary) are mostly unconnected to any broader Islamist battles. But in one respect the Thai south should get more attention: The spiral of violence there echoes a situation that could be repeated in the heart of Thailand itself, in which an initial revolt, combated by overly repressive government policies (under Thaksin), actually made the situation far more explosive. (Photo: Surapan Boonthano/courtesy Reuters)
  • Indonesia
    A Conversation with Marty Natalegawa
    Play
    LEE CULLUM: Let's get started. First I want to thank you, Richard, and Nancy (sp), and Megan (sp), and the meetings committee, who have put together -- meetings department, I should say -- who have put together a riveting week this September. Every U.N. week in September is marvelous, and this one, I think, is going to be especially important. And to begin the week, I'm happy to say -- and this is on the record -- we have the 17th foreign minister of Indonesia, the 17th since independence almost 60 years ago. Dr. Marty Natalegawa took office in October, and he already knew the job exceedingly well because he had been chief of staff for his predecessor, Hassan Wirajuda. He also was spokesman for the department, for the ministry, and did a marvelous job, apparently. He had to deal with the media during the Bali bombings, which was very difficult, and other circumstances also which were trying, I don't doubt. But he performed with such high competence that the PR society of Indonesia awarded him its first public relations society award. Now, Minister, we have a number of agencies of government at every level in this country that could use some PR advice. (Laughter.) So if you have any time after the U.N., you might travel around and dispense some of your wisdom. Of course, he knows the U.N. very well, also, because he was -- he was permanent representative of his nation there when Indonesia chaired the Security Council, so he chaired the Security Council. He's always in interesting places at interesting times. Next year, you chair the East Asia summit, so -- he always turns out to be the chairman. Now, I think there's a reason for that. I note that he is the youngest son of his family. He's the son of a director of a state bank. And correct me if I'm wrong, but I think that would be a very privileged position in a family: adored by all; provided with a lot of latitude; you didn't have to be a banker; you could do something really interesting, like international relations, and get a Ph.D., like Dr. Haass. And I think that's wonderful, because I think that the broader perspective is certainly needed in the work you're doing now. I want to ask you about a couple of weeks you've had -- or two weeks ago, I should say. Problems on the high seas seem to be epidemic in Asia. We note in The New York Times today that China is very upset because Japan has arrested a captain of a trawler. And two weeks ago, Malaysia arrested three of your officers. There was a great hue and cry. You released seven fishermen who had been arrested for poaching, they released the officers. But still you had politicians in your country saying you were too soft on Malaysia and this was very bad. How did you respond to all that? FOREIGN MINISTER MARTY NATALEGAWA: Well, thank you, Ms. Cullum, for that question, and thank you, Mr. Haass, for arranging this wonderful occasion. Let me address that issue. Yes, we've had very difficult -- somewhat difficult period of time about couple of weeks ago in managing our relations with one of our neighbors, namely Malaysia. And Malaysia, as you are probably aware, is a maritime country. It's an archipelago country made up of some 17,000 islands; most of them -- quite a few of them are not even named yet. So it's -- we are that huge and that diverse. And we share boundaries with some 10 countries, including with Malaysia, and as a result, we have a number of unresolved delineations. Some of our maritime boundaries have yet to be fully delineated. And as a result of this, there is often some incident of the type that we went through a couple of weeks ago. The incident is related to a -- (fishery's/fisheries' ?) issues. Malaysia said the fishermen carried out their activities within their waters; we say it's in our waters. But in any case, it created all kind(s) of diplomatic difficulties. But what is most important to underscore is that both governments resolved to address this issue through negotiations and through dialogue. And that's why since then I've had a meeting in Malaysia on the 6th of September; I'm having another one -- meeting here in New York with Malaysian foreign minister, two more -- between three more, between now and December, essentially intensification of our negotiations on boundary issues. Of course, Indonesia is now a very open, robust democracy with all shades of opinion to be heard. And hence some members of our legislature have different views, perhaps. But I think in the final analysis all of us are resolved and in agreement that the issue of this type needs to be solved through negotiations. And in this connection, what I have been trying to convey to our colleagues as well is that, within ASEAN, Indonesia doesn't do -- what do you call it -- conflicts. We are a country that has often been seen to be above the fray. In other words, Indonesia has been a country that other ASEAN countries turn to whenever they have some bilateral problems or challenges. So when we have this particular situation with Malaysia, we have always been resolved to address through negotiations rather than -- rather than any other means, because we have an interest to ensure that we maintain Indonesia's role as, like, above, you know, bickering and above disputes of this type. CULLUM: Well, you've done very well for many years being above the fray. There was an op-ed piece in The New York Times in August by Stanley Weiss, who runs something called Business Executives for Security (sic/for National Security) in Washington. And the headline was "Rowing Between Two Reefs." I think you have a phrase for this in Indonesia, do you not? What is it, "mendayung antara dua" -- NATALEGAWA: "Karang." CULLUM: -- "karang," yes. NATALEGAWA: Classic. CULLUM: You correct me when I got it wrong. NATALEGAWA: One of the -- one -- (inaudible) -- CULLUM: Anyway, you have rowed between two reefs for many years, first between the United States and the Soviet Union, and you kept your virtue -- NATALEGAWA: Yes, ma'am. (Laughter.) CULLUM: -- now between the -- (chuckles) -- NATALEGAWA: Just about. CULLUM: Not easy; now between China and the United States. You met with your counterpart from China at the U.N. this morning. NATALEGAWA: That's right, yes. CULLUM: How would you assess those reefs at home and in your relationship to each one of them? NATALEGAWA: Yes. Well, actually, I missed that op-ed, but I'll make sure that -- CULLUM: It was all about Indonesia. It was -- NATALEGAWA: Was it really? CULLUM: Yeah. NATALEGAWA: Well, yes, we have been describing our foreign policy as being to row between two reefs. And it's otherwise known as independent and active foreign policy. It's classically presented during the Cold War period, between East and West, not to choose between the two sides, which is otherwise also known as the Non- Aligned Movement, in a more generic sense. But of course with the end of the Cold War, with the demise of the Eastern Bloc, et cetera, some people question what is the continued relevance of such an outlook. But now we define it in a different way. Independent and active foreign policy essentially means a capacity to make up our own mind in terms of issues -- in other words, room for us to be able to maneuver, being able to reach positions and to have positions independent of any other powers and interests. In other words, we'd safeguard that capacity to make independent choice. But actually nowadays we think the world today is no longer a world of two reefs but it's of multiple reefs. We have so many; it's a very multi-polar world, with different kind of challenges, no longer East and West, no longer -- about security, political issues; about the environment; about food security, energy security. So it's a very messy world, and our orientation now is to ensure that for every one of these issues, we are part of the solution. In other words, we are about building bridges. We are not interested in accentuating differences. Indonesia is naturally a consensus builder because that's the makeup of our own country. We are, as we know, a very diverse country made up of hundreds of different ethnic groups, hundreds of languages spoken. So consensus building comes naturally to Indonesia, I think, and I think this is one quality that Indonesia is now trying to propagate, trying to project in international affairs. Whether it be on climate change, whether it be on disarmament issues, development issues, we always try to be part of the solution to many of our contemporary issues. CULLUM: When China called for the East Asia Summit, which is meeting in October, and the U.S. will join (then ?), it had in mind just a handful of members -- itself, of course, the ASEAN nations, the 10 ASEAN nations, plus Korea, plus Japan. And you were among the leaders in insisting that there be other members -- the U.S., India, Australia, New Zealand. And your thought, as I understand it, was to be sure there's some weight on the other end of the see-saw to China, on the opposite end. Now, do you feel that's been accomplished? NATALEGAWA: Yes, it's been accomplished in the sense that we have been having a rather lengthy debate on what is called regional architecture building. And Indonesia has really weighed in on this debate and tried to take a leadership position. Our interest is what we call a dynamic equilibrium for our region, not quite in a classic balance-of-power situation where not one country is preponderant in our region, but in a more holistic and a more hopefully positive sense, in the sense that we don't wish to see our region dominated by one country, whoever that country is, but we wish to see inclusivity, more countries, the merrier -- the more, the merrier; and for countries to be engaged in multisectoral issues, not only security but also political and also environment, economic, social-cultural, et cetera. Now, in that (debate ?), we have been very interested in ensuring the participation of the United States and even the Russian Federation in the ongoing evolving regional architecture. And I think our view eventually was accepted by the rest of ASEAN and was even accepted by China. I just met the Chinese foreign minister earlier today and where -- they basically endorse(d) our proposal, our view to have both the Russian Federation and the United States part of the regional equation in the Asia-Pacific area. So all in all, it's about building -- achieving equilibrium, a state of affairs where there is not one preponderant country. But we will be very careful and very reluctant to see the return of, like, a Cold War mentality for our region, because we don't wish to see a self-fulfilling type of situation where the rights of one country is seen to need to be managed or to be contained, even, by other group of countries. So that's why we are very keen to manage this equilibrium. Putting our foot in one camp ensures that we have constant equilibrium, hopefully. CULLUM: Not so long ago, China declared that it had a national interest -- a vital national interest in the South China Sea. Secretary Clinton traveled to the ASEAN forum, the regional forum, in July, and said, well, she had some thoughts about that, and they were that the U.S. would happy to support a collaborative diplomacy to settle the Spratley Islands and other disputed islands in the area. Everybody was happy. Twelve of the 27 nations there applauded. China did not. But how did you feel about it? NATALEGAWA: Well, Indonesia is not a claimant state in the South China Sea, so we have no vested interest in terms of jurisdiction or claims to the islands on the South China Sea. In fact, because of that status, over the past 20 years Indonesia has actually facilitated discussions and dialogue between the claimant states on how to ensure that notwithstanding the jurisdictional issues, that countries in the region can collaborate on development issues and resource management issues. So from our perspective, we are very keen, as I said before, to avoid situation where the South China Sea becomes a new area for conflict and tensions in our region. It's a lot to do with self- fulfilling type of situation. We have been mentioning to the United States to be aware that there is a lot of sensitivities involved. Of course, the -- we choose to make the issue a bit more generic. We speak of maritime issues, rather than specifically South China Sea issues; because under the maritime chapeau, we can speak of, obviously, freedom of navigation, safety of navigation, the issue of environmental challenges as well. So we make it a bit more diverse, a bit more comprehensive. Well, certainly, this is one of our challenge (sic) just now. Vietnam is chairing ASEAN at the moment. As you are probably aware, Vietnam is also a claimant state to the South China Sea equation. Indonesia isn't, so next year, in 2011, we hope under our chairmanship of ASEAN this is one area we can make progress, because we have no vested interest, as I said, on particular outcome of the South China Sea. CULLUM: China now has a free-trade area with ASEAN, China- ASEAN Free Trade Area. The United States has tried to put together a free-trade agreement with ASEAN, but it's hung up on Burma, because the U.S. has sanctions against Burma. How do you feel about Burma, as a member of ASEAN? Is it a good thing? Is it a hindrance? NATALEGAWA: Well, we could feel better about how Myanmar is -- CULLUM: We could, too. NATALEGAWA: We could feel better, because we have been extremely -- now, to put it a bit more frank and candid way, we have been unhappy with how things have been developing in Myanmar. Because while the issue is clearly internal, is clearly national; but at the same time, it has clear regional ramifications. And we have said on many occasions -- and I will say it one more time here -- Indonesian government, we have been crystal clear in demanding for the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi -- not tomorrow, not today, it should have been many years ago. She does not deserve her detention, and that has been our position. But that's one thing, a position of principle of the type, but we also wish to see a solution brought about. Condemnation is not policy, and we need to go beyond condemnation. And in this connection, we and neighboring countries of Myanmar in ASEAN, we've been trying to have some kind of a road map. How do we resolve this issue in a -- in a -- in a -- in a good way? And where we are now is basically trying to ensure that Myanmar (authorities ?) live up to its commitment to conduct the free and fair elections that they had said they will conduct. We have readied ourselves to observe such an election if and when it does take place in November. We haven't heard from them, to be honest, since, whether they are ready to accept our observers to their elections. But despite its likely faults, we do feel that the elections does offer a promise of change. At least the system may be somewhat -- open up. There could be some possibilities that the election bring forward. So we're looking to that. Of course, Myanmar situation cannot simply be seen as being a national situation. We have the geopolitics of the region as well. Myanmar is surrounded by quite -- you know, I mean, countries of substance, which I won't have to mention who these -- which these countries are. So we have an interest to ensure democratization in Myanmar and, at the same time, to ensure that Myanmar remains within the ASEAN group of families rather than otherwise. CULLUM: Well, now, you mention the ASEAN group of families. You have a number of families, it seems to me. You have ASEAN, you have the East Asian Summit now -- NATALEGAWA: That's right. CULLUM: -- you have APEC, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. There's been talk of an East Asian community, though Japan seems to be backing off because of its problems with China. But how do you see all these organizations, all these families of families, sorting themselves out? NATALEGAWA: Well, I'm glad you asked that question, because recently there's been some debate in Indonesia asking and questioning why it is that Indonesia is investing too much or concentrating too much, apparently, on ASEAN. They say that as Indonesia can basically go beyond ASEAN. But actually, in our perspective at the moment, they are all mutually reinforcing. Indonesia of course have other forums and other organizations within which we are active, most notably and most recently, the G-20 groups of countries, the G-20 nations. CULLUM: But am I right? Are you the only East Asian nation in the G-20? NATALEGAWA: From ASEAN, certainly -- CULLUM: Yeah. NATALEGAWA: -- and so of course we have the -- we have Japan -- CULLUM: Of course. Yeah. NATALEGAWA: -- also Korea. But from Southeast Asia it's only -- so we have China, South Korea and Japan and Indonesia, that I can think of, from the East Asia part of the world. Contrast 10 years ago. Ten years ago, when we were in the midst of our financial crisis, Indonesia had the IMF come in to rescue our economy. But 10 years of democratization have brought about clear democratic dividend. We are now not only in a better state politically but also economically. We are now a member of this G-20 group of nations. In other words, now we are finding ourself having our foothold and our imprint and in so many other forums -- the G-20; Non-Aligned, of course; the Islamic Conference; the U.N. But our trick is how to ensure that these things can be done in a mutually reinforcing way. And certainly a foothold in ASEAN is a prerequisite for a role elsewhere. You cannot do the work without also your doing your own region. And here -- and you mentioned chairmanship before as well in your kind introduction -- in our view, Indonesia's role in ASEAN -- when we chair ASEAN, for example -- it's about exercising leadership. If there's a difference between chairmanship and leadership, leadership is taking a more influential, a more prominent adding-value role. But given Indonesia's status, it size, obvious size, population- wise, geographic-wise, we cannot exercise leadership by -- in forcing ourselves. It has to be an earned leadership. In Indonesia's case, less can be more. In many instances, we have to defer to ASEAN to create the necessary space for ASEAN to develop and to become more -- stronger. So that's why our diplomacy has to be a bit more thought through, not -- and well calibrated, and not to make it too obvious that we are trying to be imposing our thoughts and our will on our neighbors. Less can be more in our -- in our case. And I think in that way, we have been able to earn our leadership role within ASEAN. CULLUM: You see, that's what I mean about good PR advice. Less can be more, you're absolutely right. Let's talk a bit about terrorism. I know it's -- you've worked very hard on it. You've made a lot of progress, from what I'm told. Karen Brooks here at the council, who was -- who was really very good on your part of the world, made that clear to me. And still, there are problems. You had the Bali bombing, you had the Marriott bombing in 2008. Abu Bakar Bashir was arrested and tried and imprisoned and released. Now you rearrested him. You're going to try him again. He's the guiding inspiration of terrorism, apparently, in Indonesia -- Al Islamiyah and other groups. What are you trying to accomplish with this rearrest of him? NATALEGAWA: Well, the effort to combat the global (coming ?) of terrorism is not a war. If it was simply a war, then it's simply about the application of force, brute force and all that to overcome the challenge. But we see it in a more comprehensive way. When we had our Bali bombing in 2002, of course, soon after the 9/11 act in New York, we were all awoken to the reality of the challenge of terrorism. But from the very start we were keen to ensure that our fight to overcome terrorism was done in a way that is a democratic response as well. As a country, we have just escaped from decades of authoritarian rule. There was always a healthy cynicism and suspicion of too much authoritary -- authority to the government -- in other words, this distinction between civil liberties and security angle. But I think we have just gotten it right in the balance, in terms of civil rights and terrorism efforts. And we have been fighting terrorism. Those who have been involved in acts of terrorism have been brought to trial, have been -- have been -- have been serving their -- serving their sentence, but -- including the one person that you had mentioned just now. But the trick for us now is how to preempt, how to prevent. Because to preempt and to prevent, you must have some anticipatory measures as well. And here the issue of civil liberties become(s) especially prominent. How do you strike that balance? Do you outlaw certain groups because that group is espousing clearly undesirable goals? But then where does it put you in terms of civil liberties? So that's a bit tricky debate. At the same time, we are also empowering the moderates. Indonesia is proud to be the -- to be the fact that we have the largest Muslim population in the entire world, bigger than the entire Middle East, probably, combined. But at the same we espouse moderate Islam, recognize all the major faiths in a -- in a good way, a template for the fact that democracy, Islam and modernity can all go hand in hand. But terrorism is (sincere ?) work in progress in terms of our countering it. We are not complacent. We will always be on -- you know, very, very careful in ensuring that we ensure maximum security and safety. CULLUM: Although you say they're serving their sentences, Abubakar Ba'asyir was serving a sentence when he was released. NATALEGAWA: That's right. CULLUM: So why are you going through the trial again? NATALEGAWA: Well, it's a totally different case now that we -- he's serving for, I think -- he's being charged for. This relates to the most recent (incidents ?) of a terrorist cell that was identified in the province of Aceh, in the northern tip of Sumatra. And so he's now being charged and being brought to trial on account of that particular episode. The previous sentence was -- that he was serving was vis-a-vis the Bali bombing. But I think it demonstrates well how, in so far as Indonesia is concerned, we are not leaving any stone unturned in trying to overcome the threats of terrorism. We have actually translated -- transformed ourselves. We used to be seen as being part of the problem on terrorism, but now we have become the regional hub for counterterrorism efforts. We have in Indonesia what we call the Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation. It's called Jakarta, but it's located in another town called Semarang, in central Java. But don't ask me why that is the case. It's in -- it's called Jakarta, but it's in Semarang. But it has become a hub. We have U.S. participation of civilian government, the British government, as well, in developing capacity not only for Indonesia but capacity for the region on counterterrorism. CULLUM: Back for a moment to the incident with Malaysia over the fishermen and the officers, your president, Yudhoyono, SBY, as he is called -- NATALEGAWA: That's correct. CULLUM: -- we used to have initialed presidents, LBJ and JFK; I liked that -- he made a statement. Some said it was too weak, as you and I discussed. But your military chief, General Sonosa (sp), said, oh, no. He was very clear. He was admonishing the army to stay out of it, the military to stay out of it. So was this on your mind, then, that the military might on its own decide to get involved in this and other situations? NATALEGAWA: Not really. Not really. I think we have always been on the same page in terms of addressing this issue through diplomatic means, through diplomacy and through negotiations. And as I said before, all of us are extremely mindful of the implications both in terms of real costs, in cost of lives, cost of resources, of any conflict that was to ensue, open conflict, but also in terms of the diplomatic standing of Indonesia in the region and indeed beyond. So that's why we resolved to solve the issue through diplomatic means. By the way, when you made reference to our TNI, our armed forces, if there is ever one institution that has gone through as much transformation during our past 10 years of democratic change, it has been within our military. I mean, you can imagine back 10, 12 years ago the military, the armed forces, was very much part and parcel of the life of our country, in terms of not only security but also in political area. But now they have basically moved back to the barracks, become professional units. And that's why we need to engage with countries like United States, to reinforce this trend, to make sure that it doesn't become -- it becomes irreversible, that we no longer have backtracking in our democratic (path/past ?). CULLUM: You were in Copenhagen almost a year ago, in December. You're planning to go to Cancun. NATALEGAWA: It was very cold in Copenhagen. CULLUM: Very cold, but you're gong to warm up in Cancun this coming December. NATALEGAWA: Yes. CULLUM: What do you expect in Cancun? NATALEGAWA: Well, I mentioned the weather in Copenhagen because we had -- the previous conference on climate change was in Bali in December, so you can imagine the contrast between Bali in December and Copenhagen in December. But yes, we were -- we have been somewhat disappointed by the outcome of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference. We had all looked forward to so called sealing the deal, to seal the deal, as the secretary-general described it. But obviously, it didn't happen. But we had the Copenhagen Accord out of that particular conference, and Indonesia was very much a part -- our president was actually very much part of that small group of countries that came up with the accord. Indonesia is keen to ensure that, first, of course we wish to see the multilateral negotiation succeed, the so-called UNFCCC process, which is still ongoing and still very difficult. I'm not sure whether Cancun will do the trick in terms of achieving the necessary binding agreement. But we have done since Bali of 2007 is that we've asked ourself what we can do on our own, rather than simply waiting for the global architecture to be ready. And in this connection, I think our precedent at the G-20 summit in Pittsburgh last year -- we announced our commitment to reduce our emission by 26 percent from business as usual, on our own efforts, and by 41 percent with international support. So that's really -- we hope to have a demonstrative effect by saying here is a developing country that choose to do things on its own, rather than -- not waiting for the bigger picture, by addressing the deforestation issue, by addressing the issue of renewable energy, promoting renewable energy. So that's what we have hoped to be a game-changing position, and it has had the necessary impact, because India, Brazil, China even came up with their own national targets. So we have been trying to be part of the solution in climate change by setting emission reduction targets, by raising the profile of forest issue as a way to deal with climate change, by bringing the issue of marine -- maritime issues as well vis-a-vis climate change, and by making the so-called MRV -- monitoring, reporting and verification -- of emission measures to be an acceptable modality for countries to commit themselves, because prior to Indonesia's announcement, many developing countries felt it was an interference to be looking at the MRV. CULLUM: MRV, what is -- ? NATALEGAWA: Ah. Monitoring, reporting and verification. CULLUM: Okay. NATALEGAWA: So all those commitments that we make to reduce our emissions must be monitorable, must be verifiable, and there must be reports. Because it's easy to make commitments without clear benchmarks. And until recently, developing countries have said that they have been very reticent to go this route, because they say this is interference. But Indonesia changed the mindset. We said this is fine, we are good to go, we have national commitments. We are open and ready to be monitored and to be verified, because we are confident that we can -- we can live up to our commitments. CULLUM: Well, Minister, I know that our members are open and ready to speak to you, have questions and perhaps comments. Yes. Right -- thank you. Oh, there are two of them back there. We'll just go from one to the other. QUESTIONER: Herbert Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Minister, for clear explanations of Indonesia's foreign policy. To go back to the South China Sea, where Indonesia is not a claimant and therefore has a very clean and good role -- and one should pay tribute to the meetings the Indonesians have sponsored in track two diplomacy on this, et cetera. Given this knowledge in Indonesia of this question, I wonder if you could look into the future, not an Indonesian plan to impose on everybody -- that's not the way Indonesia does business -- but if you look at treaties like the Antarctic Treaty or the high-seas fishing treaties, is it possible for there to be a solution in the South China Sea which does not involve examining Dutch, British, French, American old claims for every mud -- bit of mud out there but involves something which would permit exploitation of oil and gas without ruling on territorial claims? Can you see this in the Indonesian crystal ball? NATALEGAWA: Well, if I may just address that, that exactly has been our perspective over the past 20 years. You made reference to the track-two process that Indonesia has initiated, the so-called workshop series on the South China Sea. It's been based, premised on the assumption that notwithstanding the overlapping jurisdiction between the different countries, we must try to encourage and make possible cooperation on resource management, on environmental issues. And this track has actually been quietly, in a very diligent way, making headways. Actually we are commemorating 20 years of this track this coming November. But, you know, all this good work becomes secondary when you have very high-profile incidents or high-profile exchanges between countries that are more to do with security issues. I've had a very good conversation with some of my colleagues who have claims to the South China Sea, precisely now trying to identify whether it's doable for them to set aside, without prejudice to their sovereignty claims, to begin the process of having some kind of cooperation. We must begin to -- we must develop comfort level between the countries concerned, and probably begin with some very innocent, you know, non-political kind of endeavors to do with, for example, search- and-rescue cooperation, to do with resource management, although resources nowadays is obviously quite complicated because, obviously, one of the reason that countries are very much interested in the South China Sea is because of the potential riches it's supposed to hold. And therefore -- but the mindset is there, the approach is that way. Next year, we will be chairing ASEAN in 2011. We will be keen to ensure that that chairmanship delivers something concrete -- a code of conduct, perhaps, for countries in the region, to conduct themselves to ensure that there is not inadvertent conflict over the area. But beyond that, we must try to have management of the conflict -- not quite resolution, management of the conflict, through precisely working on functional areas. And here, I think the Track Two process will become very key, and the high politics of it must not suffocate the possibilities for collaboration in other areas. CULLUM: I think there was -- I think you -- yes, please. QUESTIONER: Hi. Jeff Laurenti, Minister Natalegawa. As the world's most populous Muslim country, as you reminded us, Indonesia is often mentioned by "the great mentioner" as a country that could somehow contribute to the resolution or the strengthening of peace and security in Afghanistan, either as a potential contributor of administrative support and building up the government infrastructure so it's not simply a Western projection but one of shared Muslim convictions, or as a possible facilitator of explorations and possibly negotiations between the Afghan sides or -- and, should that prove successful, as a possible contributor of peacekeepers to guarantee a settlement, if one is reached. Have you all received feelers from the Afghan government, the U.S. government, the United Nations, somebody, to explore any or all of those roles? Would such a more active face by Indonesia in Afghanistan be politically controversial at home? And what advice from the safe distance of Jakarta do you have for the parts of the international coalition that are on the ground there as to how best to try to resolve it? NATALEGAWA: Well, yes, we have had a number of communications of the type that you mentioned, precisely based on the kind of rationale that you have highlighted, identifying Indonesia's potential modest role on the situation in Afghanistan. Especially we have been very much zeroing in on two aspects. One is capacity building for Afghanistan, especially in that more benign area of -- such as in agriculture possibilities, irrigation, and other -- even policing, training of the Afghans' police, et cetera, and then cooperation in the health sector as well. Actually, all these years we have had quite a few Afghan nationals come to Indonesia to be trained in our training centers, to develop capacities precisely in that kind of area. On top of that, we have been thinking out loud about the possibility of facilitating dialogue among the different factions in Afghanistan, to ensure that we have some kind of a resolution to the situation they're in. Now Afghanistan obviously is a country that is not short of international attention. If anything, I think it's been quite a oversupply, perhaps, of international attention and good will. So what we have been trying to do is to be a bit more well- defined and a bit more (listening ?) in our outlook. We have been approaching Afghanistan just to tell us what are your needs, rather than supply driving the demand. So we've been asking them what they need and they've been telling us what they need, and we've been meeting those needs in a very modest and low-key way. We have a bit of a procedural issue insofar as involvement on the ground in Afghanistan, because politically we've never served overseas other than under the (United ?) Nations umbrella. So as long as we have the ISAF in Afghanistan as the umbrella within which international forces are operating, it will be a non-event for us because we will not be able to participate. But we have enough space to participate through bilateral means, trilateral, even. We have been working closely with Japan, working closely with them to develop certain capacities in Afghanistan. Actually, the point, the quality that you mentioned about Indonesia and its Muslim population does open up several possibilities for us. I must mention and underscore, however, that while Indonesia obviously has the world's largest Muslim population and we are a member of the Organization of Islamic countries Conference, we are not an Islamic state. We do not apply the Islamic law, the Shari'a law. We treat all the religions and all the faiths as being equal, and enjoy a number of benefits as a result of it, one of which, I wanted to add, is that we celebrate and enjoy all the holidays of the different faiths. (Laughter.) So probably, if you were to identify the number of holidays that we enjoy, probably Indonesia has the most because we celebrate all the major holidays of the different faiths. (Laughter.) But we are very proud of that fact: on the one hand, largest Muslim population, but on the other hand, we are a country that tries to be a bit more inclusive and not in any other way. Thank you. CULLUM: Yes. QUESTIONER: Laurie Garrett. I run the -- CULLUM: Laurie Garrett! Hi. I didn't know that -- QUESTIONER: Hi, Lee. CULLUM: Hello. QUESTIONER: I run the Global Health program here at the Council. And Mr. Minister, if I may for a moment, I just want to compliment Lee Cullum, who always does such a brilliant job in her questioning. And we owe a debt to you. CULLUM: Thank you, Laurie. Thank you. (Applause.) Thank you very much. Thank you. QUESTIONER: Mr. Minister, before the elections, you had a minister of Health, Dr. Supari, who asserted on behalf of your country the notion of viral sovereignty. The idea was that the H5N1 bird flu virus belonged to Indonesia, not to any other country, not to any other place in the world, and that Indonesia was justified to abrogate certain aspects of the international health regulations in order to protect its sovereignty over the H5N1 bird flu samples. At this point, Indonesia's had more bird flu deaths than any other country in the world, and you've had cases in pigs as well as birds. So there's a great deal of concern on the part of the international community to see those viruses and determine whether there are specific mutations going on and whether something imperils the world as a whole for a pandemic. What is the current administration's position on the notion of viral sovereignty, on the sharing of H5N1 samples and the relationship between surveillance for disease and the sort of Doha round's intellectual-property issues with vaccines? NATALEGAWA: Well, yes, this has been a somewhat difficult issue for many, including for Indonesia. You used the term sovereignty just now to describe our concern and position. Basically, it's about -- I guess you can put it in different ways, but essentially, the main concern that Indonesia -- a country like Indonesia has had is how to ensure access to vaccine. Results of research, et cetera, that may be conducted, like in a country like Indonesia, because of its own -- its own reasons, becomes -- contributes greatly to the finding and discovery of new vaccines. And yet, once those vaccines have been -- have been discovered, have then become available, we have not an access to it in a good way. So there is a principle of accessibility to vaccine that I think our former minister fought for. And I think that message has been made loud and clear. And at the same time, of course, we are mindful of our own international obligations to ensure that our science does not in any way impair or impact on the -- on the -- on the health of -- concerns of other countries as well. So we need to achieve a balance. And I think what our present administration is doing is precisely striking that balance: how to ensure, on the one hand, we live up to our international obligations; but on the other hand, along the line of the message that we have said, of course, before, how we must make the issue of access to vaccines by developing countries a bit more prominent in international discourse, in terms of making sure that countries like Indonesia have -- as population within it, have access to vaccines. And actually, we, Indonesia, together with Norway, have made foreign policy and global health one of the major -- what do you call it -- priority in our foreign policy. We are having a meeting, I think on the 23rd of -- this coming 23rd, on this issue, how we can reach a balance between the concerns of a developing country like Indonesia, and at the same time that generic concern about -- this question of intellectual property and the other issues that we have mentioned. But I think, all in all, the point that I want to say is that the Indonesian government, the president, Indonesian administration is keen to ensure a win-win, mutually reinforcing, mutually satisfactory way of solution to this issue. CULLUM: Yes. QUESTIONER: Hello. My name's Timothy Reuter. I'm with Tiger Trade (ph). I was interested in your thoughts on expanding trade between the U.S. and Indonesia. I know Indonesia recently revised upwards its statistics on what the expected expansion of exports is to the entire world. Where do you see this going in the future, both in terms of amount and flows and sort of the politics of free-trade agreements? Thank you very much. NATALEGAWA: Well, I have just returned from Washington on -- I was in Washington on Friday to have a meeting with Secretary Clinton wherein we launched what we call the joint ministerial commission. It is -- it will -- there will be annual meetings between the secretary of State and the new foreign minister of Indonesia on a regular basis every year, and -- and we will be overseeing some six working groups, on environment, on defense/security issues, on education, on trade and investment and science and technology, among others. I think what we have found is that, while Indonesia-U.S. relations is a -- is a happy one, is a -- is a very positive one, and we are now using the term "comprehensive partnership" to describe Indonesia-U.S. relationship, at the same time, we do identify lacunae and gaps where we can do even better, especially in the investment area and as well -- in the trade area as well. And here, I think, through this Joint Ministerial Commission that we have just established, which will facilitate hopefully greater visits among businesspeople from the United States to Indonesia and likewise, we can really raise the profile of the United States in Indonesia, akin to, for example, China, which has been making a great deal of headways in our region through various kind of free trade agreement that it has been able to come up with between our countries. But all in all, the best is yet to come, in the sense of trade and investment relations with the United States. I hope through forums such as this we can, you know, alert all concerned about the possibilities in Indonesia. As you know, we have this notion of BRIC -- Brazil, India and China and Russia. We have not been categorized under the same chapeau or template. We don't really mind, to be honest, because we would like to overachieve, I think, but now -- nowadays, I think, increasingly there is more and more recognition of the possibilities that Indonesia is offering as an added host to U.S. investment and U.S. trade. And I'm very optimistic about where Indonesia is heading on -- in this economic area. CULLUM: You have every reason to be. I mean, you've come through this economic calamity far better than most. How did you manage that? NATALEGAWA: Well, with a great deal of prudence. I'm afraid we learned the hard way because of the 1998, 1999 financial crisis that -- begun elsewhere, not in our country. It was begun in Thailand, even in Korea, but then we felt the most -- the most extreme form of the crisis in '98, '99. Hence from then on we've become a bit more prudent, a bit more -- even more transparent, a promotion of good governance in our banking practices. And as a result, we were able to withstand the recent financial crisis better than most. I think we registered 6-something percent even during 2008, in 2009 we went down to around 4 percent, and this year, hopefully, we'll have around 6.5 percent. Our domestic economy is sufficiently large, we think, to be able to absorb, then, the downturn in the global financial situation, but the contagious effect of such a situation was obviously very much a situation of concern. But this time around we were, of course, in the G-20 group of nations as well, to ensure that all the remedies that have been suggested to deal with the financial concern, crisis, does not result in prolonged depression or recession in some of our economies. But we work hard. We try to do our best. CULLUM: But also you have 260 million people who are consumers. You're consuming your own produce, is that right? NATALEGAWA: That is what I was saying, to refer to the size of our domestic economy, the largest economy in Southeast Asia, a population of some 230, 250 million people, fast-rising income bracket, a young population as well. I think we are yet to feel the full benefit of the demographics in our country. Because we have a young population, the productivity no doubt will be even more enhanced. And beyond our own country -- because, as you are aware, ASEAN is integrating the ASEAN economic community by 2015. There will be a market of some 500 million people. So I think when -- of course, you have your China, you have your India in our neighborhood. But I think Southeast Asia, Indonesia in particular, has also a positive story to tell. Any -- yes. QUESTIONER: Mr. Minister, Paul Speltz. Thank you very much for your comments. And also, Lee, you asked all the good questions already. CULLUM: Thank you. QUESTIONER: What I'd like to do is just ask a macro question, having served and worked in your country for years. And as you look now at where things stand, what you have achieved, which has been remarkable, in the last eight -- next -- last eight years, what do you see as the four biggest challenges for Indonesia over the next five to 10 years? And how might you be dealing with them? NATALEGAWA: Well, thank you for acknowledging the transformation that Indonesia has been going through over the past 10 years, the so-called Reformasi period, wherein some 250 million people who had previously languished under authoritarian rule almost overnight find themselves transformed into the third-largest democracy in the world. We are still obviously a work in progress in terms of our democratic transition, gone through quite a few shortcomings that we are trying to overcome. But I think the trajectory is well and good. And as I said -- as I've been trying to describe just now, the 10-year period has seen a democratic dividend in many areas: obviously in the economic area, in the transformation from IMF-supported country to a member of the G-20; politically, the resolution of many conflict situations in my own country, Aceh. The -- the situation in the province of Aceh was resolved through dialogue, negotiations; it's unthinkable 30 years ago -- over the past 30 years. So we have had political dividend, economic dividend as part of this bigger democratic dividend. But ahead, the next 10 years or so, we are not taking things for granted, for certain, because there will be still tremendous challenges for us. One thing that we need to be ensuring is that our democracy becomes further stabilized and further solidified, capacity of our democratic institutions, so that we don't revert back to where we were before. But to ensure the strengthening of our democratic institutions, the consolidation of democracy, we must make sure that democracy delivers. It's no good people simply going to elections and taking part in elections. We must ensure that our development continues to take place and that Indonesia earns its place as a -- as a middle- income country, as a country that is fast consolidating its role in the world, as well -- so consolidation of democracy, the (centering ?) of our development efforts to raise the standard of living of our -- of our people, population. The national unity, of course, is a constant focus on -- by us. But on this issue, I think I'm less worried than I would have been 10 years ago, 12 years ago. Because if you would remember in 1998, 2000, political obituaries have been written about Indonesia. Many have said that we would go the route of Yugoslavia or even the Soviet Union in terms of coming apart, but actually we have become stronger by central -- by decentralization rather than by a greater centralization. So development, democracy, ensuring of our unity are key pieces for us, but of course, not the least, how to continue our positive role in international affairs. We want to be recognized as being problem solvers, as being bridge builders; not interested in accentuating differences. We have a motto in our foreign policy just now about -- from the independent (elective ?). It's "million friends and zero enemy." We are keen to build bridges, we have friends -- we are keen to be friendly to all and to ensure that we can really deliver in our international capacity. CULLUM: One last question. When you were working towards your Ph.D., you wrote two dissertations: one on disarmament, and on intervention. NATALEGAWA: Yes. CULLUM: So what do you see ahead for disarmament, on the one hand, and international norms regarding intervention on the other? NATALEGAWA: Well, I'll take the first one first, disarmament. This has been a very big year for disarmament, 2010; and I must acknowledge here, thanks principally to the changed approach by the U.S. administration. I know the U.S. administration and the Russian Federation, the START II -- the agreement that they have reached with the two of them have begun a new -- new possibilities. Indonesia announced earlier this year, in April this year, our commitment to ratify the CTBT, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Indonesia is one of the -- is it nine, or 12? Nine? Indonesia is one of the nine countries whose certification of the CTBT is required before the treaty comes into effect. In the past, Indonesia has chosen to await ratification by the United States before -- CULLUM: That's been a long -- NATALEGAWA: -- before we proceed. But we recalibrate our position. Rather than simply follow, we choose to, hopefully, demonstrate and encourage. And hence, we announced that policy review -- policy statement. We are now fast-tracking our ratification process, hopefully by the end of this year. So disarmament -- a very important issue, the classical sense, in the sense of a reduction, either for the nuclear arsenal of the established nuclear-weapons states, but the proliferation issues also must be very important. I know, of course, the United States very much are concerned about Iran, are very much concerned about North Korea. We are very much concerned over those two situation as well, but we want to be sure that the attempt -- or the effort to ensure nonproliferation is consistent with the principle of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. So that's one. On non-intervention, very much still current. But especially, since you spoke of Myanmar just now, how can we, in the present-day world, ensure that we can be concerned, we can have interests in developments of certain countries' internal situation without being seen to be interfering in the affairs of that country. We do feel that in the present day and age it would be possible, it is possible to have a synergy between friendly concern, friendly interest, with the precepts of non-intervention. CULLUM: Well, Dr. Natalegawa, thank you very much. Have a good week in New York. We're glad you're here. NATALEGAWA: Thank you. (Applause.) If I may, just very quickly, I'd like to -- once again, I'd like to thank everyone for making it possible for today. And I'd like to -- on behalf of all of you, I'm sure, I hope, and I'm certain -- I'd like to say how very much we appreciate the manner you have conducted our conversation -- CULLUM: Thank you. NATALEGAWA: -- Ms. Cullum. As one of you have said just now, you're obviously a person who is extremely well informed on many matters, including my own country. I'm especially pleased to acknowledge your very well-informed status vis-a-vis our foreign policy. Thank you very much. CULLUM: You're very kind. Thank you. (Applause.) Thank you very much. LEE CULLUM: Let's get started. First I want to thank you, Richard, and Nancy (sp), and Megan (sp), and the meetings committee, who have put together -- meetings department, I should say -- who have put together a riveting week this September. Every U.N. week in September is marvelous, and this one, I think, is going to be especially important. And to begin the week, I'm happy to say -- and this is on the record -- we have the 17th foreign minister of Indonesia, the 17th since independence almost 60 years ago. Dr. Marty Natalegawa took office in October, and he already knew the job exceedingly well because he had been chief of staff for his predecessor, Hassan Wirajuda. He also was spokesman for the department, for the ministry, and did a marvelous job, apparently. He had to deal with the media during the Bali bombings, which was very difficult, and other circumstances also which were trying, I don't doubt. But he performed with such high competence that the PR society of Indonesia awarded him its first public relations society award. Now, Minister, we have a number of agencies of government at every level in this country that could use some PR advice. (Laughter.) So if you have any time after the U.N., you might travel around and dispense some of your wisdom. Of course, he knows the U.N. very well, also, because he was -- he was permanent representative of his nation there when Indonesia chaired the Security Council, so he chaired the Security Council. He's always in interesting places at interesting times. Next year, you chair the East Asia summit, so -- he always turns out to be the chairman. Now, I think there's a reason for that. I note that he is the youngest son of his family. He's the son of a director of a state bank. And correct me if I'm wrong, but I think that would be a very privileged position in a family: adored by all; provided with a lot of latitude; you didn't have to be a banker; you could do something really interesting, like international relations, and get a Ph.D., like Dr. Haass. And I think that's wonderful, because I think that the broader perspective is certainly needed in the work you're doing now. I want to ask you about a couple of weeks you've had -- or two weeks ago, I should say. Problems on the high seas seem to be epidemic in Asia. We note in The New York Times today that China is very upset because Japan has arrested a captain of a trawler. And two weeks ago, Malaysia arrested three of your officers. There was a great hue and cry. You released seven fishermen who had been arrested for poaching, they released the officers. But still you had politicians in your country saying you were too soft on Malaysia and this was very bad. How did you respond to all that? FOREIGN MINISTER MARTY NATALEGAWA: Well, thank you, Ms. Cullum, for that question, and thank you, Mr. Haass, for arranging this wonderful occasion. Let me address that issue. Yes, we've had very difficult -- somewhat difficult period of time about couple of weeks ago in managing our relations with one of our neighbors, namely Malaysia. And Malaysia, as you are probably aware, is a maritime country. It's an archipelago country made up of some 17,000 islands; most of them -- quite a few of them are not even named yet. So it's -- we are that huge and that diverse. And we share boundaries with some 10 countries, including with Malaysia, and as a result, we have a number of unresolved delineations. Some of our maritime boundaries have yet to be fully delineated. And as a result of this, there is often some incident of the type that we went through a couple of weeks ago. The incident is related to a -- (fishery's/fisheries' ?) issues. Malaysia said the fishermen carried out their activities within their waters; we say it's in our waters. But in any case, it created all kind(s) of diplomatic difficulties. But what is most important to underscore is that both governments resolved to address this issue through negotiations and through dialogue. And that's why since then I've had a meeting in Malaysia on the 6th of September; I'm having another one -- meeting here in New York with Malaysian foreign minister, two more -- between three more, between now and December, essentially intensification of our negotiations on boundary issues. Of course, Indonesia is now a very open, robust democracy with all shades of opinion to be heard. And hence some members of our legislature have different views, perhaps. But I think in the final analysis all of us are resolved and in agreement that the issue of this type needs to be solved through negotiations. And in this connection, what I have been trying to convey to our colleagues as well is that, within ASEAN, Indonesia doesn't do -- what do you call it -- conflicts. We are a country that has often been seen to be above the fray. In other words, Indonesia has been a country that other ASEAN countries turn to whenever they have some bilateral problems or challenges. So when we have this particular situation with Malaysia, we have always been resolved to address through negotiations rather than -- rather than any other means, because we have an interest to ensure that we maintain Indonesia's role as, like, above, you know, bickering and above disputes of this type. CULLUM: Well, you've done very well for many years being above the fray. There was an op-ed piece in The New York Times in August by Stanley Weiss, who runs something called Business Executives for Security (sic/for National Security) in Washington. And the headline was "Rowing Between Two Reefs." I think you have a phrase for this in Indonesia, do you not? What is it, "mendayung antara dua" -- NATALEGAWA: "Karang." CULLUM: -- "karang," yes. NATALEGAWA: Classic. CULLUM: You correct me when I got it wrong. NATALEGAWA: One of the -- one -- (inaudible) -- CULLUM: Anyway, you have rowed between two reefs for many years, first between the United States and the Soviet Union, and you kept your virtue -- NATALEGAWA: Yes, ma'am. (Laughter.) CULLUM: -- now between the -- (chuckles) -- NATALEGAWA: Just about. CULLUM: Not easy; now between China and the United States. You met with your counterpart from China at the U.N. this morning. NATALEGAWA: That's right, yes. CULLUM: How would you assess those reefs at home and in your relationship to each one of them? NATALEGAWA: Yes. Well, actually, I missed that op-ed, but I'll make sure that -- CULLUM: It was all about Indonesia. It was -- NATALEGAWA: Was it really? CULLUM: Yeah. NATALEGAWA: Well, yes, we have been describing our foreign policy as being to row between two reefs. And it's otherwise known as independent and active foreign policy. It's classically presented during the Cold War period, between East and West, not to choose between the two sides, which is otherwise also known as the Non- Aligned Movement, in a more generic sense. But of course with the end of the Cold War, with the demise of the Eastern Bloc, et cetera, some people question what is the continued relevance of such an outlook. But now we define it in a different way. Independent and active foreign policy essentially means a capacity to make up our own mind in terms of issues -- in other words, room for us to be able to maneuver, being able to reach positions and to have positions independent of any other powers and interests. In other words, we'd safeguard that capacity to make independent choice. But actually nowadays we think the world today is no longer a world of two reefs but it's of multiple reefs. We have so many; it's a very multi-polar world, with different kind of challenges, no longer East and West, no longer -- about security, political issues; about the environment; about food security, energy security. So it's a very messy world, and our orientation now is to ensure that for every one of these issues, we are part of the solution. In other words, we are about building bridges. We are not interested in accentuating differences. Indonesia is naturally a consensus builder because that's the makeup of our own country. We are, as we know, a very diverse country made up of hundreds of different ethnic groups, hundreds of languages spoken. So consensus building comes naturally to Indonesia, I think, and I think this is one quality that Indonesia is now trying to propagate, trying to project in international affairs. Whether it be on climate change, whether it be on disarmament issues, development issues, we always try to be part of the solution to many of our contemporary issues. CULLUM: When China called for the East Asia Summit, which is meeting in October, and the U.S. will join (then ?), it had in mind just a handful of members -- itself, of course, the ASEAN nations, the 10 ASEAN nations, plus Korea, plus Japan. And you were among the leaders in insisting that there be other members -- the U.S., India, Australia, New Zealand. And your thought, as I understand it, was to be sure there's some weight on the other end of the see-saw to China, on the opposite end. Now, do you feel that's been accomplished? NATALEGAWA: Yes, it's been accomplished in the sense that we have been having a rather lengthy debate on what is called regional architecture building. And Indonesia has really weighed in on this debate and tried to take a leadership position. Our interest is what we call a dynamic equilibrium for our region, not quite in a classic balance-of-power situation where not one country is preponderant in our region, but in a more holistic and a more hopefully positive sense, in the sense that we don't wish to see our region dominated by one country, whoever that country is, but we wish to see inclusivity, more countries, the merrier -- the more, the merrier; and for countries to be engaged in multisectoral issues, not only security but also political and also environment, economic, social-cultural, et cetera. Now, in that (debate ?), we have been very interested in ensuring the participation of the United States and even the Russian Federation in the ongoing evolving regional architecture. And I think our view eventually was accepted by the rest of ASEAN and was even accepted by China. I just met the Chinese foreign minister earlier today and where -- they basically endorse(d) our proposal, our view to have both the Russian Federation and the United States part of the regional equation in the Asia-Pacific area. So all in all, it's about building -- achieving equilibrium, a state of affairs where there is not one preponderant country. But we will be very careful and very reluctant to see the return of, like, a Cold War mentality for our region, because we don't wish to see a self-fulfilling type of situation where the rights of one country is seen to need to be managed or to be contained, even, by other group of countries. So that's why we are very keen to manage this equilibrium. Putting our foot in one camp ensures that we have constant equilibrium, hopefully. CULLUM: Not so long ago, China declared that it had a national interest -- a vital national interest in the South China Sea. Secretary Clinton traveled to the ASEAN forum, the regional forum, in July, and said, well, she had some thoughts about that, and they were that the U.S. would happy to support a collaborative diplomacy to settle the Spratley Islands and other disputed islands in the area. Everybody was happy. Twelve of the 27 nations there applauded. China did not. But how did you feel about it? NATALEGAWA: Well, Indonesia is not a claimant state in the South China Sea, so we have no vested interest in terms of jurisdiction or claims to the islands on the South China Sea. In fact, because of that status, over the past 20 years Indonesia has actually facilitated discussions and dialogue between the claimant states on how to ensure that notwithstanding the jurisdictional issues, that countries in the region can collaborate on development issues and resource management issues. So from our perspective, we are very keen, as I said before, to avoid situation where the South China Sea becomes a new area for conflict and tensions in our region. It's a lot to do with self- fulfilling type of situation. We have been mentioning to the United States to be aware that there is a lot of sensitivities involved. Of course, the -- we choose to make the issue a bit more generic. We speak of maritime issues, rather than specifically South China Sea issues; because under the maritime chapeau, we can speak of, obviously, freedom of navigation, safety of navigation, the issue of environmental challenges as well. So we make it a bit more diverse, a bit more comprehensive. Well, certainly, this is one of our challenge (sic) just now. Vietnam is chairing ASEAN at the moment. As you are probably aware, Vietnam is also a claimant state to the South China Sea equation. Indonesia isn't, so next year, in 2011, we hope under our chairmanship of ASEAN this is one area we can make progress, because we have no vested interest, as I said, on particular outcome of the South China Sea. CULLUM: China now has a free-trade area with ASEAN, China- ASEAN Free Trade Area. The United States has tried to put together a free-trade agreement with ASEAN, but it's hung up on Burma, because the U.S. has sanctions against Burma. How do you feel about Burma, as a member of ASEAN? Is it a good thing? Is it a hindrance? NATALEGAWA: Well, we could feel better about how Myanmar is -- CULLUM: We could, too. NATALEGAWA: We could feel better, because we have been extremely -- now, to put it a bit more frank and candid way, we have been unhappy with how things have been developing in Myanmar. Because while the issue is clearly internal, is clearly national; but at the same time, it has clear regional ramifications. And we have said on many occasions -- and I will say it one more time here -- Indonesian government, we have been crystal clear in demanding for the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi -- not tomorrow, not today, it should have been many years ago. She does not deserve her detention, and that has been our position. But that's one thing, a position of principle of the type, but we also wish to see a solution brought about. Condemnation is not policy, and we need to go beyond condemnation. And in this connection, we and neighboring countries of Myanmar in ASEAN, we've been trying to have some kind of a road map. How do we resolve this issue in a -- in a -- in a -- in a good way? And where we are now is basically trying to ensure that Myanmar (authorities ?) live up to its commitment to conduct the free and fair elections that they had said they will conduct. We have readied ourselves to observe such an election if and when it does take place in November. We haven't heard from them, to be honest, since, whether they are ready to accept our observers to their elections. But despite its likely faults, we do feel that the elections does offer a promise of change. At least the system may be somewhat -- open up. There could be some possibilities that the election bring forward. So we're looking to that. Of course, Myanmar situation cannot simply be seen as being a national situation. We have the geopolitics of the region as well. Myanmar is surrounded by quite -- you know, I mean, countries of substance, which I won't have to mention who these -- which these countries are. So we have an interest to ensure democratization in Myanmar and, at the same time, to ensure that Myanmar remains within the ASEAN group of families rather than otherwise. CULLUM: Well, now, you mention the ASEAN group of families. You have a number of families, it seems to me. You have ASEAN, you have the East Asian Summit now -- NATALEGAWA: That's right. CULLUM: -- you have APEC, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. There's been talk of an East Asian community, though Japan seems to be backing off because of its problems with China. But how do you see all these organizations, all these families of families, sorting themselves out? NATALEGAWA: Well, I'm glad you asked that question, because recently there's been some debate in Indonesia asking and questioning why it is that Indonesia is investing too much or concentrating too much, apparently, on ASEAN. They say that as Indonesia can basically go beyond ASEAN. But actually, in our perspective at the moment, they are all mutually reinforcing. Indonesia of course have other forums and other organizations within which we are active, most notably and most recently, the G-20 groups of countries, the G-20 nations. CULLUM: But am I right? Are you the only East Asian nation in the G-20? NATALEGAWA: From ASEAN, certainly -- CULLUM: Yeah. NATALEGAWA: -- and so of course we have the -- we have Japan -- CULLUM: Of course. Yeah. NATALEGAWA: -- also Korea. But from Southeast Asia it's only -- so we have China, South Korea and Japan and Indonesia, that I can think of, from the East Asia part of the world. Contrast 10 years ago. Ten years ago, when we were in the midst of our financial crisis, Indonesia had the IMF come in to rescue our economy. But 10 years of democratization have brought about clear democratic dividend. We are now not only in a better state politically but also economically. We are now a member of this G-20 group of nations. In other words, now we are finding ourself having our foothold and our imprint and in so many other forums -- the G-20; Non-Aligned, of course; the Islamic Conference; the U.N. But our trick is how to ensure that these things can be done in a mutually reinforcing way. And certainly a foothold in ASEAN is a prerequisite for a role elsewhere. You cannot do the work without also your doing your own region. And here -- and you mentioned chairmanship before as well in your kind introduction -- in our view, Indonesia's role in ASEAN -- when we chair ASEAN, for example -- it's about exercising leadership. If there's a difference between chairmanship and leadership, leadership is taking a more influential, a more prominent adding-value role. But given Indonesia's status, it size, obvious size, population- wise, geographic-wise, we cannot exercise leadership by -- in forcing ourselves. It has to be an earned leadership. In Indonesia's case, less can be more. In many instances, we have to defer to ASEAN to create the necessary space for ASEAN to develop and to become more -- stronger. So that's why our diplomacy has to be a bit more thought through, not -- and well calibrated, and not to make it too obvious that we are trying to be imposing our thoughts and our will on our neighbors. Less can be more in our -- in our case. And I think in that way, we have been able to earn our leadership role within ASEAN. CULLUM: You see, that's what I mean about good PR advice. Less can be more, you're absolutely right. Let's talk a bit about terrorism. I know it's -- you've worked very hard on it. You've made a lot of progress, from what I'm told. Karen Brooks here at the council, who was -- who was really very good on your part of the world, made that clear to me. And still, there are problems. You had the Bali bombing, you had the Marriott bombing in 2008. Abu Bakar Bashir was arrested and tried and imprisoned and released. Now you rearrested him. You're going to try him again. He's the guiding inspiration of terrorism, apparently, in Indonesia -- Al Islamiyah and other groups. What are you trying to accomplish with this rearrest of him? NATALEGAWA: Well, the effort to combat the global (coming ?) of terrorism is not a war. If it was simply a war, then it's simply about the application of force, brute force and all that to overcome the challenge. But we see it in a more comprehensive way. When we had our Bali bombing in 2002, of course, soon after the 9/11 act in New York, we were all awoken to the reality of the challenge of terrorism. But from the very start we were keen to ensure that our fight to overcome terrorism was done in a way that is a democratic response as well. As a country, we have just escaped from decades of authoritarian rule. There was always a healthy cynicism and suspicion of too much authoritary -- authority to the government -- in other words, this distinction between civil liberties and security angle. But I think we have just gotten it right in the balance, in terms of civil rights and terrorism efforts. And we have been fighting terrorism. Those who have been involved in acts of terrorism have been brought to trial, have been -- have been -- have been serving their -- serving their sentence, but -- including the one person that you had mentioned just now. But the trick for us now is how to preempt, how to prevent. Because to preempt and to prevent, you must have some anticipatory measures as well. And here the issue of civil liberties become(s) especially prominent. How do you strike that balance? Do you outlaw certain groups because that group is espousing clearly undesirable goals? But then where does it put you in terms of civil liberties? So that's a bit tricky debate. At the same time, we are also empowering the moderates. Indonesia is proud to be the -- to be the fact that we have the largest Muslim population in the entire world, bigger than the entire Middle East, probably, combined. But at the same we espouse moderate Islam, recognize all the major faiths in a -- in a good way, a template for the fact that democracy, Islam and modernity can all go hand in hand. But terrorism is (sincere ?) work in progress in terms of our countering it. We are not complacent. We will always be on -- you know, very, very careful in ensuring that we ensure maximum security and safety. CULLUM: Although you say they're serving their sentences, Abubakar Ba'asyir was serving a sentence when he was released. NATALEGAWA: That's right. CULLUM: So why are you going through the trial again? NATALEGAWA: Well, it's a totally different case now that we -- he's serving for, I think -- he's being charged for. This relates to the most recent (incidents ?) of a terrorist cell that was identified in the province of Aceh, in the northern tip of Sumatra. And so he's now being charged and being brought to trial on account of that particular episode. The previous sentence was -- that he was serving was vis-a-vis the Bali bombing. But I think it demonstrates well how, in so far as Indonesia is concerned, we are not leaving any stone unturned in trying to overcome the threats of terrorism. We have actually translated -- transformed ourselves. We used to be seen as being part of the problem on terrorism, but now we have become the regional hub for counterterrorism efforts. We have in Indonesia what we call the Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation. It's called Jakarta, but it's located in another town called Semarang, in central Java. But don't ask me why that is the case. It's in -- it's called Jakarta, but it's in Semarang. But it has become a hub. We have U.S. participation of civilian government, the British government, as well, in developing capacity not only for Indonesia but capacity for the region on counterterrorism. CULLUM: Back for a moment to the incident with Malaysia over the fishermen and the officers, your president, Yudhoyono, SBY, as he is called -- NATALEGAWA: That's correct. CULLUM: -- we used to have initialed presidents, LBJ and JFK; I liked that -- he made a statement. Some said it was too weak, as you and I discussed. But your military chief, General Sonosa (sp), said, oh, no. He was very clear. He was admonishing the army to stay out of it, the military to stay out of it. So was this on your mind, then, that the military might on its own decide to get involved in this and other situations? NATALEGAWA: Not really. Not really. I think we have always been on the same page in terms of addressing this issue through diplomatic means, through diplomacy and through negotiations. And as I said before, all of us are extremely mindful of the implications both in terms of real costs, in cost of lives, cost of resources, of any conflict that was to ensue, open conflict, but also in terms of the diplomatic standing of Indonesia in the region and indeed beyond. So that's why we resolved to solve the issue through diplomatic means. By the way, when you made reference to our TNI, our armed forces, if there is ever one institution that has gone through as much transformation during our past 10 years of democratic change, it has been within our military. I mean, you can imagine back 10, 12 years ago the military, the armed forces, was very much part and parcel of the life of our country, in terms of not only security but also in political area. But now they have basically moved back to the barracks, become professional units. And that's why we need to engage with countries like United States, to reinforce this trend, to make sure that it doesn't become -- it becomes irreversible, that we no longer have backtracking in our democratic (path/past ?). CULLUM: You were in Copenhagen almost a year ago, in December. You're planning to go to Cancun. NATALEGAWA: It was very cold in Copenhagen. CULLUM: Very cold, but you're gong to warm up in Cancun this coming December. NATALEGAWA: Yes. CULLUM: What do you expect in Cancun? NATALEGAWA: Well, I mentioned the weather in Copenhagen because we had -- the previous conference on climate change was in Bali in December, so you can imagine the contrast between Bali in December and Copenhagen in December. But yes, we were -- we have been somewhat disappointed by the outcome of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference. We had all looked forward to so called sealing the deal, to seal the deal, as the secretary-general described it. But obviously, it didn't happen. But we had the Copenhagen Accord out of that particular conference, and Indonesia was very much a part -- our president was actually very much part of that small group of countries that came up with the accord. Indonesia is keen to ensure that, first, of course we wish to see the multilateral negotiation succeed, the so-called UNFCCC process, which is still ongoing and still very difficult. I'm not sure whether Cancun will do the trick in terms of achieving the necessary binding agreement. But we have done since Bali of 2007 is that we've asked ourself what we can do on our own, rather than simply waiting for the global architecture to be ready. And in this connection, I think our precedent at the G-20 summit in Pittsburgh last year -- we announced our commitment to reduce our emission by 26 percent from business as usual, on our own efforts, and by 41 percent with international support. So that's really -- we hope to have a demonstrative effect by saying here is a developing country that choose to do things on its own, rather than -- not waiting for the bigger picture, by addressing the deforestation issue, by addressing the issue of renewable energy, promoting renewable energy. So that's what we have hoped to be a game-changing position, and it has had the necessary impact, because India, Brazil, China even came up with their own national targets. So we have been trying to be part of the solution in climate change by setting emission reduction targets, by raising the profile of forest issue as a way to deal with climate change, by bringing the issue of marine -- maritime issues as well vis-a-vis climate change, and by making the so-called MRV -- monitoring, reporting and verification -- of emission measures to be an acceptable modality for countries to commit themselves, because prior to Indonesia's announcement, many developing countries felt it was an interference to be looking at the MRV. CULLUM: MRV, what is -- ? NATALEGAWA: Ah. Monitoring, reporting and verification. CULLUM: Okay. NATALEGAWA: So all those commitments that we make to reduce our emissions must be monitorable, must be verifiable, and there must be reports. Because it's easy to make commitments without clear benchmarks. And until recently, developing countries have said that they have been very reticent to go this route, because they say this is interference. But Indonesia changed the mindset. We said this is fine, we are good to go, we have national commitments. We are open and ready to be monitored and to be verified, because we are confident that we can -- we can live up to our commitments. CULLUM: Well, Minister, I know that our members are open and ready to speak to you, have questions and perhaps comments. Yes. Right -- thank you. Oh, there are two of them back there. We'll just go from one to the other. QUESTIONER: Herbert Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Minister, for clear explanations of Indonesia's foreign policy. To go back to the South China Sea, where Indonesia is not a claimant and therefore has a very clean and good role -- and one should pay tribute to the meetings the Indonesians have sponsored in track two diplomacy on this, et cetera. Given this knowledge in Indonesia of this question, I wonder if you could look into the future, not an Indonesian plan to impose on everybody -- that's not the way Indonesia does business -- but if you look at treaties like the Antarctic Treaty or the high-seas fishing treaties, is it possible for there to be a solution in the South China Sea which does not involve examining Dutch, British, French, American old claims for every mud -- bit of mud out there but involves something which would permit exploitation of oil and gas without ruling on territorial claims? Can you see this in the Indonesian crystal ball? NATALEGAWA: Well, if I may just address that, that exactly has been our perspective over the past 20 years. You made reference to the track-two process that Indonesia has initiated, the so-called workshop series on the South China Sea. It's been based, premised on the assumption that notwithstanding the overlapping jurisdiction between the different countries, we must try to encourage and make possible cooperation on resource management, on environmental issues. And this track has actually been quietly, in a very diligent way, making headways. Actually we are commemorating 20 years of this track this coming November. But, you know, all this good work becomes secondary when you have very high-profile incidents or high-profile exchanges between countries that are more to do with security issues. I've had a very good conversation with some of my colleagues who have claims to the South China Sea, precisely now trying to identify whether it's doable for them to set aside, without prejudice to their sovereignty claims, to begin the process of having some kind of cooperation. We must begin to -- we must develop comfort level between the countries concerned, and probably begin with some very innocent, you know, non-political kind of endeavors to do with, for example, search- and-rescue cooperation, to do with resource management, although resources nowadays is obviously quite complicated because, obviously, one of the reason that countries are very much interested in the South China Sea is because of the potential riches it's supposed to hold. And therefore -- but the mindset is there, the approach is that way. Next year, we will be chairing ASEAN in 2011. We will be keen to ensure that that chairmanship delivers something concrete -- a code of conduct, perhaps, for countries in the region, to conduct themselves to ensure that there is not inadvertent conflict over the area. But beyond that, we must try to have management of the conflict -- not quite resolution, management of the conflict, through precisely working on functional areas. And here, I think the Track Two process will become very key, and the high politics of it must not suffocate the possibilities for collaboration in other areas. CULLUM: I think there was -- I think you -- yes, please. QUESTIONER: Hi. Jeff Laurenti, Minister Natalegawa. As the world's most populous Muslim country, as you reminded us, Indonesia is often mentioned by "the great mentioner" as a country that could somehow contribute to the resolution or the strengthening of peace and security in Afghanistan, either as a potential contributor of administrative support and building up the government infrastructure so it's not simply a Western projection but one of shared Muslim convictions, or as a possible facilitator of explorations and possibly negotiations between the Afghan sides or -- and, should that prove successful, as a possible contributor of peacekeepers to guarantee a settlement, if one is reached. Have you all received feelers from the Afghan government, the U.S. government, the United Nations, somebody, to explore any or all of those roles? Would such a more active face by Indonesia in Afghanistan be politically controversial at home? And what advice from the safe distance of Jakarta do you have for the parts of the international coalition that are on the ground there as to how best to try to resolve it? NATALEGAWA: Well, yes, we have had a number of communications of the type that you mentioned, precisely based on the kind of rationale that you have highlighted, identifying Indonesia's potential modest role on the situation in Afghanistan. Especially we have been very much zeroing in on two aspects. One is capacity building for Afghanistan, especially in that more benign area of -- such as in agriculture possibilities, irrigation, and other -- even policing, training of the Afghans' police, et cetera, and then cooperation in the health sector as well. Actually, all these years we have had quite a few Afghan nationals come to Indonesia to be trained in our training centers, to develop capacities precisely in that kind of area. On top of that, we have been thinking out loud about the possibility of facilitating dialogue among the different factions in Afghanistan, to ensure that we have some kind of a resolution to the situation they're in. Now Afghanistan obviously is a country that is not short of international attention. If anything, I think it's been quite a oversupply, perhaps, of international attention and good will. So what we have been trying to do is to be a bit more well- defined and a bit more (listening ?) in our outlook. We have been approaching Afghanistan just to tell us what are your needs, rather than supply driving the demand. So we've been asking them what they need and they've been telling us what they need, and we've been meeting those needs in a very modest and low-key way. We have a bit of a procedural issue insofar as involvement on the ground in Afghanistan, because politically we've never served overseas other than under the (United ?) Nations umbrella. So as long as we have the ISAF in Afghanistan as the umbrella within which international forces are operating, it will be a non-event for us because we will not be able to participate. But we have enough space to participate through bilateral means, trilateral, even. We have been working closely with Japan, working closely with them to develop certain capacities in Afghanistan. Actually, the point, the quality that you mentioned about Indonesia and its Muslim population does open up several possibilities for us. I must mention and underscore, however, that while Indonesia obviously has the world's largest Muslim population and we are a member of the Organization of Islamic countries Conference, we are not an Islamic state. We do not apply the Islamic law, the Shari'a law. We treat all the religions and all the faiths as being equal, and enjoy a number of benefits as a result of it, one of which, I wanted to add, is that we celebrate and enjoy all the holidays of the different faiths. (Laughter.) So probably, if you were to identify the number of holidays that we enjoy, probably Indonesia has the most because we celebrate all the major holidays of the different faiths. (Laughter.) But we are very proud of that fact: on the one hand, largest Muslim population, but on the other hand, we are a country that tries to be a bit more inclusive and not in any other way. Thank you. CULLUM: Yes. QUESTIONER: Laurie Garrett. I run the -- CULLUM: Laurie Garrett! Hi. I didn't know that -- QUESTIONER: Hi, Lee. CULLUM: Hello. QUESTIONER: I run the Global Health program here at the Council. And Mr. Minister, if I may for a moment, I just want to compliment Lee Cullum, who always does such a brilliant job in her questioning. And we owe a debt to you. CULLUM: Thank you, Laurie. Thank you. (Applause.) Thank you very much. Thank you. QUESTIONER: Mr. Minister, before the elections, you had a minister of Health, Dr. Supari, who asserted on behalf of your country the notion of viral sovereignty. The idea was that the H5N1 bird flu virus belonged to Indonesia, not to any other country, not to any other place in the world, and that Indonesia was justified to abrogate certain aspects of the international health regulations in order to protect its sovereignty over the H5N1 bird flu samples. At this point, Indonesia's had more bird flu deaths than any other country in the world, and you've had cases in pigs as well as birds. So there's a great deal of concern on the part of the international community to see those viruses and determine whether there are specific mutations going on and whether something imperils the world as a whole for a pandemic. What is the current administration's position on the notion of viral sovereignty, on the sharing of H5N1 samples and the relationship between surveillance for disease and the sort of Doha round's intellectual-property issues with vaccines? NATALEGAWA: Well, yes, this has been a somewhat difficult issue for many, including for Indonesia. You used the term sovereignty just now to describe our concern and position. Basically, it's about -- I guess you can put it in different ways, but essentially, the main concern that Indonesia -- a country like Indonesia has had is how to ensure access to vaccine. Results of research, et cetera, that may be conducted, like in a country like Indonesia, because of its own -- its own reasons, becomes -- contributes greatly to the finding and discovery of new vaccines. And yet, once those vaccines have been -- have been discovered, have then become available, we have not an access to it in a good way. So there is a principle of accessibility to vaccine that I think our former minister fought for. And I think that message has been made loud and clear. And at the same time, of course, we are mindful of our own international obligations to ensure that our science does not in any way impair or impact on the -- on the -- on the health of -- concerns of other countries as well. So we need to achieve a balance. And I think what our present administration is doing is precisely striking that balance: how to ensure, on the one hand, we live up to our international obligations; but on the other hand, along the line of the message that we have said, of course, before, how we must make the issue of access to vaccines by developing countries a bit more prominent in international discourse, in terms of making sure that countries like Indonesia have -- as population within it, have access to vaccines. And actually, we, Indonesia, together with Norway, have made foreign policy and global health one of the major -- what do you call it -- priority in our foreign policy. We are having a meeting, I think on the 23rd of -- this coming 23rd, on this issue, how we can reach a balance between the concerns of a developing country like Indonesia, and at the same time that generic concern about -- this question of intellectual property and the other issues that we have mentioned. But I think, all in all, the point that I want to say is that the Indonesian government, the president, Indonesian administration is keen to ensure a win-win, mutually reinforcing, mutually satisfactory way of solution to this issue. CULLUM: Yes. QUESTIONER: Hello. My name's Timothy Reuter. I'm with Tiger Trade (ph). I was interested in your thoughts on expanding trade between the U.S. and Indonesia. I know Indonesia recently revised upwards its statistics on what the expected expansion of exports is to the entire world. Where do you see this going in the future, both in terms of amount and flows and sort of the politics of free-trade agreements? Thank you very much. NATALEGAWA: Well, I have just returned from Washington on -- I was in Washington on Friday to have a meeting with Secretary Clinton wherein we launched what we call the joint ministerial commission. It is -- it will -- there will be annual meetings between the secretary of State and the new foreign minister of Indonesia on a regular basis every year, and -- and we will be overseeing some six working groups, on environment, on defense/security issues, on education, on trade and investment and science and technology, among others. I think what we have found is that, while Indonesia-U.S. relations is a -- is a happy one, is a -- is a very positive one, and we are now using the term "comprehensive partnership" to describe Indonesia-U.S. relationship, at the same time, we do identify lacunae and gaps where we can do even better, especially in the investment area and as well -- in the trade area as well. And here, I think, through this Joint Ministerial Commission that we have just established, which will facilitate hopefully greater visits among businesspeople from the United States to Indonesia and likewise, we can really raise the profile of the United States in Indonesia, akin to, for example, China, which has been making a great deal of headways in our region through various kind of free trade agreement that it has been able to come up with between our countries. But all in all, the best is yet to come, in the sense of trade and investment relations with the United States. I hope through forums such as this we can, you know, alert all concerned about the possibilities in Indonesia. As you know, we have this notion of BRIC -- Brazil, India and China and Russia. We have not been categorized under the same chapeau or template. We don't really mind, to be honest, because we would like to overachieve, I think, but now -- nowadays, I think, increasingly there is more and more recognition of the possibilities that Indonesia is offering as an added host to U.S. investment and U.S. trade. And I'm very optimistic about where Indonesia is heading on -- in this economic area. CULLUM: You have every reason to be. I mean, you've come through this economic calamity far better than most. How did you manage that? NATALEGAWA: Well, with a great deal of prudence. I'm afraid we learned the hard way because of the 1998, 1999 financial crisis that -- begun elsewhere, not in our country. It was begun in Thailand, even in Korea, but then we felt the most -- the most extreme form of the crisis in '98, '99. Hence from then on we've become a bit more prudent, a bit more -- even more transparent, a promotion of good governance in our banking practices. And as a result, we were able to withstand the recent financial crisis better than most. I think we registered 6-something percent even during 2008, in 2009 we went down to around 4 percent, and this year, hopefully, we'll have around 6.5 percent. Our domestic economy is sufficiently large, we think, to be able to absorb, then, the downturn in the global financial situation, but the contagious effect of such a situation was obviously very much a situation of concern. But this time around we were, of course, in the G-20 group of nations as well, to ensure that all the remedies that have been suggested to deal with the financial concern, crisis, does not result in prolonged depression or recession in some of our economies. But we work hard. We try to do our best. CULLUM: But also you have 260 million people who are consumers. You're consuming your own produce, is that right? NATALEGAWA: That is what I was saying, to refer to the size of our domestic economy, the largest economy in Southeast Asia, a population of some 230, 250 million people, fast-rising income bracket, a young population as well. I think we are yet to feel the full benefit of the demographics in our country. Because we have a young population, the productivity no doubt will be even more enhanced. And beyond our own country -- because, as you are aware, ASEAN is integrating the ASEAN economic community by 2015. There will be a market of some 500 million people. So I think when -- of course, you have your China, you have your India in our neighborhood. But I think Southeast Asia, Indonesia in particular, has also a positive story to tell. Any -- yes. QUESTIONER: Mr. Minister, Paul Speltz. Thank you very much for your comments. And also, Lee, you asked all the good questions already. CULLUM: Thank you. QUESTIONER: What I'd like to do is just ask a macro question, having served and worked in your country for years. And as you look now at where things stand, what you have achieved, which has been remarkable, in the last eight -- next -- last eight years, what do you see as the four biggest challenges for Indonesia over the next five to 10 years? And how might you be dealing with them? NATALEGAWA: Well, thank you for acknowledging the transformation that Indonesia has been going through over the past 10 years, the so-called Reformasi period, wherein some 250 million people who had previously languished under authoritarian rule almost overnight find themselves transformed into the third-largest democracy in the world. We are still obviously a work in progress in terms of our democratic transition, gone through quite a few shortcomings that we are trying to overcome. But I think the trajectory is well and good. And as I said -- as I've been trying to describe just now, the 10-year period has seen a democratic dividend in many areas: obviously in the economic area, in the transformation from IMF-supported country to a member of the G-20; politically, the resolution of many conflict situations in my own country, Aceh. The -- the situation in the province of Aceh was resolved through dialogue, negotiations; it's unthinkable 30 years ago -- over the past 30 years. So we have had political dividend, economic dividend as part of this bigger democratic dividend. But ahead, the next 10 years or so, we are not taking things for granted, for certain, because there will be still tremendous challenges for us. One thing that we need to be ensuring is that our democracy becomes further stabilized and further solidified, capacity of our democratic institutions, so that we don't revert back to where we were before. But to ensure the strengthening of our democratic institutions, the consolidation of democracy, we must make sure that democracy delivers. It's no good people simply going to elections and taking part in elections. We must ensure that our development continues to take place and that Indonesia earns its place as a -- as a middle- income country, as a country that is fast consolidating its role in the world, as well -- so consolidation of democracy, the (centering ?) of our development efforts to raise the standard of living of our -- of our people, population. The national unity, of course, is a constant focus on -- by us. But on this issue, I think I'm less worried than I would have been 10 years ago, 12 years ago. Because if you would remember in 1998, 2000, political obituaries have been written about Indonesia. Many have said that we would go the route of Yugoslavia or even the Soviet Union in terms of coming apart, but actually we have become stronger by central -- by decentralization rather than by a greater centralization. So development, democracy, ensuring of our unity are key pieces for us, but of course, not the least, how to continue our positive role in international affairs. We want to be recognized as being problem solvers, as being bridge builders; not interested in accentuating differences. We have a motto in our foreign policy just now about -- from the independent (elective ?). It's "million friends and zero enemy." We are keen to build bridges, we have friends -- we are keen to be friendly to all and to ensure that we can really deliver in our international capacity. CULLUM: One last question. When you were working towards your Ph.D., you wrote two dissertations: one on disarmament, and on intervention. NATALEGAWA: Yes. CULLUM: So what do you see ahead for disarmament, on the one hand, and international norms regarding intervention on the other? NATALEGAWA: Well, I'll take the first one first, disarmament. This has been a very big year for disarmament, 2010; and I must acknowledge here, thanks principally to the changed approach by the U.S. administration. I know the U.S. administration and the Russian Federation, the START II -- the agreement that they have reached with the two of them have begun a new -- new possibilities. Indonesia announced earlier this year, in April this year, our commitment to ratify the CTBT, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Indonesia is one of the -- is it nine, or 12? Nine? Indonesia is one of the nine countries whose certification of the CTBT is required before the treaty comes into effect. In the past, Indonesia has chosen to await ratification by the United States before -- CULLUM: That's been a long -- NATALEGAWA: -- before we proceed. But we recalibrate our position. Rather than simply follow, we choose to, hopefully, demonstrate and encourage. And hence, we announced that policy review -- policy statement. We are now fast-tracking our ratification process, hopefully by the end of this year. So disarmament -- a very important issue, the classical sense, in the sense of a reduction, either for the nuclear arsenal of the established nuclear-weapons states, but the proliferation issues also must be very important. I know, of course, the United States very much are concerned about Iran, are very much concerned about North Korea. We are very much concerned over those two situation as well, but we want to be sure that the attempt -- or the effort to ensure nonproliferation is consistent with the principle of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. So that's one. On non-intervention, very much still current. But especially, since you spoke of Myanmar just now, how can we, in the present-day world, ensure that we can be concerned, we can have interests in developments of certain countries' internal situation without being seen to be interfering in the affairs of that country. We do feel that in the present day and age it would be possible, it is possible to have a synergy between friendly concern, friendly interest, with the precepts of non-intervention. CULLUM: Well, Dr. Natalegawa, thank you very much. Have a good week in New York. We're glad you're here. NATALEGAWA: Thank you. (Applause.) If I may, just very quickly, I'd like to -- once again, I'd like to thank everyone for making it possible for today. And I'd like to -- on behalf of all of you, I'm sure, I hope, and I'm certain -- I'd like to say how very much we appreciate the manner you have conducted our conversation -- CULLUM: Thank you. NATALEGAWA: -- Ms. Cullum. As one of you have said just now, you're obviously a person who is extremely well informed on many matters, including my own country. I'm especially pleased to acknowledge your very well-informed status vis-a-vis our foreign policy. Thank you very much. CULLUM: You're very kind. Thank you. (Applause.) Thank you very much.
  • Indonesia
    A Conversation with Marty Natalegawa
    Play
    Indonesian minister of foreign relations, Marty Natalegawa, discusses Indonesia's relationship with the United States, China, and ASEAN, as well as efforts to overcome terrorism and international maritime conflicts.
  • Indonesia
    Indonesia: Winning on Terror, but not on Tolerance
    Last week, Indonesia arrested Abu Bakir Basyir, the most prominent militant cleric in the country, and a man believed to be the spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiah and its offshoots. The government had arrested Abu Bakir before, in 2002, and then several years later, but he served only light sentences, and this time the Indonesian government believes it has much more serious evidence against him, evidence that clearly links him to the planning and running of a terrorist training program in Aceh. The Indonesian police broke up that training program, in another major success story, and in the process captured or killed at least one hundred militants. All of this is being treated, in Jakarta and Washington, as a major triumph. And without a doubt, the government of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has amassed a strong record in fighting terrorism. Detachment 88, the elite police force that has received training from the US, has become a model for counterterrorism, rolling up informants, infiltrating militant cells far more effectively than most Western intelligence agencies, and taking Jemaah Islamiah apart, so that it is a shadow of its presence of five or ten years ago. But even as the Yudhoyono government wins against terrorism, it has proven strikingly mealy-mouthed and ineffective against intolerance. The government mostly says nothing as radical groups have attacked Christians throughout the archipelago and harassed and even attacked secular Indonesians partying at bars in Jakarta. In the past, Yudhoyono has hardly fought back when hardliners have changed laws to discriminate against minority Muslim sects, like the Ahmadiyah, and he seems basically unwilling to take a tough line against the Islamic Defenders Front, a leading vigilante group that tries to enforce its hardline version of Islam, and that is mutating into smaller, more thuggish cells, according to a recent investigation by the Jakarta Post. Yet in the long run, the Indonesian government cannot carry out such a schizophrenic policy. Yudhoyono, a conciliatory and slow-moving politician, moves cautiously, so as not to alienate more religious political allies. But creating the kind of democracy in which public opinion will not accept such intolerance – and thus, public opinion will back the government if it needs to crack down on violent militants – means speaking out publicly against vigilante justice, attacks on Christians, and other affronts. Otherwise, groups like Detachment 88 are just fighting battles, without any context. And in a climate of intolerance, militants will generate new cells as quickly as the government can arrest them. (Photo: Stringer Indonesia/courtesy Reuters)
  • Indonesia
    Restoring Ties to Kopassus?
    Dadang Tri/courtesy Reuters Reasonable people can disagree, I think, on the value of the White House’s decision, announced this week, to restore U.S. ties with Kopassus, the Indonesian Special Forces who have been linked to a range of past abuses, including massacres in East Timor. Boosting the U.S.-Indonesia partnership to a higher level is a critical objective of Obama’s Asia policy, and given that the president has canceled trips repeatedly to Jakarta, this is a sign he can offer to the Indonesian government of his seriousness about the relationship. Of course, as groups like Human Rights Watch note, it is unclear whether Kopassus has really reformed itself, and sending this signal could be questionable at a time when many other nations in Southeast Asia are actually  heading backward on democracy. I see the merits to both arguments. However, one element of the Kopassus debate is extremely worrisome. The US must recognize Kopassus, many argue, because otherwise China will muscle in on the Indonesia relationship, and of course, China has no worries about partnering with alleged human rights abusers. This is a similar argument to why the US needed to re-engage with the Burmese junta and foster closer ties to the regime in Laos, which last time I looked, had held one fewer election in the past two decades than Burma has. All of these decisions could be justified for other reasons; it is not a bad idea to try to re-engage with the Burmese junta, if simply because a decade of sanctions proved fruitless and there are good reasons to work with the Lao government, not least to help empower it to protect crucial parts of the Mekong River. But to develop a policy based on outmuscling China – especially if that policy depends on a race to the bottom with human rights abusers – is a flawed tactic. For one, you can never "out-China" China; as India learned in dealing with Burma, where it reversed years of advocacy for the democratic opposition and threw in with the government, it will always be easier for Beijing to make deals with oppressive regimes, since there is no real legislature or activist movement to question the Chinese government. Like India, the United States shouldn’t try: Will we invest in Sudan because China does? Will we build ties to Uzbekistan because China does? Obviously, it is a slippery slope. What’s more, part of the United States’ advantage, in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, is that its “brand” can be popular not only with regimes but also with average people, provided that it actually sticks to the brand, a brand that includes standing up for human rights. And if Southeast Asia is to return to the democratic path, with opposition parties eventually winning elections in places like Malaysia, Thailand and, yes, even Burma, that U.S. brand will be valued over China’s.
  • Terrorism and Counterterrorism
    Indonesia’s War on Terror
    Dadang Tri/courtesy Reuters The news coverage this week over the White House’s decision to restore ties to Kopassus, the Indonesian Special Forces (more on that decision in a later post), has crowded out what should be a point for celebration. In a recent report, the International Crisis Group, widely respected as an authority on terrorism in Indonesia, declared, “The truth is that the jihadi project has failed in Indonesia.” In other words, the Indonesian authorities have all but won their war on terror. That doesn’t mean there will be no more terrorist attacks – isolated cells and radicalized individuals can still commit acts of deadly violence, and a democratic, relatively poor archipelago with porous borders will always have difficult policing who is coming in and out of the country. But the threat of the early 2000s, of coordinated large-scale attacks like the ones in Bali in 2002 or Jakarta in 2000, and of Islamist recruiting networks dominating the Indonesian school system, seems ever more remote. There are many reasons for this triumph: President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s use of the bully pulpit; Jemaah Islamiah’s tactical mistakes in some of the targets they chose; a deradicalization program for militants that, if controversial, has had some effect on recidivism. But, in large part, it is because the Indonesian police, and particularly elite units like the U.S.-funded Detachment 88, have made strides that other forces in the region, like the Thai units operating in war-torn southern Thailand, have not. The Indonesian police have infiltrated cells, identified terror networks’ leaders, and found informants willing to rat out Jemaah Islamiah leaders and bomb-makers. The police have also  been able to keep the information to themselves long enough to surprise terrorists with raids on their hideouts, and then the police have followed the rule of law enough to avoid their investigations and prosecutions being undermined. All this has come without much support from the Indonesian armed forces, including Kopassus, even though Kopassus today claims it can be a vital partner in combating terrorism. When restoring ties to the Indonesian Special Forces, then, Washington must remember exactly what it is – or isn’t – getting.
  • United States
    Obama and Asia, Part Deux
    Crack Palinggi/courtesy Reuters My colleague Elizabeth Economy raises some important points about my article in Newsweek, but I think that, overall, she takes a far too rosy  view of the White House’s efforts, and its rewards, in Asia. Much of the polling data showing the White House’s popularity or favorability in Asia, for example, reflects as much Asian enthusiasm for Obama, and dislike for his predecessor George W. Bush, as it does any real regional response to the Obama administration’s efforts, or lack thereof, in the region. In Indonesia specifically, the favorability rating reflects Obama’s status as a kind of “local boy,” having spent part of his childhood there; by contrast, specific elements of the mooted US-Indonesia comprehensive partnership are not necessarily popular in important segments in Indonesia, including a renewed relationship with Kopassus. I do, as Liz notes, acknowledge when the administration has made headway. However, even some of the supposed triumphs are not necessarily so. The U.S.-South Korea free trade deal was negotiated by the previous administration, and despite Obama’s vow to move forward with it, the conditions he might attach to rethinking it may well kill it anyway, thereby both raising Seoul’s hopes and crushing them at the same time. The Trans-Pacific Partnership, meanwhile, is not an initiative launched by the Obama administration – it was started by Chile, Singapore, and New Zealand, and joined by the United States years later. The Obama administration, as even some administration officials admit in private, highlighted the TPP during the president’s visit to Asia last year exactly because the White House did not have any other good news on trade to offer, and TPP is so far from coming into reality that Washington could support it without having to face any real consequences of that support. Liz’s criticisms of my critique of China policy are reasonable, and perhaps some of my points got too compressed in the article. I do believe that the administration’s conciliatory moves toward China earlier on alienated India, Singapore, and to some extent the Philippines. By contrast, I think that, at times, the White House’s lack of attention to the region has pushed other countries – namely, Indonesia, Cambodia, Thailand, and at times Japan closer to Beijing. However, to ask “are we really worried” about China’s soft power compared to that of the United States is too trusting in the United States’ long-term roots in the region. Yes, polling data comparing the United States and China’s popularity now shows the United States ahead, just as several years ago, when I did research for my first book, it showed China ahead – again, the polls then were skewed by the response to George W. Bush and now have been skewed by the personal popularity of Obama. Were Obama to be replaced by a figure with less global popularity, like Sarah Palin, you might see the figures reverse once again. But the underlying trends surely must cause U.S. policymakers to worry: regional economic integration occurring largely without the United States and now including even Taiwan, even if the US-Korea deal actually by some miracle is finalized; Chinese outreach to Indonesian students and academics, even as Washington has ignored the Indonesians’ desire to include Peace Corps  programs to send Indonesians to the US; growing Chinese aid across mainland Southeast Asia, which has emboldened leaders like Hun Sen and in part prompted the US to re-engage with regimes like the Burmese junta; and rising Chinese projection into areas, like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, where the US already had weak historical links. One popular president can’t forestall all those trends.
  • United States
    What Now for U.S.-Indonesia Policy?
    Jim Young / Courtesy of Reuters In the wake of President Obama’s canceled trip to Indonesia – his third cancellation in less than a year – officials on both sides are urging calm. The White House has vowed to add Jakarta to Obama’s Asia trip in November, while Indonesian officials reportedly assured their American counterparts that President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono did not take offense and understands that Obama had to stay in the United States to manage the fallout from the massive BP oil spill. But even if everyone tries to make nice, the White House’s ambitions for the relationship with Indonesia will at least be damaged. The hope had been not simply that Indonesia would be one of many important Asian relationships, worthy of a visit as part of a longer regional swing, but that Indonesia would be for Obama what India was for George W. Bush – a country where he could take credit for vastly upgrading relations. This type of partnership, however, requires one-on-one bilateral visits that would appeal to a broad range of Indonesian policy makers, and, more importantly, to the general public there, which is already inclined to support Obama. In India, for example, though successive governments have pushed for much closer ties to the United States, a legacy of popular distrust of the United States, particularly pronounced among older Indians who remember frosty relations during the Cold War, has hindered progress in the relationship and made the U.S.-India nuclear deal controversial there. Though President Yudhoyono likely would deny it, Obama’s repeated cancellations have also hurt Yudhoyono’s standing in Jakarta.  The Indonesian president, for all his flaws of sloth and indecisiveness, has tried to move Jakarta closer to Washington, which is a gamble in Indonesian politics. SBY’s decision is a major shift from the early 2000s, when the vice president in Megawati Sukarnoputri’s government, Hamzah Haz, celebrated the 9/11 attacks as a means to “cleanse America of its sins,” and Megawati seemed utterly indecisive as to whether she wanted closer ties to the United States. But many Indonesian political figures – Islamists, old school figures from the Suharto era, and urban leftists -- remain suspicious of Washington and highly skeptical that the United States can deliver on the economic, military, and strategic promises that would come with upgraded bilateral ties. Repeated failures to come through on a presidential visit, which also would have provided the best opportunity to announce all the specific details of the new comprehensive partnership, only strengthen these doubters, making it seem like Yudhoyono was naïve to put such trust in relations with the United States. At a time when retrograde elements like Golkar Party chairman Aburizal Bakrie are already making headway again in Jakarta, putting reformers on the defensive, Washington can hardly afford to give these doubters any more ammunition.