China

At this moment of profound global uncertainty and unprecedented socioeconomic crisis in Brazil, it is difficult to speculate about the future direction of the China-Brazil relationship. The two countries would have much to gain by adopting a shared commitment to social and environmental sustainability.

The Digital Silk Road's extension to Latin America has had both advantages and potential risks for states in Latin America and the Caribbean.

The dramatic growth in trade and investment relations between China and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has not yet translated into a significant expansion of Beijing’s influence over the region’s media and civil society.

Amazon, tech companies drop Parler; Treasury Department sanctions individuals in Russia-linked effort to influence U.S. election; Commerce Department issues rules to block telecom equipment from six countries; Trump administration blacklists nine additional Chinese companies; and Uganda blocks social media platforms ahead of general election.

2020 was a difficult year for Chinese tech companies. 2021 won't be any easier.

Experts assessing cybersecurity fallout after raid on Capitol; Trump bans U.S. transactions on eight additional Chinese apps; Anne Neuberger tapped for new NSC cybersecurity role; U.S. extradition attempt for Assange fails; and Singapore reverses course on contact tracing data.

This article is co-authored with Chaesung Chun, Patrick Cronin and Sang-hyun Lee. The U.S.-South Korea alliance has survived for almost seven decades, and has sustained peace on the Korean peninsula since the Korean War. To thrive going forward, however, the alliance must not only hold open the door to the establishment of peace and denuclearization with North Korea, but expand even further. The U.S.-South Korea alliance should refashion itself to meet urgent global challenges and enhance regional and global prosperity. Although the list of global challenges has rarely been more daunting than it is now—from the pandemic to North Korea’s nuclear program to China’s growing assertiveness—common pursuit of a partnership built on shared values has never been more essential to overcoming nationalist-driven impulses, domestic divisions and defend against economic and political coercion. The U.S.-South Korea alliance should work bilaterally and in concert multilaterally with like-minded partners for peaceful solutions to disputes based on agreed-upon rules and to expand space for cooperation and peace-building in Korea, Asia and beyond. Toward that aim, the U.S. and South Korea should quickly resolve issues like burden-sharing costs, the transition of operational control and impediments to the maintenance of military readiness. To do so, both “America first” and “Korea first” impulses will have to be set aside in favor of continued force integration and the establishment of institutions strong enough to protect alliance cooperation from the threat of rising nationalist challenges. Resolution of these issues will enable Presidents Joe Biden and Moon Jae-in to more effectively coordinate policies toward North Korea and expand the focus of the alliance to larger contextual issues, such as how to better handle Chinese economic and political coercion while leveraging new technological forms of cooperation to address challenges to a peaceful and prosperous democratic global order. Early consultations between Biden and Moon to fashion a joint strategy toward North Korea are critical, and will be closely watched. North Korea and others will be looking for early signs of a combined approach that enhances stability on the Korean peninsula, affirms a commitment to the peaceful coexistence of the two Koreas, establishes a pathway and benchmarks for economic cooperation, and strives to overcome mistrust and removes the nuclear issue as an obstacle to improved political relations. The two allies should expand the breadth of their alliance to hold in-depth consultations that also include blunting the effectiveness of Chinese policies that resort to economic and political coercion rather than accepting the peaceful rules-based settlement of disputes. The establishment of a whole-of-alliance approach to policy toward China will require in-depth dialogue to understand and close gaps between Washington and Seoul on how to effectively respond to China’s growing assertiveness. The U.S.-South Korea alliance approach must be developed alongside multilaterally coordinated efforts both with regional and global U.S. alliance partners to clearly establish the conditions necessary to push back on “might makes right” efforts to establish a Sinocentric order. Large-state bullying needs to be dissuaded in favor of a global system that encourages disputes to be resolved through peaceful diplomatic negotiations. There are even more significant opportunities to expand the alliance functionally, both to develop new frontiers for alliance cooperation and to enhance joint responses to common threats that endanger humankind. As leaders in development and practical application of technologies, the U.S.-South Korea alliance has the potential to address emerging global challenges in the areas of health, climate change, AI, energy security, supply chains and space cooperation. The U.S.-South Korea alliance stands as an antidote that can be readily used to manage not only the ongoing challenge posed by North Korea, but also to address the shared threats of heightened nationalism, major power rivalry and global health challenges facing the two nations. The authors have completed a year-long study for the East Asia Institute analyzing the U.S.-ROK alliance and recommending a course for the future, the full text of which is available here.

Neil Edwards is an Open Source African Media Analyst at Novetta. Media analysis for this piece was enabled by Novetta data. On December 3, John Nkengasong, director of the Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) announced a 60 percent vaccination target—one estimate of the level needed to achieve herd immunity from COVID-19—in Africa’s fifty-four countries. Since American and European officials have pre-purchased vaccines from Pfizer and Moderna for domestic use, African governments and the Africa CDC are being forced to find alternative vaccine supplies. The immunization drive is expected to be among the largest in the continent’s history—the first being the campaign to eradicate polio, which required 9 billion oral vaccine doses, over the course of twenty-four years. The World Health Organization’s COVAX program aims to help developing countries secure vaccines. However, the program will only cover the most vulnerable 20 percent of each country’s population. Assuming that each vaccine requires the administration of two doses, Africa, with a population of over 1.3 billion people, will need at least 1.6 billion doses to meet its 60 percent vaccination target. Africa CDC—after accounting for COVAX’s contribution—will need to secure 1.28 billion more doses at an estimated cost of $13.54 billion to close the remaining gap. More vaccines may be needed, however, as some will inevitably spoil during transport—Africa’s heat, rainy seasons, and poor road infrastructure provide logistical barriers to distribution. To make up for COVAX’s limited reach, African governments are considering deals to buy vaccines that are viewed with skepticism in the West. In particular, several governments have expressed interest in China’s leading vaccine, BBIBP-CorV, developed by the China National Pharmaceutical Group (SinoPharm); Novetta’s Rumor Tracking Program revealed that Russia’s leading vaccine, Sputnik V, also remains popular on the continent. The SinoPharm vaccine received approval for distribution on January 4 after reporting a 79 percent efficacy rate in interim late-stage trials. The vaccine is now being lined up to inoculate 50 million people in China before January 15, with second shots to be delivered before February 5—all free of charge to Chinese citizens. However, medical experts have questioned the vaccine’s safety, citing China’s unwillingness to release publicly any of their trial results. Regardless, China could use vaccine access to bolster its economic and political influence in Africa and other regions struggling to secure enough vaccines. In May, Chinese President Xi Jinping addressed developing countries’ need for vaccines, offering to provide the Chinese vaccine as a “public good” at an affordable price. On October 16, Liu Jingzhen, chairman of SinoPharm, told fifty African diplomats visiting a SinoPharm vaccine factory that “after the COVID-19 vaccine is developed and put into use, it will take the lead in benefiting African countries.” Those who visited offered messages of reassurance to their citizens regarding the vaccine. James Kimonyo, Rwanda’s Ambassador to China, commented on SinoPharm’s size and experience developing vaccines on polio, yellow fever, and smallpox, stating that the visit was “an eye-opener” that led him to “hope that we get the vaccines anytime soon.” This “vaccine diplomacy” is a continuation of China’s efforts to frame itself as the solution to—rather than the cause of—the pandemic. Since the early days of the COVID-19 outbreak, China’s President Xi Jinping has focused on publicizing Chinese efforts to supply medical aid worldwide. According to state-owned China Global Television Network, an international language broadcasting network, from March to mid-October the Jack Ma Foundation delivered over four hundred tons of medical supplies across Africa, including monthly deliveries of thirty million testing kits, ten thousand ventilators, and eight million surgical masks. In addition, the Chinese government claims that it sent nearly two hundred experts to support medical personnel across the continent. China’s planeloads of COVID-19 donations—including hospital gowns, nasal swabs, and surgical masks—were initially viewed positively, especially in countries like Zimbabwe, where equipment in public hospitals has been systemically looted over the years. However, in August, a corruption scandal emerged over Jack Ma’s medical donations in Kenya and Tanzania. Kenya’s Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission accused the Kenya Medical Supplies Authority of selling a consignment of medical equipment intended for the Kenyan people to a dozen Tanzanian companies in March. The scandal raised doubts over China’s ability to circumnavigate corrupt institutions and ensure that medical supplies—including vaccines—will arrive and be administered to their intended targets. In another front of China’s public-relations offensive, state-owned news outlets are suggesting the SinoPharm vaccine has technological and logistical advantages over mRNA vaccines, such as those developed by Moderna and Pfizer-BioNTech. The Global Times, a Communist Party mouthpiece, emphasized SinoPharm’s use of an “inactivated” vaccine, a decades-old technique used for influenza and polio vaccinations that delivers a killed or weakened virus into the body to prompt an immune response. This was presented in contrast to Western firms using “less-proven technologies” to develop their vaccines. The Global Times further questioned whether African medical staff have the experience to deal with any adverse reactions from mRNA vaccines. Chinese media assert that distribution networks in Africa are well-established due to existing commercial ties. Alibaba, Jack Ma’s e-commerce giant, has a firm footing on the continent; the company recently struck a deal with Ethiopian Airlines to ship vaccines to Africa. Media also highlight that SinoPharm’s inactivated vaccine can be transported in affordable, off-grid refrigeration units—a genuine advantage over mRNA vaccines, which need to be stored between -20 and -70 degrees Celsius. In Africa, tropical heat and a dearth of ultra-cold freezers—the machines can go for over $15,000, more than fifteen times the cost of off-grid units—make it especially challenging to deliver mRNA vaccines to rural communities and remote islands. Yet despite Chinese media’s questioning of mRNA vaccines, one Chinese company, Fosun Pharmaceutical, partnered with Pfizer-BioNTech to develop and commercialize the mRNA vaccine that has been authorized in many Western countries. Furthermore, in December, following a strategic cooperation agreement between Fosun Pharmaceutical and SinoPharm, China agreed to receive 100 million doses of the popular mRNA vaccine—demonstrating an approach to stockpile both domestic and foreign-made vaccines. China’s vaccine diplomacy in Africa serves to be a high-risk, high-reward venture. If SinoPharm’s vaccine restores a sense of normalcy to life across Africa, China will be praised. However, if the vaccine proves ineffective or creates unforeseen health effects, China’s carefully crafted image—one based on ideals of credibility and philanthropy—could be undermined.

It has been over two years since Chinese officials detained Canadians Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor. How the next U.S. administration handles this issue could foreshadow the future of U.S.-Canada relations.

The effects of COVID-19 on Southeast Asia’s health, economies, and political systems will not be the only stories to watch in the region in 2021, although they will surely be among the most important. But the region also will be impacted by shifting geopolitical and trade tensions and the effects of superpower rivalry. 4. U.S.-China Tensions and Their Impact in Southeast Asia Although the incoming U.S. presidential administration may shift some aspects of the U.S.-China relationship, it is unlikely to alter the overall trajectory of U.S.-China ties, which continues to evolve into outright competition in many spheres. The Biden administration will, however, probably want to bolster relations with Southeast Asia to create a broader coalition to push back against some of Beijing’s actions. While shifting the nature of the relationship with China, the Trump White House simultaneously alienated several important partners in Southeast Asia, which made it even harder to build any regional bulwark against Beijing. The new White House likely will make efforts rhetorically to reset ties with Indonesia, Thailand, and other Southeast Asian states, possibly reduce trade tensions with these states in order to reset ties, and try to restore the United States’ role in multilateral trade integration, although this may be impossible to do given the U.S. political environment. It also may bolster the U.S. focus on regional cooperation related to COVID-19 and climate change, two issues of central importance to Southeast Asian states, which are on the frontlines of climate change in particular. And China’s image in the region has indeed suffered significantly during the COVID-19 pandemic, as it has in some other parts of the world, in part due to regional concerns about Beijing’s more nationalistic and belligerent regional diplomacy despite the pandemic. Yet even with its image suffering, Beijing retains significant pull in Southeast Asia. China will remain the region’s most important trading partner, and its trade relationship will only grow in the coming years; given the shifting nature of U.S. domestic politics, there is little likelihood that in a new administration the United States will participate in Asian trade integration. China’s economy continues to perform well, even as most of the world struggles due to COVID-19, and this economic strength puts Beijing in a powerful position regionally and even in its bilateral trade relationship with the United States. China also likely will provide a significant amount of vaccines to Southeast Asian states, especially poorer countries in mainland Southeast Asia, giving it further leverage. With other powerful blocs like the European Union recently agreeing to trade or investment deals with China, and with Southeast Asian states (and several other Asian countries) pushing through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), Southeast Asian states will be even harder for a new U.S. administration to convince that they should work with Washington to make any trade demands of Beijing. Indeed, there is little reason to expect most of them to push back against China’s increasingly assertive diplomacy, crackdown on rights at home, or export of its developmental model.

Possibly the most significant cyber breach targeting the U.S. government in years, the compromise of SolarWinds highlights the need for a risk-based approach to supply chain security and resilience. 

As 2020 comes to a close, here are five foreign policy news stories to follow in the coming year.