War Returns to the Democratic Republic of Congo: What to Know

In January, rebel fighters claimed the eastern city of Goma in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Their sweep into Goma—a longtime humanitarian hub—marks the worst escalation in an ongoing insurgency since 2012. The fighting has prompted hundreds of thousands of people to flee and fueled government accusations that Rwanda was declaring war by supporting the rebels. Editor Mariel Ferragamo talked to Stuart Reid, author of The Lumumba Plot, about what’s behind the fighting.

Who is involved in the latest spate of fighting?

The conflict is largely confined to three eastern provinces: North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri. More than 120 armed groups are operating there, and at the risk of oversimplifying, there are basically two sides: the Congolese government forces and their allies, and the pro-Rwandan, antigovernment rebels.

On the Congolese government side, there’s the Congolese military and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a militia composed of ethnic Hutu extremists, the oldest of whom are refugees who were involved in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. FDLR advocates for the overthrow of the current Rwandan government, but it’s fairly weak these days, by most experts’ assessment. There are also Mai-Mai groups, which are a smattering of local militias, each with its own particular identity and agenda.

The main rebel group is called M23—composed mostly of ethnic Tutsis and which launched its first rebellion back in 2012. It receives material support from Rwanda, and Rwandan soldiers have fought alongside the group. Other rebel groups on that side include the ADF, which originated in Uganda and has some ties with the Islamic State group, also known as ISIS. 

Then, there are the eleven thousand UN peacekeeping troops. They’re cooperating to some extent with the Congolese government forces, but their main goal is to protect civilians. They’re not universally popular, and there have been occasional public protests against the peacekeeping mission. The United Nations and Congolese government agreed to withdraw peacekeepers, though it’s been delayed. 

What sparked the fighting?

The latest round of fighting was spurred by the collapse of peace talks and the M23’s launching of an offensive. But let’s back up for a moment. Although the conflict is unbelievably complicated, it’s helpful to look at it on three different levels: local, national, and regional.

At the local level, there are fights over identity and who gets to be considered Congolese. Ethnic tensions, mineral resources such as gold and coltan, and access to fertile land—all are hyperlocal drivers of conflict.

Then there is the national level. Congo is cursed with an extremely weak government led by President Félix Tshisekedi. That government is also of questionable legitimacy, given that Tshisekedi came to power in 2019 after a fraudulent process and then stayed in power after flawed elections in 2023. The Congolese security forces, for their part, are both weak and predatory. Often, they harass local populations and are unwelcome.

Finally there are regional factors. These include the presence of foreign armed groups—especially from Rwanda—and tensions between Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame. Peace talks between the two countries broke down last December, and negotiations between the two leaders were canceled. Then came the M23’s January offensive into Goma.

You mentioned Rwanda. How has it played into the conflict today?

Rwanda has been backing the M23 rebels, giving them weapons, drones, and ammunition. Between three and four thousand Rwandan troops are even on Congolese soil, according to UN reporting.

It’s impossible to overstate the memory of the 1994 genocide in explaining the thinking of Rwandan officials. The Hutu militias who perpetrated the genocide fled to refugee camps in eastern Congo shortly after, and Kigali sees the current iteration of these groups as existential threats living just across the border. This is how Rwanda justifies its own intervention (never mind that many of these groups are in fact quite weak now). There’s also economic motivation at play, as Rwanda is exporting smuggled gold and other minerals.

After watching recent mediation efforts between the DRC and Rwanda fall through, what do you think a DRC-Rwanda peace deal would take shape as?

Two things need to change for lasting stability. One is a more legitimate and capable Congolese government, meaning one that has actual democratic transitions of power and security forces who can control territory without harming local populations.

The second thing that needs to change is the main external factor: Rwanda’s meddling. The West has leverage over Rwanda. A third of the country’s budget comes from foreign aid and loans; the United States and the European Union (EU) could pressure Rwanda to cut off its support for the rebels. This was the method tried back in 2012–13, which had some success. Of course, Rwanda will point to the internal instability in Congo to make its case for continued meddling.

What else are Western powers like the United States and EU doing in the DRC?

The EU is a large provider of humanitarian aid and has been a diplomatic actor engaged in peacemaking efforts over the years. U.S. policy has been consistent, but relatively limited. There’s a lot of humanitarian assistance; $6 billion has gone from the United States to Congo over the past decade, and the United States has supported the UN peacekeeping mission. The Joe Biden administration undertook efforts at mediation between Kagame and Tsheskedi.

Backing up to 1960, the post-independence experience was one of crisis and disaster. It was rushed, with extremely little preparation on Belgium’s part, and it had the misfortune of taking place during the Cold War. The country was thrown into chaos, and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba was assassinated with the CIA’s complicity in January 1961. His replacement was Joseph Mobutu, later Mobutu Sese Seko, the country’s pro-American dictator throughout the Cold War. Mobutu ran the country into the ground.

His successor, Laurent Kabila, was also installed by foreign powers. He ruled through the first and second Congo Wars until he was assassinated in 2001. His son succeeded him. A peace deal was struck in 2003, but it didn’t end all the fighting. Arguably, we are now in the third phase of this same overall conflict.

But one thing that I think is important to point out is that the current problems—as much as I said the roots of them can be traced to outside intervention—are not the result of outside meddling today. This is a common conspiracy theory in Congolese politics, understandably so, given the history of actual meddling. But in fact, the rest of the world largely ignores, rather than meddles in, the DRC today.

Let’s get into that past outside intervention a little more. You wrote a book, The Lumumba Plot, telling the story of Belgium’s and the CIA’s role in the DRC’s post-independence crisis. What’s the effect of that past U.S. and European intervention on the country’s strength today?

The most important thing that happened after independence was the CIA’s installation of Mobutu and the continued propping up of him throughout the Cold War. The government was not popularly legitimate, so Mobutu did not have an authentic source of support. His government was not dependent on providing services to the Congolese people for its continued existence and power; it was paid for by the United States. That tilted Congo off of its natural political axis and led to decades of misrule and the Congo wars.

Belgian colonialism also left behind a legacy of weak institutions. The Belgians operated their colony with little real development. They placed strict limits on how much education Congolese people could receive. They heightened awareness of ethnic identity—every colonial self-identifying form had a blank for “tribe” to be entered. Those factors shaped the country’s trajectory, no doubt about it.

How has all this affected Congolese civilians?

The statistics are staggering: there have been more than six million deaths related to the conflict since 1996. There’s some disagreement about how to calculate this figure, but suffice it to say, it’s an extremely high number. The UN refugee agency has estimated now six million internally displaced people, and over a million Congolese refugees abroad, mostly in neighboring African countries. Five hundred thousand refugees from other countries are in the DRC. There’s rampant sexual assault and recruitment of child soldiers. 

Depending on where one lives in Congo, the humanitarian situation can be very bad. But in the capital, Kinshasa, the problem of violence can seem very distant because the conflict is largely confined to the east, over a thousand miles away. There’s less of a sense of urgency. And in fact, there is a perverse incentive to have the security forces occupied in the east as opposed to being present in Kinshasa, where they represent a potential threat to the government.

[Editor’s Note: At the time of publishing, the latest outburst of violence in Goma has caused at least another three thousand deaths and around seven hundred thousand internally displaced in the region since the start of the conflict in late January. These numbers are expected to continue climbing. Civilians face widespread gender-based and sexual violence and disease outbreaks. News broke this week that well over a hundred women were assaulted and then burned alive after a mass jailbreak in Goma.]

Why do you think this issue is so underlooked on the global stage, despite it being one of the biggest displacement crises worldwide?

An instructive comparison is coverage of the war in Ukraine, which has been extensive by contrast. In Ukraine, you have a relatively simple story: a foreign aggressor invades the country. There’s a clear sense of right and wrong. In Congo, it’s much more complicated. There is a tangle of causes and a proliferation of actors. There’s also no clear narrative, and narratives matter. 

A second factor is the perceived geopolitical importance of where the conflict is taking place. One is at the edge of Europe; the other is in the middle of Africa. In terms of Western interests, and therefore Western press coverage, there’s a difference.

Then there are more pernicious factors behind the lack of coverage. For one thing, violence is seen as expected and typical in Africa, and so the war in eastern Congo isn’t deemed worthy of coverage because it’s “more of the same.” For another thing, there’s the racial factor. In Ukraine, you have white Christians being attacked; in Congo, it’s Black people. I can’t help but think that affects Western press coverage.

You mentioned that there are misinformation narratives within the country. But are there common framings that the United States and other Western media also get wrong about the conflict?

One thing worth discussing is the focus on conflict minerals. The DRC has massive amounts of copper, cobalt, tantalum, and gold. There’s been an argument that the resources are fueling the conflict. There’s some truth to this, and this focus has helped generate a lot of attention, which can be a good thing.

But there’s a debate among experts about the relative importance of natural resources versus other factors. I do think things other than conflict minerals have gotten short shrift: ethnic tensions, the weakness of the Congolese state, the need for security-sector reform, and intervention by Rwanda, to name a few.

There’s also the problem that the focus on conflict minerals led to U.S. legislation about disclosing conflict minerals. That has sometimes had a perverse effect of causing a de facto boycott of Congolese minerals, which ends up harming the Congolese.

What does the DRC government need to find peace and an end to its suffering? Do you think the DRC can solve this, either militarily or diplomatically, without the United Nations?

I think the UN peacekeeping mission is a Band-Aid, but it’s an important Band-Aid. If the eleven thousand UN peacekeepers were to leave the country tomorrow, life for Congolese civilians would get worse.

Pressure on Rwanda would also help. Foreign meddling is a huge part of the problem, but there’s only so much Congo can do about that on its own. The root problem is the Congolese state: its weakness, its illegitimacy, and its ineffective and exploitative security forces. Ending the violence would require fixing these ailments. 

What’s the likelihood of that?

The Congo still has not experienced a truly democratic and peaceful transition of power in its entire history as an independent country. The military has been fragmented since independence. It’s never been cohesive or popular. All that makes me pessimistic. But no one should give up hope. The Congolese people certainly haven’t.

This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. 

Conversation has been edited for length and clarity.