Toward a Settlement of the Russia-Ukraine War

Thomas Graham is a distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

This Ukraine Policy Brief is part of the Council Special Initiative on Securing Ukraine's Future and the Wachenheim Program on Peace and Security.

Executive Summary

President Donald Trump will find that it will take much time and effort to negotiate an end to the Russia-Ukraine war that advances U.S. interests and burnishes his reputation as a peacemaker. Because Kyiv faces deteriorating conditions, it should be easier to persuade it to negotiate seriously than it will be Russian President Vladimir Putin, who believes he is making progress toward achieving his maximal goals. The key to getting him to think otherwise is to convince him that time is not on his side. That requires action in four areas: articulation of a shared Western and Ukrainian vision of success; continued support for Ukraine’s war effort and its integration into the Euro-Atlantic community; resistance to Russia, including targeted sanctions, ramped-up weapons production, and pressure on its partners; and incentives for Russia such as an offer to restore more normal diplomatic relations. 

Because the Kremlin sees the war as part of a wider confrontation with the West, the settlement will have to be embedded in a discussion of European security. And that means that the main conversations will have to take place between Washington and Moscow. Because of the complexity of the issues involved, the settlement will not likely come in the form of a single agreement, but rather in a series of agreements devoted to discrete issues, negotiated at different paces over an extended period. The likely elements of a settlement include a cease-fire along the line of contact, non-bloc status for Ukraine coupled with security cooperation with the West, de facto Russian control of the Ukrainian territory it has seized, and limited sanctions relief.

Presidential engagement will be critical to success, but the hard work will have to be done by two presidential envoys. The process should be initiated by a Trump-Putin phone call, followed by intense U.S. consultations with its allies and Ukraine and talks between the Russian and U.S. envoys, with the goal of agreeing on the conditions for a cease-fire and a roadmap for an enduring settlement. Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy would endorse the cease-fire and roadmap at a summit, and Putin would add his endorsement at a subsequent summit with Trump.

Setting the Stage for Peace

President Trump has vowed to quickly settle the Russia-Ukraine war. He is right to seek an end to the carnage. But he will find that it will take considerable time and careful preparation to produce a resolution that advances an enduring peace in Europe, discourages Russia and other powers from using force to seize the territory of another state, and burnishes his own reputation as a peacemaker and statesman.

Three years of savage warfare have compelled Russian and Ukrainian leaders to reassess their immediate goals. Outmanned and outgunned on the battlefield, subjected to withering aerial assaults on major cities and critical infrastructure, and unsure of continuing Western—especially U.S.—support, Ukrainian leaders have abandoned their earlier goal of expelling Russia from all Ukrainian territory seized since the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. The goal now is to prevent, to the extent possible, further Russian encroachment and move toward a cease-fire with ironclad security guarantees to deter Russian aggression in the future.

Russian President Putin, by contrast, has only hardened his position. Bolstered by grinding progress on the battlefield, an economy that proved unexpectedly resilient against Western sanctions—Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP) rose between 3 and 4 percent in the past two years—and Ukraine’s mounting problems in the face of flagging Western support, Putin has shown no interest in negotiating anything other than Ukraine’s capitulation. His demands, laid out explicitly last June and reiterated in the past several weeks, include: Ukraine’s recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea and the four provinces it annexed in 2022 (even though Russia does not fully control any one of them), its renunciation of ambitions to join NATO, and its demilitarization and denazification (code for the installation of a Russian puppet regime in Kyiv), as well as the lifting of Western sanctions.

Putin does face major economic and manpower problems. The Central Bank of Russia forecasts that economic growth will plunge to 0.5–1.5 percent this year. Meanwhile, the demands of a war economy for workers and military operations for soldiers have raised the possible need for a general mobilization, which the Kremlin anxiously wants to avoid. Even a partial mobilization in fall 2022 sparked widespread social unrest. But Putin is apparently wagering that Ukraine will crack before those problems bite.

In those circumstances, the Trump administration will find it relatively easy to persuade Kyiv to make the tough decisions needed to reach a settlement, although Kyiv will not be a pushover by any means. The challenge will be persuading Putin to negotiate in earnest and good faith, and reaching a settlement that Putin can accept that still meets the minimal requirements of the United States, its European allies, and Ukraine. Success will require imagination, skill, and tenacity.

The War and European Security

Success will also require recognizing that, for the Kremlin, the war is not simply, or even primarily, about Ukraine. It is part of a broader conflict the Kremlin is waging against the West to revise the post–Cold War settlement, which it believes the West imposed on Russia at a time of extreme strategic weakness. The expansion of NATO in particular drove Russia to the margins of Europe, depriving it of the buffer zone it considers critical to its security and eroding its status as a great power on the global stage. Tellingly, the draft security treaties with NATO and the United States, which the Kremlin released in December 2021, had little to say about Ukraine. The focus was on defanging NATO and undoing the geopolitical consequences of its post–Cold War eastward expansion.

The Kremlin’s perspective bears two immediate implications for the Trump administration’s approach. First, the settlement of the war will have to be embedded in a broader discussion of European security. Second, the critical conversations will be not between Moscow and Kyiv but rather between Moscow and Washington. The reason is straightforward: only the United States, as the ultimate guarantor of European security, and Russia, the continent’s leading military power, can unilaterally alter the security equation in Europe. And Moscow—wrongly—presumes that only the United States enjoys genuine agency and can impose a solution on Ukraine and its European allies. There will be no progress toward a settlement until Washington talks directly with Moscow, without the Europeans and Ukrainians in the room.

Elements of Strategy

The key to getting Putin to negotiate in earnest is to convince him that time is not on his side, that this conflict can continue without a Russian breakthrough on the front until he has to confront severe economic and manpower crises that will test the limits of his own power. Action in four areas will help create the necessary pressure and incentives:

• Vision for Ukraine. The United States, its European allies, and Ukraine need to agree on a vision for Ukraine’s future to guide their current policy choices. The less public daylight there is between them, the less reason Moscow will have to believe it can drive wedges that will undercut Kyiv’s position. A suitable, and achievable, vision could be the emergence of a strong, secure, democratic, and prosperous Ukraine anchored in the Euro-Atlantic community on as much of Ukraine’s internationally recognized territory as possible, given military realities.
• Support for Ukraine. To advance that vision, the West will have to continue to provide military, financial, and humanitarian support to Ukraine. Just as important will be steps to show that the process of integration is underway and accelerating. Critical in this regard will be progress in the EU accession talks, with Ukraine undertaking the needed socioeconomic and political reforms required for membership. Although NATO membership is not in the offing, the various bilateral security agreements that Ukraine has signed with all Group of Seven (G7) countries and many NATO members could be consolidated into a potent support network, which would help integrate Ukraine into European security structures and provide a reliable deterrent against future Russian aggression.
• Resistance to Russia. Resistance can come in many forms: well-targeted and enforced sanctions that erode Russia’s ability to prosecute the war (as opposed to sanctions that are largely punitive and therefore counterproductive because they strengthen domestic support for the Kremlin’s war effort), a concerted effort to expand and rationalize Europe’s defense-industrial sector to demonstrate determination to outproduce Russia in critical military equipment, stepped up pressure on a newly vulnerable Iran to reduce the level of material support it can provide Russia, and insistence that China’s support for Russia remain a factor in bilateral U.S.-China relations.
• Incentives for Russia. The main incentive would be the offer to restore more normal diplomatic relations, coupled with the rejection of any calls for Russia’s strategic defeat or regime change. Washington should acknowledge that Moscow will be a central pillar of any future world order and that constructive relations are critical to future global stability and security. This would not be a call for a reset, but rather a call to transform a dangerous adversarial relationship into one of competitive coexistence, in which the inevitable strategic and geopolitical disputes could be managed responsibly.

Elements of a Settlement

At some point, Washington will have to present a framework for the resolution of the war in Ukraine to Moscow. The elements should be vetted with Ukraine and European allies in advance, with the aim of achieving the broadest agreement possible (but not necessarily complete consensus on all points). The first task would be getting Moscow’s agreement to an enduring cease-fire, which would set the stage for the resolution of the full range of issues over time. Because some elements of any settlement will have to be embedded in a larger agreement on arrangements for European security, the talks would likely continue for an extended period. In this regard, the settlement of the conflict should not be conceived as a single act, codified in a peace treaty, but as a prolonged process marked by periodic agreements on discrete issues as they can be achieved. That approach is much the way the United States dealt—ultimately successfully—with the trials of the Cold War.

Based on an assessment of what Moscow and Kyiv could find minimally acceptable and U.S. interests, conditions of the settlement could include the following:     

• Cease-fire along the line of contact. This would also entail the cessation of all aerial attacks on each other’s territory. The separation of forces would be monitored by national technical means, much as arms control agreements were during the Cold War. (Russia will never accept a monitoring mission composed of military forces from third countries.) A trilateral U.S.-Russia-Ukraine commission could be established to deal with disputes.
• Non-bloc status for Ukraine. Ukraine would abandon its effort to join NATO and amend its constitution accordingly. It would also formally abjure any effort to acquire nuclear weapons and agree to ban foreign military bases on its soil. Ukraine would, however, remain free to maintain and develop security, military, and intelligence cooperation with other countries, including NATO members. Demilitarization is a nonstarter for Ukraine, although limits on its armed forces are conceivable as part of a broader arrangement on European security, in which Russia would also accept limits on its armed forces in a wide zone bordering Ukraine.
• Disposition of territory. Russia would retain de facto control of the territory it has seized so far, and Ukraine would renounce any effort to use force to regain the lost land. Ukraine and the West would withhold de jure recognition of Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian lands.
• Minority rights. Kyiv would explicitly recommit to the protection of minority rights, especially for ethnic Russians, consistent with EU standards. Russian-language print and broadcast media would be permitted as long as all funding and ownership were domestic in origin.
• Reparations. Neither side would pay reparations. Each side would be responsible for the reconstruction of the territory it controls with funds from domestic or foreign sources.
• War crimes. Each side would be responsible for prosecuting the war crimes that took place on the territory it controls. The other side would not be required to assist in the investigations.
• Sanctions. The West would lift sanctions against individuals that were primarily punitive in nature and had no discernible impact on Russia’s ability to wage war. Any relief from other sanctions would be tied to concrete steps toward a settlement by Russia.

Recommendations

Any movement toward a settlement will depend on both process and sequencing.

Process

U.S.-Russia relations are presidential. There will be no progress toward resolving the Russia-Ukraine war, or in stabilizing the broader relationship, absent active participation by the two presidents. The special envoy for Russia and Ukraine, Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg, can act as Trump’s representative. His authority will be enhanced if he works out of the White House and oversees the interagency process on Russia and Ukraine, in close consultation with the president and his national security advisor. Ideally, Putin will designate a counterpart who enjoys his trust and is empowered to engage on the full range of U.S.-Russian issues. Kellogg will also need trusted contacts in Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s entourage and in the chancelleries of key European allies to maintain unity of purpose with them.

Other elements of the U.S. government, especially the State Department, will have active roles to play. As a matter of practice, the Kremlin will insist that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conduct any formal negotiations, even if it has little influence over actual policy. For that reason, Secretary of State Marco Rubio will need to develop a working relationship with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Even then, the White House-Kremlin channel will be critical to setting the framework for negotiations and breaking logjams as they arise.

Sequencing

The timing of each step would depend on the progress made in the previous step. An ambitious goal would be to complete all the steps by the fall of 2025.

• Shortly after inauguration, President Trump calls President Putin to underscore his desire to restore normal diplomatic relations and resolve the Russia-Ukraine war. He expresses his hope for an early summit, with the condition that they reach an agreement on a roadmap for the settlement of the war that the two presidents can endorse at that summit.
• President Trump calls President Zelenskyy to brief him on his call with Putin and to solicit his commitment to a negotiated settlement of the war.
• General Kellogg begins a round of consultations with European allies and Ukraine to develop an agreed vision for Ukraine and a framework for settling the war. President Trump calls major European leaders to gain their support for his approach to the settlement.
• General Kellogg travels to Moscow for meetings with Kremlin and other officials to lay out preliminary thinking on restoring a broad U.S.-Russia dialogue, as well as a framework for settling the war. 
• President Trump calls for, and Congress passes, a supplemental aid package for continued support to Ukraine to underscore the United States’ commitment to creating the conditions for good-faith negotiations to end the war.
• A U.S.-Ukraine summit meeting in Kyiv, at which Trump and Zelenskyy agree on a cease-fire and a roadmap for settling the war, followed by a U.S.-Russia summit where Putin adds his endorsement to the cease-fire and roadmap.
• The roadmap is presented to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and UN Security Council for endorsement (these steps bring in U.S. allies as partners to the settlement and gain China’s support).

Conclusion

There is no quick and easy path to peace in Ukraine. Ironically, the only way the Trump administration can get Putin to negotiate seriously in the short term is by demonstrating that the United States, along with its allies and Ukraine, has the means and resolve to prolong the war. Similarly, a cease-fire, however much it is to be desired, will not lead to an enduring peace unless the United States remains engaged in putting in place the pieces, over time, that will reliably deter future Russian aggression, effectively rebuild Ukraine as a strong, democratic society, and irreversibly integrate it into the Euro-Atlantic community. With a well-coordinated effort, President Trump might be able to get Ukraine and Russia to agree to a roadmap to peace in the next several months. That would be a major diplomatic success. But it would be a map for a long journey.

This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.