How a Harris-Walz Administration Might Handle Asia Policy

In the U.S. presidential election, as I noted in a very brief post on this topic for CFR.org, the race remains very close between former President Donald Trump and current Vice President Kamala Harris, who are joined by their running mates, Ohio Senator J.D. Vance and Minnesota Governor Tim Walz, respectively.

Yet despite the closeness of the race––the two candidates are tied or within a few points of each other in critical swing states—the two tickets would have dramatically different approaches to Asia policy.

The Trump-Vance ticket, while disdaining many of the United States’ traditional European allies and openly voicing skepticism of continuing to support Ukraine, has signaled an extremely hawkish approach to China and a desire to push countries in Asia to clearly side with Washington or Beijing. However, the campaign has said little about how human rights issues in Asia would factor into U.S. decision-making. Trump has floated the possibility of high tariffs on Chinese products, a move that could decimate economies in Asia and around the world.

Some of the top potential advisers in a Trump administration, like prominent analyst Elbridge Colby, who could be a second Trump administration’s national security adviser, have also argued that the United States should dramatically increase and upgrade its forces in Asia to better position itself, alongside partners, to potentially fight a war with China.

For its part, a Harris-Walz administration would hardly be soft on China, as some Republican commentators have said, claiming that Walz’s time teaching in China signals the running mate is weak on the Chinese Communist Party. Quite the contrary; in Congress, Walz had a very tough record on China and was a consistent defender of freedoms in China, Tibet, and Hong Kong. He received praise for this record from many Chinese and Hong Kong rights activists.

While a Harris-Walz administration is unlikely to impose the type of unilateral and dramatic economic measures against China as a Trump-Vance administration would, they are likely to make human rights a higher priority in the China relationship. They would publicly mention human rights, take greater actions to protect Chinese nationals against transnational repression, and possibly support congressional steps to restrict CCP influence over key social media sites like WeChat and TikTok, among other measures. A Harris-Walz administration is also likely to ramp up pressure on China compared to that of the Biden administration to prevent Beijing from accessing the most important chips for military/security usage and compete more aggressively with Beijing in cutting-edge industries.

At the same time, while not directly pressuring U.S. partners in South and Southeast Asia to clearly side with either Beijing or Washington (other than the Philippines, which already seems to have sided with the United States), a Harris-Walz administration would likely continue the Biden-era approach of more clearly preparing for possible military conflicts in Asia—if not to the extent that Vance would propose.

Harris seems to understand how far she can push Southeast Asian states. As I noted in a Council on Foreign Relations post, she traveled to “Southeast Asia during her four years on the job, attending the ASEAN Summit, and it seems likely she is aware of the tensions, the high-wire act, facing nearly every Southeast Asian state.”

Such steps would include bolstering the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between the United States, Japan, India, and Australia, commonly known as “the Quad.” It also likely would include a more assertive pushback against Chinese militarization in the South China Sea via more regular U.S. patrols, a continued push to make the AUKUS security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States a reality in Asian waters, and an effort at encouraging Southeast Asian claimants to sign more security partnerships related to the sea. Vietnam and the Philippines, two states whose claims are directly threatened by China’s, are already increasingly working together on South China Sea cooperation.

They also likely would continue the Biden-era policy of providing direct military assistance to Taiwan and advocate for Taipei to better prepare its forces and citizens for a possible Chinese attack.

In addition, a Harris-Walz administration, less likely to alienate Tokyo than a Trump administration, almost surely will encourage Japan to play a larger role in defense cooperation with key partners in Southeast Asia. It almost surely will push Tokyo to bolster its already burgeoning cooperation with Taipei on issues related to the Taiwan Strait and declare that Japan and Taiwan have mutual interests in keeping peace in and around the island—a critical signal to China.

Yet at the same time, compared to a Trump-Vance administration, a Harris-Walz administration, with Walz as vice president and advisers with human rights backgrounds, would probably promote a greater focus on human rights not only in China but also in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific Islands. Of course, this advocacy would be balanced with the need to cultivate strategic partners who are far from free, like Vietnam. Still, there is considerable room for a Harris-Walz administration to boost such rights advocacy—and some funding for governance and promoting freedom—in places that are either near state collapse, like Myanmar and Bangladesh, or those that are regressing from democracy, like Thailand and Indonesia.

In addition, given the dramatic boost in U.S.-India ties over the past fifteen years and Harris’ own ethnic background, it is easy to imagine that a Harris-Walz administration would build an even more special relationship with India than any prior administration, considering its strategic importance as an important regional partner and counterweight to China. To be sure, India itself has slid backward on democratic rights and freedoms, and pulling off closer bilateral ties will remain tricky, even for Harris. There are plenty of Indian-Americans angry about the Modi administration’s undermining of democratic norms, and as critics, will be poised to blast Harris and Walz for fostering rights in some countries while ignoring Modi’s actions.

There would be worries, meanwhile, in Asia about a Harris-Walz administration—just a different type of worry as would come if Trump became president again.

While some Asian states may be concerned that a Trump-Vance administration would move the region closer to war or sink regional economies, Asian countries are somewhat concerned that Harris and Walz might pay too little attention to the Asia-Pacific overall and focus on Europe, Russia, and Ukraine. The party’s 2024 policy platform lists Europe at the top of its foreign affairs priorities, followed by the Indo-Pacific. Europe has again become the locus of many Democratic Party foreign policy professionals and Harris’s top national security adviser (a former colleague of mine at the Council on Foreign Relations), Philip Gordon, is a specialist on Europe and Atlanticist affairs. That said, the Indo-Pacific is just too important, even with a war in Ukraine, for it not to eventually rise to the top of U.S. national interests, regardless of who wins the race in November.