Americas

Venezuela

Venezuela: The Rise and Fall of a Petrostate
Venezuela’s descent into economic and political chaos in recent years is a cautionary tale of the dangerous influence that resource wealth can have on developing countries.

Backgrounder by Diana Roy and Amelia Cheatham Jul 31, 2024

The Day After in Venezuela
If Nicolas Maduro relinquishes power, he will leave behind a country in economic and political ruin and the Western Hemisphere’s largest humanitarian crisis. The United States and its international partners should prepare now to help Venezuelans address major security and justice challenges.

Council Special Report by Paul J. Angelo Sep 24, 2020

A Venezuelan Refugee Crisis
In addition to a sharp economic downturn, Venezuela faces a humanitarian crisis. The United States can do little to prevent a downward spiral, but it should take measures to mitigate the political, economic, and humanitarian consequences of a potential mass emigration.

Contingency Planning Memorandum by Shannon K. O'Neil Feb 15, 2018

  • Americas
    What to Watch in 2013: Latin America’s Presidential Elections
    Last year Mexico, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic held presidential elections, leading to some of the region’s biggest news stories of the year: the PRI’s return to power and the strong second place showing from Venezuela’s opposition. With four scheduled presidential elections (and a possible fifth) in 2013, along with congressional and municipal elections in Argentina and Venezuela respectively, here is what you should be watching. Ecuador will hold its presidential election first on February 17. Current President Rafael Correa recently announced that he will hand over the day to day reigns of governing to his Vice President Lenín Moreno on January 15, dedicating himself for the next month full time to his reelection campaign. Bolstered by strong approval ratings and a divided opposition, odds are that he will win a second term. Paraguay will hold presidential elections next on April 21 to officially elect a successor to former President Fernando Lugo (who was impeached in June 2012 over his handling of deadly clashes between police and farmers). With the current interim president Federico Franco not running, most expect the long-ruling Colorado Party to return through the election of former businessman Horacio Cartes. Honduras too will hold presidential elections in November, choosing a successor to President Porfirio Lobo Sosa (as the country’s political rules prohibit reelection). The wife of deposed former President Manuel Zelaya, Xiomara Castro, is running as the new Liberty and Refoundation Party’s (more commonly known as the Libre party) candidate. Hoping to upset the traditional two party system, she will face Juan Orlando Hernández of the National party and Mauricio Villeda of the Liberal party. The campaign, which officially begins ninety days before voters head to the polls, is likely to be dominated by concerns over violence and political instability more generally. Chile will close out the year with presidential elections on December 13. While popular abroad, at home current President Sebastián Piñera struggled with low approval ratings (hovering between 20 and 40 percent), suggesting an uphill battle for the Rightist candidates (former ministers Laurence Golborne and Andrés Allamand Zavala). The big question will be whether former President Michelle Bachelet runs for a second term. (Immediate reelection is not allowed in Chile, but Bachelet will be eligible to run for another four year term in 2013.) So far she has remained silent, but preliminary polls show her to be wildly popular. The traditional party coalition candidates could also again face an outside opponent, such as Marco Enríquez Ominami, who won 20 percent of the vote in the 2009 election. Venezuelans may also head back to the ballot boxes in 2012, as the country’s Constitution states that, “When the President of the Republic becomes permanently unavailable to serve during the first four years of this constitutional term of office, a new election by universal suffrage and direct ballot shall be held within thirty consecutive days.” With Chávez’s fragile health, and public statements questioning Chávez’s attendance at his own inauguration (which the Constitution stipulates should occur on January 10), many are beginning to consider a political future without the president. Chávez’s chosen successor Vice President Nicolás Maduro might be able to ride the momentum from the recent presidential and regional elections, as well as the widespread sympathy for Chávez, to victory, but he will face a reenergized opposition led by Henrique Capriles and others. For many of these countries, this electoral cycle provides an opportunity to move beyond recent confrontations and real challenges to electoral democracy itself. In others, the alternation of power is more a chance to reengage voters and citizens, and define and refine policies for the coming months and years. So watch for the new faces in many of the region’s executive branches.
    Blog Post by Shannon K. O'Neil January 3, 2013 Latin America’s Moment
  • Human Rights
    On Winning Reelection to the UN Human Rights Council
    Once upon a time, the United Nations had a Human Rights Commission. The United States left it because it spent most of its time condemning Israel, and elected some of the worst human rights abusers in the world to membership. In 2005, for example, China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Cuba were members, making the organization a farce. In 2006 the Commission was closed down, and the new UN Human Rights Council created. The Bush administration refused to seek election to the Council until it proved it was something new and different. But the Obama administration reversed that policy, and today we see one of the fruits of this new approach. The United States was elected to membership again, with 131 votes; and Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela was elected, with 154 votes. Besides telling us something about how much popularity Obama foreign policy has won the United States, this vote and the election of Venezuela tell a good deal about the Council and how it is seen around the world. By the way, despite its human rights record Pakistan was also elected to membership. As to the ludicrous focus on Israel, that country remains the only country listed on the Council’s permanent agenda. Not North Korea, not Sudan, not Cuba—only Israel. The Obama administration argues that despite its flaws the Council does some good work. I am sure it does. But think of the message of contempt the UN Human Rights Council sent to today to the embattled democrats of Venezuela—to the millions of citizens heroically struggling to protect human rights there.
    Blog Post by Elliott Abrams November 12, 2012 Pressure Points
  • Venezuela
    Venezuela’s Chávez Wins Fourth Term
    Longtime Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez’s fourth term as president allows for the continuation of his "socialist revolution," but questions over his health remain a wildcard in assessing Venezuela’s future.
    Backgrounder by Brianna Lee October 17, 2012
  • Americas
    Evolution of Latin America’s Economies
    I’ve been looking recently at the structural changes in many of Latin America’s economies (through the evolution of their exports). The different trajectories are quite striking, as you can see in the graphs below. Out of Latin America’s biggest economies, Mexico has transformed the most. In the 1980s the manufacturing sector comprised just 10 percent of total exports; today it is over 75 percent. Mexico’s economic diversification and dynamism, especially in the automotive and electronic industries, have held oil at a steady 10-15 percent of exports for the last twenty years, even as oil prices have risen (though, in fairness, production has also declined). World Bank Database Next in the "most changed" category is Brazil. Over the last forty years, Brazil has moved away from a heavy reliance on food exports, and manufacturing has steadily risen—peaking at over 50 percent of exports in the 1990s and early 2000s. But the graph below also highlights Brazil’s continuing challenges: commodities have risen as a percentage of exports, leading manufacturing to slip to less than 40 percent of total exports in 2010 (back to early 1980s levels). World Bank Database Colombia has followed a similar trajectory; moving away from food production and toward manufacturing (although never reaching near the same levels as Brazil). What has also increased substantially is oil production, jumping from under 2 percent in 1981 to reach some 60 percent of the country’s exports today. The combination of government incentives and expanding geographic safety suggests this upward trend will continue. World Bank Database Interestingly, Chile, though rightly touted as one of the most open and advanced economies, remains in essence a commodity producer. Some areas have increased their value added—for instance, within food exports is the successful wine industry. But overall, copper dominates, bringing in roughly $41 billion a year, or nearly 60 percent of exports. Structurally, not much has changed in the last 30 years. World Bank Database Finally, Venezuela has changed, though unlike its neighbors it has reverted to the past. Where manufacturing, food, and ore and metal exports rose steadily during the 1980s and 1990s (to total a combined 20 to 30 percent of exports), under the Chávez government they now comprise less than 7 percent. Over the last fifteen years, food and agricultural production have been wiped out, and oil dominates once again. World Bank Database Taking this longer view, we see the direct benefits of high global commodity prices, bringing in billions of dollars each year to many of these economies. But we also see real structural changes. If a measure of maturing economies is their diversification (particularly toward manufacturing and services), then many of Latin America’s largest economies look to be moving in the right direction.
    Blog Post by Shannon K. O'Neil October 16, 2012 Latin America’s Moment
  • Venezuela
    Venezuela After the Vote
    The victory of President Hugo Chávez raises questions about the country’s future trajectory. Expert Jennifer McCoy details the post-election political landscape.
    Interview with Jennifer McCoy and Brianna Lee October 10, 2012
  • Americas
    Latin America’s Growing Social Network
    In 2000 only 8 million Latin Americans were active online. Today that number has ballooned to 129 million regular users—more than a 1000 percent increase—with almost all (127 million) signing in to their social media accounts at least once a month. The number of absolute and relative users differs by country, but the upward trend has been steady across the region, led in sheer number by Brazilians and in time dedicated by Argentineans and Chileans (10 hours and 8.7 hours a month respectively). Facebook dominates for most of the region, with 114 million unique Latin American visitors monthly, spending over a billion combined hours on status updates, wall posts, and photo browsing. Twitter comes in a (distant) second place, with some 27 million Latin Americans expressing their thoughts in 140 characters or less (here #Mexicans and #Brazilians outpace their neighbors). Millions more in the region access sites such as Orkut, Slideshare, Tumblr, and the more professionally oriented LinkedIn. The region’s politicians have noticed, and adapted. Social media platforms offer direct access to millions of constituents and, during campaign time, often provide a means to avoid media regulations. While most Latin American politicians are active online (Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Colombia’s presidents all have over one million followers), no Latin American political figure has embraced social media as wholeheartedly as Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez. Though he once famously referred to Twitter as a “tool of terror,” today Chavez is the second most followed president in the world (coming in only behind President Barack Obama), with 1700 tweets, 3.5 million followers, and a rumored Twitter account staff of 200. Political incumbents aren’t the only ones using social media to advance their causes. Mexico’s #YoSoy132 movement exploded onto the scene through a YouTube video and a Twitter hashtag bearing its name. Chile’s student protestors use Twitter and Facebook to organize protests and release statements, recently starting an English language account @Mobilized2011 to reach the international media. And Venezuela’s political opposition hasn’t shied from taking on the master in this realm: opposition front-runner Henrique Capriles may only have half the numbers of followers as Chavez, but he (presumably with the help of his team) has three times the number of tweets. This frenzy of activity has attracted journalists, commentators, and ordinary citizens. Joining in, many share minute by minute news updates, and retweet, like, and share political minutiae and commentary across the globe, letting gaffes and ideas alike go globally viral in hours. Social media has taken on life and death seriousness in places such as Mexico, where reporters and civilians alike tweet real time crime reports, at times paying the ultimate price for their bravery. Whether for established politicians, opposition activists, the press, or voters, social media has become a dynamic battleground, increasingly shaping the narrative. But in this brave new world of political interaction, how much will social media actually matter? In the book Going Public, Samuel Kernell argues that when politicians find new ways (and reasons) to engage directly with constituents, the initial effects are quite powerful, transforming politics as usual. But he also finds that these effects diminish quickly as the public becomes “fatigued.” While Kernell is talking more about the rise of radio and television in politics, there is reason to think that social media may follow a similar path as its predecessors. As the novelty wears off, newsfeeds become saturated, and other technologies emerge, these platforms will likely overtime become less useful and effective in shaping the political arena. Still, at least for now, social media campaigns will play a defining role in Latin America’s politics.
    Blog Post by Shannon K. O'Neil October 3, 2012 Latin America’s Moment
  • Venezuela
    Preventing Political Unrest in Venezuela
    Andrew C. Miller is a research associate in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. American policy toward Venezuela and its tendentious president, Hugo Chavez, rarely captures headlines. But when it does, the results aren’t pretty. In a campaign spat this July, Mitt Romney called President Obama’s Venezuela policy “alarmingly naïve.” An Obama spokesman, in turn, labeled Romney’s remarks “disturbing." Obama administration officials would happily ignore Chavez if they could. They see him as relishing attention from “the Yankee empire.” With Venezuela’s presidential elections approaching, however, the administration might have to give Chavez the attention he craves. The election, set for October 7, is perhaps the most competitive since Chavez took the presidency more than a decade ago. Chavez’s ill health has limited his campaigning, while his forty-year-old opponent Henrique Capriles Radonski has gained traction by running around the country (literally, in some cases) to show off his youthful vigor. Most polls give Chavez the edge, but surprisingly, Capriles has caught up to—and even overtaken—the president, according to some pollsters. Will Chavez concede if Capriles wins? What happens if the results are too close to call? What if Chavez wins but dies shortly thereafter? Patrick Duddy, a former U.S. ambassador to Venezuela, looks at these scenarios in a recently released Center for Preventive Action memo, “Political Unrest in Venezuela.” Venezuela has a highly polarized political climate, which could boil over into unrest—and possibly violence—if the upcoming elections are somehow scuttled. Venezuelans have largely avoided political violence to date, but the threat exists nonetheless. Chavez recently warned of “civil war” unless wealthy voters backed him, and Capriles had to cancel a rally due to reports of armed chavistas threatening his supporters. The United States would have trouble ignoring unrest in its southern neighbor. The instability would create new opportunities for narcotraffickers, hinder democracy promotion efforts, and put U.S. commercial interests at risk. Duddy encourages the Obama administration to not sit on the sidelines as the election draws closer. It could, for example, identify actors (including opposition figures) that would face financial and diplomatic penalties for trying to scuttle democratic processes or inciting violence. The Defense Department could also leverage its Latin American and Spanish contacts to stress to “the Venezuelan military leadership that they is obliged to uphold their constitution, respect human rights, and protect their country’s democratic tradition.” The outcome of October’s polls is uncertain, but the Obama administration should be working now to support a democratic and stable electoral process. If not, President Obama risks appearing, as Romney has said, “out of touch” when it comes to Venezuela.
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Micah Zenko September 13, 2012 Politics, Power, and Preventive Action
  • Venezuela
    Political Unrest in Venezuela
    In March 2015, the author wrote an update to this memo to reflect recent developments in Venezuela. Read the update. Introduction In the coming months, Venezuela could experience significant political unrest and violence that lead to the further curtailment of democracy in the country. Presidential elections are scheduled to take place on October 7, 2012. President Hugo Chavez is in the midst of a tough reelection campaign against Henrique Capriles Radonski—the young and energetic governor of the state of Miranda—who enjoys multiparty support and appears to have a better chance of defeating the incumbent than earlier challengers. Over the course of the past year, Chavez and several of his most senior associates have asserted that there will be instability and violence if he is not reelected. At the same time, Chavez is battling cancer, but he has shared little information with the public about the state of his health beyond the fact that he has twice been treated for the disease since spring 2011. Speculation about Chavez's health problems has generated considerable uncertainty among his supporters, especially since he has not anointed a successor. Should Chavez appear to be losing the election, die suddenly, or withdraw from public life for health reasons, tensions are likely to rise in Venezuela, especially if the public suspects that Chavez has used extra-constitutional means to preclude or invalidate an opposition victory in order to sustain his regime's hold on power. Protests over such actions, which could turn violent, may in turn lead to the imposition of martial law and the further curtailment of democratic rights in Venezuela. This would almost certainly trigger a major political crisis in the Western Hemisphere that pits countries seeking to restore democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela—including the United States—against those who support Chavez and the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states. Longstanding U.S. efforts to promote good governance in Latin America as well as cooperation on a range of political, economic, and security challenges in the region would be threatened as a consequence. Accordingly, the United States should seek free and fair elections in Venezuela. If Chavez or a replacement candidate is defeated, it should offer to help promote an orderly, peaceful transition. If Chavez is reelected in a process judged acceptably free and fair, the United States should seek to reset the bilateral relationship with an eye toward the eventual renewal of high-level communication on areas of mutual interest. If the election results appear fraudulent or apparently legitimate results are nullified, the United States should encourage international pressure to restore democracy and suspend bilateral business as usual until a legitimate government is restored. The Contingency Political unrest leading to a suspension of democracy before or after the upcoming elections in Venezuela is not inevitable. If Chavez can participate in the campaign and win convincingly in what is accepted as a free and fair election, while seeming sufficiently healthy to govern, the opposition will likely concede and violence will be avoided. If Capriles wins convincingly, is recognized internationally as the victor, and can reassure Chavistas of his intention to work for the benefit of all, trouble also may be averted. Although Chavez has indicated he will respect the results of the election, most plausible scenarios for instability and conflict in Venezuela derive from the premise that the Chavistas will not willingly surrender power and would be willing to provoke violence, orchestrate civil unrest, or engage in various forms of armed resistance to avoid doing so. This is the real danger surrounding the current campaign and it extends beyond the election itself because of the questions concerning Chavez's health. There is nothing to indicate the opposition has the will, wherewithal, or weapons to challenge the Chavistas through violence. That said, student-led protests over the closing of the national television channel RCTV set the stage for the defeat of the Chavez-sponsored constitutional referendum of 2007. There is no evidence to suggest any opposition effort to arm or organize militarily. Chavez, on the other hand, has worked assiduously to inculcate supporters with the notion that a Capriles victory would be achievable only through deception, collusion with the remaining independent media, and covert U.S. support. The Chavez government also insists that an opposition victory would result in the termination of the popular Chavista social programs known as Misiones Bolivarianas (commonly known as misiones) and would return to power the elites who had earlier governed Venezuela. Chavez has added huge numbers of workers to the government payroll and extended direct government benefits to many other low-income Venezuelans. Further complicating matters, Chavez has announced an economic plan for his next term that would accelerate dismantling the private sector economy, putting those who defend democratic pluralism, free enterprise, and private property on notice of his intention to complete Venezuela's transformation into a socialist state. More than a year ago, his brother Adan Chavez, governor of the state of Barinas, publicly advised Chavez's supporters that they might need to defend the Bolivarian Revolution by force of arms. Given current circumstances in Venezuela, several plausible scenarios could trigger significant political unrest that degenerates into violence: Chavez's defeat on October 7 looks likely before the election. Street violence erupts either spontaneously or at the instigation of Chavez's allies in the government. The government declares a state of emergency and postpones the election. The suspension of civil liberties following such a declaration may last for ninety days and can be renewed. The state-controlled media would likely endorse the temporary imposition of martial law as necessary to preserve order and the revolution. Such actions, however, could precipitate widespread clashes with opposition supporters, particularly where there are military and National Guard deployments. Chavez wins the election—or plausibly claims to win—and almost immediately dies or withdraws from public life for health reasons. A state of emergency is declared. New elections are required but also new candidates. Since none of Chavez's chief lieutenants appears to enjoy sufficient public support to assure election, cracks begin to appear in the Chavista movement that prove difficult to reconcile. It is also possible that the opposition splinters. In many respects Chavez holds the opposition together much as he does his own coalition. The election is held and Capriles wins. Government workers and the beneficiaries of misiones riot before Capriles can be inaugurated. An apparently lame-duck Chavez declares a state of exception and postpones the inauguration. The perception that the government had manufactured a justification for setting aside a Capriles victory would lead to widespread demonstrations by Capriles supporters. An angry, resurgent opposition, convinced it was in danger of having its triumph stolen, would be vulnerable to Chavista provocation. Clashes between opposition supporters and the Chavista faithful would occur. Capriles wins and is inaugurated. Strikes by Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) oil workers paralyze oil production. Chavistas at all levels of government resist the new administration's efforts to implement its own programs and/or jettison moribund Chavista projects. Government workers are encouraged by Chavista media to see Capriles's efforts to cut the government's swollen payroll as a purge. This is particularly likely at PDVSA, the state oil company, which has doubled its workforce since the strike of 2003 even though oil production has stagnated at well below pre-strike levels. The military intervenes, and supporters of the new government take to the streets. The election is held and the results are too close to call or are unacceptable to the government. The Electoral Tribunal delays announcing the results. Both the opposition and Chavez's supporters take to the streets. The Chavista base fears a loss while the government seeks a way to avoid acknowledging a defeat. The opposition fears a manipulated outcome. The Council of State or the somewhat vaguely constituted Anti-Coup Command denounces efforts to subvert the election or destabilize the country while Chavez or an interim president declares a state of exception. Street violence erupts and is attributed to the opposition. Although the government has enjoyed extraordinary advantages in terms of both resources and media access, most observers expect the vote count on election day to be largely accurate given the experience of the legislative elections of 2010 and the referenda votes of 2007 and 2009. The great unanswered question is how the government will react if it appears Chavez has lost. Unrest and violence, should it occur, is likely to be concentrated in the cities and to take the form of a rise in street protests and a spike in violent criminal activity—Venezuela has one of the world's highest homicide rates—accompanied by political hooliganism and possibly sabotage of public services. The point of instigated violence would be the creation of circumstance sufficient to justify a suspension of civil liberties, postponement of the election, or, following a vote, invalidating the results of October 7. Spontaneous violence emanating from Chavez's supporters remains a real possibility if it appears that the Bolivarian movement has or is about to suffer a reverse at the polls. A preemptive move by the military cannot be categorically ruled out but seems unlikely unless the security situation in the major cities threatens to unravel. Another possible aim of any Chavista-choreographed instability, if recognition of defeat were unavoidable, would be to force a brokered transition to an opposition administration such as occurred in Nicaragua following the election of Violeta Chamorro. Warning Indicators A range of developments could indicate one of the aforementioned scenarios for violence. Chavez dies or an announcement is made that his death is imminent. The possibility of violence would be particularly high if Chavez died or announced his resignation for medical reasons after being reelected. Violent crime is allowed to surge in the major cities before the election. Irregular armed groups violently harass the opposition and/or seek to disrupt Capriles's political events. Weapons are distributed to the militia. Military units are repositioned. After the abortive coup of 2002 (though not immediately after), Chavez created a national militia, organized outside the formal military chain of command and drawn from the social and economic strata in which Chavez's support is strongest. Weapons for the militias, however, remain under the control of the regular military. Arming the militia would be tantamount to putting military weapons in the hands of the Chavista base. Basic food items disappear. Private businessmen are accused of hoarding and their businesses are expropriated. Stocks of staples are perpetually low at present in Venezuela because of Chavista penalties for hoarding in reaction to price controls. Remaining independent media are closed and/or prominent journalists are detained. The independent media have been under pressure by Chavez since 2006. Most that remain are critical of the government. Sharp divisions within Chavismo surface publicly, suggesting insiders know Chavez is failing. There are persistent rumors of tensions among prominent senior Chavistas, several of whom have been perceived as jockeying to position themselves as Chavez's logical successor. A senior political figure close to either Chavez or Capriles is assassinated. Though the homicide rate in Venezuela is high, political assassination is rare. Local supplies of gasoline are interrupted. Most Venezuelans, especially poorer Venezuelans, consider cheap (pennies per gallon) gasoline a birthright. Efforts to raise prices in 1989 caused violent riots in the capital. The government via PDVSA controls the supply of gasoline, and an interruption of supply would likely enrage segments of the population. Implications for U.S. Interests Political instability and violence in Venezuela would damage U.S. efforts to promote democracy, increase regional cooperation, combat narcotics, and protect its economic interests in the region. Democracy Promotion: The United States has worked for decades to promote democracy in the Western Hemisphere. In recent years, Chavez has become increasingly authoritarian, undermining important political institutions, giving more powers to the presidency, and weakening both civil society and the independent media. The United States should view a suspension or further deterioration in the quality of Venezuela's democracy as a setback for U.S. policy and for the hemisphere. The emergence of a military junta or a compromised Chavez regime would also likely increase Iranian and Cuban influence in Venezuela. It already has a close relationship with Iran from which it reportedly receives advanced weapon systems and other assistance. Cuba sends thousands of teachers and technical, medical, and security advisers in exchange for an estimated ninety to one hundred thousand barrels of oil per day. Regional Cooperation: The United States has an interest in nurturing regional cooperation particularly under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS), of which it is a core member. While often disappointing to both the United States and Latin America, the OAS provides the only regional forum in which all of the countries with democratically elected governments participate. A failure by the OAS to play an effective role in Venezuela if it appears democracy is at risk would further undermine support for the organization both in the region and in the United States. How the United States manages its relations with Venezuela if violence does break out would likely affect U.S. relations with others in the hemisphere, especially Brazil, which has cordial relations with Chavez and reacts badly to perceived U.S. efforts to dictate to Latin America. A repetition of the acrimony that characterized the hemisphere's efforts to resolve the Honduras crisis of 2009 would be corrosive to U.S. relations with the region. Counternarcotics: Venezuela does not cooperate with the United States on counternarcotics, except at the most minimal level. Drug trafficking has, consequently, surged. A number of Venezuelan military officers, including the current minister of defense, have been plausibly accused by the U.S. Treasury of cooperating with the Colombian insurgent group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and facilitating drug shipments through Venezuela, especially from Apure State. Venezuelan recalcitrance in counternarcotics clearly undermines other regional efforts to combat the drug trade. Even low levels of violence would create new opportunities for the FARC and other drug traffickers to retrench and extend their reach. Economic Interests: A significant number of U.S. companies have operations in Venezuela; it remains an important market for U.S. goods and some services, especially oil services. Many of these companies could be at risk if violent internal conflict broke out. Venezuela is consistently among the five largest foreign suppliers of oil to the United States. The United States is Venezuela's largest market, buying up to nine hundred thousand barrels of oil daily, up to 45 percent of Venezuela's total oil exports. Around six hundred thousand barrels of Venezuelan crude per day are refined at CITGO facilities in the United States. Although a cut off of Venezuelan oil to the United States is theoretically possible, it is unlikely given Venezuela's dependence on the U.S. market. The United States is now less vulnerable to a cut off of supply from Venezuela as U.S. domestic production has risen and imports from elsewhere could relatively quickly replace Venezuelan oil. Venezuela's economy, on the other hand, has become more dependent on petroleum. Although production has stagnated since 2003, oil accounts for over 95 percent of Venezuela's export earnings, and export revenue pays for nearly 50 percent of the government's budget. Thus, although Venezuela is vulnerable to pressure via its dependence on its oil exports generally and the U.S. market and refineries specifically, global markets would likely react negatively to either an interruption of Venezuelan production or a crisis in U.S.-Venezuelan relations that threatens the bilateral trade in oil. Preventive Options Two factors seem most likely to dissuade leading Venezuelan actors from violence: scrutiny of the electoral process and a clear sense that the rest of the Western Hemisphere would not countenance an attempt to subvert or set aside the outcome of a legitimate vote. All Western Hemisphere international organizations make having a fully functioning democracy a necessary precondition to full participation. Chavez's influence (beyond oil revenue) has always rested in large part on the perception that he is legitimately elected and enjoys a popular mandate. The options to prevent instability in Venezuela include the following: Regional/Bilateral: The United States could urge Brazil, Colombia, and other countries in the region to press for transparency and compliance with the highest possible standard of election administration and to press Venezuela to permit exit polling, quick counts, and other mechanisms for independent validation of the electoral results. Brazil, in particular, has influence with the Chavez government and seeks to play more of a leadership role globally and in the hemisphere. Instability, violence, or an interruption of democracy in Venezuela would hurt Brazil's geopolitical ambitions as well as its extensive business interests. It would also be problematic for the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), which recently made Venezuela a full member. (Mercosur requires members to be fully functioning democracies and recently suspended Paraguay after the Senate there removed the sitting president under circumstances that other members considered questionable.) Extra-regional: The EU (and especially Spain), Japan, and China all have significant investments in Venezuela that would be at risk in the event of an internal conflict. Interested stakeholder countries could be encouraged to make clear that free and fair elections in Venezuela, and an orderly transition if Chavez loses, are important to the global community. (China, however, while having a growing stake in the Venezuelan economy, is unlikely to agree to pressure Caracas.) Electoral authorities in democratic capitals could be encouraged to review with the media the criteria for judging the quality of election administration. Multilateral: The Venezuelan government declined to invite substantial international observation and the deployment of a robust international mission is most likely impractical now except for the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). Nevertheless, the United States and other hemispheric partners could press the OAS to insist that the Venezuelan government permit the accreditation of interested diplomats and other volunteers as election observers and to permit international media–facilitated access to voting sites. In the event a new election was necessary for any reason, the OAS could push for early deployment of an international observer mission. (International observation and other steps to guarantee transparency were precisely the elements Chavez considered necessary for a free and fair election when he first ran for the presidency in 1998.) Mitigating Options In the event that the government either orchestrates or takes advantage of a violent popular reaction to Chavez's defeat, death, or incapacitation to suspend civil liberties and govern under a renewable state of exception, the United States could take or encourage several steps in order to accelerate a return to democracy. The likelihood of success for unilateral U.S. efforts is low; multilateral efforts that include other important regional players are far more likely to influence Venezuelan behavior. Diplomatic Options Together with like-minded nations, the United States could demand that the OAS declare Venezuela in breach of its obligations as a signatory of the Inter-American Democratic Charter and encourage a secretary-general–led mission to Caracas. (Note: It would be difficult to generate a consensus condemnation of Venezuela at the OAS but the secretary-general can undertake such a mission on his own authority. A secretary-general–led mission would still require Venezuelan acquiescence to enter the country.) Venezuela would understand that if regional and subregional organizations determine that the country is no longer a functioning democracy, it will be suspended, as has happened recently with both Honduras and Paraguay. The United States could bring the issue of Venezuelan democracy to the United Nations Security Council and urge the UN to endorse a fact-finding mission or to explicitly endorse regional efforts to restore democracy. With other international partners, including the European Union, the United States could support offers to mediate. If it proves difficult to get the OAS or UN involved in mitigation efforts, the United States could propose a delegation of foreign ministers to travel to Caracas to engage the Venezuelan authorities. The United States could suspend visas for all individuals (officials and nonofficials, government and opposition) perceived to be involved in precipitating violence or undermining democracy; or suspend normal visa adjudication services at the U.S. embassy pending a resolution of the crisis. Economic and Financial Options In the event of violence or an interruption of democracy, the United States could freeze individual bank accounts of key figures involved or responsible and seize assets in the United States. It could also arrange for the proceeds of Venezuelan government–owned corporate entities like CITGO to be held in escrow accounts until democracy is restored and encourage other important trading partners (i.e., Canada, Spain, France, Brazil) to do the same. If other forms of pressure fail to have an effect, the United States could block access to CITGO's refining facilities in the United States and consider prohibiting PDVSA oil sales to the United States while the government's status is uncertain. Military Options The United States could encourage other Latin American militaries, as well perhaps as the Spanish, to communicate to the Venezuelan military the importance of complying with constitutional mandates, respecting human rights, and preserving democracy. While Chavez loyalists dominate the Venezuelan high command, it is not clear to what extent they control the middle ranks. Nor is it clear to what extent the military's loyalty to Chavez's Bolivarian movement would trump other considerations. In the abortive coup of 2002 the military temporarily removed Chavez but also restored him to power. Direct military involvement appears inappropriate. The United States has never unilaterally intervened militarily in a South American internal conflict (criticisms of Plan Colombia notwithstanding) and to do so now would likely unite most of South America behind Chavez and/or his successor. Most Latin American countries are profoundly reluctant to intervene or even comment on the internal affairs of their hemispheric neighbors. Even multilateral military intervention in any but the direst circumstances (Haiti) is all but unthinkable. Recommendations As the election approaches, the United States needs to emphasize publicly as well as privately the importance for the hemisphere of free and fair elections in Venezuela. The United States should restate its interest in renewing cooperation in areas such as counternarcotics and emphasize the continuing complementarities of the U.S. and Venezuelan economies. While the United States should emphasize the U.S. view that only Venezuelans can solve Venezuela's political problems, it should also encourage democratic countries in the region to make clear the hemisphere's concern that democracy be preserved, basic political liberties be respected, including press freedom, and violence be avoided. The importance of transparency in administration of the elections and verification of results should be stressed. At the same time, U.S. policymakers should avoid feeding the Chavista narrative that the United States is plotting the overthrow of the Bolivarian Revolution. More specifically, the United States should take the following steps as soon as possible: Reach out to important regional and extra-regional partners now to gauge their likely response to instability, particularly those countries that would be most directly affected (i.e., Brazil, Colombia, and the EU), and convey a sense of the range of options the U.S. government would entertain in the event of an outbreak of violence and/or interruption of democracy. It will be particularly important to engage Brazil and its Mercosur partners early because of their close relations with Chavez to minimize the possibility of misunderstandings arising between them and the United States. This should include proactively sharing information that would signal Venezuelan preparations for violence or manipulation of the electoral outcome. Begin identifying important actors (military and civilian officials as well as opposition figures) now whose visas would be canceled and accounts frozen in the event that they are linked to political violence and/or an interruption of democracy. Work to build awareness at the UN, in Europe, and in Japan of what is happening in Venezuela and attempt to organize a coalition of partners to limit an illegitimate Venezuelan administration's access to government assets held abroad as well as to the international financial system. Continue to stress directly to the Venezuelan government as well as publicly that the United States will accept and be prepared to work with a legitimately elected government, including one headed by Hugo Chavez or a Chavista successor, provided the election is free, fair, and constitutional. Leverage defense department contacts in Latin American and Spanish armed forces to communicate to the Venezuelan military leadership that they are obliged to uphold their constitution, respect human rights, and protect their country's democratic tradition.
    Contingency Planning Memorandum by Patrick Duddy September 6, 2012 Center for Preventive Action
  • United States
    Guest Post: Colombia’s Displaced
    This is a guest post by Stephanie Leutert, a research associate here at the Council on Foreign Relations who works with me in the Latin America program. The best known Colombian security story is that of declining violence. Indeed its homicide rate dropped from near 80 homicides per 100,000 in 1990 to 32 per 100,000 in 2010 lower than its eastern neighbor Venezuela, or the notoriously violent Central American countries to the north. In fact, Colombian police now share best practices and security advice with their Honduran and El Salvadoran counterparts, and are training twelve thousand Mexican officers. A new report by Colombian nonprofit CODHES shows, however, that these security statistics are incomplete. The number of people displaced by violence has not fallen in tandem with murders. CODHES estimates that some 260,000 Colombians were forced from their homes in 2011 (an average of seven hundred displacements a day).  By comparison, 280,000 Colombians were displaced in 1999, when the murder rate was closer to 75 per 100,000. Estimates of the total number of Colombians displaced by violence in the past seventeen years range from 3.6 to 5.4 million (more than Sudan, Iraq, or Somalia). Approximately five hundred thousand of these Colombians have flooded across Colombia’s borders with Ecuador, Venezuela, and Panama. Most are driven out by organized crime, paramilitaries, or the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) rebel group. Since taking office, President Juan Santos has actively supported Colombia’s displaced, pushing through land-restitution policies and even joining a displaced farmer’s protest. But concrete results have been painfully slow. Many rural areas of Colombia don’t have land-ownership records, making claims hard to verify. And many displaced land-owners fear coming forward, with good reason. Threats are common, and some twenty land-rights leaders have been murdered in the past two years. Among those living abroad, polls show that Colombian refugees are afraid of returning home due to continuing security problems. Though homicides have turned the corner, ongoing displacement and intimidation still threaten Colombia’s security.    
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Shannon K. O'Neil April 20, 2012 Latin America’s Moment
  • Americas
    Guest Post: Ecuador’s Military and Why Correa Will Be Reelected (Once)
    This is a guest post by Gabriel Aguilera, an Assistant Professor of International Security Studies at the Air War College. The views expressed here belong solely to the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, or Air War College. During a recent trip to Ecuador I learned more about President Rafael Correa; why he is popular and why he will most likely be reelected. Though it’s easy to caricature him as a Chavista populist, it was difficult to find serious and fair-minded voices in Ecuador that would say he is anything other than extremely shrewd, sane, pragmatic, and predictably unpredictable. In contrast to Hugo Chavez, he is making good use of high oil prices by fixing roads and infrastructure, subsiding energy, improving the delivery of basic services, raising educational standards, and providing money transfers to the nation’s poorest citizens. To be sure, this government is nationalistic, interventionist, and heavy-handed, and Correa is no conventional democrat, as his attack on the press so eloquently demonstrated. There is, however, a method to President Correa’s heavy-handed tactics. They are arguably necessary in a country where few institutions work and vested interests, including foreign ones, regularly make use of raw power via marches, manipulation of the media, and corruption. Weak chief executives of any stripe would not survive in Ecuador. In fact, they haven’t. U.S. officials are fretful of Correa who consistently resists closer ties with Washington. And in all fairness, it is easy to understand his mistrust given that the United States has demonstrated a willingness to stir up trouble for leftist governments in the region, both historically and in recent times. The Ecuadorian military, for its part, is concerned with the Correa administration’s willingness to meddle in military management. Although the brass seems to have developed a good working relationship with the poet-cum-defense minister, one of Correa’s right-hand men, the military continues to closely guard its prerogatives. The military and Correa desperately need each other, and in Ecuador one is hard pressed to find an institution that works as well as the military, even though it is small and stretched far too thin. Moreover, the military supports many institutions that do not work well or simply cannot be relied upon, such as the police. Ecuadorian citizens understand this, it seems, and support the military just as they support the government. Military officers, for their part, understand Correa’s popularity and that much of his policy agenda is a welcome one for the beleaguered country. They sympathize with the president’s desire for increased sovereignty and agree that strained relations with Washington are due to longstanding differences and not just the government’s populism. Finally, if I understood the signals correctly, the military will not support Chavismo in Ecuador. They support the president and civilian control, and they respect the latest in the plethora of Ecuadorian constitutions. Indeed, they helped write it. ”This too shall pass” seems to be the military’s common sentiment, often in reference to Correa, who they expect will serve his final term after the anticipated victory in 2013. The question I have is whether Correa will till the soil for institutional changes that would permit him to run again after what should be his final term in office. Many observers believe that he will try, but I’m not so sure. One can, I think, reasonably hope that he realizes that Chavismo cannot work without a critical mass of support from within the armed forces, something that he does not have now based on what I saw and heard. And going about the business of rallying support from Ecuador’s military men might, in itself, trigger an early end to his administration. Ecuadorian military leaders are serious people; they control the only major institution that has continued to function reasonably well throughout the country’s historical turmoil, and there is no doubt that they will jealously protect it from the government’s efforts to politicize it for its own ends.
    Blog Post by Shannon K. O'Neil April 4, 2012 Latin America’s Moment
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    South Africa: An Alternative to Iran Oil?
    Reuters reports that on March 13, South Africa’s minister of energy, Elizabeth Dipuo Peters, said that South Africa is looking to have in place by the end of May a plan for an alternative to Iranian crude, suggesting Venezuela as a possibility. She told Reuters the United States is not pressuring South Africa to cut Iranian imports nor has Iran offered South Africa concessionary prices. U.S. pressure would be a red flag for parts of the ruling African National Congress that are suspicious of alleged Western "neo-colonialism" in Africa. Iran supplies South Africa with up to thirty percent of its energy imports. The energy relationship between South Africa and Iran is long standing, extending back to the apartheid era. Many refineries in South Africa are specifically designed for Iranian crude. Hence, a shift away from Iranian crude is a big South African decision. Nevertheless, South Africa is a party to the UN sanctions against Iran, the most likely reason for moving away from Iranian oil, despite the likely significant costs. That South Africa is taking concrete steps to end its dependency on Iranian oil, and the explicit recognition by the minister of energy that the move was not the result of American pressure, suggests that Iran may be an area where close consultation between the Obama and Zuma administrations could be fruitful and strengthen the bilateral relationship.
    Blog Post by John Campbell March 14, 2012 Africa in Transition
  • Politics and Government
    Press Freedom and Democracy in Latin America
    Last Wednesday, Ecuador’s Supreme Court upheld sentences handed down in July 2011 for four members of the El Universo newspaper’s staff in the latest chapter of a lengthy and controversial trial. Three of the newspaper’s directors, Carlos, César, and Nícolas Perez, and an editorialist, Emilio Palacio, face three years in jail and $40 million in fines. All have fled the country or sought asylum abroad, and many expect that the fines (if collected) will bankrupt the 90-year-old periodical. The February 2011 article that incited the controversy, entitled “NO a las Mentiras” by Emilio Palacio, alleged that during the September 2010 uprising Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa ordered troops to fire on a hospital filled with unarmed civilians. President Correa vigorously denied these claims and filed a libel suit in March 2011. He claims that the defendants are part of a powerful private media aiming to undermine his government and said a court victory “would represent a great step forward for the liberation of our Americas from one of the largest and most unpunished powers: the corrupt media.” The case has been a messy back-and-forth, full of demands for written retractions, refusals of retraction offers, and accusations of judicial corruption—capturing the attention of international human rights organizations and free press advocates. Newspapers such as the New York Times and the Washington Post have published highly critical op-eds on the case, saying that Correa is conducting “the most comprehensive and ruthless assault on free media under way in the Western Hemisphere.” This is just one of several clashes between Correa and the press. This month Ecuadorian journalists Juan Carlos Calderón and Christian Zurita were both fined $1 million for their book, Gran Hermano, which detailed government contracts given to Correa’s brother Fabricio. The government recently passed a law that bans the media from “either directly or indirectly promoting any given candidate, proposal, options, electoral preferences or political thesis, through articles, specials or any other form of message.” Ecuador isn’t the only Latin American country with tense government-media relations. Hugo Chavez’s battles with opposition-leaning television and radio stations are well-known, and the Kirchners of Argentina have had legendary fights with long-standing newspapers Clarín and La Nación. President Cristina Kirchner recently nationalized the only domestic supplier of newsprint (leading many to worry that this will increase the state’s influence over these news outlets). Granted, in some places and cases the press hasn’t been guilt free. In many countries it is concentrated in a few hands, and those individuals have at times chosen to present biased views of politicians and events. These aggressive attacks on ideological opponents have not fostered a more open and inclusive society. What is true is that a strong, independent, and responsible media is vital for Latin America’s democratic future. The challenge now is to both encourage and enable the press to play the role of watchdog. To become substantive (versus just electoral) democracies, Ecuador and other nations must think beyond the ballot box. I look forward to your feedback via twitter, facebook or in the comments section.
    Blog Post by Shannon K. O'Neil February 23, 2012 Latin America’s Moment
  • Economics
    Venezuela’s Capriles Radonski Wins Primary, Looks toward October Election
    Things are heating up in the two presidential races facing Latin America this year. On the heels of Josefina Vázquez Mota’s victory in the PAN party primary last week, on Sunday Venezuela hosted yet another historic vote. For the first time since Chávez won the presidency 1999, the opposition united, giving Venezuelans the chance to choose a single candidate to run in the general election this October against Chávez. And vote they did. Nearly 3 million ballots were cast in a massive turnout,  which is particularly impressive given that many (particularly those with public sector jobs) fear even being seen in line to vote, as it would paint them as opposition sympathizers, perhaps costing them their jobs. Longstanding front-runner Henrique Capriles Radonski won the contest by a convincing margin, taking 62 percent of the vote to Pablo Perez’s 29 percent. The 39-year-old Governor of Venezuela’s second largest state (Miranda) told a boisterous crowd of followers last night, “We came to build a distinct future, we came to build a future for all Venezuelans. Now is not the hour of left nor right; it is the hour of Venezuela, of all Venezuelans.” Capriles Radonski – and the opposition more generally – seem to have learned a few important lessons after 12 plus years out in the cold. Most importantly, they have come around to the need to come together in order to take on a dominating incumbent. In the past, divisions and infighting stymied the opposition at least as much as Chávez’s electoral machinations. They have also learned the payoff of appealing to the center, and competing with rather than condemning the social programs and public works projects that appeal to the poor – an estimated 30 percent of this oil rich country. Capriles Radonski in particular does this well, donning the “Lula” mantle and advocating policies to spur inclusive economic growth, benefitting Venezuelans rich and poor. The opposition looks to focus on issues of escalating crime, stagnant growth and rising inflation. But even with this momentum, Chávez will still be hard to beat. Polls show him with just over 50 percent popularity, and diehard support of a third of the population. He also dominates the radio and television airwaves, and has billions at his disposal to spend on campaigning – high world oil prices favor the government. Still, his health remains an issue, calling into question whether he can meet the rigors of the campaign trail, particularly vis-à-vis the energetic Capriles. But despite the uneven playing field, the opening start suggests a close (and closely watched) election season.
    Blog Post by Shannon K. O'Neil February 13, 2012 Latin America’s Moment
  • Human Rights
    What to Watch in 2012: Two Elections That Could Transform Latin America
    Though fewer in number than in 2011, the two Presidential elections on the docket for 2012 will make up for it in terms of their importance in the region. The first will happen in July in Mexico. Leaders of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) are already talking about not only winning Los Pinos, the Mexican White House, but taking the “carro completo” – gaining a majority in the House and Senate. Recent trends favor the PRI – they won four out of six governorships in the 2011 midterm elections, now control almost half of the 500 seats in Congress, and have united behind Enrique Peña Nieto, the young, handsome former Governor of the State of Mexico. The National Action Party’s (PAN) close association with rising violence – as Calderón made the war on drug traffickers his signature issue – will likely hurt the incumbent party’s chances, whomever wins their presidential nomination in February. And the Party of the Democratic Revolution’s (PRD) choice of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) –who lost to Calderón in 2006 by a razor thin margin (he claims the election was rigged) – suggests this party too is stuck in the last sexenio, which should also benefit an energized PRI. Though many see the race as locked up, there are still six long months to go. The PAN has yet to choose its hopeful, and current front-runner Josefina Vázquez Mota could shake up the race as the first female presidential candidate from one of the main political parties (and due to her distance from President Calderón). AMLO too has been working to revamp his image away from the combativeness of the last five years, talking to the media about “love and peace,” and saying recently, “I want to be the Mexican Lula,” the market friendly former president of Brazil. His poll numbers have risen, and even some business leaders have switched over to AMLO’s camp. Peña Nieto has stumbled a few times in unscripted moments, for instance when he couldn’t name his favorite books (even as he hawked his own campaign book) at the Guadalajara International Book Fair.  Some wonder if he can hold his own in a debate. If the PRI does triumph, domestic and international observers alike will be watching to see if Peña Nieto is in fact the epitome of the much heralded and marketed “new PRI” – a modern, democratic, grassroots party -- or if he is just a young face for the “old PRI,” one more used to back room deals, corruption, and opaque governance. Venezuela too heads into Presidential elections in October, with Hugo Chávez now running for his third six-year term. Many things seem the same – already the opposition is denouncing the regime’s electoral machinations (such as moving up the election date from December to October 2012) and repression of anti-Chávez media. Some things, though, are different, making the elections interesting for observers and for Venezuela’s future. First, the opposition has finally come together [learning its lesson in 2005 when it boycotted  legislative elections and was left out in the cold, allowing Chávez and his United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) to govern unchallenged]. It will hold a February primary, where voters will choose between six candidates, including front-runners Henrique Capriles Radonski, Governor of Miranda state, and Pablo Pérez, Governor of Zulia state.  This early on, the opposition holds a much stronger position in opinion polls as well. Recently released data place Capriles Radonski just two percentage points below Chávez in the general election. The biggest difference though is Chávez – and his health. Though he claims to have beaten cancer, others, including his former doctor, believe he may not live more than two years. Worries of succession continue to plague PSUV, as all recognize none can replace the charismatic (if erratic) leader. This 2012 election lead up will be one to watch – for Chávez’s health and his ability to campaign, for ever increasing electoral shenanigans and repressive measures (particularly if the ruling party feels their candidate is flagging, either in his health or the polls), and for the broader actions and reactions of Venezuela’s society, and its international neighbors.
    Blog Post by Shannon K. O'Neil January 10, 2012 Latin America’s Moment
  • Human Rights
    Venezuela’s Presidential Race
    Members of Venezuela's militia and supporters of Venezuela's President Chavez attend a ceremony in Caracas (Jorge Silva/Courtesy Reuters). Today, chances are Hugo Chávez will face off against Henrique Capriles Radonski in the 2012 October presidential elections. The 39-year-old former mayor of Caracas’s Baruta Municipality (2000-2008) and current Miranda state Governor is leading the opposition candidates, and polling just 2 percentage points below Chávez. He is a lawyer who entered politics at the age of 26 to become the youngest member of the Chamber of Deputies until it was dissolved in 1999. Capriles appeals to the non-Chavista Left. Following in Lula’s Brazilian footsteps, he has poured money into education and social programs, drawing strong support among the lower classes as well as from a growing contingent of independent voters put off by the Chávez-centered polarization of Venezuelan politics. Comfortable among slum dwellers and businessmen alike – and unafraid to don Chávez’s signature Veneuelan flag jacket-- the young candidate has won hearts and minds with his intensity and obvious passion. He has also attracted Chávez’s ire. In 2004, he was arrested for “trespassing, intimidation and ’violating international principles’” for his involvement in a protest outside the Cuban embassy in the wake of the 2002 attempted coup. The charges were eventually thrown out and two months after leaving prison he was reelected to his post as mayor with 80 percent of the vote. Yet while a rising star, he faces three major challenges. The first is the divisions within Venezuela’s anti-Chávez opposition. There are other worthy competitors -- Leopoldo López, the former Mayor of Chacao Municipality and Pablo Pérez, another young and dynamic governor of the state of Zulia. While one of these -- probably Pérez -- may give him a run for the nomination, the real test will be whether the opposition can remain united. In the past, their divisions have weakened them perhaps as much as any moves Chávez has made. The opposition’s track record has gotten a lot better. In the 2008 regional elections they were able to come together, winning governorships in 5 of Venezuela’s 22 states (including the two most populous, Miranda and Zulia). The 2010 Congressional run was their best showing yet. By uniting behind candidates chosen either by consensus or in local primaries, they managed to win the popular vote (52%) -- though only  40% of the legislature due to gerrymandering. Signs look good for this coming year, as last month the three major opposition parties signed a pact promising to support the winner in February’s primary. A second challenge is Chávez’s electoral machinations. While the ballot box itself has not yet been in question, the Chávez administration has repeatedly tilted the electoral playing field --  arresting prominent opposition leaders, silencing independent media outlets, and undercutting autonomous institutions such as the National Electoral Council (CNE). The meddling for 2012 has already started, beginning with moving up the election date from December to October 2012. This is likely just the first of many measures to take the wind out of opposition sails. The third, less analyzed challenge is Chávez’s health. At first brush his potential inability to run for reelection should boost the opposition’s chances. But it could make it all the much harder. Left without a popular candidate, hard-line Chavistas might pull the plug on elections all together. Hugo’s brother Adán has already suggested as much, saying recently, “It would be inexcusable to limit ourselves [PSUV] to only the electoral and not see other forms of struggle, including the armed struggle.” Instead of opening up Venezuela’s political system, Chávez’s absence might put an end to Venezuela’s democratic trappings altogether.
    Blog Post by Shannon K. O'Neil October 11, 2011 Latin America’s Moment