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In From Peril to Partnership, using case studies of Colombia and Mexico, Paul Angelo evaluates the efficacy of U.S. security assistance and the necessary conditions and stakeholders in partner nations that facilitate success. The book answers why Plan Colombia achieved its objectives and why the Mérida Initiative underdelivered in Mexico. It goes beyond drug war theatrics and the “one-size-fits-all” approach to U.S.-led stabilization.  The CFR Fellows’ Book Launch series highlights new books by CFR fellows. 

Panelists preview potential foreign policy themes in President Joe Biden's State of the Union address, including immigration, trade, and conflict in the Middle East. ROBBINS: So welcome to today’s virtual media briefing on foreign policy in the State of the Union. We are joined today by three of my fabulous colleagues: CFR expert analyst Christopher Tuttle, who’s a senior fellow; Shannon O’Neil, who’s vice president of Studies; and my boss, Steven A. Cook, the Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies.  And I’m Carla Anne Robbins. I’m a senior fellow at the Council and I’m co-host of The World Next Week podcast.  As a reminder, this conversation is on the record, and a video and transcript will be posted online afterwards at CFR.org. We’re going to chat for about thirty minutes, and then we’re going to open it up to questions from everybody online. So welcome and let’s get started.  So, Chris, can we start with you? Foreign policy is rarely a major focus of these speeches, but this year lots of stuff going on out there. We have a war in Ukraine, the war in Gaza, threats by former President Trump to pull out of NATO. What are you going to be watching and listening for on foreign policy? And can Biden both use the speech to persuade the House to approve aid to Ukraine—which is, obviously, of great concern to him and to a lot of us—and at the same time persuade the American public that he’s the best steward of foreign policy with this speech?  TUTTLE: Yeah, so I think it’s very likely foreign policy’s not going to play—it’s not going to occupy a large amount of the speech. But I think, actually, from a messaging standpoint foreign policy presents a great opportunity for the president. I think one of the broad thematics—perhaps the most important broad thematic in this speech—is going to be sort of Republican chaos and the steadiness of Joe Biden. And foreign policy’s a great way to sort of encapsulate that.  You’ve got, you know, this emergency supplemental, national security supplemental, that is—you know, they’ve been attempting to move; $95 billion. Ukraine assistance is in there. There is broad agreement in both House and Senate to support Ukraine assistance, but what’s stopping it is, sort of what the president would argue, is Republican chaos. And I think that if you look at some of the fault lines within the Republican Party, that’s a big one. You know, if there’s an applause line when it comes to Ukraine assistance, it’s going to look a little strange because you’re going to get all the Democrats standing up and, you know, more than half of the Republicans. Similarly with Israel-Gaza, you know, there’s broad support for continued support for Israel and for additional humanitarian assistance for the Palestinians, and yet it can’t move because of—because of chaos. You know, similarly with the border, similarly with the $4 billion that’s in the supplemental for sort of Taiwan and sort of pushing back against China. Here are all these priorities where there is bipartisan agreement and things can’t happen because of the chaos, and I think that Republicans, particularly House Republicans, serve as a proxy for the presidential race that’s to come.  And we can get into some of the decorum questions later, but I think foreign policy offers perhaps the most potent way for the president to demonstrate what is going to be, I think, a critical question in this campaign, which is: Do you want a steady hand on the tiller or do you want what the president would describe as the chaos of sort of House Republicans?  ROBBINS: And not just the chaos. I mean, he really went pretty hard at former President Trump when the president quite proudly—former president quite proudly on the campaign trail said that he, you know, would invite Russia to potentially do whatever the hell it wanted with a—with a member of NATO that didn’t pay its dues. We all know that, of course, NATO doesn’t have dues. But one of the invited guests is the Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson, who—and Sweden is now just a member. Do you expect Biden to go directly after Trump on something like NATO? And that’s really sort of hard to imagine people not cheering NATO and not cheering a new member of NATO.  TUTTLE: No, I wouldn’t expect any direct attacks. I think that the—I think that the House—largely House Republicans, some of the Senate Republicans, that sort of proxy will work effectively, as sort of a mirror of Trump and the presidential campaign. You saw a little bit of this last year. You saw the president with certain lines that he knew, I think, in advance were going to incite some of the folks who may break the quorum and may stand up and look—and those are sound bites that are played over and over. I mean, 27 million Americans watched the State of the Union last year. That’s not a ton, but the sound bites or the video was played over and over of sort of this group of, you know, ruckus makers, you know, on the floor of the House of Representatives, you know, hollering at the president. And that’s not such a great look.   So I don’t think that he’ll go after the president directly. I think he’ll allow House Republicans to serve as that proxy, to do it for him. But I think he will offer a full-throated support—offer his full-throated support for NATO and for the Ukraine assistance, and how critical it is. And again, this is a—this is an issue that divides Republicans. And so, you know, again, if you have that applause line, you know, it’s going to be an interesting dynamic. So that’s what I would say.  ROBBINS: So, Shannon, after age, the border and migration seem to be driving the president’s declining approval numbers. And not just with Republicans, but with Democrats as well. Former President Trump is certainly out there fomenting fear and loathing about migrants everywhere he goes, What will you be listening for about the migration issue? And is this a potential area where he can leverage President Trump’s resistance to a bipartisan deal?  O’NEIL: Well, we saw last week on Thursday both Trump and Biden at the border in Texas. Two different cities. One—Biden was in Brownsville and Trump was in Eagle Pass. But they were both there presenting their views. And, right, Trump’s view was that there’s chaos at the border, and this is the Biden administration’s fault. And Biden’s view was that we had a deal. And back to Chris’s point about, you know, a house that that can’t come together. We had a deal that was going to help fix this. We had a deal that was going to bring in more judges. We had a deal that was going to allow this processing to go faster, that would slow the movement of people to the border, that would change, you know, who applied for asylum, and the like. And, you know, and Trump and the Republicans killed it.   So in some ways I think he was trying to put it off to last week and sort of handle it there. But we will see it tonight. Even if the President doesn’t talk at length during his speech, some of the guests—especially the Republican guests that have been invited—are focused on the border. So we see Republicans in Congress have invited New York police officers that dealt with migrants here. And one of them is leaving an open seat for a young woman who was killed by an illegal migrant. So they are definitely bringing it to the table here. And if and when Biden addresses it again—and tonight, it will be that. It will be that Americans want this done. We need to change the system so it works.  I mean, right now we have two, almost 2.5 million people that came to the border last year. We have over eight million people waiting for their asylum claims to be processed. And that will take years and years to work through. And so he will say, look, we need to come together on issues that Americans care about. This is one of them. And it’s not his fault. It’s their fault. I think if we hear anything, it’ll be that.  ROBBINS: There have been some talk that he was going to issue an executive order. Certainly, legislation can do a lot, but he can also take great political advantage about the fact that President Trump has told the Republicans not to—not to go ahead with legislation. Do you think there’s a chance he will come up with announcing an executive order during this speech to shut the border down?  O’NEIL: You know, we will see. The president has emitted, I think last count, 300 executive orders on immigration issues, on migration issues, to try to manage this process. And one of the challenges he has faced is that many of those have then gotten caught up in courts. So you have various, you know, if they seemed lenient towards migrants, various states or attorney generals who are less in line with opposition have tried to stop them in court and get injunctions, and vice versa when they have deemed too hard. So executive orders are a path and, you know, there has been talk about that, but the problem with executive orders is it’s not a solution. It’s not a solution because, one, those who are opposed to these kinds of orders and the kind of things in these orders take it to court and it gets caught up in there; and, two, this is not a long-term solution. It’s not a sustainable solution for the challenges of migration.  So, you know, I don’t know if we’ll see an announcement tonight. You know, my tendency is to think perhaps we won’t. But this isn’t a new thing. We’ve seen executive orders, and that hasn’t really resolved the problem that we’ve seen over the last three years grow.  ROBBINS: But Chris was also talking about, you know, these issues that divide Republicans. Migration’s also an issue that divides Democrats. And so do you expect the president to sort of take a stand and say I really care about this and move past it really quickly because he can’t talk that much about it? How much is he bound by the—by the limitations of his own—his own political party on this?  O’NEIL: I mean, that is his challenge, right? This is an election year, as we obviously all know. He’s trying to bring together a progressive side as well as a sort of centrist side and appeal to those in the center, appeal to the Nikki Haley voters who are now up for grabs, appeal for this broad range. And so it’s very hard to have an executive order that’s either very draconian or very open that will kind of thread that needle. So I think if I had to guess, I think he will—what he did at the border last Thursday, which is: Look, we had a deal. This needs to be legislation because that’s the way to actually have a sustainable solution. And the problem is not me, it’s not the Democrats; it’s the Republicans.  ROBBINS: So, Steven, President Biden’s criticism of Israel’s campaign in Gaza has become increasingly sharp in recent days, and this is really an issue in which multiple constituencies are going to be listening really closely tonight to what the president has to say from the progressive base of the Democratic Party to Israel’s leadership and—as well as to the Arab world. What do you expect to hear? What do you want him to say? And can anything that he says tonight change the dynamic on the ground in the region or the dynamic in Michigan?  COOK: Well, it’s really not a question of what I—what I want him to say; it’s more what he’s likely to say. And I think that what he’s likely to say is precisely what the administration has been saying over the course of recent weeks, is that it absolutely supports Israel’s right to defend itself; it absolutely supports the destruction of—Israel’s goal to destroy Hamas; but that the humanitarian situation in Gaza is more than dire, and that the Israelis must not move into Rafah until they have a credible plan to protect civilians in that city, and that the United States expects the Israelis to do a much, much better job in flowing aid into the Gaza Strip.  I think that much of this is at a rhetorical level. I don’t think that we are really seeing a shift in the president’s position with regard to Israel. I think we would see more dramatic steps if there really was a shift in policy, something along the lines that some of his allies have brought up in recent days about conditioning weapons to the Israelis should they proceed with a Rafah operation. One has to wonder whether this comes directly from the White House or not. If it’s a bluff, it’s a risk that it’s just a bluff. And if it isn’t, it does send the message to important constituencies both here in the United States as well as, importantly, abroad about an American commitment to an ally in the middle of a—in the middle of a conflict.  So this is the most complicated—other than immigration, I think this is the most complicated issue that the president has to tackle in this—in this State of the Union address. He’s likely not to make any of his core—any of the constituencies very happy about it. There are constituencies that don’t believe him regardless of what he—of what he says on this, in part because of miscalculations that he made at the beginning of this conflict in providing kind of maximum support for the Israelis while underestimating how they were going to frame the conflict in terms of an existential struggle, which means he has actually limited influence over them. So that will be the extent of it.  The big news, obviously, of the afternoon is that the United States is going to build some sort of offshore pier or port in order to flow aid into the Gaza Strip. That’s certainly superior than airdrops, which is not a good way of delivering aid—it’s limited amounts of aid; there’s little control over it. This is an idea that actually has been kicking around since the fall. I first heard about it from the Cypriot government. And there’s been some talk for some number of months now about aiding Gaza through—by sea. And it’s good news that the administration is taking this up, given the situation in the Gaza Strip. But I think the president is sort of hemmed in here by the politics of everything, both at home as well as abroad, so it’s not likely that he’s going to emerge from this in a way that people aren’t going to be unhappy about.  ROBBINS: So can we talk a little bit about the pier? Because we have been talking—there had been talk about corridors coming from—through Cyprus for a long time and all that. How much of a difference can this make? And I think the U.N. keeps talking about how people are starving in Gaza. Can this—can they get enough food in there? And will the—will the Israelis let enough food get in there to really make a difference in the humanitarian situation in Gaza with this, or is this another symbolic move?  COOK: Well, one would think that in light of Benny Gantz’s visit—unofficial visit to Washington this week, Benny Gantz being a member of the War Cabinet, in which he expressed, quote/unquote, “surprise” at the pointed criticism from senior American officials and others in Washington about Israel’s military operations, that the Israelis would want to be cooperative on the aid issue. After all, they are being beaten up by both their traditional allies and others over the aid situation. It would strike me that this would have to be coordinated with the IDF, though one would hope that others would take the lead in this, most importantly the United States. And in that way, I don’t think the Israelis can block what the United States wants to do.  It may be actually more advantageous for the Israelis because it does relieve them of a certain responsibility that the United States is now taking on, and that’s something that I think they would like to do. But of course, it does undermine their day—part of their day-after plan in the Gaza Strip, which is to rely on, quote/unquote, “local Gazans” and others who are non-Hamas-affiliated to take up some of the responsibilities in terms of humanitarian relief and administration of aid. We saw that did not go very well a week ago. And so that really is something that the international community is going to have to take up, and I think that the Israelis are going to have to step aside here. They will have a role in it, but I don’t think that they can say no to President Biden on this.  ROBBINS: So I have many more questions on all these topics, but I’m going to—we want to throw it open to the participants. But I have a jump-ball question, which is China. There was a time in which China was the number-one strategic competitor or the number-one strategic threat for this administration. It was the focus of their National Security Strategy. It was the focus of their National Defense Strategy. And nobody talks about—or, we’re barely talking about it these days. Do you think he’s going to talk about China tonight? And if he does, in what context? Is it going to be about trade? Is it going to be about the CHIPS Act? Is it going to be about how foreign policy actually has a positive effect on people’s, you know, home life or their—or our competitiveness? What do you think? Jump in.  COOK: Well, given that Chris and Shannon are taller than me, I’m going to bow out of this question. (Laughter.)  ROBBINS: Actually, Steven, I wanted you to answer this question. (Laughter.)  O’NEIL: I’ll start.  TUTTLE: Yeah—or I’m happy to. Whatever you like.  O’NEIL: You know, I think what he’ll do here, because this is—he’s tried to—the Biden administration in general has tried to take the temperature down on U.S.-China, so I don’t think we’re going to see sort of big rhetoric or sort of chest-beating—even though you’re in Congress, where there’s really bipartisan support for hardening the relationship between the two countries. So I think we will see that—you know, the sort of cooperate where we can, compete where we must sort of—sort of approach.  But this will give him the ability to turn to his domestic agenda and a lot of what he sees as his accomplishments. And if, you know, the theme of this speech is, you know, I need—I need another term because I need to finish the job, then that is where a lot of the China policy is, and particularly the economic policy. So I think he will tout the CHIPS Act and, you know, the hundreds of billions of dollars that are going into creating secure semiconductor supply chains. I think he will tout the Inflation Reduction Act and, you know, hundreds of billions of more dollars that are going into greening the economy and everything from electric-vehicle cars to solar panels to wind turbines to updating electricity grids to all of that that’s happening and sort of win the race for green technology, which is vis-à-vis China.  So I think what we will see is we’ll see a mention, probably, of China and, you know, the need to compete where we must, but really a pivot to what he sees as his accomplishments. That opens the door to all of these domestic policies. And then that gets to the kinds of things you hear in State of the Unions about the jobs that are being created and about the communities that are getting invested in and the growth that’s happening.  ROBBINS: Chris?  TUTTLE: Yeah, no, I agree. I think it’s going to be about—it’s not going to be necessarily about taking it to the Chinese; it’s going to be about making the United States more competitive, and industrial policy, and some of the things that Shannon mentioned, and also pointing out that he has worked on all of these different policies—CHIPS, Inflation Reduction Act, even the infrastructure bill—bipartisan infrastructure bill—as an example of, infrastructure and CHIPS at least, bipartisan successes to make the United States more competitive when it comes—when it comes to China. But I don’t—I agree with Shannon. I think that with the administration’s move to sort of take the temperature down a bit, we’ll see if that lasts through the campaign. I think that that probably is likely to be mention of it.  ROBBINS: So, Monica, can we invite our participants to ask questions to grill our panelists?  OPERATOR: (Gives queuing instructions.)  ROBBINS: We only have one hand up here so far. So I suppose I will call on the one hand that’s up here. If you could identify yourself—if you could identify yourself, and ask a very brief question. Khushboo Razdan.  Q: Can you hear me?  ROBBINS: Yes.  Q: Hi. This is Kushboo from the South China Morning Post, about the China angle that you were talking about.  You know, you mentioned the CHIPS and Science Act. Can we also expect some kind of funding announcements? We’ve only seen three so far. Not much coming out in terms of money when it comes to the CHIPS and Science Act. Can we expect President Biden to make some big announcements. We’re hearing there could be something about TSMC and Intel getting some big funding tonight? What are your thoughts on that?  O’NEIL: Well, we have seen the CHIPS and Science Act in a whole host of things, right? We’ve seen some with Global Foundries here in New York, which is where I’m based. We’ve seen Intel. It looks like the Columbus plan—or outside of Columbus plan in Ohio that they’re going forward may benefit from that. We’re seeing TSMC and others in Arizona. So I think there are parts here. And the question is, does it come from CHIPS—the CHIPS Act, or does it come from other aspects here?  But I do think, you know, whether it’s a big announcement of here’s yet another, you know, layer that’s coming out tonight, I do think we are starting to see the dispersion of that money and the support that goes with it. Because it’s not just the actual money. It’s not—it’s also sort of the whole infrastructure that goes around here. And I do think we will see—as I said before, I do think we’re going to see touting of these various—especially the bipartisan bills, which CHIPS and, as Chris said, the infrastructure act—is part of it. And in some places, those are working in tandem in terms of the investment.  TUTTLE: I would also add, it’s hard to imagine a State of the Union where there aren’t some major announcements like that. It’s great to sort of bring news to the—for a president to bring news to the table.  ROBBINS: They do like to—certainly love to give away money. It’s, you know, come on down! (Laughs.)  The next question is from Jim Zirin.  Q: There we go. I’m sorry. I tuned in a little late, so I may have missed this.  But there’s a shocking statistic out there from Gallup that only 3 percent of those polled nationally think democracy is a very important issue in the United States today, and that care about the future of our democracy. And isn’t this a great opportunity for Biden to rally the country that you have a national presidential candidate who wants to be a dictator, who wants to deport naturalized citizens born elsewhere, and who has made a number of wild statements which are about dealing with his political enemies and weaponizing the Justice Department, that are undermining the very fabric of democracy? And isn’t this a great platform for him to take on this issue, which I would think is the major issue in the campaign?  TUTTLE: Yeah, I think that definitely will factor in. I said earlier, Jim, that I don’t think that he’ll take on Trump directly on this question. He may. But I think that references to the future of democracy is at stake, that type of—those type of types of rhetorical devices I think will be employed possibly throughout the speech, as something that is—you know, of the gravity of the situation and what’s at stake. We didn’t really get into that question because we were earlier talking—again, if you missed the first part—talking about foreign policy. But I think that’s definitely going to be peppered throughout the speech.  ROBBINS: So my old friend Tracy Wilkinson, from the L.A. Times.   Q: Hi. Hi, Carla. Thank you.  ROBBINS: Hi, Tracy.  Q: (Laughs.) Long time no see. I also came in a little late, so forgive me.  But, Shannon, I mention, to yours and my chagrin, Latin America won’t figure in the speech tonight. But I thought it might come up—the one way it might come up is in the context of immigration, and whether Biden might or might not talk about the cooperation—entrecomias (ph), you know, the so-called cooperation he’s getting from some Latin American countries, like Mexico, like El Salvador, and—you know, for—with all that that, you know, implies. If you might talk about that at all—appraise it, when we all know there are a lot of issues involved. Just curious if you think that might come up that way. Thanks.  O’NEIL: Yeah, no, thanks, Tracy. Nice to hear your voice. There’s a possibility there, right? Is that, you know, one, I don’t think he really wants to talk about migration for a long time because it’s a very—obviously, we were talking about, it’s one of the most difficult issues for his administration. But that idea that, look, we were trying to get this bill passed, and there was bipartisan support, and the Republicans killed it. So we can’t go that path. But that he is approaching this in a broader context, in a multilateral context, and working with other governments. And that this is a bigger problem around the world. It’s a bigger problem, and that they are taking steps on there.   And they have taken some steps in that sense. As you point out, right, working with these governments. They’re slowly—and I would say slowly—starting to roll out, you know, various offices in these countries so people don’t have to come to the border to apply for asylum and the like. That’s been pretty slow to roll out. So I think we will see some of that. And, you know, more broadly, you know, I think, a difference that he—you know, he puts forward, some of it’s this bipartisanship but another part is this sort of multilateralism, right? And that’s his approach to the world.   So if we get—where we might get something on foreign policy is that. So we see, you know, the Sweden’s prime minister being invited, because NATO. So kind of nodding to NATO and then the multilateralism there. I think if we—when we hear about the Ukraine, we hear about these, we’ll also see sort of the multilateral side there. And perhaps, you know, the nod on immigration that like, look, we’re working with other countries here too, because it is a broader—a broader Western Hemisphere problem.  ROBBINS: So, Elise Labott—hi, Elise—of Zivvy News, formerly of CNN.  Q: Hi, guys. How are you?   TUTTLE: Hey, Elise.  Q: I was a little bit—I was a little bit late as well. Sorry, everybody. Kind of just ducked on late. But—and, Steve, I caught the tail end of your remarks.  And I was wondering, I’m sorry if I missed this, but how do you think Biden is going to just kind of thread the needle between those who, you know, want this kind of unconditional support for Israel with the growing wing of the Democratic Party that is becoming, you know, so disillusioned with his policy?  COOK: Yeah. Well, I mentioned that this was the biggest challenge that he has in this speech, which is his own worldview and his own kind of pro-Israel proclivities. I mean, this is—I mean, we’ve discussed this before privately, Elise. He can’t talk about Israel without mentioning Golda Meir. And it’s an Israel that he remembers, that doesn’t really exist any longer. But I think what he’s going to do is he is going to repeat his, you know, heartfelt and support for Israel, and everything that he has done for the State of Israel since October 7th. He is hosting at this State of the Union families of hostages. And he will point to them, as—and will lay out his pro-Israel bona fides.   But also say, that with that he has responsibilities, and that the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip is unbearable, and that it is important, and that it is American responsibility and, quite frankly, in Israel’s interest, for the United States and the international community to flow aid into the Gaza Strip. And to think clearly about a day after and a process in which two states can live side by side in peace. That’s probably the best that he’s going to be able to do.   My sense is that it’s really not going to move anybody. As you alluded to, there are large constituencies that after five months do not give much credence to what the president says about humanitarian aid to the Palestinians because the United States has, kind of in an unfettered way, provided the weaponry to the Israelis that have made it possible for the suffering of the Palestinian people; and that there is very little likelihood that—despite all the discussion within the Democratic Party about the possibility of conditioning aid, it seems unlikely that the president is going to support that.   At the same time there’s another large constituency that is going to be—that has become increasingly suspect about the language that the administration has been using and suspect of the—what they perceive to be the growing influence of the progressive left on the president and the White House’s thinking.   So it’s really a lose-lose situation for the president. It’ll have to be entirely up to him and his political people to decide which constituency he wants to upset more. But that is an issue of politics, not policy, and that’s not anywhere that I’m prepared to go right now.   ROBBINS: Steven, how much of a problem does Biden have within his own congressional constituency? Do you think that he’s going to—there’s going to be a demonstration on the floor of Congress tonight about Gaza or the sort of things that we see with people—you know, we’ve seen somewhat in the primaries? We’ve certainly seen demonstrations, you know, out in the street. Or do you think that they’re going to hold it together because it is an election year?   COOK: Carla, as you know, I do policy, not politics. This is—but people feel very strongly about this issue and I don’t consider myself a, you know, expert Congress watcher.  I would think that members of the Democratic caucus would not want to embarrass the president at the State of the Union in the way that some of his opponents have tried to do in previous addresses. But, like I said, people feel very strongly about this issue.   TUTTLE: Yeah, and I would just add I think Steven’s right about a floor demonstration and with regard to the political calculation that may be going on in the White House I think the—their balancing of the assistance to Israel with the humanitarian assistance is critical and anything that moves I think you’re going to see that in terms of the House.  The question is if you are an Arab-American voter in Dearborn, Michigan, when it comes down to a binary choice are you going to stay home in November when you know that a Trump policy is likely to be much closer to what the Netanyahu government would prefer and there are a number of other—you know, Trump has a history on sort of the Arab-American side. That’s the political calculation they’re going to have to make and how much this actually—this issue is actually suppressive of votes that they’re going to need in order to get through—to get over the line in November.   ROBBINS: How central do you think—there’s Ukraine and then there’s sort of—then there’s Russia and Putin, and Biden came in and he was going to make the—democracy versus autocracy was going to be his central theme for his presidency and he seemed to always seem very sort of academic almost to me, and particularly the word existentialist threat is overly used there but I understood that he saw the world as a fight between darkness and light and, certainly, there is a fight between darkness and light going on there and Putin is a very strong example of that.   You know, Navalny’s widow decided not to come. I don’t think that was a diss of him. I think she’s genuinely worn out.   Do you think—and who knows what he’s going to do—do you think he needs to keep Russia a central focus for this speech or shouldn’t he take a very strong stance on it because it seems like a lot of people who don’t want to support aid to Ukraine seem to be sloughing off the threat from Russia.   TUTTLE: Yeah. I don’t think it—again, I don’t think foreign policy is going to occupy a large amount of space in this speech but it does offer some potent opportunity for Joe Biden. I think that, you know, foreign policy is seldom an issue that really moves the needle during elections. You’ve seen that tick up a little bit.   There was a poll—an AP poll along with the University of Chicago that showed that foreign policy is taking on a larger and larger role. That may be because people are particularly interested in the Israel question. They may be particularly interested in the Ukraine question.  I think, by and large, voters just know that we’re in a world that is tumultuous, that’s chaotic, where there are lots of problems and that they’re getting more and more concerned about these issues that, you know, there’s—that bring with them huge gravity.   So I think that he’s not going to spend a ton of time on Ukraine, to answer your question, but I think that it does factor into voters thinking that he is actually getting—that he’s a responsible actor who’s trying to push back against not necessarily autocrats but enemies of the United States—adversaries of the United States—and that Putin is one of them.   And I agree with you that the rhetoric on sort of democracy versus autocracy doesn’t get much purchase with voters. I don’t think that gets you very far. I think the question is can you paint Russia as the threat—successfully as the threat that it actually is and then persuade people that if we are going to push back on this even though it is expensive this is a way to do it on the relatively cheap. You know, that every day that the Russians aren’t—have not won in Ukraine they’re losing and we’re degrading—their capabilities are being degraded by our proxy support. So I hope that answers your question.   ROBBINS: It does.   So, finally, running out of time here and I just wanted to go around and ask you all, you know, there is a long tradition in White Houses of calling in experts and asking for advice before these speeches are written, much to the dismay of speech writers because it’s not like they don’t have a thousand people lobbying them.   But my initiative into this speech, you know, cast it this way. Were you to be called in—I’m not going to ask whether you’ve actually been called in for your advice—for the good of the nation what would you like to hear in the speech tonight?   Steven, you want to go first?   COOK: Well, let me just say I was not called in probably because I would have told the president’s speech writers that whatever they’re talking about in terms of their day after plans in the Gaza Strip they’re unlikely to work.   But I think—again, I, you know, approach this question with a little bit of trepidation because I don’t want to get into politics. But for the good of the country, I think I would go—talk about two things.  One, a domestic politics issue, and that is the importance of democracy, back to Jim Zirin’s question, and that this is a system that has not always delivered but it really has created this extraordinary country—which is not perfect, but is—can be; we can all strive together to make it better, and that democracy is the way to do that, and that it can deliver. And I don’t want to get into the specifics how he—I think he might do that but I do think that any emphasis on the importance of democratic practices and the rule of law are called for at this moment.  And on foreign policy, oddly, I would spend—I would make a clarion call for support for Ukraine. Europe prosperous, whole, and free is a core global interest of the United States and this sort of—the sense that has come over people, a sort of defeatist sense about Ukraine and accepting the situation as it is, will not serve us and serve that core interest quite well and this is a problem in this country.   It’s something that actually I’m writing about now is that, you know, in a way sometimes in foreign policy things are too hard. We overthink the escalatory spirals and the possibility of wider wars and the problems pile up and pile up and then when we are forced to confront them the problem is bigger than it was.  ROBBINS: Chris?  TUTTLE: Sure. Well, it’s very unlikely that I will be called over within the next hour or two because I am a lifelong conservative Republican with a lot of Republican presidents, having worked for a lot of Republican presidents and Hill members of Congress.   I would say that I would focus on exactly what I said sort of at the outset, which is the contrast between the steadiness of Joe Biden, in his words, and the chaos of the Republicans on the Hill and by proxy Donald Trump. I would make that central to my messaging. And I would also use, as I said before also, the foreign policy issues as encapsulating that sort of steadiness versus chaos, and the immense gravity of these issues. You can talk about economic issues. You can talk about accomplishments. You can talk about how you’re making people’s lives better.   But there is a real advantage, I think, on foreign policy because I think people, even though they don’t necessarily pay attention to foreign policy issues, they understand how critically important they are. And they do sense a world that is, again, in real tumult. And for him to make that point, I think is a good one. And it points up some of the issues—you know, some of the questions, do you want the steadiness of, you know, this administration, even though you might not like everything we’re doing? Or do you want—even if, you know, a president who you may agree with more ideologically, but it’s going to be chaos once again. That would be the point I would make.  ROBBINS: Shannon.  O’NEIL: Well, I agree with both of my colleagues. I thought it was great on policy and on the politics. So I’m sorry that there wasn’t a phone call to either of them. (Laughs.) But I guess what—I guess what I would add, and just sort of augment a little bit, is, you know, I think one of Biden’s strengths, and I think as, you know, polling for people in the United States and the like if you’re trying to sell this, is that, you know, he is good at reaching out. He’s known for his bipartisan approach. It always has—you know, it always hasn’t taken, and we know it’s very polarized. But there is something there. And so I’d leaned into that if I was him. You know, he’s trying to do these things.   And whether that’s on the domestic side, but also taking that to the foreign policy, to the international side, right? This is a man who, as we look at the future, will be reaching out to allies will be thinking about working with NATO, working with Europe, working with various countries, you know, in the Western Hemisphere, in Asia. You know, we have all of these initiatives that are going on right now, trying to build that core of supporters, and building a network around the world that’s going to be helpful to the United States. And I think that is something that would make sense to lean into.   And, you know, he wouldn’t take this advice, but as he talks about all of his domestic accomplishments, on industrial policy in the like, I would—I would ask or I would—I would suggest that we shouldn’t just make it just domestic—just about domestic jobs, or about domestic growth. But to really do that right, to really have secure supply chains, to really have economic security along with national security, and U.S. growth, it’s got to be international as well. And so thinking about the foreign policy on that side as well.  ROBBINS: Well, if they called me in, and this is me as the former editorial writer—(laughs)—I’m going to take the prerogative here. Biden had what I thought was an extraordinary line about Russia, just that we can have back after President Trump’s line about whatever the hell they want. He said: No other president in our history has ever bowed down to a Russian dictator. Well, let me say this as clearly as I can, I never will. I think that’s a hell of an applause line. So I’m going to be listening tonight to see whether he repeats that one. Whoever wrote that one should be lobbying very hard to get it into this speech, as far as I’m concerned. (Laughs.)  Well, I wanted to thank Shannon O’Neil, Chris Tuttle, and Steven Cook for an extraordinary conversation. I want to thank everybody who joined us. And just as a reminder—I have to get my notes back up here, because I have to make sure that I do everything right or they won’t invite me back here—this has been on the record. Please visit CFR.org for additional resources and a transcript for this. And thank you all for joining us. And we’ll all be watching.   (END) 

David J. Scheffer, senior fellow at CFR, leads the conversation on complex humanitarian emergencies. CASA: Welcome to today’s session of the Winter/Spring 2024 CFR Academic Webinar Series. I’m Maria Casa, director of the National Program and Outreach department at CFR. Thank you all for joining us. Today’s discussion is on the record and the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/academic, if you would like to share them with your colleagues or classmates. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We are delighted to have David Scheffer with us to discuss complex humanitarian emergencies. David Scheffer is a senior fellow at CFR, where he focuses on international law and international criminal justice. He is professor of practice at Arizona State University, working out of Washington DC, and was previously a professor of law at Northwestern University, where he is director emeritus of the Center for International Human Rights at the Pritzker School of Law. Ambassador Scheffer served in both terms of the Clinton administration. During the second term, he was appointed the first-ever U.S. ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues. And he led the U.S. delegation to the UN talks establishing the International Criminal Court. Of particular interest to this group is his book, All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals, published by Princeton University Press in 2013. Welcome, David. Thank you very much for speaking with us today. SCHEFFER: Thank you, Maria. CASA: If you could begin by giving us a little bit of context, defining complex humanitarian emergencies, and maybe giving us a few examples. SCHEFFER: I will certainly do so. And it’s a great pleasure to be with everyone here today. This is a large audience and a very distinguished one, of students, of professors, of deans, and others in this space in our life, which is an interest in humanitarian needs and causes and emergencies around the world. What we’re going to talk about today is complex humanitarian emergencies. And it’s not too complex a definition. By using the word complex, we really mean that these are humanitarian needs—which usually look to issues of food security, to habitat, to safety, and security, and one’s livelihood—that enables one to live and thrive where one permanently lives and thrives. But then we have humanitarian emergencies. And they get complex when people are being displaced from where they normally live and nominally thrive as normal human beings. They get displaced by armed conflict, or by economic disparities, extreme poverty, or by climate change, or by political upheavals and rivalries within their countries, particularly targeting particular ethnic groups. That creates a complex situation because in order to solve it, you have to think not only of the basic necessities of life to solve it, but you have to think about war, how to solve that, or the climate crisis, how to solve that, or extreme poverty, how to solve that. And that makes it an extremely complex problem. What I want to do is speak for about maybe eight, nine minutes or so, and then open this up for a fulsome discussion among our many participants. And that means not necessarily asking me a question, but perhaps delivering a comment of your own—brief, of course, because we have a lot of people on this—so that you can contribute to this and add to the educational value of this for students now, and in the future. I want to point out the very latest list of humanitarian emergencies that have been identified by the International Rescue Committee. And their latest report, I think is—you know, in 2024 is a very, very enlightening one. And I encourage everyone to link on to it at some point after this discussion to look at it. The top ten are as follows: Sudan, the occupied Palestinian territory—which, of course, many countries would regard as the state of Palestine. More than 130 countries recognize that territory as the state of Palestine. But nonetheless, it’s now in the number two position, which is probably obvious to everyone on this webinar, given the news since October 7. South Sudan is number three. Burkina Faso, number four. Myanmar, number five. Mali, number six. Somalia, number seven. Niger, number eight. Ethiopia, number nine. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, number ten. And then, without ranking, but in the eleven through twenty slots are Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Chad, Ecuador—for the first time—Haiti, Lebanon, Nigeria, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen. So, among those twenty countries, you can see that there’s a tremendous challenge. Now, interestingly, the total number of people who are regarded as being caught up and trapped in humanitarian emergencies actually declined slightly or somewhat, from 2023 to 2024. In 2023, that number was about 363 million people in the world were trapped in humanitarian emergencies. In 2024, it’s estimated to be about 300 million. But that’s an incredible number. And I think in our recent understanding of humanitarian emergencies, remember that in Gaza two million people live. And they were not really on that list prominently until this year. I want to emphasize that the three major components that we typically see in humanitarian emergencies of this character, the engines of them, are: armed conflict, climate change, and economic shocks. And sometimes there’s a combination of them, where you will see a country and it’ll be identified—for example, Syria, Somalia, and Ethiopia, are described as humanitarian crises or emergencies driven by both conflict and climate change, coming together as sort of a double power punch at the people to forcibly displace them from their homes. I think in the readings—one of the most interesting readings that we offered to you on the list is the one regarding Sudan, which is kind of a sleeper now because it’s overtaken by the situation in Gaza and in Ukraine in the last couple of years. But Sudan is getting worse and worse and worse. And it is now at the top of the list. You’ll recall that in 2003 we were struggling with genocide in Darfur in Sudan. And that has actually resurrected itself in the last year or so in terms of continued genocide in Darfur. But that’s just part of the entire conflict in Sudan, which is an armed conflict. And it is driving tens and tens of millions of Sudanese across the borders into Chad, into South Sudan, forcibly displacing them within Sudan itself. So that is a true emergency. I want to point out a couple of sort of larger cosmic issues for you all to think about. One, you know, since after—well, in the early 2000s there was a tremendous amount of focus—and I was part of this—put on creating this principle called “responsibility to protect” (R2P). And it was memorialized in an outcome summit statement of the UN General Assembly in 2005, you know, in two paragraphs—I think it was paragraphs 136-137. But it was focused on the responsibility to protect populations who are victimized by atrocity crimes. Not by climate change, not by economic shocks, not by armed conflicts, per se. But rather by atrocity crimes—genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and they also listed ethnic cleansing specifically, even though that is part of crimes against humanity. But the point is that the world’s focus was on a duty to prevent—or a responsibility to protect—exposed populations to those crimes, a responsibility both domestically and then, if it’s not done domestically, the international community has to put that focus on it and ultimately work through the Security Council to address the problem. I would suggest that we’ve reached a stage now where, first of all, the responsibility to protect principle has come under great strain, particularly given the fractured character of the Security Council, to the extent that it’s not achieving the promise that it originally held. But we need to start thinking about what I would call a responsibility to survive, R2S. I’m just throwing this out at you. Because the humanitarian emergencies of our time are enormous. And they require very, very rapid action. And they require a focus on the responsibility of governments to address these humanitarian emergencies, both governments that have to address them domestically because they’re happening inside those countries but, of course, also the world community to try to staunch the egregious sort of assault on the humanity of various populations. And I just think we’ve reached that stage now where we have to have a responsibility to survive principle out there that holds governments accountable. And that takes me sort of to the next cosmic point I want to point out, which is I have—because my career has been in international criminal justice for decades now, and I’m always looking at, you know, who’s the next war criminal. And we just got that announcement yesterday out of The Hague with respect to indictments on two Russian military officials with respect to war crimes and crimes against humanity against the Ukrainian people during the winter season in that conflict. So that’s good. That’s good. Accountability for atrocity crimes is definitely part of our system now. It doesn’t work perfectly, obviously, but it’s there. What we are missing is holding accountable what I would call burden shifters. These are leaders who just dump burdens on the rest of us. They’re just dumping. A humanitarian emergency is a burden on the rest of the international community. That’s not a critical step. I mean, I’m just—obviously, we have to react to that and deal with it. But I always marvel at how certain leaders think that they can just act in a manner that shifts an enormous burden for taking care of just the basic necessities of life of tens of millions of people—they can just sort of dump it on to the international community. And so, we don’t have a system politically where we call out the leaders who—they might not be doing anything illegal, per se, but they sure as heck are shifting an enormous burden off of their shelf of responsibility and governance onto the rest of the world. And I think we should more clearly identify those individuals. We should figure out a way to identify burden shifters among leaders, strongmen or otherwise, around the world. And finally, I want to just make a final comment about Gaza, which of course has seized our attention so much particularly since October 7. What I have found disconcerting in analyzing this from an international law perspective is that I found myself in October-early November, rather easily stating principles of law pertaining to the right of self-defense, how one engages on a daily basis in combat in terms of recognizing principles of law that focus on proportionality, distinction, necessity, humanity, in how one wages combat between two combating forces. And to keep the fate of the civilian population, you know, front and center in how you engage on a day-by-day basis in combat. International lawyers, military lawyers, we can all talk about this. And there are lots of principles. It’s sort of a microscopic aspect of international law. We’ve got the Geneva Conventions of 1949. We’ve got the 1977 protocols to them. We have the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. We’ve got the statutes of the other tribunals of the last thirty years, all focusing on how, particularly judges, would determine, have war crimes been committed? Has a crime against humanity been committed? Has genocide been committed? That can all be determined on a sort of classic, day-by-day basis. It’s very granular. It can get very, very granular, in the courtroom particularly. But what international does not have—international law has not done yet is what we see in—what we haven’t accomplished a structure for yet is what we see really unfold in Gaza, whereby even if one can justify a daily use of military force, there has to be some structure in international law that defines the totality of what is occurring, and whether that is justifiable under law. Namely, how long does a military assault take place in Gaza, against what collection of targets, with what impact on the civilian population? At what point would international law step in and say: There is a red line here that you cannot cross any further. We don’t have that kind of structure in international law. It’s not there. That has to be a political decision. And you see that being played out now in the news, with the United States becoming more concerned, obviously, about the humanitarian situation there. Sort of coming late to the party. And the rest of the world being somewhat outraged by it. And yet in law, we don’t really have that structure for that totality analysis. And whether or not, when you start a conflict if you want to comply with international law—and, of course, you know, one could argue Hamas has no intention of complying with any law at all, so it’ll just proceed as it sees fit. But if you’re a law-abiding force, then you might sit down and say, well, over the next two to three months if we use military force in the following way in order to defeat Hamas, what does that mean in terms of the totality of the destruction, the totality of deaths, the totality of injuries? And where does it leave the population at the end? Are they in a state of starvation? You know, what do we anticipate? Does law give us any guidance here? And so, I just want to put that position down on the table, that I have found it somewhat frustrating that in analyzing the humanitarian emergency of Gaza, international law helps to some extent it just doesn’t go far enough in giving us guidance beyond that. It really becomes very much a political dynamic, as opposed to a strictly legal one. So let me leave it at that for my little introduction and let’s dive into it. People are free to share a comment or two. I strongly encourage students to participate. This is for you, the students, primarily. And so we want you to participate. Do not be shy. And obviously, we’ve got many other distinguished faculty members, deans, et cetera, on. And I welcome all of you for comment, for questions, but everyone should keep it short so that we can get as many people as possible. So I turn it over to Maria. CASA: Thank you, David. (Gives queuing instructions.) We will start out with a question from Jonathan Cristol, adjunct assistant professor of political science at Yeshiva University. Jonathan. You have the unmute prompt to accept. Oh, we can come back to you later, Jonathan. Let’s go to Stephen Kass, adjunct professor at the Center for Global Affairs at New York University. Q: Thank you, Maria. David, thank you so much for this very modest, self-effacing series of comments, and for all the great work you have done for the world. My question is not about the second subject, Gaza, but about the first. You raised the R2S suggestion. The problems of conflict, and climate change, and economics that are driving the migration and the humanitarian crises you focused on are hard to pin on particular leaders. In fact, it’s the international community that, to a very considerable degree, has flooded the world with arms, and certainly has led to the extraordinary climate impacts that are driving people off their land. I agree that corruption is an issue, but it seems to me hard to pin responsibility for the first two significant causes of these crises on individual leaders, particularly in the developing world. SCHEFFER: Stephen, I accept the premise of your question. I would simply add that really what I’m focusing on are those leaders that self-initiate, in particular, armed conflicts that drive—that are sort of power-seizing conflicts internally that drives so much of this. I mean, I could—you know, the Myanmar military would be, you know, sort of candidate number one. But even on climate change, et cetera, I mean, I would look back at the presidency of Mr. Bolsonaro in Brazil, and ask during—you know, during his term what did he do with respect to climate change challenges in Brazil that either exacerbated the situation there or, you know, diminished them? Not necessarily for purposes of legal culpability, but I think to call them out, to essentially almost shame them under old human rights principles of shaming. That they were part of the problem and not part of the solution. So it’s—I accept exactly what you’re saying. I’m just saying that I still think there should be some focus on the responsibility of leaders to get it as right as possible while they’re in governance, and not to sort of cross what I would call as red lines that clearly exacerbate situations that that can lead to humanitarian emergencies. That’s my basic point. CASA: Thank you. Your comments on burden shifting has interested our audience. We have two written questions that I’ll put together for you. One is from Fodei Batty, professor of political science at Quinnipiac University, who says: Dr. Scheffer points out leaders who dump their problems, burdens, responsibilities on the rest of U.S./international community. But don’t such bad leaders do so because the rest of the international community is complicit in their actions? Every bad leader has a powerful friend somewhere in the international community who offers them some level of protection because of their own national interests. How do you go around the problem? Should great powers be more responsible in who they regard as friends and who others consider bad leaders? And second to that is a written question from Elke Zuern, professor of politics at Sarah Lawrence College, who writes: My class is interested in a bit more detail on your interesting point regarding burden shifters. SCHEFFER: Right. Well, let me—let me answer both of them. I think what you’re identifying is a clearly acknowledged point, which is the double standards involved. And I’m extremely conscious of that. The Global South in particular I think today looks at the actions of the major powers—whether it be China, Russia, the United States, the European Union—and their responsibility for climate change over the decades, and also for economic issues that they perhaps could have had much greater influence in solving rather than exacerbating, whether it be almost, you know, punitive tariff regimes, et cetera, that put a great burden on developing economies. So I get it. I’m not trying to exclude the great powers from burden shifting. And I know it’s probably controversial to sort of place the United States in yet another position of responsibility in the world, but I think we always are recognizing the contribution the United States made, unfortunately, to climate change, and also to economic situations in various parts of the world that we try to solve, but that we also have to recognize sometimes we’re the cause of, at least partially, in the beginning. So yeah, it’s not—I mean, I’m not trying to establish legal accountability. I’m just trying to say that there must be a recognition in governance. What is governance of a society? What does it comprise of? Does it comprise, regardless of double standards or whatever, dumping these problems on other countries? Is that good governance, or is that bad governance? How does one define governance today? It might sound a little simplistic, but I see it every day in the news. And so, I think that gets to the second question that I just want to emphasize. I find that in almost everything that I approach these days with international parties—whether they be in academia, in government, in journalism—that the double standards argument is constantly being made. For example, I have tried for two years just on my narrow beat of the world—international criminal law—to work with others to construct a special tribunal on the crime of aggression against Ukraine. And yet, it has proven so difficult to do that because of the allegation of double standards, particularly by the Global South. That we’re paying attention to what has happened in Ukraine as opposed to paying attention to what has happened elsewhere in the world, even with respect to the crime of aggression. And in particular for the United States, you know, the first utterance is, well, what about the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003? Please explain. So that comes up again, and again, and again. And it’s a very, very difficult hurdle to jump. CASA: Thank you. We will take the next question from Clemente Abrokwaa, associate teaching professor at the African Studies Program at Pennsylvania State University. Clemente. Q: Thank you so much for your insightful talk. I have two short questions. And the first one is, the numbers that you mentioned, regarding the humanitarian crisis and so on, I could tell that—we could all tell that a greater number of it is from Africa. And I wanted to know why that is so. And second—my second question also is—echoes the first speaker, that mentioned about by the flooding of the—of guns or weapons at the international level that goes into Africa, and elsewhere. I know that Africa is—you know, they don’t really manufacture these guns. They buy them. So how can that be checked? Yeah, so basically those are my two questions. Thanks. SCHEFFER: Well, thank you so much, Clemente. I will do my best to answer these. In terms of their first question, what we have seen in the last year in particular in Africa is the tumult and somewhat the collapse of democratic governance and stability in the Sahel region of Africa, the middle part of Africa. One country after another. And those countries are all popping up on the Humanitarian Emergency Register now. And it is driven by internal power struggles, internal armed conflicts. I don’t think I would—I mean, I could be proven wrong on this—but I don’t think we’re looking in the Sahel necessarily at cross-border armed conflicts. I think almost everything there right now is internal. I could be proven wrong on that. But, of course, you have the outside influence, particularly of the Wagner Group from Russia, and other nonstate actors, are ginning things up in the Sahel. And I think that shows the increased focus on Africa in the humanitarian emergency space. As far as the weapons are concerned, I have found it rather ironic—and sort of understandably ironic, but still ironic—that when it comes to the flow of weapons, on the one hand we have an intense need—at least many of us would argue—for there to be arms manufacturing and arms transfers to Ukraine to defend itself from Russian aggression. That has—you know, in the human rights community we normally and naturally argue for regulation of arms transfers, for limitation of arms transfers. All of this is bad. However, in the last couple of years, I’ve seen a very clear shift in attitudes, whereby, frankly, the task of saving humanity actually requires manufacturing arms and delivering them to countries in need who are acting in self-defense. And we didn’t really—you know, we didn’t have an adequate capacity to do that when the Ukraine war of 2022 broke out. And we’ve been catching up ever since. I mean, the stories out of Europe with trying to regalvanize their arms manufacturing plants, building new ones in order to meet this need—not only for Ukraine, but also in the future for the defense of Europe under NATO—is all an arms manufacturing, arms transfer issue. And of course, here in the United States it’s a huge issue now of gearing up the arms industry and paying them with public funds to actually provide all of these arms. So then you come to Africa. And unfortunately, the spillover is a lack of focus on regulating arms transfers. There’s a treaty out there on arms transfers that is more or less been—you know, has laid fallow now. But it just means the focus has turned away from actually regulating arms transfers to ramping up arms manufacturing, and presumably legitimate transfers. But I think the blowback is, in Africa, you’re going to see a lot of that just gin up more availability of arms for conflicts, particularly non-international armed conflicts, which are not helpful to peace, security, stability, and good governance in Africa. So I’ll leave it there for that answer. CASA: Our next question is a written one. It comes from Zoe Hughes, a graduate student at Stanford University: What value do legal frameworks of war hold in the now, if the global audience cannot confidently assess in the now proportionality and necessity? How do you recommend the global audience factors the laws of war into their response to wars? SCHEFFER: That’s a very, very good question, because it makes even my job very difficult too. In other words, on a day-by-day basis how am I supposed to assess, sitting here in Washington, DC, the extent to which the Israeli Defense Forces have complied with the law of war and international humanitarian law yesterday in the conflict? How do I understand what Hamas has or hasn’t done in that respect? It’s very, very difficult for the public to know what, ultimately in a courtroom, would be the evidence of whether or not a military force has complied with the standard principles—which we do have in customary international law; we have it in rules of engagement, et cetera—of, proportionality, namely you don’t kill more civilians than is absolutely necessary to get at the military advantage of hitting that combat force you’re trying to hit at, and necessity, that the object here is to go after Hamas and no one else. And distinction, between trying to identify between civilians, and, in this case, Hamas. If they’re in a residential building, do you know who’s the civilians and who are the Hamas fighters? How do you calculate that? And if they’re firing back at you out of one window, what’s the story with the window on top? Is that fair game? Who knows? Those are determinations of distinction. And then just basic humanity, which sometimes the military describes as fighting with honor. Namely, yeah, there’s an enemy. There’s combat. But there’s also the honor of doing it in a way that complies with law and, of course, preserves the civilian population to the greatest extent possible. I think my point is, when I say, “the civilian population to the greatest extent possible,” yes, on any given day, with any given strike. But the question is, are you asking the larger—I mean, does one ask the larger question of, at what point is the civilian population, frankly, perhaps of more significance than totally defeating the enemy? Literally, at what point does that red line get crossed? And so that would be my response. CASA: Next question comes from Otávio Cunha, an undergraduate student at Lewis University, who writes: With respect to the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, what role, if any, is the United Nations Security Council playing in addressing the situation and promoting a peaceful resolution to the conflict? SCHEFFER: Well, they have—they have been convening and holding sessions, and resolutions have been introduced calling—particularly those introduced by almost everyone other than the United States—call for a full ceasefire. And I think in the minds of many of those who introduced those resolutions, a permanent ceasefire. Now, the United States, as you probably know from reading the news of the last few weeks, has been shifting its position now to this term “ceasefire.” I think has been somewhat confusing for the general public because I think most of the public sees ceasefire as a permanent thing. Whereas you can have a temporary ceasefire for humanitarian purposes as well, and it’s still a ceasefire, but for a temporary period of time. And that’s really what the United States has been supportive of. And I know that Vice President Kamala Harris recently emphasized in Selma on Sunday that the United States supports a temporary ceasefire of six weeks to get this humanitarian situation under control and to get the hostages returned. Those are the two big, you know, priorities. But it’s that dispute within the Security Council over are you permanently ending the war or are you just temporarily. The United States has not been prepared yet to say under Chapter Seven authority of the UN Charter under the Security Council, Israel must completely, permanently cease all combat actions in Gaza. Why? Because of the threat of Hamas. But that is not how the rest of the Council sees it. And since the United States has a veto, there remains somewhat of a gridlock. But it is possible, ultimately, to work our way out of that gridlock in the Security Council if we sort of do two things, from the United States perspective. One, just to almost ignore what the Russian ambassador is saying. He’s there to score points, as hypocritical as it is. And, you know, he’s just going to say whatever he wants to say. And let’s not get too worked up about it. But I think the other point is that we can actually start to use our leverage within the Security Council I think to get, if I may put it this way, Israel to the right place on all of this. And to make it clear that, you know, we’re not simply going to follow directions from Tel Aviv in terms of how—or, Jerusalem—in terms of how to conduct ourselves in the Security Council, because we need to meet the priorities that are in the best national security interests of the United States. At this time, I would describe them as, obviously, the security of Israel, but also the humanitarian survival in good order of the Palestinian population in Gaza. And the two of them are going to have to come together as twin objectives and to be achieved as twin objectives. It’s not binary. It’s not one or the other. It has to be both. And that’s what the U.S. has to keep pressing for and persuading other Security Council members to buy into to that formula. And, of course, part of that formula, if I may say, is the end game, which is moving towards a negotiated outcome to all of this that resolves, in large part, this situation that is triggering so many humanitarian emergencies. And to solve it, shall we say, quote/unquote, “once and for all.” CASA: Thank you. We have a lot of written questions. We would love to hear your voices. So please, don’t be shy about raising your hand and asking them verbally. In the meantime, we’ll go to Evan Maher, undergraduate student at Buffalo State University, who writes in, asking: We have heard a lot about Palestine and Ukraine in the media lately. Why do you think that these receive so much attention while others, such as the conflict in Sudan, are also popping up? Would you say that it is due to these issues being in nations which the U.S. and the rest of the Western world interact with more? SCHEFFER: Well, I would say that answers—or, the answer you provided more or less explains it. But I would take you back to, you know, there was a time in 2003, when the situation in Darfur was at the top of the list of attention by even the United States government. And that was in Africa. It was in Sudan. It was a genocidal situation in Darfur. So, it’s not as if just because something is in Africa it will not accord attention. I do think that it’s being out-competed by the urgency and, you know, the attention by everyone on what’s going on in Gaza, and before that, in Ukraine. I mean, even the media exposure of what is occurring in both locations—in both regions is swamping us, particularly with Ukraine. And then once journalists could get closer and closer to see what’s going on in Gaza, it just—you know, there’s a shock value to that every single day. And politicians and government officials have to react to that. That’ll be issue number one at the morning meeting, you know. And you just—there’s no way of avoiding it. And that means that it’s going to be prioritized for action. But it also explains why you see someone like Secretary of State Blinken, even though there’s the continuing war in Ukraine, the conflagration in Gaza and Israel, you still see that he has to do his job dealing with other issues in the world, whether it be traveling through Africa, or traveling through South America. He does that, even in the midst of all of this, in order to address those issues. But I have to acknowledge the point of the question, which is right now, the worst humanitarian disaster, emergency in the world is in Sudan. That’s where it’s happening. It’s also in Gaza. It’s also in Ukraine. But just in terms of sheer numbers, it’s in Sudan. And the modest proposal I’ve made, because I work the law beat on these things, is I do not understand why the United States is not taking a clear initiative in the Security Council to address charges of genocide in Darfur under the authority of the original referral by the Security Council of Darfur in 2005, I think, to address the issue of accountability for that crime. Well, that’s still on the books. It’s still alive and active. It can be reenergized, reactivated for the current situation that is hitting Darfur. And so that’s a way for the United States to say, yeah, we recognize everything else going on, but we need to get back to a problem that has reignited. And that is genocide in Darfur. And it needs to be dealt with by this Security Council, in part to support the work of the International Criminal Court, which has been investigating the 2003 genocide and issued indictments with respect to it. But the United States can bring that to the forefront again and seek action in the Security Council. CASA: We will now take a question from JY Zhou, who is executive director of the Center for Global Engagement at James Madison University. JY. Q: Hi, can you hear me? CASA: Yes. Q: Hi. My name is Chris Nelms. I’m a student here at James Madison University. And my question is, you mentioned the list of the twenty countries that are facing the humanitarian crisis. I wanted you to know if there were nations on that list—or that are there were countries that have left that list, and how they succeeded in getting off that list, and how other countries can learn from that. Thank you. SCHEFFER: Yeah. Well, one of them, although it’s in the second ranking now, is Yemen. Three or four years ago, we put Yemen at the very top of the humanitarian emergency list. But there has been a truce in the armed conflict in Yemen. And, of course, this is where, as you know, the Houthis are operating in order to cripple the commercial shipping through the Red Sea in protest of what’s going on in Gaza. But nonetheless, despite the Houthi, frankly, attention to those kinds of issues, the humanitarian emergency in Yemen, while it’s still there, has greatly receded, and is not even in the top ten anymore. It’s in the top twenty. So, I think I’ll leave it at that example. I don’t think, for example—well, I was going to say one that I see is now there. I think the interesting thing is what has newly arrived on the list in the top twenty, and that’s Ecuador. Who would have thought, you know? But the situation there is quite dire now, politically, and also with armed gangs and stuff. So that’s a very difficult one. And, by the way, I would also just make an editorial comment about Haiti, which is in the top twenty. Not the top ten, but the top twenty of the IRC list. It is—it’s not as if millions or thousands of people are being displaced in Haiti. They honestly don’t have very much territory to go to, even if they were. But rather, it’s the state of life in Haiti as controlled by the gangs as opposed to a government in Haiti. And there’s—just to go back to the last question on the Security Council—the Security Council has been laboring for a long time now, to try to get some kind of law enforcement capacity into Haiti. Kenya offered peacekeepers for that purpose. And then there’s been some backtracking. Everything is now under discussion again. But I have always thought, you know, because I dealt with Haiti during the Clinton administration and saw it upfront. I’ve always thought Haiti really is a special responsibility of the United States. It’s in our neighborhood. It was the first real surge of democracy in the western hemisphere. And we have a lot of immigrants from Haiti. And I just think if this country were to have some special responsibility for any particular nation in the world—in other words, responsibility to respond, to deal with the problems, to address the problems of Haiti, it’s the United States. And I’ve always been a little distressed that we don’t have a greater push domestically to address this terrible emergency that’s taking place quite close to our shores. CASA: Ambassador Susan Page’s class at the University of Michigan is joining us, and they’ve written in: What do you think a new international law defining totality would look like? More specifically, would it be another atrocity crime or under a different designation? SCHEFFER: Right. I don’t know if I would list it as an atrocity crime, per se. I think you might be able to get there eventually. But I would like to see something a little more towards the state responsibility construct to begin with, as opposed to just trying to pinpoint this on individual criminal responsibility. I would like to see more of a state responsibility treaty of some sort, whereby nations agree—it’s sort of like an extension of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, but primarily on a state responsibility platform. So that governments are on notice that once they go down this path of armed conflict, there needs to be a greater sense of the totality of the conflict and what their responsibilities are to acknowledge the realities of that totality, and not try—to put it quite bluntly, you don’t want to slaughter humanity in order to save humanity. There’s got to be a better balance. And I think it’s an excellent question. And don’t assume I’ve thought this all through. (Laughs.) This has really occurred to me, frankly, from the Gaza experience of the last several months, that we have this great gap in international law. And I do think it could be filled with a better attention to what do we need more than just the Geneva Conventions in terms of a focus on the entirety of the conflict? CASA: We have a raised hand now from Charlotte Langeveld, college lecturer at Ocean County College. Charlotte. Q: Yes. Hi. Thank you for taking my question. And thank you for hosting this session. It’s very informative and important. I worked as a humanitarian aid worker in the Sudan from about 1998 to 2001, and I saw the brewings of the genocide. And, you know, I didn’t see it happen. And I left and I saw it happen. And I’m like, oh, makes sense because, of course, there’s a lack of resources that people begin to fight over. In this case, I believe it’s water. And then—it was water, and then you had, you know, different ethnic groups from the north, and the animist Africans’ land being trashed, villages, et cetera. I just wonder, do we need to look at the political economy, the global political economy, and figure out how to stop gold as being the interest, then conflict minerals in the Congo? And, I don’t know, because as long as governments and corporations are connected, how is the United Nations going to make a difference in trying to address these things? I’m sorry, I’m a little passionate, but there you go. SCHEFFER: Thanks, Charlotte. Very, very, very good question. And, you know, one of the readings that we assigned is by my friend John Prendergast, “Dirty Money is Destroying Sudan,” from February 27, only a few days ago in Foreign Affairs. And that article points to the very point that you’re making, which is that the source of a lot of the trouble in Sudan is, frankly, a race for gold. And those who are trying to influence that, and money laundering, and, you know, countries like the United Arab Emirates that are just knee-deep in—obsessed with the gold of Sudan. So that’s all very, very important. But it actually gives me an opportunity to make a larger point, which is I’ve spent, oh, gosh, thirty years on not only accountability for atrocity crimes, but also the huge challenge of prevention of atrocities. And so there’s a lot of focus on that. You know, how do you prevent atrocities from occurring? Is it an armed conflict, where you can prevent war crimes from, you know, being the sine qua non of every day of fighting, et cetera? So that’s—we’ve got a lot of history with prevention of atrocities. But we don’t have that same kind of sharp focus on atrocity—on prevention of a humanitarian emergencies. We respond to humanitarian emergencies. And there’s a huge school of thought and practice on how do you most effectively respond to humanitarian emergencies, whether it be the provision of food, dealing with refugees, employment issues, you know, political settlements that return refugees to their homes and their countries, et cetera. All of that is part of dealing with humanitarian emergencies. But I’m not aware of a kind of a school of thought out there where we place a lot of focus on, well, wait a minute, how can we prevent this humanitarian emergency from occurring? We see it coming. And, yes, there will—there are—even the IRC report, if you were to look at it, will say, yes, we need to have, you know, better educational issues dealt with, we need to have better economic relations established, you know, better farming techniques—I mean, all sorts of things to address what could be a humanitarian emergency. And, of course, we need to deal with climate change. But I don’t see it as a coherent sort of school of thought, or there’s no academy of prevention of humanitarian emergencies that I’m aware of. I could be proven wrong. It certainly has not come to my attention. Because I’ve been so immersed with prevention of atrocities that it occurs to me that one could also address prevention of humanitarian emergencies. CASA: Thank you. I think we can squeeze in one more question. Sebastian Kandakudy is an undergraduate student at Lewis University. Sebastian. Q: Hi. My question is, how should global actors navigate a delicate balance between the living essentials, humanitarian aid to vulnerable populations, and avoiding unintentional bolstering of oppressive regimes or prolonging conflicts in negotiations over aid access? SCHEFFER: Yeah. Let me take one prong of your question, if I might. Which is, unfortunately, the reality of responding to humanitarian emergencies so often rests upon, you know, negotiating and getting relief to the oppressed, to the population that is in dire need of it. But in doing so, one can be bolstering the very regime that is causing the problem, because—that’s part of my burden shifting argument. That, yeah, I know, we got to—we got to accept the burden now, and deal with this, and basically save your people because it’s our responsibility as decent international actors to do so and through our allegiance to, you know, the United Nations principles, our participation in the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, et cetera. But at the end of the day, it can actually be a facilitator for the survival of the very regime that’s causing the problem, because it doesn’t have to deal with the problem anymore. So I think I probably should leave it at that, Maria. A very rich subject to talk about. CASA: Thank you. I’m sorry we can’t go to the rest of the questions. But, David, thank you so much for speaking with us today, and to all of you for your questions and comments. The next Academic Webinar will take place on Wednesday, March 27, at 1:00 p.m. Eastern Time. Moisés Naím, distinguished fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace will lead a conversation on authoritarianism. In the meantime, I encourage you to learn about CFR paid internships for students and fellowships for professors at CFR.org/careers; follow @CFR_Academic on X; and visit CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for research and analysis on global issues. Thank you again for joining us today. We look forward to tuning in for our next webinar on March 27. (END)

Meghan L. O’Sullivan, director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the Jeane Kirkpatrick professor of the practice of international affairs at Harvard University, leads the conversation on energy security. FASKIANOS: Welcome to today’s session of the Winter/Spring 2024 CFR Academic Webinar series. I’m Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach at CFR. Thanks again for being with us. Today’s discussion is on the record and the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/Academic. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We’re delighted to have Meghan O’Sullivan with us to discuss energy security. Dr. O’Sullivan is director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the Jeane Kirkpatrick professor of the practice of international affairs at Harvard University’s Kennedy School. She’s served in multiple senior policymaking roles and has advised national security officials in both Republican and Democratic administrations. Between 2004 and 2007, Dr. O’Sullivan was special assistant to President George W. Bush, and was deputy national security adviser for Iraq and Afghanistan during the last few years of her tenure. In 2013, she was the vice chair of All-Party Talks in Northern Ireland. And Dr. O’Sullivan is a member of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s foreign policy advisory board. And she serves on the board of directors at CFR. So, Meghan, thanks very much for being with us today. I thought we could begin by having you define energy security, and how the environment has changed over the years as you have worked on this issue, taught it, and made policy, in fact. O’SULLIVAN: Sure. Thank you, Irina. And thanks to you and all of your colleagues for inviting me to do this webinar. And I’m really looking forward to it. I spend a lot of time here at Harvard talking to my students about these issues, and I’m looking forward to talking to an even broader audience of students and professors. And it’s interesting. I’m glad to see we have a good group. When I saw the title of “Energy Security,” I thought, like, oh, well, that’s interesting, because usually we don’t talk just about energy security anymore. We talk about it in a broader context. And so what I thought I would do, just in response to your question, is to talk a little bit about how I’ve seen these concepts evolve. And it actually is reflective of the way that I have taught these issues. I’ve been teaching a class here at Harvard that was originally called “Energy and Geopolitics.” And it has evolved. That was back in 2007, I think, was the first time I taught it—maybe 2008. And over this period of time, it’s become probably unrecognizable to my 2008 students. In 2024 I’m teaching it, but it’s really much more about the energy transition and geopolitics. So, you know, there’s still a very big idea around the whole notion of energy and geopolitics. This whole idea that energy and the international system—kind of the distribution of power, alliances, the impetus for conflict or peace—that all of these things are often wrapped up in energy. And I think we can go through and be happy to talk about many historical examples. I can’t really say exactly where they begin, but certainly we start to really notice them in the historical record around the time that oil becomes a major driver of the global economy. But, of course, this was probably true long before that, where you have big changes in the energy system really influencing the state of relationships among states. And certainly the histories of World War I and World War II are full of examples of how commanders and leaders made decisions around oil—either strategic decisions or tactical decisions that ended up ultimately feeding into how wars played out. We think about the bombing of Pearl Harbor, which was so consequential to World War II, had a lot to do with the oil embargo that the United States had placed on Japan, and on the Japanese really thinking that they needed to neutralize the American force in Pearl Harbor before it made an effort to take over—they made an effort to take over the oil-rich areas in today’s Indonesia. So, that entanglement of energy and geopolitics has been with us a long time. And I would say fifteen years ago in highlighting what really is a history of international relations, that is about a fight for resources energy is a piece that I often was trying to expose as being a driver of international affairs. And I used a concept, and I still use a concept, which I think is really relevant today. And that is thinking about energy as a means in grand strategy, and energy is an ends in grand strategy. So if you think about energy as a means, is usually we think about producing countries—producing any form of energy, but maybe oil and gas in particular if we’re looking at the last decades. Countries that have this ability to produce large quantities of this energy have used this energy to try to advance non-energy interests. So, the most obvious example may be the 1973 embargo of the Arab members of OPEC. You know, using their prowess in the energy field to try to advance political objectives. And there are many, many examples of this around the world. We could look at Venezuela, how it used its oil wealth to try to buy the acquiescence of neighboring states and Caribbean states. There are many, many examples. But there’s also another frame to look at it and think about energy as a means of geopolitical ends, which is the flip side of this idea. That there are countries—and the United States is probably the best and most obvious example—that have historically used non-energy power—so economic, political, and military power—to try to ensure that they have sufficient energy. Their goal is to have energy—either to acquire the energy resources, if you think about some countries have looked at it that way, or to ensure that they have access to energy resources, which has been traditionally the view of the United States. And so there we get a lot into the Middle East and American strategy vis-à-vis that part of the world, where energy was a big part of the end goal. So, again, that was the frame that I had looking at this over a long period of time. Five years ago, I wrote a book called Windfall, which was really focused on how, when you get a big change in the energy system, you should expect a big change in geopolitics. And that book was specifically looking at the energy revolution that came from the fracking boom in the United States, and in some other parts of the world. And just the move of the United States from being a major draw on global energy resources to a major contributor toward it. And how that changed America’s role in the world, how that recreated a global atmosphere that on the whole was more conducive to America’s interests and the interests of its allies, and really moved the world into an age of energy abundance. So that has been a consistent focus. And energy security obviously fits right in there. I’m now spending more time—a lot more time, maybe all of my kind of intellectual time—or, not all of it. A good portion of it thinking about the energy transition, as both an ends and a means of foreign policy. And the energy transition I define really quite broadly. And to me, the energy transition and companies encompasses energy security and climate action, because the energy transition—some people think, oh, I’m just talking about substituting solar power for coal. And certainly, that’s a component of the energy transition. But when I conceptualize the energy transition, I am thinking about the huge societal movement to get to a net zero economy, to decarbonize the global economy. And all of the social, political, and in some cases even military, actions that different countries, and companies, and other actors are taking in their quest to get to net zero. And so while I think it, of course, matters a lot from the perspective of a human, the human race, a planetary matter. It matters if the world gets to net zero. The impact of the effort to get to net zero—regardless of whether that goal is reached—the impact of that has already started to really dramatically transform global politics and the basis of power in the international system. And here, I’m developing this idea—actually, working on a Foreign Affairs article on it with my friend and colleague Jason Bordoff—about the energy transition as both an ends and a means. But for the purposes of this call, I thought I’d just say a couple more things about the energy transition and geopolitics. And this is also reflected in three pieces that Jason Bordoff and I have written for Foreign Affairs over the last two years, which talk about the energy transition as a big driver of geopolitics, and geopolitics a big driver of the energy transition. So that first piece, I think of it as a cycle. And the first piece is how the energy transition is shaping geopolitics because, again, going back to this idea, this is an enormous change in how we generate, use, transport, store energy. We’re remaking the backbone of the global economy. Not just switching from coal to solar. Remaking the backbone of the global economy. And this has all kinds of implications for the way that our global system is organized, and political power, and diplomatic power, and otherwise. And there’s lots of examples of this. And I imagine that much of our conversation will be talking about this. One example is just looking at how China’s big investments in clean energy technologies are giving it a claim to geopolitical power. So that’s one way we see the energy transition shaping geopolitics. We could look at the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These are all things I’d love to talk about in greater detail if there’s interest. I wouldn’t argue that the Russian invasion of Ukraine was about the energy transition. I think it was about a lot of things, but primarily Putin’s kind of disillusionment and his fixation on Ukraine. But certainly there are real elements of how the energy transition played into that, played into the timing, and even empowered Vladimir Putin in this particular moment. And then we can look at the energy transition as a driver for trade routes and a whole variety of other things, depending on what energy sources end up being dominant. And finally, I would say there’s also this flip side. So we have the energy transition shaping geopolitics, but—and I think this is something we feel very acutely in the last year, year and a half, is how the geopolitical environment is actually shaping the energy transition. And again, lots and lots of good examples of this. The most obvious one, I think, is just the relationship between the United States and China. And this relationship, you know, going from one of some elements or dominant elements of cooperation to being the most highly competitive bilateral relationship in the world and the most consequential bilateral relationship in the world. So, looking at how that shift from cooperative to competitive has had an impact on a whole range of things, one of them is definitely the energy transition. And we could talk about a variety of ways in which that has played out. Some of it has been, I would say, detrimental in the sense that some of the international bodies, which are the obvious things to deal with global problems, are hamstrung a bit by an environment of geopolitical competition and great-power rivalry. On the other hand, I think the world is adjusting to the fact that this competitive relationship is the one that’s infusing competition into the global environment. And some of our efforts to pursue the energy transition have shifted to be more competitive. And the Inflation Reduction Act, that was partially in the reading people had for today, that’s evidence of a competitive approach to the energy transition rather than a cooperative one. There’s also, of course, the Russian invasion of Ukraine. That has had an impact. That geopolitical reality has had a big impact on the energy transition, which we could discuss. I think there are strong arguments that it expedited the transition, and also strong arguments that it has impeded the transition. So with that, I think I will stop there. Hopefully, I put enough on the table to define our topic in a fairly broad way. And I’m really looking forward to people’s thoughts and insights, and any questions they may have. FASKIANOS: Fantastic. Thank you, Meghan. That was terrific. Let’s go to all of you. (Gives queuing instructions.) So the first question we have we can take from King Fahd University, our international participants. O’SULLIVAN: Great. FASKIANOS: And you need to unmute yourself. Still muted. There we go. Please say your name— Q: So my name is Ahmed Hazmi. FASKIANOS: Good. Q: My name is Ahmed Hazmi. I am from King Fahd University. Before I ask the question, I have to let you know that we have multiple students with their own questions. So my question is, what are the recent effects of the energy crisis on the global efforts to move towards clean energy? That’s my question. O’SULLIVAN: Sure. It’s a great question. And I have some good memories of visiting King Fahd University. So nice to see you on the call and know there are several of you. This is obviously a central question and a really big question. And I can give you examples of how this geopolitical—this environment of geopolitical crises have moved the energy transition in both ways. As I mentioned very briefly, I think there’s are quite a strong argument to say that the crisis with Russia and the war in Ukraine has expedited the drive, and the commitment, and the ambition of Europeans in particular to try to get to net zero more quickly. So many of the already ambitious European goals have been made even more ambitious because the Europeans now not only have an environmental drive for meeting their energy—their climate goals, but now they have a very, very real kind of a national security, economic security argument as well. So you could—there’s, I think, a reasonable debate. You know, having more ambitious goals doesn’t necessarily mean that you meet them, but I think there’s a genuine and very authentic desire on the part of the Europeans to move more quickly. Now, that said, it can also be true that on the whole, if we take a global perspective, that if we just look at that one war, which has had ripple effects throughout the world, that it’s possible that that could slow down the energy transition in other parts of the world. And of course, if we look at the anticipated carbon emissions over time, going forward in the future, I don’t know what the numbers are for Europe but when I look at those numbers and I think of it from an American perspective, 88 percent of future carbon emissions are going to happen outside of the United States. So it’s absolutely essential that the rest of the world actually is bought into, sees value in, is then supported in an energy transition. Otherwise, it’s not going to happen. So Europe could end up being a carbon-free zone or a net zero zone, but if the rest of the world isn’t there—and I think in a lot of ways the war in Ukraine has by stoking inflation, creating a food crisis, raising the cost of energy, and really deepening the divide between the developed world and the developing world—all of these things, I think, work against the energy transition. And that’s just one conflict. So, the other geopolitical environment, I could do the net-net when it came to the U.S.-China relationship, or even the war in the Middle East is having an impact on all of this. I would say, just to wrap up, if you asked me on the whole how do I see it, I’m concerned that this deteriorating geopolitical environment is impeding our ability to get to net zero in some significant ways. It’s not the only obstacle. We need policy. We need new technologies. We need big investments. There’s all of that. But I think what’s often overlooked from the conversation about climate is the fact that the geopolitical environment is really an enabler of a successful transition as well. And right now, the geopolitical environment doesn’t look so good. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to take the next written question from Michael Strmiska, who’s a professor of world history from SUNY-Orange in Middletown, New York: I’m concerned about how right-wing political movements worldwide are converting energy issues into identity politics. I refer to those who denounce green energy transition as a globalist plot and promote continuation of carbon fuel production and consumption as a badge of identity. The “drill, baby, drill” kind of rhetoric. How can those on the side of a green future combat this effort by the right wing to demonize green energy and environmentalism? O’SULLIVAN: Yeah. This is a great—it’s a great question and a great issue. And I hope that you are writing something on this because I think it’s a relatively new phenomenon in the whole energy transition landscape, but is one that can be very consequential. So I’ll just say one example of where I’ve seen this, and then your real question is, how do we combat it? I was just ten days ago, I guess, in Germany for the Munich Security Conference, which is a very large gathering of people working on national security issues. And being in Germany was an opportunity to talk to some German colleagues and friends about just, like, the political landscape, and just the general feeling among Germans about a variety of things, including the energy transition. And right now, there’s a movement on the part of the German government to require people to make certain investments in their home, which are costly—or people perceive them to be too costly. And this is in a context of a real weakening economy in the wake of the war against Ukraine and what many people often refer to, like, the deindustrialization of Germany in particular, because of such high energy prices in the wake of the efforts to get off of Russian gas. And so, there’s a sense among many Germans—not all—but a sense, like, that these requirements are just getting very expensive in an incredibly tough time. And it’s building political opposition to it. That is not just among the right wing. And I think that the question had to do with, like, the right wing and people kind of consciously taking these issues and trying to stoke right-wing ideological agendas. That is certainly happening as well. But I think it’s broader than that. I think it’s leading to—it’s contributing to the rise in populism, which I think we’re going to see most consequentially in Europe with the European Commission elections coming forward. In terms of what can be done, I mean this is where we get into the piece about energy security and how literally, like, three years ago if we titled a webinar “Energy Security,” nobody would show up because people thought, like, that’s a concept—that kind of puts you in the caveman category, right, or cavewoman category. Like, we don’t talk about energy transition. We just talk about—or, energy security. We talk about climate action. The reality is these two things are not opposite. They are absolutely two sides of the same coin. And so recognizing that energy security is—meeting energy security needs is part of almost, like, a prerequisite for a successful energy transition I think is a very different way of thinking about it than many have in the past. And I think that is part of what’s required. And the challenge is that, like, that is going to be hard to do and to keep the speed at which we need to go. And the real answer there is just more and more investment into clean energy because there’s the need to meet the energy needs, but to do so with a different kind of energy. And we’ve seen huge increases in investment into clean energy, but those investments are still far short of what is needed not only to meet additional energy demand but to start to displace the demand for coal and then, eventually, other sources of fossil fuels—or, other fossil fuels. FASKIANOS: Great. Next question from Benedetta Luccone If you can—there you go. And state your affiliation. Q: I am Benedetta Luccone, from Lewis University. And my question is, how can advances in renewable energy technology contribute to changing energy security, particularly in regions vulnerable to geopolitical instability or resource scarcity? O’SULLIVAN: OK. So, Irina, would you repeat for all of us? FASKIANOS: Maybe—yeah. If you could—you’re breaking up a little bit, Benedetta. Can you just repeat it again? Q: Yes. So how can advances in renewable energy technology contribute in changing energy security, particularly in regions vulnerable to geopolitical instability or resource scarcity? O’SULLIVAN: Sure. OK. How can renewable energy contribute to energy security, particularly in vulnerable areas? So I think there’s enormous capacity for this to prove true. A couple of things I would say about it. So, first, energy security is in its most traditional definition, it is simply having adequate supplies of energy to meet one’s economic needs and to satisfy certain levels of growth, and prosperity, and human welfare. Energy underpins almost everything that humans do on the planet. So energy security is having sufficient energy. And in some of these very vulnerable parts of the world that you talk about, one of the biggest constraints, in many cases the biggest constraint, on growth and human flourishing is the lack of energy. And so to the extent that we can have more energy meeting the energy needs of a wider swath of the globe, that is going to be beneficial. And if that—particularly if that energy is renewable. If it’s not renewable, then it brings with it a whole new set of problems related to the climate. But the basis of your question is how can renewable energy assist in these countries? And I think there’s a very real sense that if the world could meet the energy needs of these populations with renewable sources, that it would be very beneficial. A couple of—a couple of just nuances here, or smaller points from that very high-level point. I would say, you mentioned countries that were geopolitically vulnerable. And I think there’s probably a lot of different ways to define that. One of the things about renewable energy—it’s not true for every form. But if you’re thinking about really renewable energy—solar, wind, and a variety of other types of energy—a lot of that energy is produced where it’s consumed, for the most part. So that has the benefit of diminishing the requirement to be dependent on outsiders in the way that importation of natural gas through big pipelines has been an issue. That just trade and oil flowing through choke points, all of these things. If you’re producing the energy where you’re consuming it in your own country, then I think it does kind of enhance self-sufficiency and energy security. The downside, I would say, and then I’ll stop here—not the downside, but one of the things—or, a couple of things that we have to be cognizant of. And one is the fact—this is known to everybody on this call, probably—but renewable energy is still intermittent. There’s a variety of ways to address it. We’re much better at it than we were before. But it is still very hard to have renewable energy as, like, a baseload for industrial development. So, if you have a source of energy that comes in and out over the course of the day, either when the sun is shining or the wind is blowing, it’s much harder to build a factory and expect that you’re going to get that kind of development. Sure, you can charge your cell phone, you can watch television, and there are—there are enhancements to the quality of life. But in terms of, like, the kinds of development that a lot of these countries want, we either need to make—continue to make big advances in battery storage, or we need backup, which tends to be natural gas and coal. Or we need new sources of green energy, like green hydrogen. So there’s still some technology that is required in order for the benefits to be realized in the way that many of us envision. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to take the next written question from Genevieve Connell at Fordham IPED: Given that new technologies can be quite expensive to develop and distribute to emerging economies, what political strategies would it take to allow for developing countries to be able to sustain economic growth while adapting to energy transitions? O’SULLIVAN: OK. So, I think the answer to this question really gets into the whole question of climate finance and how to help ensure that countries around the world, not just wealthy Western countries, are able to benefit from clean energy technologies. And this, of course, has been an issue that has gotten a lot of attention in recent years. And that attention is almost—I don’t know that it’s crescendoed. because I think it’s still building, but it certainly was one of the really big foci of COP-28 in Dubai, which I had the privilege of attending. So, really seeing the focus on getting that clean energy finance not just to different parts of the United States, or Europe, or even Japan, but how can—how can that money go and flow into countries that are developing? And here, the need is clear. The volume of investment that has to be found and facilitated is enormous. I’d say the last annual numbers we have for clean energy investment globally is about 1.1 trillion dollars. And the sense is that that has to grow to about 4 trillion dollars a year to kind of put the world on track. You know, 4 trillion dollars per year for decades, on track. And that the majority of that needs to go to the developing world. And so when the—when the person with a question mentioned the high cost of these renewable energy, I would say there’s been enormous advantages—or, not advantages—enormous strides made in bringing down the costs of many of these clean energy technologies. Some of them are cheaper depending on their location than certain kinds of fossil fuels. The challenge is in many developing countries there are other things that make it costly to develop these clean energy projects, political risk being one of them. So, again, you have money. You want to invest in clean energy. It tends to flow to Europe or the United States rather than to Africa. And there are reasons for that that people are trying to figure out how to minimize those risks, how to create new mechanisms of political insurance, how to have blended finance where you have a big loan, part of it is from a government or government public sector entity that kind of de-risks the rest of the loan for the private sector. And then the last thing I would say, which is really important and maybe it’ll come up, again, is just this whole idea that that finance ideally will flow to these countries to help them build the capacity to be part of the clean energy supply chain, rather than just give them finance so that they can buy solar panels from China or electrolyzers from the United States. You know, not just to buy products that are made elsewhere, but to create investments in places in the supply chain, which makes them part of the green energy transition in a way that their economies and their people can really benefit. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Next question from Wilson Wameyo. There you go. Q: Hello. Thank you for talking here. I wanted to ask some question—OK, I’m going to introduce myself— FASKIANOS: Wilson, can you identify yourself? Q: Yes, I’m Wilson. I come from—I come from Poland—Jagiellonian University in Poland, but I come from Kenya originally. My question is, how is rivalry between China and the U.S. affecting energy transitions? And how can we overcome it? FASKIANOS: Can you repeat it again? Because I think you broke up, Wilson. I don’t know, did you hear it, Meghan? O’SULLIVAN: No, I didn’t. FASKIANOS: OK. (Laughs.) Q: OK. My question is, how is rivalry between China and the U.S. affecting energy transition, and how can we overcome it? O’SULLIVAN: I’m sorry, Irina, were you able—do you think Wilson could put it in writing, just so that—because I wasn’t able to discern that. FASKIANOS: Right. We heard your name clearly. And then all of a sudden it muffled when you started asking your question. So I don’t know if you change positions, or— Q: Can you hear me now? FASKIANOS: Yes. Q: OK. So my question is, how is rivalry between China and the U.S. affecting energy transition? And how can we overcome it? O’SULLIVAN: Yeah. OK. Thank you, Wilson. And thank you for persisting. This is a really great question. So, I think there’s a number of ways. As I referenced earlier but I’ll say a little bit more about, we have this global challenge. I think everyone appreciates it’s a global challenge. That this is not something that one country can solve, but is a challenge that needs to be met by many countries, adopting—and, in many cases, fundamentally changing their behavior. So when you have a global problem, the ideal way for dealing with it would be through global cooperation, because, again, we need multiple actors to bring about a solution. And I think that the COP, the Conference of the Party, mechanisms that have been in place for almost thirty years were reflective of that analysis. You know, basically we’ve got a global problem. We need a global solution. And we’re going to cooperate until we find one. And so over nearly thirty years, that has been—not the only approach, but that’s been a center point of the approach. Where that has worked the best I think is when we’ve seen the U.S. and China cooperating together. So probably the most consequential COP—I think we could debate this, but that’s not the point—I think one of the most consequential COPs was Paris—the Paris COP in 2015. And a large part of that success was that a big agreement between China and the U.S. on climate kind of greased the wheels for the rest of countries to come forward. So this was the COP in which countries decided that they would—almost all of them—would come forward with a nationally determined contribution. That they would assess their own economic situation, they would assess their own carbon emissions, they’d make goals, that ideally would be consistent with keeping global temperatures, at that that time, under two degrees. And they would present those ambitions to the global mechanisms. And the idea was that every few years or so the world would reevaluate these goals and make them more and more ambitious. And really, the fact that President Obama and President Xi got together in 2014 and came up with a bilateral agreement where both countries really advanced their ambitions, made them clear, made them public, set the stage for a lot of other countries coming forward and doing the same. So, you had meaningful U.S.-China cooperation, which helped catalyze greater global cooperation. And that U.S.-China deal in 2014 wasn’t just the product of Presidents Obama and Xi sitting down and talking. It was months of negotiation at multiple levels of government. So that’s an example of how cooperation can really be helpful. And if you look at a map of global emissions, the U.S. and China really stand out as the countries that are putting the most carbon emissions in the in the air. China more so than the United States, but the United States, historically probably a larger amount than China. So now that kind of cooperation is hard to imagine. I think our diplomats—you look at Secretary Kerry and others—continue to pursue it, continue to hope that persistent efforts to get climate cooperation between the U.S. and China have continued. And certainly that is a noble pursuit, and one that should continue. But the overall relationship is one that is so sour that it’s very hard to imagine that both countries are going to put aside all of the issues that they have on completely other issues—non-climate issues—and come up with some kind of joint strategy. In fact, the Biden administration, that was its approach for the first couple of years, was simply saying: we’re going to disagree about all these things. We’re going to argue about all these things. But we’re going to cooperate on climate because it matters to the whole world. And the Chinese approach was, well, we understand why you want to do that, but we also understand how important climate is to you. And why would we give you something without getting something in return? And, why would we divorce this issue from the rest of the relationship? So if you want to come to Beijing and talk about climate, we want to talk about Taiwan. So, there was this real block. There’s been some progress. Saw a little bit of a joint statement on methane, something about some progress over the last year or so. But in general, what has happened is that in the United States the real impetus for climate action has shifted away from thinking we’re going to get these big cooperative mechanisms to competitive approaches, like the Inflation Reduction Act, which is this very large piece of American legislation—the biggest action on the part of the United States ever taken in the climate space. And I can tell you, that that would have not happened in the absence of U.S.-China cooperation because members of Congress and of the political establishment are now so concerned about China having a competitive edge in a number of technologies that it decided, hey, it’s worth us putting hundreds of billions of dollars into American capacity to develop these technologies. And if China wasn’t on this planet, I don’t think we would have at all seen a consensus for such an enormous investment in climate, but really that investment was also in American competitiveness in the face of this very, very competitive bilateral relationship. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to go next to a written question by Gavin Rolle, who is a senior international business major at Howard University: Could you talk more about how large multinational corporations play a part in the geopolitical implications of the energy transition? O’SULLIVAN: OK. So large multinational corporations—I mean, that could mean so many different things. So I’ll make a general point and then maybe put forward a few examples. I think there’s no question that corporations in the private sector are now a big part of what is perceived as the solution. They’re also, of course, if you think about corporations as oil and gas companies, they’re part of the problem. So I think there’s that dual component of it. First, let me just talk about part of the solution. So multinational corporations, we think about all kinds of things. But the ways in which they’re going to be central to a solution is manifold. So, one, I would say think about big global mining companies and the role that they have in trying to meet this really, really staggering growth in demand that is anticipated for critical minerals which are needed for clean energy technologies, particularly batteries and large, offshore and onshore wind. So on the one hand, those companies, some of them, might be state owned—or, are state owned, from China and other places. But a lot of them are big, multinational companies that have mining operations all over the world. And so suddenly the energy transition rests to some extent on these companies being able to produce a lot more critical minerals than it was anticipated in the past. On the solution side, think about corporations, the private sector more generally, I mentioned about the need for more climate finance. Most of that new climate finance is going to have to come from the private sector. And so, again, there the question is how to mobilize that finance. But it’s not going to come from governments. The gap is just too large to be met by governments alone. And then on the contribution side, I think shifting to oil and gas companies here, you do have companies that have the ability to make very big investments in new technologies. And so, what you do see is some companies investing heavily in carbon capture and storage technologies, trying to see if those technologies can—the costs of them can be brought down and the scale that they can be exercised at can be increased. There’s some controversy around those technologies, and the idea of oil and gas companies being the funders of it. But I think on the whole, if you look at any of the scenarios of what the global energy mix looks like in a net zero global economy, there’s a big element of carbon capture, right, that we really can’t get to those goals without having that technology play a bigger role than it is today. Now, in terms of multinational companies, on the downside there is—I would say there’s this intense focus on the role that these companies play in producing oil and gas, and the role that those energy sources play in creating carbon emissions. And that—I mean, those links are very well known to all. And here, I think what I would say—this is obviously a long and complex situation—but I think we need to look at the entire energy system and see the role of energy companies in the global energy system, and to think about their supply, and think about their investments, and moving those investments into more renewable energy areas, which some of them are doing. And we also need to think about demand. That as long as global demand for oil and natural gas are rising, as they are today, you have companies that are going to be interested in meeting those goals. And when the supply falls short of the demand, what also happens is that prices go up and you have politicians trying to get companies to produce more oil. So I think it needs to be tackled from both the supply side and from the demand side. And we rightly focus on supply, but we often overlook demand. So I think whenever we’re thinking about that, we should keep both in mind. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Next question from Benjamin Schmitt, who has a raised hand. Q: Hi. Benjamin Schmitt. I’m an affiliate at the Harvard Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics and Harvard Ukraine Research Institute. One of the questions I have is, there’s been a—first of all, Meghan, thank you for doing the, quote/unquote, caveman energy security discussion today, because it’s really been lost, as you said, in some of the good—very good discussion over the energy transition. What I want to ask about is the extent to which physical energy infrastructure attacks that we’ve seen across Northern Europe in particular, but more broadly, whether it be Nord Stream, or Baltic Connector, or some of the telecommunications cables, including that in the Red Sea that we’ve seen. How does this impact the thinking of the global energy transition? Because when I was at COP-28, I tried to talk to folks as much as possible about the need to have physical infrastructure as a part of an energy security strategy. But it’s oftentimes overlooked as a key element of this, because if you don’t have energy security of the physical infrastructure, you might end up with energy poverty. And that would reduce the support for electorates to support the energy transition, which we obviously need. So want your thoughts on that. And thanks, again, for doing this great event. O’SULLIVAN: Thank you very much. And it’s always great to meet a colleague over a webinar of another institution. So nice to meet you. And I hope I’ll get to benefit from your work. You know, I think you’re hitting on an extremely important point. And it is one that I do think is very much underweighted in the conversation around climate. And that is the security of energy infrastructure. And, of course, we had some of those—some of those failures of energy infrastructure here in the United States a couple of years ago, that really made people nervous, woke people up to the importance of pipelines and energy security infrastructure. But seemingly not as much attention sustained over a long period of time. There’s no question that this is going to be part of the vulnerability of an energy transition. So it’s not just a fact today. You mentioned Nord Stream and some other pieces of infrastructure in place now which have been or were vulnerable. But this vulnerability is going to intensify dramatically as the energy transition progresses. And, again, just make more vulnerabilities with energy transition around things like electric grids, and other transmission modes, and storage. So one of the big things about the energy transition is that in a successful energy transition world, so much of what we do on a daily basis will be electrified. So I think now 20 percent of global economic activity is electrified. That number will be more like 50 percent. And so at first you think of all the additional infrastructure that is going to be needed to support the electrification, not just of the transport sector but of many, many other places. And that that electricity is going to need to be almost fully decarbonized, which is a big step up. I think, now it’s about—globally, about 38 percent of the energy flowing through to electricity is of a decarbonize nature. So you’re going to have a lot more infrastructure that is going to be sustaining a much greater proportion of global economic activity. And with that is going to come all kinds of vulnerabilities. Now, some of the vulnerabilities will be, as we’ve just been discussing, kind of like attacks, cyberattacks, physical attacks, like we saw on Nord Stream. But some of them will come from other sources. So if you think about climate change and look at just how climate change has affected the generation of clean energy in the last few years, whether it’s in France, where a very hot summer made it hard to cool the nuclear reactors of France, or in Brazil where droughts have made hydropower very hard to sustain. But then we think about increasing vicious weather systems and the impact that that’s going to have on energy infrastructure. So you have kind of manmade threats, but you also will have climate change—all of these things making this infrastructure more vulnerable. And then finally, I’d just point out, if you look at the government’s assessment of kind of cybersecurity vulnerabilities, one of the areas where I’ve had friends and colleagues who are in government kind of point out to me—this is public information, but public information that they feel nobody has focused on—is just how concerned the U.S. government is about the Chinese penetration of energy infrastructure in the United States, and presumably other parts of the world. Which is just a dormant capacity, but the sense is that if the United States and China were to get into any kind of conflict, that there’s actually a latent Chinese capacity to do some significant damage to our energy infrastructure. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Next question from John Francis, who’s at the University of Utah: Regardless of the outcome of the war in Ukraine, do you think that lasting impact on Europe will be an increased and sustained commitment to renewable energy? O’SULLIVAN: Great question. I touched on it a little bit at the beginning. Since it’s asking for my opinion, I’ll give my opinion. And as I said, I think there are some reasons why this is a good source of debate. In fact, I had this as a debate in my class not too long ago, a few weeks ago. I do think, on the whole, if you’re just talking about Europe—and I understand the question was directed towards Europe—on the whole, I do think that this is probably going to lead—not probably. I think we’re already seeing it, and I believe it will continue, which is this enhanced commitment to energy transition. So keep in mind that Europe was already there. Europe was already the most advanced in terms of reining in its carbon emissions to any other region in the world. So it already had that commitment. And this goes back to the whole caveman question. And it generally was not focusing so much on energy security, because it saw Russia as a reliable supplier over the course of decades. And so there was a desire to transition away from natural gas and fossil fuels, but there wasn’t seen to be a national security imperative at all. And that has changed. And I think that has really meant that you’re going to have this intense, intense commitment to it. Some people have asked me—I think this question was prefaced with “regardless of the outcome in Ukraine.” Some people have asked, well what happens if, when Putin is no longer in power in Russia? Are the Europeans going to go back to importing Russian natural gas? And my answer there would be, I don’t really see that happening even remotely to the scale of European dependence before the war. Even in the face of a different kind of Russia. I think the effort that the Europeans are taking to move away from Russian natural gas is not going to be easily reversed, even in the face of a different kind of government in Russia—which I’m quite skeptical about happening in the short term in any case. So I think we could certainly imagine a future in which Europe is importing more Russian gas than it’s importing now—and it still is importing Russian gas, a lot of it liquefied natural gas. But I don’t see it reverting back to the volumes in which the Europeans were importing Russian natural gas before the war. I see more of this commitment to meeting energy needs through renewable energy. What I see is really slowing it down, to some extent, is what we talked about earlier, which is the rise of populism and that, again, if energy security becomes a rallying factor for European politics, I think it could influence some of the initiative and energy and resources that exists to go into it. But I don’t think the political commitment is going to disappear. FASKIANOS: Great. I’d like to go to Ken Bernier at Central New Mexico Community College, with a raised hand. Q: Yes. Thank you, Irina and Dr. O’Sullivan. I am with Central New Mexico Community College, in the political science department. I had a relatively simple question, and it’s a follow on to Nord Stream. I’ve read Seymour Hersh’s article and I’m trying to figure out, was this an attempt to convert Europe to green energy quicker or was it an attempt to stymie Russia’s influence on providing natural gas and reaping the benefits of all that money? Thank you. O’SULLIVAN: So I haven’t read Seymour Hersh’s article, so I’m at a disadvantage. And when somebody says, I’m asking a relatively simple question, I always think, Ken, hmm, that’s not going to be simple. So it’s hard. I haven’t read the article. And to be honest, I think there’s a lot of uncertainty around the motives and the particular actors, and who ordered it, and all of that. So I think it’s a little bit hard to answer your question in a very specific sense. I think what was happening—if you look at the graph of how Europe was getting off of Russian energy before the explosions in the Nord Stream pipelines, it was moving pretty rapidly away from Russian natural gas. And the flows through the Nord Stream pipelines had diminished greatly but were still substantial in some way. I suppose—again, I could speculate on the motives of potentially various actors, but I think that the trend line away from Russian energy was very, very clear. And if we keep in mind—we kind of go back to—the IEA had this report that came out. I think it came out in March 2022. And it basically was an assessment. This is the International Energy Agency in Paris. It had this assessment of what does Europe need to do to get off of Russian energy by the end of the year? I think that was their timeframe. And they had ten steps. And these were really hard steps. They had to do with curbing European demand for Russian energy, or energy generally. Had to do with diversifying supply. Had to do with reigniting politically controversial nuclear power plants. Had to do with building new LNG capacity. All of these things, to get away from Russia natural gas. And I looked at that plan and I thought, like, well, that’s great. It’s good that there’s a path forward. But I was deeply skeptical that it would be able to be achieved. And I think for the most part the Europeans outperformed even their own expectations. And I think that would have happened regardless of whether that pipeline had been destroyed or not. So I don’t know that that particular act had a fundamental effect on the direction of Europe weaning itself away from Russian gas. FASKIANOS: So thank you, Meghan. I’m going to take—there are lots of written questions and raised hands, and I’m sorry that we can’t get to them all. But I wanted to take the opportunity. If you could just give us a little bit—we have professors and students on the call. You’ve worked in—you’ve worked in the government. You’re now heading up the Belfer Center. And just talk a little bit about your career choices and encouraging students, what you would like to say to students and professors who are teaching students, what you would like to leave with them about career opportunities. O’SULLIVAN: Sure. So, first of all, I’ve really enjoyed speaking with you all, and wish we had more time to go through your questions and hear from you. I’ve been at Harvard now for about sixteen years. And before that, as Irina mentioned when she was introducing me, I served in the U.S. government. And I served at the State Department. And I served at the Pentagon, and overseas. And most of my time at the White House. And I sort of feel like there are different stages in life and different delights out of different career paths. And I think that many of the professors on this call will share with me the real sense of privilege to be able to teach young people, and inspire young people, and to learn from young people. It’s a great thing to be in an environment that is filled with people with lots of energy to change the world. But being in government was a certain kind of extraordinary privilege as well. And in many respects, the ability to combine both of those things I feel has been a true professional gift, but one that that many people are able to create because there’s a real synthesis between thinking deeply about things and then deciding that you’re going to take the deep thought that you have had the opportunity to indulge in and try to turn it into action. And to me, that’s just been one of the greatest satisfactions of my career, is to have an idea and work with others in a government setting to try to put it into action. Of course, there are other settings where you can put ideas into action—the private sector, that world of philanthropy. There’s lots of places to do that. In government, the beauty and challenge of it is, one, you can never do it on your own. So it’s inherently a collaborative effort. And two, the government can be very hard to maneuver, very hard to get an aircraft carrier to shift course. But when it does, it’s so powerful and your impact is magnified. So, I would say that if you’re interested in public service it is still a very noble career. And it is one that I think you’ll find enlists every part of you. You’ve got to be smart, but you also have to know how to cajole people and convince people. You have to be persuasive. You have to have a certain amount of stamina. You have to be able to look at the long term, but also not lose track of the details. So, if you like to challenge yourself and you’d like to wake up and never ask yourself the question, what am I doing, then I definitely would consider a career in public service. FASKIANOS: Thank you very much, Meghan. That was terrific. Again, Meghan O’Sullivan. If you haven’t read her book, Windfall, you should, as well as go back to those articles that she mentioned coauthoring with Jason Bordoff in Foreign Affairs. We have already sent out—shared at least one with you, but you should go back and look at those. And thank you for serving on our board. We look forward to seeing how you’re shaping the Belfer Center as the new leader of it. To all of you, thank you for your questions and written questions. I’m sorry, if we could not get to you. We will just have to have another webinar on this topic. The next one will be on Wednesday, March 6, at 1:00 p.m. with David Scheffer, who is a senior fellow at CFR. And he’ll talk about complex humanitarian emergencies. In the meantime, I encourage you to learn about CFR paid internships for students and fellowships for professors at CFR.org/careers. You can follow us at @CFR_academic on X, and visit CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for research and analysis on global issues. So, again, thank you all, and thank you, Meghan O’Sullivan. O’SULLIVAN: Thank you. (END)