Americas

Mexico

Mexico’s Long War: Drugs, Crime, and the Cartels
Violence continues to rage more than a decade after the Mexican government launched a war against drug cartels.

Backgrounder by CFR.org Editors Aug 5, 2024

How the U.S. Patrols Its Borders
President Joe Biden’s attempts to grapple with a record number of migrants are keeping the role of enforcement at the center of the debate over U.S. asylum, border, and deportation policy.

Backgrounder by Diana Roy, Amelia Cheatham, and Claire Klobucista Jun 18, 2024

Play
Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in the Western Hemisphere
Panelists discuss the social, economic, and political factors that contribute to the mass migration of people from Central and South America toward the United States and Mexico and potential U.S. policy responses.

Event with Katharine M. Donato, Silvia Giorguli, and Manuel Orozco Jun 26, 2023

Why U.S. Imports From Mexico Surpassed Those From China
New U.S. Census Bureau data shows the United States importing more goods from Mexico than from China. Will the shift change the global trading landscape?

In Brief by Brad W. Setser Feb 20, 2024

  • Economics
    Mexico’s Road to Economic Sanity
    President Enrique Peña Nieto and his administration presented a telecommunications bill earlier this week that would, if fully implemented, make sweeping changes throughout the sector. In this op-ed that I published for Fortune, I look at what the bill may mean for Carlos Slim and Mexico’s other moguls, as well as for the country’s overall development. With a bill introduced by the president and backed by all three political parties, Mexico is poised to take on a few of the country’s biggest monopolies and moguls. But for Mexico to truly engage in economic competition, it needs to do much more. A lack of competition pervades the Mexican economy, as one or a few companies dominate sectors as diverse as glass, cement, flour, soft drinks, sugar, and tortilla flour, not to mention the state’s control of energy and electricity. This hits consumers’ bottom lines—an OECD study estimates that it increases the costs of basic goods for households by some 40 percent. It hurts Mexico’s working and middle classes the most, as they must spend a larger proportion of what they earn on these goods and services. It also hits the burgeoning manufacturing sector, which has to pay more for raw materials and basic inputs. To read the entire article, click here.
    Blog Post by Shannon K. O'Neil March 15, 2013 Latin America’s Moment
  • Defense and Security
    Mexico’s Drug War and the Disappeared
    An often overlooked problem with the so-called “war on drugs” mindset has been the effect on local populations: as military officials or militarized law enforcement officers fight narcotraffickers, they often play by rules of engagement that end up hurting the very citizens they are mandated to protect. Human Rights Watch has just released a report on disappearances in Mexico over the last six years. The document, “Mexico’s Disappeared: The Enduring Cost of a Crisis Ignored,” painstakingly investigates some 250 cases. The local police are linked to the most disappearances (roughly 40 percent of those that Human Rights Watch investigated), but the report provides unsettling evidence that all branches of Mexico’s armed forces have been involved in disappearing people at some point. This includes Mexico’s navy—generally considered to be one of the least corrupt military branches—for 20 missing people in June / July 2011. The report argues that it is not just the armed forces and police that contribute to the disappearances, but also the country’s judicial system. It reveals how prosecutors systematically delay or altogether avoid investigations, demanding at least seventy-two hours to pass before beginning the process and discouraging family members from filing claims when security forces are involved. For example, when Nitza Paola Alvarado Espinoza tried to report the Mexican army’s arbitrary detention (and eventual disappearance) of her cousin, Irene Rocío Alvarado Reyes, she was sent from one state prosecutors office to another, only to be finally told that there was no prosecutor available to speak with her. These 250 cases are just those that Human Rights Watch has investigated. Last November a leaked document from the Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Prosecutor’s Office named over 25,000 people who had disappeared on President Calderón’s watch. Recent official revisions place the actual number closer to 27,000. Current President Enrique Peña Nieto’s government has vowed a shift in the country’s security strategy, recently announcing a national program on crime prevention that will pour some $9 billion into programs targeting drug addiction, as well as school and domestic violence. Though many critique the lack of specifics, the rhetoric has definitely shifted. But the government will need to do more to bring safety and security to Mexico’s streets than just change the way it talks about crime. It will have to make sure that law enforcement officials and citizens alike understand that the ends don’t justify the means, and that disappearances cannot continue if Mexico hopes to turn the security corner and establish a sustainable democratic rule of law.
    Blog Post by Shannon K. O'Neil February 21, 2013 Latin America’s Moment
  • Economics
    Mexico’s Murder Rate Plateaus
    Last week the Trans-Border Institute’s Justice in Mexico Project released their fourth special report on drug violence in Mexico. These reports (see the 2010, 2011, and 2012 ones too) provide some of the most in-depth analyses of homicide trends in Mexico by using a range of government and media sources, as well as their own data. The authors, Cory Molzahn, Octavio Rodriguez Ferreira, and David A. Shirk, conclude that Mexico’s homicide rate has peaked. Using the Mexican government’s National Public Security System (SNSP) data—which you can see in the graph below—the number of organized crime related homicides dropped some 28 percent over the last year. Other tallies from the newspapers Reforma and Milenio showed a 21 percent decrease and a 1 percent increase respectively (the substantial differences stemming from the ways they categorize organized crime related homicides). But by all counts, the violence has at least leveled out, if not fairly dramatically declined. Trans-Border Institute, Justice in Mexico Project Data, 2013 The geographic spread of the violence in 2012 also seems to have receded—after expanding during each of the last four years. The worst hit areas continue to be near the U.S.-Mexico border (including the northwest states of Sonora, Chihuahua, and Sinaloa, and the northeast states of Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon) and in the southwest states of Guerrero and Michoacán. The majority of 2012’s violence was concentrated in fewer than 10 percent of Mexico’s 2,457 municipalities. Another positive shift occurred in Ciudad Juárez, where the homicide rate fell from 2,738 murders in 2010 to 656 in 2012. The city has now passed on the unfortunate distinction of being Mexico’s most violent to Acapulco. Some analysts question whether the declines in reported homicides are real—pointing to the thousands of Mexicans who have simply disappeared during the conflict (anywhere between 5,000 and 20,000 according to government and NGO estimates). Even so, the Trans-Border report calculates that even adding in these missing Mexicans to the death toll wouldn’t fully negate the recent declining trend. Though murders now seem to have plateaued, President Peña Nieto promised during his campaign to reduce violence. This, as Alejandro Hope among others have argued, will be a real challenge. The administration will have to engage in painstaking institution building, strengthening Mexico’s police forces and court systems, in order for future reports to have similar positive messages.
    Blog Post by Shannon K. O'Neil February 14, 2013 Latin America’s Moment
  • Mexico
    Mexico’s Drug War
    Despite its booming economy, Mexico continues to struggle with alarmingly high levels of violence linked to drugs and organized crime. This video primer examines the crisis and explores policy options for Mexico and the United States.
    Explainer Video with Robert McMahon , Shannon K. O'Neil , Alejandro Hope, Stewart M. Patrick and Laura Vargas February 8, 2013
  • Economics
    Mexico’s Congressional Agenda for 2013
    With Enrique Peña Nieto’s first congressional session just starting, expectations are high. Between now and April 30th, when the sixty-second Congress will adjourn, many hope the administration will tackle the deep seated structural issues that hold the nation back. Mexico’s Congress has much going for it, as momentum for reform—lacking for years—is there. This new Congress began its tenure last September (working with President Felipe Calderón), and during its first go round, it passed a labor reform that enables greater flexibility in hiring and firing workers and an education reform that changes the way teachers will be hired, evaluated, and promoted. Though some deemed the reforms as watered-down, these significant pieces of legislation represent a break from the gridlock of the past. Another advantage lies in the congressional leadership. The heads of the PRI delegations—the largest in both houses—are adept political operators. Senator Emilio Gamboa Patrón brings over thirty years experience working in a multitude of government positions to the table. Even stronger is Manlio Fabio Beltrones in the lower house, recognized by supporters and critics alike as one of Mexico’s most gifted politicians. Their developing agenda complements much of the PAN’s, where they may find willing partners. Finally, Mexico’s three main political parties have already identified the substantial common ground on what needs to be done. The Pacto por Mexico is comprised on five central areas (constructing a law-based society, promoting economic growth, employment and competitiveness, improving security and justice, enhancing transparency, and furthering democratic governance) and includes ninety-five proposals that address everything from breaking up monopolies to investing more in science and technology. Though moving from principles to details is always difficult, this underlying consensus provides a starting point missing in the past. So what will be on 2013’s agenda? The Pacto por Mexico lays out complete first and second semester schedules that can be found here and here, but the items to watch are fiscal and energy reforms. On the tax side this will mean changes that both increase contributions and better collection. On energy it means reforms that open up the sector in some capacity to foreign involvement, bringing in the needed technology, expertise, and investment to make sure oil and gas exploration and production grows. Changes in telecommunications—to increase competition, strengthen regulation, and boost investment—are also vital, as this sector is both more expensive and less efficient than those of many other emerging economies, including Brazil, South Korea, and China. As important are judicial and political reforms to foster greater transparency and accountability more broadly. How successful the Peña Nieto administration is in 2013 will determine not only the legacy of his six year term, but also in no small way Mexico’s future. The president and his team need to take advantage of the political capital and parties’ consensus before midterm politics emerge (which will occur in 2015 ). The next ten months will decide whether the optimism is warranted.
    Blog Post by Shannon K. O'Neil February 5, 2013 Latin America’s Moment
  • Economics
    Mexico’s Democratic Malaise
    During Mexico’s 2012 presidential election, many political pundits voiced their fears that the PRI’s return would bring a resurgence of the country’s less democratic past. According to new polling data by the Pro­yecto Comparativo de Elecciones Nacionales, this worry seems widespread, as fewer Mexicans believe in and support the country’s institutions and democracy itself. Yet this is at a time when Mexico’s checks and balances are, if anything, strengthening, especially when compared to the past PRI presidencies. In an article published in the recent issue of Foreign Affairs Latinoamerica (and below), Alejandro Moreno and I look at the survey results and how they fit into the country’s political and social context.  La opinión pública mexicana acerca de la democracia muestra focos rojos luego de la elección presidencial de 2012. El apoyo popular a la democracia registra una baja notable respecto del nivel observado hace 6 años: la mayoría de los ciudadanos percibe deterioro en vez de avance en el carácter democrático del país, y el sentimiento de insatisfacción con el funcionamiento de la democracia va al alza. Todo esto se acompaña por una amplia creencia de que la elección presidencial de 2012 estuvo marcada por irregularidades. Acaso estos podrían ser componentes de un síndrome de desilusión democrática que acecha a la sociedad mexicana y cuyas causas pueden estar en el creciente malestar ciudadano ante la inseguridad, la situación económica y la corrupción. Lo más llamativo es que ni el resultado de la elección presidencial (el voto de castigo al Partido Acción Nacional, pan, como partido gobernante) ni el cambio de gobierno (el regreso del Partido Revolucionario Institucional, pri, a la Presidencia) parecen generar optimismo entre los mexicanos. El nuevo gobierno de Enrique Peña Nieto tiene frente a sí a una sociedad menos esperanzada en la democracia. En este artículo analizamos los resultados para México de la encuesta del Proyecto Comparativo de Elecciones Nacionales (cnep). La encuesta cnep es un estudio internacional que se lleva a cabo en varios países después de celebrarse comicios nacionales. En México, la encuesta se ha realizado a nivel nacional en dos ocasiones: en la elección presidencial de 2006 (a 2 116 adultos entrevistados después de la elección, en julio de ese año) y en la elección presidencial de 2012 (a 1 600 adultos entrevistados también en julio). Esta última contó con el patrocinio del Centro de Estudios Sociales y de Opinión Pública de la Cámara de Diputados. La comparación de las respuestas de los entrevistados en ambos entornos postelectorales nos permite documentar que las percepciones que hay en el país acerca de la democracia son mucho más negativas hoy de lo que eran en 2006. Nuestro objetivo es reflexionar acerca de este malestar democrático y de los problemas a los que se enfrentará el nuevo gobierno de Enrique Peña Nieto para fortalecer la confianza ciudadana en la democracia. La mexicana nunca ha estado entre las sociedades que expresan una gran convicción democrática. Después de la elección de la alternancia, en 2000, los indicadores de apoyo democrático en el país mostraban que la mayoría de los mexicanos había recibido a la democracia con entusiasmo; pero incluso en ese año, era evidente que el apoyo popular al sistema democrático era bajo, en comparación con lo que se observaba en otros países y regiones del mundo: dos tercios de los mexicanos (el 65%) apoyaban un sistema democrático de gobierno, comparado con porcentajes superiores al 80% en Europa y Latinoamérica, y por arriba del 70% en Asia, África y en el mundo postcomunista, según datos de la Encuesta Mundial de Valores. Por lo visto, el apoyo a la democracia en México no sólo es bajo, sino que además va a la baja. Según la encuesta cnep, de un 66% de los mexicanos que en julio de 2006 opinaban que “la democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno”, la proporción disminuyó a 54% en julio de 2012. Esta caída en el apoyo a la democracia resulta disonante si pensamos que una mayor democratización en el país debería ir acompañada por crecientes actitudes sociales de apoyo al régimen democrático. Pero otra pregunta del cnep nos confirma la erosión en el apoyo popular a la democracia. Según la encuesta, la proporción de ciudadanos que están “muy de acuerdo” con la frase “la democracia puede tener problemas, pero es el mejor sistema de gobierno”, bajó del 47% al 30% de 2006 a 2012. Ésta parece una señal inequívoca de que la convicción democrática en el país está debilitada. Este deterioro refleja, en parte, el legado de la elección presidencial de 2006, cuando Andrés Manuel López Obrador se negó a reconocer los resultados de la cerrada contienda. Su discurso de denuncia contra el presidente Felipe Calderón y el sistema político en general se extendió durante el sexenio, y amainó al competir por segunda vez por la Presidencia en 2012. Al no mostrarse como una oposición leal democrática, su retórica debilitó la creencia de sus seguidores en las instituciones del país. Por otro lado, el declive del apoyo a la democracia también refleja los contratiempos económicos de los últimos años. La crisis financiera internacional de 2008 golpeó a México más que al resto de los países latinoamericanos debido a sus vínculos más cercanos con la economía de Estados Unidos. La economía mexicana tuvo un golpe adicional en 2009 a causa de la gripe ah1n1. Aunque algunos gobiernos y organizaciones internacionales aplaudieron la rápida y comprensiva reacción de México, el costo sumó cientos de millones de dólares y se extendió a miles de millones en pérdidas en el sector del turismo. Luego de cierta recuperación económica en 2010 y 2011, el crecimiento de los empleos siguió rezagado. Más de dos millones de empleos creados durante el sexenio del presidente Calderón, según las cifras del Sexto Informe de Gobierno, no fueron suficientes para mantener el ritmo en el número de mexicanos que entraron al mercado de trabajo. Pero quizás el factor que más ha incidido en el debilitamiento de la creencia en la democracia es la inseguridad. En 2007, se registraron poco más de 2 000 muertes relacionadas con la violencia por las drogas, mientras que en 2011 el número había ascendido a 16 000. Estas cifras pueden variar, pero la tendencia ha sido ascendente. Más importante aún para el ciudadano promedio es el aumento en la tasa de delitos: el 40% de los mexicanos afirmó haber sido víctima del crimen en el último año (2011), lo que situó a México como el lugar más peligroso de Latinoamérica, según las cifras del estudio Latinobarómetro. La creciente inseguridad no sólo ha tenido serias consecuencias económicas y sociales, sino también para la democracia mexicana. Las virtudes de la competencia democrática pueden parecer un consuelo menor para los ciudadanos, cuando les preocupa más la seguridad de su patrimonio, de su vida y la de sus familias. Más aún, la creciente transparencia e independencia mediática han dejado al descubierto, en varias ocasiones, las debilidades del sistema mexicano y la corrupción que le acompaña. Las historias de corrupción entre los políticos y de filtraciones del narco en las instituciones son revelaciones que ciertamente pueden disminuir la convicción de los mexicanos en la democracia y en su funcionamiento. Los politólogos han tomado prestados de los economistas los conceptos de oferta y demanda cuando analizan las diversas actitudes ciudadanas hacia la democracia. La demanda suele verse como el porcentaje de la población que apoya a la democracia, en el sentido de que esa forma de gobierno se considera algo deseable. Las preguntas citadas arriba reflejan una demanda popular en el sentido de que “la democracia es preferible” o que “la democracia es el mejor sistema de gobierno”. Una genuina demanda democrática (la convicción por la democracia) debería estar acompañada por un bajo apoyo popular (una menor demanda) a otras formas alternativas—no democráticas—de gobierno. En contraste, el lado de la oferta se refiere a la disponibilidad y a la calidad de la democracia, como una especie de bien o servicio. Esto suele representarse mediante las percepciones ciudadanas acerca de cuánta democracia hay y qué tan bien o mal está funcionando. Para el primer aspecto, las encuestas internacionales, como el cnep, miden las percepciones de la gente acerca de cuán democrático es el país, mientras que, para el segundo aspecto, se pregunta qué tan satisfecha o insatisfecha está la población con el funcionamiento de la democracia. La encuesta cnep registra una disminución de la oferta democrática en ambos sentidos. De 2006 a 2012, el porcentaje de entrevistados que considera que México es una democracia plena bajó del 15% al 10%, mientras que el porcentaje que opina que es una democracia con problemas menores disminuyó del 48% al 26%. Tomando la suma de ambas opiniones como un indicador de la gente que ve a la democracia en buen estado, la caída en esa percepción ha sido del 63% al 36% en 6 años. Por el contrario, el porcentaje de entrevistados que considera que México es una democracia con problemas graves aumentó del 26% al 34%, mientras que la proporción que simplemente no cree que el país sea una democracia aumentó del 7% al 28%. La suma de ambas opiniones indica un cambio del 33% al 62% en la proporción de mexicanos que ve en mal estado la democracia en el país. El otro indicador de oferta democrática, la satisfacción con su funcionamiento, confirma el sentimiento de malestar. En julio de 2006, luego de una polarizante elección y un conflicto postelectoral, el 56% de los entrevistados a nivel nacional manifestó que estaba muy satisfecho o algo satisfecho “con la manera como la democracia está funcionando en el país”, cifra que superó el 42% que dijo sentirse poco o nada satisfecho. El nivel de insatisfacción con la democracia era alto, pero minoritario. En contraste, en julio de 2012, el nivel de insatisfacción con la democracia fue mucho más alto: 70%. El 29% dijo estar muy satisfecho o algo satisfecho. La proporción de quienes dijeron que no estaban nada satisfechos aumentó del 15% al 36% de una elección a otra. Retomando la terminología señalada, puede decirse que la oferta democrática en el país es limitada (se percibe poca democracia) y de calidad cuestionable (no se ve que esté funcionando bien). A diferencia de la economía, en donde la valoración de los bienes y servicios se fija por una relación inversa entre la oferta y la demanda, en la política la oferta y la demanda democráticas parecen moverse en la misma dirección. En cualquier país que aspire a tener una democracia de calidad, se espera que haya un amplio apoyo ciudadano a la democracia (la fuente de legitimidad por principio) y que los gobiernos sean de hecho democráticos y responsivos. En México, efectivamente, estos dos aspectos se mueven juntos, pero en declive: la encuesta cnep registra una menor convicción respecto a la democracia (apoyo), un deterioro democrático (disponibilidad) y una creciente insatisfacción con la democracia en el país (funcionamiento). Tanto la demanda como la oferta caen, fenómeno que ha llegado a interpretarse como una democracia devaluada. Aunque esto lo indican las opiniones y percepciones de la gente, la evidencia institucional puede ir en sentido inverso. En comparación con lo que sucedía hace 20 años, el sistema político mexicano tiene hoy pesos y contrapesos democráticos reales. Desde 1997, el gobierno dividido ha cambiado las formas como el Presidente negocia con el Congreso y como los políticos negocian entre sí. Durante los 70 años del pri en el gobierno, el Congreso solía aprobar las iniciativas del Presidente sin mayor aspaviento. Hoy en día, con múltiples partidos y sin mayoría absoluta, los partidos están obligados a trabajar para pasar proyectos legislativos grandes y pequeños. De hecho, la queja más común es la parálisis legislativa—un problema, sí, pero también un signo de madurez de las instituciones democráticas mexicanas—. El poder judicial también ha ganado autonomía, especialmente al más alto nivel. Desde que se profesionalizó en 1990, la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación se ha transformado en un árbitro independiente. Si bien alguna vez seguía una línea partidista, desde entonces la Corte ha mostrado una nueva independencia, en algunos momentos incluso defendiendo el interés público contra las grandes empresas al derribar legislación dañina para los consumidores, como la llamada “Ley Televisa”. La Corte también ha fortalecido a los reguladores frente a monopolios y oligopolios. Si antes los medios de comunicación actuaban coludidos con el gobierno, quien controlaba sus contenidos y sus procesos de impresión, ahora el llamado “cuarto poder” es mucho más autónomo y crítico. La sociedad civil también ha encontrado una voz y un papel independientes, y ha logrado presionar al gobierno en muchos temas importantes, incluida la transparencia, las reformas judiciales y los derechos de las mujeres. Los grupos de la sociedad civil han utilizado los medios impresos tradicionales y las redes sociales para abogar por sus causas, exponer públicamente a funcionarios públicos corruptos e incentivar una mejor conducta de quienes toman las decisiones de política pública en el país. Aunque ninguna de estas fuerzas “democratizadoras” es perfecta, la diferencia respecto de hace 20 (o incluso hace 10) años es sustancial. Todo esto hace que el deterioro en las percepciones de la democracia sea aún más preocupante. Además de los sentimientos predominantes de malestar ante la inseguridad, el estado de la economía y la corrupción que la mayoría de las encuestas marca como las principales preocupaciones de la gente en México, la creciente decepción democrática tiene un eslabón electoral. La mayoría de los mexicanos opina que las elecciones sí se llevan a cabo de manera libre y justa en el país, pero también la mayoría percibe que en 2012 hubo razones serias para dudar de los resultados de la elección presidencial. Según el estudio cnep, la proporción de entrevistados que dijo estar “muy de acuerdo” o “algo de acuerdo” con que las elecciones en México “son libres y justas” fue del 61% en julio de 2012. Si bien ésta es una postura mayoritaria, ciertamente es menor a lo registrado 6 años antes, cuando la encuesta arrojó 76%. La proporción de entrevistados que no está de acuerdo aumentó del 22% al 38%. El escepticismo hacia las elecciones estuvo cerca de duplicarse de una elección presidencial a otra. Las percepciones de que el voto es respetado también se mantuvieron como un punto de vista mayoritario entre la población, pero con el mismo síntoma de deterioro. El porcentaje de entrevistados que está de acuerdo con la frase “el voto de los mexicanos es plenamente respetado” bajó del 66% al 52% de 2006 a 2012, mientras que el porcentaje en desacuerdo aumentó del 31% al 46%. La sociedad mexicana está hoy mucho más dividida que hace 6 años en cuanto opinión sobre la integridad de las elecciones. La señal más clara de división es la calificación que le otorgaron los ciudadanos a los comicios del 1 de julio de 2012, la cual se partió prácticamente en tres tercios: el 31% opinó que las elecciones “se llevaron a cabo en forma plenamente confiable”, el 35% asintió que “estuvieron bien pero con irregularidades menores” y un 32% apuntó que la elección “estuvo llena de irregularidades y los resultados no son confiables”. Como sería de esperarse, estas posturas se relacionan con la preferencia política de los entrevistados: los seguidores de Andrés Manuel López Obrador comparten mayoritariamente la tercera opción (“los resultados no son confiables”), los de Enrique Peña Nieto la primera (“plenamente confiable”) con una proporción importante que se inclina hacia la segunda (“irregularidades menores”), y tanto los seguidores de Josefina Vázquez Mota como los votantes independientes se distribuyeron entre la segunda y tercera opción. La calificación de las elecciones refleja un sesgo de ganadores y perdedores. ¿De dónde proviene, principalmente, la idea de que les faltó integridad a las elecciones de 2012? La encuesta cnep señala que una posibilidad es la forma como se utilizó el dinero. El 55% de los entrevistados cree que hubo quienes excedieron el tope de gastos de campaña y un 52% cree que hubo compra masiva de votos. Esta última percepción parece más influida por el ambiente informativo que por la experiencia directa, en tanto que el 12% de los entrevistados afirmó que “alguien le ofreció algún regalo o compensación para votar por un candidato o partido específico”. El 75% de ellos señaló que dicho ofrecimiento provino de parte de la campaña de Enrique Peña Nieto. Los cambios a la ley electoral en este sexenio dieron una nueva modalidad al uso del dinero por parte de los partidos políticos, cuya publicidad en medios solía significar un fuerte gasto y ahora no. La comparación de las encuestas cnep de 2006 y 2012 documenta una erosión de la legitimidad democrática en México. Dicha legitimidad tiene dos lados: uno de principios (el apoyo y la convicción democráticos) y uno de disponibilidad y desempeño (cuán democrático es el país y cuán satisfechos están los mexicanos con el funcionamiento de la democracia). La literatura internacional sobre el tema apunta que ha habido una “recesión democrática” en el mundo, más generalmente hablando, un déficit democrático. Pero este déficit se centra, fundamentalmente, en el lado de la disponibilidad y el desempeño, más que en el de los principios y la convicción. Sin embargo, en México, la erosión de la legitimidad democrática incluye los principios y las convicciones, el apoyo popular, la creencia de que la democracia “es el mejor sistema de gobierno”. No es solamente la falta de resultados, sino un resquebrajamiento de las convicciones. La vitalidad democrática en un país requiere que esa legitimidad por principios sea fuerte. Tanto el nuevo gobierno como las instituciones mexicanas en su conjunto tienen frente a sí la tarea de fortalecerla. Es probable que para lograrlo tengan que cambiar las condiciones de inseguridad y malestar económico, pero también de integridad y transparencia institucional.
    Blog Post by Shannon K. O'Neil February 1, 2013 Latin America’s Moment
  • Economics
    U.S. Exports Depend on Mexico
    Surprising to many Americans is the importance of the United States’ trade with Mexico. While Asia captures the headlines, U.S. exports to Mexico are double those to China, and second only to Canada. And while many of these goods come from border states—Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and California—Mexico matters for much more of the union. Seventeen states send more than 10 percent of their exports to Mexico, and it is the number one or two destination for U.S. goods for nearly half the country. The graph below shows those states most economically dependent on our southern neighbor–notice that South Dakota and Nebraska outpace New Mexico and California. These flows are only accelerating. During the first ten months of 2012 exports heading south grew by $17 billion dollars (or 10 percent) compared to 2011, reaching a total of $181 billion. They include petroleum products (some $17 billion worth) and intermediate goods such as vehicle parts, electrical apparatuses, industrial supplies, metals, and chemicals (over $40 billion combined). Spurred on by deep supply chains, these pieces and parts move fluidly back and forth across the border (often quite a few times) before ending up as finished goods on store shelves in both countries. The uptick should be seen as a good thing. According to economic studies, these exports support some six million American jobs (directly and indirectly). But to continue this dynamism, the United States and Mexico need to improve border infrastructure and facilitate flows. This means expanding border crossings and highways, and harmonizing regulations and customs to make the process easier and faster. Prioritizing and investing in bilateral trade will provide greater opportunity and security--for U.S. companies and workers alike.
    Blog Post by Shannon K. O'Neil January 11, 2013 Latin America’s Moment
  • Diplomacy and International Institutions
    Two Nations Indivisible
    Through an in-depth analysis of modern Mexico, Shannon O'Neil provides a roadmap for the United States' greatest overlooked foreign policy challenge of our time: relations with its southern neighbor.
    Book by Shannon K. O'Neil January 4, 2013 Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Program
  • Security Alliances
    Refocusing U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation
    U.S.-Mexico security cooperation, led by the Merida Initiative, is vital and must continue. But with Enrique Pena Nieto's inauguration, Mexico's political landscape is now changing, and the United States must adjust its strategy and support accordingly. Building on the lessons of the past five years, the United States should work with Mexico to implement the nonmilitary programs envisioned in the current Merida framework, in particular supporting and prioritizing Mexico's ongoing judicial reform, training police officers at the state and local levels, modernizing the U.S.-Mexico border, and investing in local community and youth-oriented programs. The Merida Initiative After Five Years The Merida Initiative was launched in 2007 under the George W. Bush administration, which promised $1.4 billion over three years to "support Mexico's law enforcement in the fight against organized crime." The Obama administration revised and expanded Merida's mission, moving from a heavy emphasis on military equipment to a more comprehensive bilateral strategy that seeks to reduce the role and influence of organized crime. The initiative now encompasses four priorities (called pillars): disrupting the operational capacity of organized crime, institutionalizing the rule of law, creating a twenty-first-century border to speed the flow of legal commerce and stop that of illegal goods, and building strong and resilient communities that can stand up to criminal intrusions. The main problem today is not Merida's design but its uneven implementation, with the gains in some areas offset by minimal progress in others. The United States and Mexico have been most successful in removing drug kingpins. Since 2009, Mexican authorities have captured or killed twenty-five of the thirty-seven most-wanted drug traffickers and substantially disrupted the operations of Mexico's best-known criminal networks. Many of these high-profile arrests resulted from bilateral intelligence and operational cooperation. Advances have been made as well in strengthening the rule of law, most notably the expansion and professionalization of the federal police. But progress has been slight beyond this particular law enforcement body, which represents just 10 percent of Mexico's police forces. Little discernible change has occurred within the justice system. Though a set of 2008 constitutional and legislative reforms set in motion a fundamental transformation of Mexico's court systems, the implementation of these changes has been exceedingly slow, so much so that the shift may not occur by the 2016 deadline, leaving Mexico's judicial future uncertain. On a practical level, rising crime and violence have exposed the weak capacity of the current justice system. With only one or two crimes out of every hundred resulting in a conviction, impunity reigns, providing no effective legal deterrent to a life of crime. Initiatives to modernize the border and build resilient communities (pillars three and four of the Merida Initiative) are even further behind. Though some innovative border management programs, such as the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism—which helps trusted businesses avoid extensive border checks—have improved efficiency, the overall tenor of U.S. policy has been to increase barriers, slowing flows of legal commerce. Financially, investment in border crossings and infrastructure has not matched the exponential increase in trade crossing the border each year. Investment has lagged not only for new construction, but also for basic maintenance on existing infrastructure, leading to overwhelmed and at times downright dangerous facilities (a border crossing roof collapsed in 2011, injuring seventeen people). Stressed infrastructure has also led to traffic jams lasting up to eight hours, and has cost billions of dollars in trade losses, without drastically discouraging or disrupting illegal flows. The building of "resilient communities" too has largely been forgotten. The pillar's ambitious objectives of addressing the underlying socioeconomic and community factors behind rising crime rates have not yet moved beyond a few pilot programs in Ciudad Juárez. Finally, though talking often of co-responsibility in the drug war, the United States has done little to address the domestic factors that affect security in Mexico. The illegal flow of weapons and money southward continues unabated, and U.S. drug consumption remains high. (The 2010 National Survey on Drug Use and Health finds that 9 percent of Americans over the age of twelve used illegal drugs in the past month.) Changing Realities on the Ground As the U.S.-Mexico security cooperation strategy has evolved, so too have the realities on the ground. The most drastic shift is the rise in violence. When the Merida Initiative was signed in 2007, there were just over two thousand drug-related homicides annually; by 2011, the official number escalated to more than sixteen thousand. Violence also spread from roughly 46 municipalities (mostly along the border and in Sinaloa) to some 225 municipalities throughout Mexico, including the once-safe industrial center of Monterrey and major cities such as Acapulco, Durango, and Guadalajara. This increase in violence is not just the direct result of drug trafficking. Criminal organizations have diversified into numerous illicit businesses, including kidnapping, robbery, human trafficking, extortion, and retail drug sales, and as a result prey more directly on the local population. In some places the violence is as much the work of local gangs concerned with rivalries and honor as it is of drug transit. Prioritizing Civilian Institutions and Communities The need to adapt to the changing realities in Mexico coincides with political change. On December 1, 2012, Enrique Pena Nieto became president. During his campaign, he promised to shift the country's current security strategy away from combating drug trafficking toward reducing violence. The United States has an opportunity with this new administration and legislative branch to push past the current limits on security cooperation and implementation. The U.S. government should continue to provide between $250 million and $300 million a year in Merida money. These funds, which are managed by the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), should prioritize civilian (versus military) law enforcement institutions, and fund training programs and other efforts to professionalize Mexico's police forces and transform its justice system. Long-term sustainable security will only exist when Mexico has a strong civilian-based rule of law, able to take on and punish all types of criminal activity. In addition, U.S. and Mexican joint efforts should concentrate on realizing the other so-far-neglected pillars of the Merida Initiative, particularly modernizing the border and engaging citizens and communities. On the border, the United States should upgrade its roads, bridges, and FAST lanes (express lanes for trusted drivers), as well as increase the number of U.S. customs officers, agricultural specialists, and support staff to help facilitate legal trade and identify and keep out illicit goods. To finance the multibillion dollar cost of modernizing the border, the U.S. Congress should pass the NADBank Enhancement Act (H.R. 2216) or similar legislation, to allow the North American Development Bank to support infrastructure projects in the border regions; currently the bank is limited primarily to environmental initiatives. And it should also reauthorize and refund the Coordinated Border Infrastructure Program, which managed federal funds dedicated for border area roads and infrastructure. In terms of reinforcing local communities, this involves not just particular programs but reorienting U.S. resources and programs in Mexico to focus on state and local law enforcement and justice institutions, where violence and insecurity are most concentrated and devastating. This will mean millions more in funds for the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) community projects and youth programs, as well as INL's training of state and municipal police (as opposed to just federal-level officers). A shift to the local level would also enable policymakers and U.S.-supported programs to recognize and address the varying nature of the violence. In cities such as Ciudad Juárez, local gangs today are perhaps as threatening as transnational drug cartels. USAID should share models developed and implemented in U.S. cities to deal with gang problems, such as those in Boston and Los Angeles and Chicago's Operation Ceasefire initiatives. In addition, it should share the United States' experiences with community policing strategies, alongside basic training and vetting programs that cultivate a close working relationship between law enforcement officers and those they protect. The United States should also move its drug policies away from eradication and interdiction abroad and incarceration at home to greater funding for prevention and rehabilitation, in order to reduce the demand supplied by organized crime. Under the direction of the White House Office on National Drug Control Policy and the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Education, and Justice, new policies should include the expansion of promising pilot programs that deal with addiction, such as Hawaii's Opportunity Probation with Enforcement (HOPE) program, which by swiftly punishing parolees who test positive for drugs has successfully lowered recidivism among a heavy-drug-use population. Though some will prefer to continue an eradication and interdiction–focused international drug control regime, the tens of billions of dollars spent during the now over forty-year war on drugs in Mexico and Latin America suggest the need for a revised policy approach. The outlined initiatives have a greater chance of reducing violence (if not drug flows) in Mexico by strengthening police forces, court systems, and communities. The border improvements, moreover, will likely benefit both the U.S. and Mexican economies, which can have indirect positive effects by providing greater legal opportunities to young people. In the end, Mexico's security will depend on the actions and decisions of Mexico. But there is much the United States can do to help or hinder the process. A transition to a demilitarized justice and a community-focused approach to U.S. security assistance will help Mexico establish more effective and long-lasting tools for combating crime and violence.
    Policy Innovation Memorandum by Shannon K. O'Neil December 5, 2012 Latin America Studies Program
  • Economics
    Calderón’s Presidency by the Numbers
    As President Calderón’s sexenio wraps up tomorrow, he will leave office with a mixed legacy. Many have presented interesting analyses of his policies, but this post looks at concrete numbers—development indicators and the like—to see how much did (or didn’t) change over the last six years. Life expectancy rose. Overall life expectancy in Mexico rose during Calderón’s time in office, from 75.8 years in 2006 to 77 years in 2011. This was accompanied by a decrease in child (under five) mortality, from 19 per 1,000 children in 2007 to 17 per 1,000 in 2009, and maternal mortality (dropping from 54 to 50 per 1,000 from 2005 to 2010). Adolescent fertility also dropped from 74 to 65 per 1,000 from 2005 to 2008. And Mexico’s National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL) reported that the percentage of Mexicans with access to healthcare rose from 59.2 percent in 2008 to 68.2 percent in 2010. Education levels increased, albeit slightly. The expected years of schooling for children rose from 13.2 years in 2006 to 13.9 years by 2011. The average years of schooling for adults also rose from 8 years to 8.5 years in the same time period. The literacy rate improved by 1.7 percent to reach 93.4 percent. Still many rightly question the quality of this greater quantity. Mexico’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) scores (an international test of students academic performance) only moved from an average of 408 (out of 800) in 2006 to 420 in 2009, leaving Mexican students far below the OECD average (of 493) in all three categories—reading, math, and science. Poverty worsened, inequality was unchanged. The number of Mexicans living in poverty increased from 44.5 percent in 2008 to 46.2 percent in 2010, an increase of 3.2 million people, according to CONEVAL. The Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC) reported that extreme poverty—under two and a half dollars a day—also increased, although only slightly. According to OECD numbers, inequality, as measured by the gini index (an indicator that puts 1 as the most unequal and 0 as the most equal), stayed roughly steady. Nevertheless, common measures of Mexico’s middle class showed improvement. The number of passenger cars per 1000 Mexicans increased from 157 to 191, and the number of cell phone subscriptions grew from 51 to 82 (per 100). More Mexicans logged on to the internet—increasing from 19.5 Mexicans out of every 100 in 2006, to 35.5 of every 100 Mexicans in 2011 (although Mexico still ranks behind peers Brazil and China in its web-connected population). Infrastructure stagnated. The percent of roads that were paved rose only slightly from 33 percent to 35 percent, while the number of kilometers of railroad tracks stayed the same (some 26,700). What did change was the usage of these networks. In 2006, 2.6 million (20 foot) container units passed through Mexico’s ports, but by 2011 this number had risen to 3.6 million. Formal sector jobs increased, but only moderately. As this graph shows, formal sector jobs steadily rose throughout the sexenio (apart from the steep mid-term recession). However, job creation failed to keep pace with the number of Mexicans entering the job market, meaning unemployment also rose from 3.2 percent in 2006 to 5.3 percent in 2010. CONEVAL reports that underemployment is at 8.3 percent. Violence escalated. Murders per capita rose from 9.7 per 100,000 in 2006 to 22.7 per 100,000 in 2010 according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime data. Other crimes (excluding health crimes such as drug consumption or possession) also increased (as reported by Mexico’s Attorney General’s office) from 52 per 100,00 in 2007 to 82 per 100,000 in 2011. There is some evidence that drug-related murders may have plateaued in 2011 and even declined in 2012 (by some 15 to 20 percent the levels of the previous year). Some of these measures were most influenced by world events and outside shocks, including the 2008 world financial crisis and 2009 swine flu outbreak. But others reflect Calderón’s policy choices, and what he was and wasn’t able to do. They also highlight the challenges for the incoming government, and the need to make progress across issues and indicators.  
    Blog Post by Shannon K. O'Neil November 30, 2012 Latin America’s Moment
  • Heads of State and Government
    Jorge Castañeda and Shannon O'Neil on Nieto and U.S.-Mexico Relations
    Podcast
    BERNARD GWERTZMAN: Greetings, everyone. Welcome aboard. And I'm Bernard Gwertzman. I'm an editor for the Council on Foreign Relations website.And we have two great guests here today to answer questions about the visit of the Mexican president to the United States and today to Canada. And I would like to introduce them. We have Jorge Castaneda, who is a professor of politics and Latin American and Caribbean studies at New York University and at one time a foreign minister of Mexico. And we also have Shannon O'Neil, who is a senior fellow for Latin American studies at the council and is an expert on Mexico and Brazil, among other countries.I would like to start by saying there's been an emphasis since the election of the new president in Mexico on Mexico's economic power and saying that Americans are paying too much attention to the drug wars in Mexico. Are the drug wars really under control, or is it just an effort to cover it up? Shannon, would you like to deal with that?SHANNON O'NEIL: Sure. Well, what we've seen in Mexico over the last six years is it's a drug problem, but really what it is is a violence problem. And so when you look at the term of President Calderon, the six-year term, you've seen at least 60,000 people killed, some independent estimates say upwards of almost a hundred thousand people. Some of this is because of drug trafficking and organized crime related to drug trafficking. But some of it is crime more broadly, so other types of organized crime, extortion, kidnapping, car theft rings and the like. And some is just your average day-to-day crime. So you look at studies and polls -- and Mexico actually, for regular types of crimes, is probably one of the most violent places or crime-ridden places in the hemisphere. And that is an issue that continues for Mexico today and will be on Pena Nieto's plate when he takes office in -- on Saturday.GWERTZMAN: Mmm hmm. And Jorge, do you want to add anything to that?JORGE CASTANEDA: Well, I agree completely with what Shannon said. I would simply add that I think the emphasis to be placed on Mexico's economy doing better than in the past is well-placed, as long as we don't exaggerate and turn Mexico into a new Brazil, and then three years from now we'll all have to say, well, actually, it wasn't such a big deal after all.The Mexican economy is doing OK, period -- (inaudible) --GWERTZMAN: Just OK? I mean, from what I've been reading, it's doing better than the United States economy.CASTANEDA: That's what I mean, Bernie. (Laughter.) Actually, that's what I'm referring to. For a country that has a GDP per capita about six times smaller than that of the United States, the fact that it's growing a little more than the United States is not exactly surprising. What would be surprising is the opposite. Mexico's doing OK. Three and a half (percent) to 4 percent growth is not bad. It's been going on now for three consecutive years. That's not bad either. This is not China, it's not Chile, it's not Peru, it's not India, (just ?) OK. I think it would be useful, unless Americans want to, you know, once again, three years from now, have a conference call like this one about Mexico and saying, what did we get wrong? Well, you got it wrong from the beginning.GWERTZMAN: I see. OK. Well, so you're saying I ought to just stay in the United States; I'll do better here than migrating.CASTANEDA: Well, I don't believe this story of any Mexicans in the United States going back to Mexico. I'd love to meet one. If someone has found one, it'd be great. I'd love to meet one.GWERTZMAN: OK. Well, Jeff, let's turn this over to our call-in audience. And do we have somebody online?OPERATOR: Thank you. (Gives queuing instructions.)Our first question is from Rafael Mathus from Reforma Newspaper.QUESTIONER: Thank you very much. Hello, Ms. O'Neil, again, and hello, Mr. Castaneda. It's a really good idea to have this conversation with you.What I'd like to know is about immigration reform. It's going to be on top of the agenda in the bilateral relationship in the next two years, specifically next year if the project that President Obama has said that might come into Congress actually comes into Congress. What do you think would be the right strategy for Mr. Pena Nieto to follow, like, a more aggressive strategy similar to the one that the Mexican government followed in early 2000s before 9/11 or something more on the backseat, if you want to say it, sort of like the strategy that Mr. Calderon followed?CASTANEDA: You asked -- (inaudible) -- GWERTZMAN: Go ahead.CASTANEDA: Well, Rafael, besides good to -- good to be in touch -- we're colleagues in the same newspaper -- I think -- I don't think Calderon put it on -- in the backseat; he threw it under the bus. So there is no -- there was no Mexican immigration policy under this administration. I think that the tone that Pena Nieto set yesterday in the published remarks of his meeting with President Obama was right: Mexico's very interested, Mexico wants to cooperate, and Mexico would welcome a comprehensive immigration reform in the United States. I think that's -- to get started, that's the right tone, and it makes -- marks a major change from what Calderon's attitude has been.At some point it will probably be necessary to go further, first of all, because like we saw in 2006 and 2007, without Mexican cooperation, it is very difficult to implement any kind of comprehensive immigration reform in the United States. And secondly, given our 50 consulates in the U.S., we can either help or not help Mexicans, for example, right now, prepare their documentation or applying for deferred action, the executive decree that President Obama issued back in August or September, which has allowed some young Mexicans now to be -- not be deported and become, quote, unquote, legal.GWERTZMAN: Can I just amplify on that question to Shannon? What are the chances of getting any legislation in the United States?O'NEIL: I mean, I think this is something that once Obama officially is re -- you know, starts a second term in January, this will be one of the issues on the agenda as we look towards 2013. But what the shape of it will be is still very much in dispute. Is it going to be another, quote, unquote, comprehensive reform that looks at those that are here unauthorized, those are here for a guest worker program, the enforcement side of it, both on the employer side and also on the border? Are we going to see all of those elements, or are we going to see little elements like starting with the Dream Act, making the administrative -- the executive orders that Obama did put in place, making those legislative -- making those law, those sort of things? So what happens? You know, it'll sort of be up in the air what we actually see try to get through Congress. And in some ways, we'll see what happens with the other types of things that are on the agenda, and particularly the fiscal cliff is a big issue. The Congress has to get through that before it can hit any other sort of domestic policy issues. And so how quickly or slowly we move through the financial challenges that we have will affect things like immigration reform.And let me just say, on the -- on sort of the role Mexico can play in immigration reform -- and you know, Jorge's been through this one round himself and had his ups and downs and probably has his lessons learned there. But there's a role for Mexico to play in terms of cooperation, in terms of support. But this is, in the United States, seen primarily as a domestic policy issue. And so any foreign government taking too active of a role, seeing it as a foreign policy issue, could be counterproductive, particularly when you're trying to create a bipartisan -- a fairly fragile bipartisan center to try to pass some sort of legislation.GWERTZMAN: OK, next question.OPERATOR: Thank you. Our next question comes from Judy Miller from Manhattan Institute.QUESTIONER: Hi. Thank you very much for doing this conference. I wanted to ask what changes you anticipate in the war on drugs or, you know, drug violence under the new administration and whether or not you think that the anticipated changes that you see are likely to be more effective than what we've seen to date.GWERTZMAN: Mmm. Who wanted to -- Jorge?O'NEIL: Tell you what, Jorge, you want to start, and then I'll follow you?CASTANEDA: OK. Well, I don't -- I think the main change regarding the war on drugs is to call it off. There's an excellent piece, I think, in tomorrow's New York Times by Alan Riding saying -- called "Safety First for Mexico." And I think that's where I would go. In other words, what can you -- what can we do about the war on drugs? Put an end to it, a little bit like the war in Vietnam. Well, what could you do with it? Get out. Finish. Over.I think that if Pena Nieto does this -- now, whether he announces it, whether he makes a big fuss and strident fuss about it or just does it discreetly is a politically consideration, which I don't have enough facts to be able to support in one direction or another. But I think the main point is to just basically say Mexico is going to use its scarce law enforcement resources to combat kidnapping, extortion, the issues Shannon mentioned a little while ago. And I wouldn't say forget about drug trafficking, but certainly place it on a much lower level of priorities than under the Calderon administration.Then what happens? We'll see. It's hard to say. Maybe there will be more violence than ever, though it's hard to imagine how there could be a whole lot more than there is right now in Mexico. Maybe there will be no leveling off and things will continue as are. Or maybe there will be a very significant drop in violence and not much of an increase in the volume of drugs entering the United States from Mexico, whether produced in Mexico or just trans-shipped through Mexico. We don't know that until we try. But certainly the idea of finding a different way to wage the war on drugs, I think, would be a huge mistake.O'NEIL: Yeah, I agree with Jorge. I mean, I -- what we've already seen in the campaigns and in this transition period up until the inauguration at the end of this week is a shift in rhetoric. We've seen a shift away from talking about a war on drugs in Mexico to talking about reducing violence.Now, many of the things you do to do -- for both of those things are the same. So the efforts to professionalize the police forces, efforts to strengthen court systems and make them work so they can convict the guilty and free the innocent -- both of those matter for fighting drug trafficking as well as fighting other types of crimes and reducing violence. But other things, as Jorge just said -- where do you focus your law enforcement resources? You don't necessarily go after kingpins. You go after local car thieves or those that break into houses or extort local businesses. And I think that we will see a shift.The other sign we've seen so far -- signal, which we'll see if it carries through, is an effort or an aspiration to reorganize the security forces in Mexico and, in many ways, consolidate them. And many of the critiques one saw during the Calderon administration is the fragmentation of sort of command and control of the various police forces. And so there were often, you know, different types of operations working in parallel, even at times working in conflict. So I think the hope are -- those trying to design it to concentrate power is that bringing it under the Ministry of the Interior might sort of increase communication, make these things more effective.Now the flip side, some would argue, is if many of these forces are corrupt or corruptible, some decentralization might be helpful rather than it all being centralized in one place. But whether that actually happens remains to be seen, but it has been proposed by the incoming government.GWERTZMAN: OK. Next question?OPERATOR: Thank you. Our next question comes from Eric Martin with Bloomberg News.QUESTIONER: Thank you for taking my question. I wanted to ask you about Pena Nieto's priorities on day one. Does anyone know in what order he's going to proceed with all the things that he said need to be done? And do we know, you know, from December 2nd what his first move within, say, his first month, two months in office will be?CASTANEDA: I'll try -- take a try at that, but it's going to be a real brief one. No, we don't. (Laughter.) I think he's going to make a speech on Saturday, an inauguration -- inaugural speech or address, which will lay out much more of a broad vision for the future and a little bit about the state of the country he has received, rather than a detailed program of what comes next. He still has stuff that he has to get done which he tried to get done during the interim period between his election and his inauguration, which did not get done, whether it's the anti-corruption commission and law, whether it's the transparency law, whether it's a law regarding how the -- how political parties purchase air -- governments purchase airtime from the media. There's a lot of stuff that he wanted to get done during these months which he hasn't gotten done. So probably before he moves on to anything else, he will try to deal with that. The only exception, of course, is the budget, which he has to get through and approved by the end of the month, by the end of December, and a lot of the things he said he wants it -- wanted to do during the first year have to have a appropriations, as of right now, in order for them to be done. In other words, he might not end up doing them, but if he doesn't have the money, he certainly won't do them. So there we will see a little bit of what's going to happen in the budget. Other than that, I really don't think they have a clear game plan. The Pena Nieto people are very bright. They're very good. They're very experienced in certain ways. But they have already shown these five months that some of the things that they think are easier to do end up being a little more difficult.GWERTZMAN: In other words, in Mexico there's this long period between the election and the inauguration, and the president-elect actually can take steps and do things, unlike in the United States, where there's a new president-elect who really can't do anything.CASTANEDA: Just briefly -- (inaudible) -- the -- it's a five-month period for the president, but it's three-month president (sic) for the congress. The congress -- the new congress takes office on September 1st.GWERTZMAN: Oh, I see. OK.CASTANEDA: (The ?) new president takes office on December 1st. At least in principle, during those three months, the new congress, which reflects part of the mandate that the new president has, can do things that the president-elect would like them to do because they are already the new congress and they are in office, in the case of senators, for six years and in the case of house members for three years.GWERTZMAN: Hm.O'NEIL: And they have done things. I mean, they have passed labor reform during this transition governing period, working with President Calderon and working with the new congress. So there has been movement there.I mean -- hi, Eric. Nice to hear from you. I'd say, as Jorge, no one really knows what they're going to do, but one is look at the budget and then two, when we come back after the holidays in the new year, the president now in Mexico has this sort of preferential initiative authority. I'm not sure -- exact translation -- but it's where the president can send two initiatives to congress, and the congress must discuss them and come up with something within about a month. And so we don't know what's going to be on those, but there -- that's what to watch, is sort of those are the two things that would see movement, what the president pushes forward.And the other thing is we saw today the three political parties -- in of course vague terms, but all three political parties sat down and signed a pact or came up with a supposed consensus on what policy issues should be on the table. And they're the ones that, you know, Mexican analysts and others have been talking about for years. But they're issues of security, issues of corruption, issues of economic reforms, making Mexico's economy more competitive and the like.But at least there is a -- there is a broad range there of what people agree on putting on the table. Of course, how you solve those problems or at least move forward, there could lots of disagreements between the parties, but what should be discussed, there is at least some framework there that has been negotiated.GWERTZMAN: The next question?OPERATOR: Thank you. Our next question comes from Jonathan Blakley from National Public Radio.QUESTIONER: Hi. Thanks for having me, and thanks for having this conference. I appreciate it. I just want to know if we can expand a bit more on the war on drugs -- and Shannon did a great job of expanding on it -- but when you talk about getting out of the war on drugs, you're just going to get out of it, I mean, what does that mean when you juxtapose that against a hundred thousand deaths? And how do you think that wouldn't be looked at -- or would that be looked at, especially on folks on this side of the border -- would that be looked at as surrender?MR. : Jorge, you raised it.CASTANEDA: Let me give you first a very concrete example then, then perhaps move on to the broader issue of surrender.You can have -- let say you can post on a more or less permanent basis 2(,000) or 3,000 troops, military troops, in a city, let's say, like Zacatecas, which is about halfway between Mexico City and Ciudad Juarez or El Paso, a long road to the border and not the short one. It's an immigration-sending state -- not too violent, not too safe a state -- OK. It's not a big city, but it's not a tiny city, either. You can have your 2,000 troops, you can have them on checkpoints on the highways. It's a highway crossroads; you've got about five big highways going through the city -- or the same is Torreon.You can have your troops on the highways with checkpoints stopping trucks, stopping cars, buses, et cetera, and not too many of them downtown protecting people. Or can you have a bunch of them downtown and pretty much just eliminate the checkpoints. If you eliminate the checkpoints, it will be a lot easier for people who are driving trucks full of cocaine, marijuana, methamphetamines, what have you, to roll up to the U.S. But you will have a lot of troops, you will be saturating the city with troops where there is no police, and you will be making people feel more safe and be more safe.If -- in an ideal world, you've got enough troops to do both. In the real world, you don't, so you choose. Calderon chose the checkpoints. Violence in the city has got totally out of control. The traditional Mexican way has been to try and provide a sufficient degree of safety for people in the cities or where they live and contain violence or drug trafficking on the highways, et cetera, but it's a policy of containment, not a policy of all-out war. I think this may help illustrate a little bit the different between being at war and getting out of the war.O'NEIL: You know, let me just add just a couple thoughts there is, you know, the United States is, in some ways, an example for Mexico to follow. I mean, if you look at the drug trade, we have more drugs in the United States than Mexico since we get them from other places, as well as our own country. We arguably have more guns than Mexico does. And we have more money in the drug trade because here because it wants (to get ?) across the border where it's really valuable. But we don't have the violence problems in the United States that Mexico has. We have -- but we have a trade probably as vibrant, if that's the correct word, as Mexico does. (Chuckles.)And so there are -- there are lessons there. We don't stop -- we don't have a war on drugs in the United States, but we have a -- you know, for lack of a better term, some sort of regulation and containment policy that we use here, that we keep it from getting violent. And so in some ways, looking at the United States and the way we've dealt -- we've had episodes in our past where drug-related violence has been quite high, and we found ways to deal with it, which has not been to end the drug trade in the United States. And so there may be some lessons for Mexico -- and other countries, like Colombia, but (for instance ?), we're talking about Mexico here -- in terms of the way the United States deals with this sort of (insidious ?) problem that is not going to go away.GWERTZMAN: Next question?OPERATOR: Thank you. Our next question comes from Michael O'Boyle (ph) from Reuters.QUESTIONER: Hi. Good afternoon. Thanks for taking the time to be with us.Going back to the reform agenda a bit -- sorry to make you guys jump around -- how do you interpret, like, the cooperation that we've -- that we've seen so far, you know, on the labor reform? Was that a real landmark? I mean, are you more optimistic or still very skeptical on what's going to happen next year? Could you say something about -- I know there hasn't been a lot said, but I mean, the -- about fiscal reform, about energy reform, are you very optimistic that we could get very substantial reforms under the new government? And thirdly, is there just anything really key that you're seeing left out of the discourse in terms of, you know, maybe some of the most important reforms that Mexico should be looking at?GWERTZMAN: Shannon, take a crack at it.O'NEIL: Sure. I mean, we have seen some basic cooperation there. I think there is room for cooperation. Perhaps one of the biggest challenges or hoops the next government will have to run through is not that the PAN disagrees with their agenda, or at least the reformist side of their agenda, but the PAN is rudderless. Who actually is going to lead the PAN and be able to bring together the representatives, the senators and those to vote I think is still a bit unclear, who is actually going to be a forceful leader to bring that party back together after their rout in the -- in the last election. So I think that's a challenge for cooperation. But I think there is some area of agreement, and there's some electoral incentive for the PAN, if they can pull it together, and for the PRI to get things done. So there's area for cooperation.Fiscal and energy reform, which likely need to go together, on that I would say I am cautiously optimistic. For those who say -- who see the next Petrobras happening in Mexico, I am very skeptical. I don't see that as being technically possible or politically possible. The changes Pemex would have to go through to make it into a listable company from the, you know, state-owned organ that it is today are quite significant, so I don't see that. But perhaps some opening where you allow risk-sharing of the costs and benefits in technologically sophisticated types of areas like deepwater drilling, perhaps there's some room for that.And then the things that I think are off the agenda, unfortunately, for Mexico, I would put political reform there. That seems to have not been -- in the numerous speeches where we see a laundry list of things that need to be done in Mexico, political reform has been shunted. And there I mean re-election, I mean election of outside candidates, a lot of things that people have talked about that would be beneficial for rejuvenating and opening up and making Mexico's system more accountable. I haven't -- I don't think those are going to be, you know, on this long list.GWERTZMAN: Jorge.CASTANEDA: I basically agree with everything Shannon said. I would add two things that I haven't been seeing recently, which I regret. One is this idea of a universal social safety net financed out of the central fiscal budget as opposed to a pension and health care system, which is what we have, based on employment, which by definition leaves out more than half of the population, although some patchwork solutions have been implemented over the past 10 or 15 years. Pena Nieto had committed himself very forcefully to this. My impression is that he's getting a little bit of cold feet on it. The same is true on education. We've been very strong, very committed to serious educational reform. I'm not sure that that is going to happen, because as very often occurs with education, unfortunately, it's been one of those things that has long lead times, the political payback is way in the future, and the political costs are tomorrow morning.GWERTZMAN: (Chuckles.) All right. Next question?OPERATOR: Thank you. Our next question comes from Gabriel Stargardter from Reuters.QUESTIONER: Hi, there. Thank you both for being here today. It's a very interesting discussion. I have a question building slightly on what Mike said regarding the reforms that have already taken place. You both mentioned earlier that the Congress has managed to actually come together and do something in these last few months, weeks. And one of the fruits of that was the labor reform law. I'm curious to know what exactly you both think will be the short- and long-term impact of that labor reform law, specifically on hiring. And will it be able to be successful in drawing people out of the informal sector, which is a big thorn in the side of both the Mexican tax man and also the Mexican politicians? And the other question I have is -- sort of looking the other way, is in terms of -- a lot has been made recently of Mexico's sort of -- there's a new narrative up here of Mexico as a sort of burgeoning manufacturing hub. What do you think will be the future direction in terms of Mexico's manufacturing experience? And how does -- how does that sort of impact countries like China, which already have a very strong, established manufacturing and export sector? Is there going to be any impact on those countries? That's it. Thanks.GWERTZMAN: Who'd like to take a crack at that?O'NEIL: Tell you what, I'll start, and then, Jorge, why don't you follow.I think the labor law reform was an important step forward, in some ways more a political step that there could be a negotiation and two parties could come together and pass something together, so perhaps more politically important than immediately fiscally important.I do think it will be -- have a positive effect on hiring and those things, but I don't think this is going to be an outsized effect. I don't think this is a revolutionary change in Mexico's labor structures or will immediately bring the, depending on your estimates, roughly half of Mexico's economic activity that's in the informal sector.GWERTZMAN: What is the reform, for those who don't know?O'NEIL: Sure, I mean, it's a reform that changes the way you can hire people and fire people. It makes it a little bit easier to hire people. It makes it a little bit easier to fire people. It limits the costs when you let someone go. It makes it a little bit more flexibility for employers, which the private sector says will enhance formal sector jobs because it'll make people more likely to hire in the formal sector, as opposed to now many people hire off the books or in the informal sector.I mean, a big challenge on the informal sector for Mexico is not just do you bring workers onto a formal company payroll, but do you formalize your company in the beginning; is it on the books in the beginning. And there you see the tax evasion from informal businesses, you know, far outstripping, by most accounts, you know, drug money or other types of money that flow within the economy. And that, I think, will have to do much more with larger incentives, incentives that could be provided by broad financing that would incentivize people to come onto the books because then they could get loans to expand their businesses or things like that, as well as some sticks, i.e., the Mexican IRS, the SAP, actually comes after you if you don't formalize your business.Let me just say one thing quickly on the sort of future of manufacturing and Mexico's role and where I think that will go. I mean, I think this is sort of the optimistic side of Mexico. And like Jorge said at the beginning, we don't want to blow this out of proportion. Mexico is not going to grow 10 (percent), 12 percent next year and for the following decade. We're not going to see China-like growth unless Mexico can make huge structural reforms that -- I think a good legacy of the Pena Nieto administration would be if they could get a few through or a couple big reforms through. They're not going to get all of them through.But how does Mexico take advantage of this? When we think about these sort of supply chains and deepening of supply chains with the United States, I mean, that is been happening over the last 20-plus years, and I do think there's space for the two governments to work together to do things like have unified customs forms, to standardize regulations, to invest in the border. There's things that aren't, you know, big treaties and aren't big and important, you know, photo opportunities, but little changes that could make it much easier for companies to have operations on both sides of the border and let the flow go back and forth.And a couple weeks ago I was visiting a plant outside of Queretaro, where there's two plants in Michigan and one down there. And they were telling me that, you know, they're happy to be down there, they may even put another plant down there, but every single shipment they send from Michigan down to Mexico, which then goes back to Michigan after there's work done in Mexico -- every single shipment has a problem at the border. There's some issue with the paperwork; there's some issue at the border. And that type of delay is something the two governments can work on that would actually make a difference, I think, in terms of -- both for Mexico, its growth, but also the United States.GWERTZMAN: Jorge?CASTANEDA: Yeah, I agree completely with Shannon, both on the labor reform and on this specific issue. I'd add, on this second issue, that it's important to place things in perspective. I don't want to just quote any of our colleagues who are listening or not listening, but I read yesterday or today something about a new -- now Nissan is going to be making cars in Mexico. Well, when I was a child -- and (unfortunately ?), that goes back quite awhile -- (laughter) -- the Cuernavaca Datsun plant was in full -- full-blown, and this is back in the 1960s. The Nissan plant in Aguascalientes was inaugurated under the Salinas administration a little more than 20 years ago. So let's take it easy on these things. That some journalist found out that there is a Nissan plant -- that there were actually two Nissan plants in Mexico last week doesn't mean that they were built last week. (Laughter.) All it means is that the journalist found out about them last week, period. Mexico has a strong manufacturing export base to the United States and has now had it since a little bit before NAFTA came into force, which was in 1994. This is now 18 years ago. It's gotten better the last couple of years for a series of reasons, among others, that U.S. demand for automobiles has increased. 2009 was a terrible year for the Mexican automobile industry, logically enough. And 2010, '11 and '12 have been better years. And this is improving not just in the automobile sector but in many others. But as Shannon said, let's not overblow this. Let's not overstate it. It's going to be very difficult for Mexico become a manufacturing hub like China, because China exists. That's probably the main reason. At some point, wages in Mexico perhaps can become once again, as they're becoming more competitive with China than they have been, but that's not necessarily a great thing for Mexico. It means it's a race to the bottom a little bit.GWERTZMAN: Right.CASTANEDA: And secondly, you can't have it both ways. You can't hope to reduce the wage differential, reduce immigration from Mexico to the U.S. and want to increase the wage differential by being more competitive with China. You sort of got to choose.GWERTZMAN: Mmm hmm. Next question?OPERATOR: Thank you. Our next question comes from Tim Johnson from McClatchy Newspapers.QUESTIONER: Hi, a fairly quick question: What kind of influence do you think Carlos Salinas de Gortari is going to have on the Pena Nieto administration? And more broadly, will the PRI dinosaurs -- how are they going to balance out this play with the modernizers like Videgaray? Are they going to be ascendant, or are they going to be in the background?GWERTZMAN: Jorge?CASTANEDA: I -- you know, in an ideal world, I think Pena Nieto would be able to form a Cabinet, which he will announce on Friday, and a broader team of people made up much more significantly by younger, more forward-looking, modernizing aides. But in the real world, I think he's going to have to accommodate a lot of the dinosaurs. By the way, there are young dinosaurs and old modernizers. (Laughter.) And -- everywhere, including Mexico. And I think that there will be a balance. It won't necessarily be the balance that I would have liked or that others would have liked or expected. I think the fact that Pena Nieto was elected with less than 38 percent of the vote, 37-point-something, makes it difficult for him to do exactly everything he wants. This was not the mandate that he expected. And consequently, he has to be very careful with how he deals with the PRI governors, with the PRI unions, with the PRI old guard. And although he's skillful and very intelligent and very practical in all these matters, very pragmatic, he's going to have to take a -- in -- a lot of these people into account.GWERTZMAN: Shannon, you want to add to that?O'NEIL: I would just say I agree. And the PRI is probably the broadest umbrella in terms of the big political parties in Mexico and sort of who falls under it. And you have from, you know, technocratic, University of Chicago-type economists to very nationalistic, very, you know -- progressive perhaps is not the word, but very leftist. And they're all under one umbrella. And then there's also those -- you know, the forward-lookers or perhaps those looking back to the past. And Pena Nieto, like his colleagues in the -- within the party have just come back into Los Pinos, are coming back into Los Pinos. They didn't like being away for 12 years, and they would surely like to stay there and, you know, remain in the house six years from now. And so electorally, how do they win? Well, probably the calculation is you keep this broad umbrella together because that's how you won this time around, is you were able to unify the party around Pena Nieto, something they couldn't do in 2006; why they had such a poor showing then is they didn't unify the party. And so unifying the party means bringing along all of these types of characters and all these types of positions, which means, you know, in short, they all have to be somewhere in the Cabinet or somewhere in there, which means a lot of compromise but also means a lot of barriers to pushing forward any real reformist agenda.GWERTZMAN: OK, next question.OPERATOR: Thank you. Our next question comes from Zach Cohen from Latin Pulse.QUESTIONER: Hi. (Coughing.) Sorry about that. Thanks for having this call. I really appreciate it.What do we see will possibly continue from the Calderon administration into the Pena Nieto administration? Do we see anything that he did with the drug war or with immigration or with trade that will continue or will be the basis for the next administration, or are we looking at really a clean slate?GWERTZMAN: Shannon?O'NEIL: I don't think any administration ever gets a clean slate. You know, you build on what is there before, and, you know, you deal with continuity inertia, and you try to fight against it and make some changes, which are often at the margins. That said, you can try to redirect some things. So we've talked a little about security, how that may be redirected away from a war on drugs to reducing violence. On the economic side, you may see a redirection bringing energy reform back on the plate. Calderon tried to do that and made a -- some -- you know, a legislative reform on energy, but we may see that come back again, trying to redirect it or deepen it in some ways. But overall -- so on the economic side you may see a few other economic things, a fiscal reform, come on to the agenda, but many of the things people hope the Pena Nieto administration will do, Calderon tried to do but was unsuccessful in doing. So that, to me, is not saying a break with the past but a continuity with the hope that perhaps the political constellations have aligned up -- are now aligned differently and/or this administration will be more politically adept or powerful in getting through many of the initiatives that have been on the overall Mexico reform agenda for many years.GWERTZMAN: Jorge, you want to add to that?CASTANEDA: Just that -- you know, not in any way contradicting, but complementing -- it will depend a little bit on what the new administration reveals or allows to be revealed about what of the things that Calderon did or claims to have done are true and which ones are not. In other words, if the successes he has flaunted turn out to be real -- so many houses, so many schools, so many hospitals, so many highways, so many policemen, so many all of this -- then I think they will be able to build on that and not necessarily have any serious breaks with the past. If it turns out that there was more simulation and more massaging the numbers than was apparent, it will be very difficult for there not to be a break between the two administrations.And this is no longer, in Mexico, and I think it's a good thing, entirely in the hands of the new government. Given its druthers, I imagine Pena Nieto would not want to have too much dirt dumped on the outgoing administration. But if the press starts getting hold of things, if the new cabinet members and other aides are leaking things, if Calderon's enemies -- and he's got a whole bunch of them -- are also looking for and finding things and leaking them, it's going to be more difficult. And there -- I mean, as it stands right now, for example, one of the scandals of the last few days is that apparently the Department of Justice or the attorney general's office has 200 planes, part -- some of whom which were financed with U.S. money through Merida, which don't fly. Now, you don't necessarily want planes to fly, but most of the time it's better if they do than if they don't.GWERTZMAN: OK. Any more questions? OPERATOR: Sir, there are no further questions in the queue.GWERTZMAN: All right. Well, with that, I think I'll thank our two hosts, and we'll sign off. Thank you very much.CASTANEDA: Thank you, Bernie. Thank you, Shannon.O'NEIL: Thanks.CASTANEDA: Take care. Let's try and get together before I go home.O'NEIL: That sounds perfect. Thanks, all.GWERTZMAN: Great. Bye-bye.CASTANEDA: Take care, Shannon.O'NEIL: Bye.CASTANEDA: Thanks, Bernie.GWERTZMAN: Bye-bye.
    Event with Jorge G. Castañeda, Shannon K. O'Neil and Bernard Gwertzman November 28, 2012
  • Economics
    What Colorado and Washington’s Vote to Legalize Marijuana means for Latin America
    As Americans went to the polls to elect their president yesterday, voters in Colorado and Washington chose to legalize marijuana (by referendum). Not only does this create conflicting state and federal laws, but it also directly challenges the United States’ war on drugs. These initiatives, Colorado’s Amendment 64 and Washington’s Initiative 502, directly conflict with the federal Controlled Substances Act, which classifies marijuana as a Schedule 1 drug (along with heroin and LSD)—deemed to have “a high potential for abuse and no accepted medical use.” In 2010 Attorney General Eric Holder announced he would “vigorously enforce” federal laws if marijuana was legalized in California (it wasn’t). Although no official statement on Washington and Colorado has been released, the White House’s website maintains that “the Obama Administration has consistently reiterated its firm opposition to any form of drug legalization.” If these legalizations stand, it would mean big changes for the U.S. marijuana market. According to a 2010 RAND report, prices would drop dramatically. Consumption would also likely increase—the report estimates that for every 10 percent decrease in price, the number of consumers would rise by 3 percent. Legalization would also have repercussions for U.S. foreign policy, and especially for U.S.-Mexico relations. A recent Instituto Mexicano para la Competitividad A.C. (IMCO) report by Alejandro Hope and Eduardo Clark estimates that legalization in each state would reduce cartels’ profits by 20 to 30 percent. This revenue drop would change the business models for many organized crime groups, especially those who rely more heavily on marijuana (such as the Sinaloa cartel). But these shifts don’t necessarily portend a decline in violence, especially if the marijuana business is replaced by stepped up robbery, kidnapping, and extortion. Even if the Colorado and Washington legalizations are delayed and/or ultimately struck down, they may change the conversation surrounding the international drug-control regime. The sitting presidents of Mexico, Colombia, and Guatemala, along with many past presidents of Latin American countries have strongly questioned the current approach to drugs, and have asked for an international evaluation and studies through the OAS and the UN. If a groundswell in the United States does the same (at least for marijuana), the political pressure could perhaps spur the federal government to rethink its approach.
    Blog Post by Shannon K. O'Neil November 8, 2012 Latin America’s Moment
  • Americas
    Evolution of Latin America’s Economies
    I’ve been looking recently at the structural changes in many of Latin America’s economies (through the evolution of their exports). The different trajectories are quite striking, as you can see in the graphs below. Out of Latin America’s biggest economies, Mexico has transformed the most. In the 1980s the manufacturing sector comprised just 10 percent of total exports; today it is over 75 percent. Mexico’s economic diversification and dynamism, especially in the automotive and electronic industries, have held oil at a steady 10-15 percent of exports for the last twenty years, even as oil prices have risen (though, in fairness, production has also declined). World Bank Database Next in the "most changed" category is Brazil. Over the last forty years, Brazil has moved away from a heavy reliance on food exports, and manufacturing has steadily risen—peaking at over 50 percent of exports in the 1990s and early 2000s. But the graph below also highlights Brazil’s continuing challenges: commodities have risen as a percentage of exports, leading manufacturing to slip to less than 40 percent of total exports in 2010 (back to early 1980s levels). World Bank Database Colombia has followed a similar trajectory; moving away from food production and toward manufacturing (although never reaching near the same levels as Brazil). What has also increased substantially is oil production, jumping from under 2 percent in 1981 to reach some 60 percent of the country’s exports today. The combination of government incentives and expanding geographic safety suggests this upward trend will continue. World Bank Database Interestingly, Chile, though rightly touted as one of the most open and advanced economies, remains in essence a commodity producer. Some areas have increased their value added—for instance, within food exports is the successful wine industry. But overall, copper dominates, bringing in roughly $41 billion a year, or nearly 60 percent of exports. Structurally, not much has changed in the last 30 years. World Bank Database Finally, Venezuela has changed, though unlike its neighbors it has reverted to the past. Where manufacturing, food, and ore and metal exports rose steadily during the 1980s and 1990s (to total a combined 20 to 30 percent of exports), under the Chávez government they now comprise less than 7 percent. Over the last fifteen years, food and agricultural production have been wiped out, and oil dominates once again. World Bank Database Taking this longer view, we see the direct benefits of high global commodity prices, bringing in billions of dollars each year to many of these economies. But we also see real structural changes. If a measure of maturing economies is their diversification (particularly toward manufacturing and services), then many of Latin America’s largest economies look to be moving in the right direction.
    Blog Post by Shannon K. O'Neil October 16, 2012 Latin America’s Moment
  • Economics
    Mexico ¿Cómo Vamos?
    Two of Mexico’s leading think tanks—Mexico Evalúa and IMCO—launched a new website this week, titled Mexico ¿cómo vamos? It lays out a perhaps surprising vision for Mexico: as a leading global economy. The website brings together some sixty economic and public policy experts from varying backgrounds to focus on where Mexico’s economy stands today and what it needs to do to achieve this ambitious future. Providing both raw data and expert analysis, the website identifies attainable goals in six critical areas (investment, competition, competitiveness, well-being, productivity, and exports), with the aim of expanding the middle class, reducing inequality, and promoting social inclusion. While much of the information is available through different sources around the internet, Mexico cómo vamos brings it all together in one place, and uses effective easy-to-read graphics to illustrate its goals. My current favorite is its “Economic Stoplight,” which will be updated every three months. In this graphic, Mexico cómo vamos explains where Mexico should be on various measure to reach a better future, and then compares these numbers to where it currently stands—color coding by just how close Mexico is to its target. As seen below (translated to English), Mexico is right on track for private investment and exports, but far below where it needs to be regarding productivity and competition. From Mexico cómo vamos wesbite http://www.mexicocomovamos.mx/semaforo-economico To move from red and yellow toward green will require a collective push from many different sectors of Mexican society and especially from the incoming government (whose transition team was invited to México cómo vamos’s launch). There are real challenges that will require significant political capital to overcome. But by breaking down the information and factors into this set of indicators, Mexico cómo vamos is helping provide a means for monitoring Mexico’s successes and failures, and hopefully influencing policy. While still in its website infancy, Mexico cómo vamos looks to be a valuable resource for Mexico watchers, informing citizens and hopefully provoking the broader discussions necessary to move the country forward.
    Blog Post by Shannon K. O'Neil September 26, 2012 Latin America’s Moment
  • Mexico
    A Conversation with Felipe Calderón
    Play
    Please join President Calderón during one of his final international trips to discuss recent developments in Mexico, bilateral relations with the United States, and the country's role on the international stage. **Please note the special timing.**
    Event with Felipe Calderón and Carla A. Hills September 24, 2012