9/11

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, killed nearly three thousand Americans, led to two major wars, and redefined the contours of U.S. foreign policy. 

 

CFR continues to examine the legacy of 9/11, and offers selections from its archive of coverage. 

Terrorism and Counterterrorism
Guantanamo Bay: Twenty Years of Counterterrorism and Controversy

Article by Jonathan Masters

The U.S. military detention center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, has generated intense debate for two decades, raising enduring questions about national security, human rights, and justice.
Sep 9, 2022
The U.S. military detention center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, has generated intense debate for two decades, raising enduring questions about national security, human rights, and justice.
Sep 9, 2022
How 9/11 Reshaped Foreign Policy
This timeline traces three pivotal years following the September 11th attacks.

Timeline by James McBride Aug 31, 2021

How the Terrorism Threat Changed
CFR’s Bruce Hoffman assesses the successes and failures of the U.S. counterterrorism response after 9/11 and explains how the threat has shifted in the past two decades.

In Brief by Bruce Hoffman Aug 12, 2021

The World 9/11 Made
For Project Syndicate, Richard Haass examines the ways in which the 9/11 attacks changed history.

Article by Richard Haass Sep 10, 2021

Seven Resources Debunking 9/11 Conspiracy Theories
Even as the smoke was still rising from the ruins of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in September 2001, conspiracy theories sprang up blaming the attacks on anyone but al-Qaeda.

Blog Post by James M. Lindsay Sep 1, 2021

  • Homeland Security
    Department of Homeland Security
    This publication is now archived. What is the Department of Homeland Security? It’s the newest cabinet department, approved by Congress in November 2002. It’s designed to consolidate U.S. defenses against terrorist attack and to better coordinate counterterrorism intelligence. Incorporating parts of eight other cabinet departments, it is the first new government department since the Veterans Affairs Department in 1989. What does the Department of Homeland Security do? The department is designed to absorb several federal agencies dealing with domestic defense, including the Coast Guard, the Border Patrol, the Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Secret Service, and the Transportation Security Administration (which was created after September 11 to oversee airline security). Its responsibilities include exploring ways to respond to terror attacks and working to better coordinate intelligence about terrorist threats. The department is also expected to implement much of the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the domestic security plan unveiled by President Bush in July 2002. What is the organizational structure of the department? When Michael Chertoff took over as the second head of the DHS in 2005, he instituted a number of structural changes including merging twenty-two federal agencies into the department, the largest government reorganization in half a century. The Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], for example, was relieved of its catastrophe-prevention duties in order to focus solely on responding to terror attacks and natural disasters. A new Directorate for Preparedness took over FEMA’s work with states and local officials to develop response plans. The notoriously error-prone Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate [IAIP] was broken up. One of the few components of DHS that did not exist prior to 2003, IAIP included mini-golf courses on a list of critical infrastructure and placed members of Congress on the “no-fly list,” among other embarrassments. Information analysis is now conducted in a newly-formed Office of Intelligence and Analysis,. A Directorate of Policy, headed by its own undersecretary, coordinates the efforts of the various DHS agencies to ensure that consistent policies are set and followed. Before the reorganization, many of the department’s agencies—such as the Transportation Security Administration, Secret Service, and Border Patrol—had their own, relatively independent policy shops. The effectiveness of these structural changes was questioned in September 2005, when Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans, killing more than a thousand people and flooding the city for weeks. Critics believed the merger of these separate emergency response agencies into the DHS umbrella led almost directly to FEMA’s poor planning, lack of communication, and slow response to the hurricane. Did the Bush administration initially want a cabinet department on homeland security? No. After the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the Bush administration tried a more modest restructuring of America ’s homeland defenses by creating a White House office to handle domestic security, headed by Tom Ridge . But congressional critics warned that the White House homeland security office fell short, noting that federal agencies were trying to buck Ridge’s oversight and that Ridge had no budgetary authority over the agencies he sought to coordinate. Ridge, a former Republican governor of Pennsylvania and close friend of President Bush, was confirmed in January 2003 as secretary of the new homeland security department. He resigned in 2004. Was this a major government overhaul? Yes. Bush administration officials say the federal government hasn’t seen such sweeping changes since 1947, when President Truman merged the War and Navy departments into the Department of Defense. Even experts unconvinced by that claim say that the department’s creation represents a major governmental restructuring. Was one federal agency responsible for domestic security before September 11? No. Earlier terrorist attacks—especially the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the 1995 bombing of an Oklahoma City federal building, and the 1995 sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway system—sparked discussions about the need for such an office, and before September 11 several blue-ribbon commissions and congressional leaders recommended that the federal government create one. Nevertheless, homeland security remained low on the political radar screen until after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
    Backgrounder March 21, 2006
  • United States
    Reviewing the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
    The new Pentagon strategic plan calls for a more mobile, modern U.S. military capable of meeting threats posed by non-state actors like al-Qaeda. Cfr.org inteviews four military experts for their views on whether the Quadrennial Defense Review creates a force that is sustainable and adequate for the task at hand.
    Expert Roundup by Lionel Beehner, Steven Kosiak, Robert L. McClure, Col. Ken Allard and Lt. Gen. Bernard Trainor February 7, 2006
  • Iraq
    Terrorism Havens: Iraq
    This publication is now archived. Has Iraq sponsored terrorism? Yes. Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship provided headquarters, operating bases, training camps, and other support to terrorist groups fighting the governments of neighboring Turkey and Iran, as well as to hard-line Palestinian groups. During the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam commissioned several failed terrorist attacks on U.S. facilities. Prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the State Department listed Iraq as a state sponsor of terrorism. The question of Iraq’s link to terrorism grew more urgent with Saddam’s suspected determination to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which Bush administration officials feared he might share with terrorists who could launch devastating attacks against the United States. Was Saddam involved in the September 11 attacks? There is no hard evidence linking Saddam to the attacks, and Iraq denies involvement. Many commentators have noted that Baghdad failed to express sympathy for the United States after the attacks. Does Iraq have ties with al-Qaeda? The Bush administration insists that hatred of America has driven the two closer together, although many experts say there’s no solid proof of such links and argue that the Islamist al-Qaeda and Saddam’s secular dictatorship would be unlikely allies. What evidence does the administration offer? Some Iraqi militants trained in Taliban-run Afghanistan helped Ansar al-Islam, an Islamist militia based in a lawless part of northeast Iraq. The camps of Ansar fighters, who clashed repeatedly with anti-Saddam Kurds, were bombed in the early days of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In February 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell told the UN Security Council that Iraq was harboring a terrorist cell led by Abu Musab Zarqawi, a suspected al-Qaeda affiliate and chemical and biological weapons specialist. Powell said al-Zarqawi had both planned the October 2002 assassination of a U.S. diplomat in Jordan and set up a camp in Ansar al-Islam’s territory to train terrorists in the use of chemical weapons. Powell added that senior Iraqi and al-Qaeda leaders had met at least eight times since the early 1990s. Czech officials have also reported that Mohammed Atta, one of the September 11 ringleaders, met an Iraqi intelligence agent in Prague months before the hijackings, but U.S. and Czech officials subsequently cast doubt on whether such a meeting ever happened. Al-Qaeda members fleeing Afghanistan have reportedly hid in northern Iraq, but in areas beyond Saddam’s control. Why did the United States declare war on Iraq in March 2003? There is still some debate surrounding the Bush administration’s case for going to war with Iraq. Initially, the war was built on the need to remove Saddam Hussein, described by the administration as a dictator who was “building and hiding weapons that could enable him to dominate the Middle East.” According to the president, the invasion of Iraq was also an integral part of the larger war on terrorism, despite a lack of support from allies such as France and Germany—both of which refused to send troops. Intensifying the debate is the fact that no WMD have yet to be recovered and the belief that initial intelligence findings on Saddam’s weapons program were inaccurate. But in the almost three years since the U.S.-led invasion took place, the dialogue surrounding the war has changed. The administration now says it also went to war to bring democracy to Iraq, in hopes it would set an example for other autocratic states in the Middle East. Saddam Hussein was captured in December 2003 and is currently standing trial. There have been three elections held in Iraq, the first in January 2005 for a preliminary government, the second in October 2005 for a constitution, and the last in December 2005 for a new government. But despite some political achievements, the insurgency remains committed and U.S. casualties have surpassed the two thousand mark, leaving many Americans doubtful that a U.S. victory is possible. What type of terrorist groups did Iraq support under Saddam Hussein’s regime? Primarily groups that could hurt Saddam’s regional foes. Saddam has aided the Iranian dissident group Mujahadeen-e-Khalq and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (known by its Turkish initials, PKK), a separatist group fighting the Turkish government. Moreover, Iraq has hosted several Palestinian splinter groups that oppose peace with Israel , including the mercenary Abu Nidal Organization, whose leader, Abu Nidal, was found dead in Baghdad in August 2002. Iraq has also supported the Islamist Hamas movement and reportedly channeled money to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers. A secular dictator, however, Saddam tended to support secular terrorist groups rather than Islamist ones such as al-Qaeda, experts say. Have U.S.-Iraq relations always been hostile? No. In the 1980s, following the Iranian revolution and the subsequent hostage crisis in Tehran , the United States saw Saddam as a useful regional counterweight to the Ayatollah Khomeini. Indeed, when Iraq launched a long, brutal war against Iran in 1980, the Reagan administration provided Saddam’s regime with arms, funds, and support. When did relations sour? U.S.-Iraq relations ruptured in August 1990, when Iraqinvaded its tiny, oil-rich neighbor of Kuwait . That prompted the UN to impose economic sanctions and eventually authorize war. In the winter of 1991, a U.S.-led coalition drove Iraqout of Kuwaitbut stopped short of ousting Saddam. After the war, the UN Security Council maintained economic sanctions on Iraq ; established two “no-fly” zones patrolled byU.S.and British planes to protect Kurds in the north and Shiites in the south; and imposed international weapons inspections to prevent Saddam from rebuilding his arsenals of WMD. TheClintonadministration sought to contain Saddam with a combination of sanctions and arms inspections, but ultimately concluded that Saddam had to go. Bush administration officials took up the anti-Saddam cause, especially after September 11. Officials characterized Saddam’s regime as an immediate threat to America—because of its history of attacking its neighbors, using chemical weapons, supporting terrorist groups, defying UN Security Council resolutions, and seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. In his first State of the Union address after September 11, President Bush said Iraqbelonged to an “axis of evil.” Has Iraq ever used weapons of mass destruction? Yes. In the 1980s Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi troops repeatedly used poison gas, including mustard gas and the nerve agent sarin, against Iranian soldiers. Iranian officials have also accused Iraq of dropping mustard-gas bombs on Iranian villages. Human Rights Watch reports that Iraq frequently used nerve agents and mustard gas against Iraqi Kurds living in the country’s north. In March 1988, Saddam’s forces reportedly killed thousands of Iraqi Kurds in the town of Halabja with chemical weapons.
    Backgrounder January 5, 2006
  • United States
    What is the Legality of the NSA Domestic Surveillance Program?
    Should the domestic spying of U.S. "persons" be permitted? If it is "critical to saving lives," then yes, argues President Bush. He further says that shortly after the September 11, 2001, attacks Congress gave him and the National Security Agency (NSA) widespread powers—among them the right to intercept international phone calls or emails with suspected terrorists—to execute the war on terror by passing a joint resolution called the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). But some civil libertarians and lawmakers say the NSA’s decision to wiretap without warrants raises a number of legal predicaments, including whether such domestic surveillance programs violate the U.S. Constitution’s separation of powers, its Fourth Amendment protections from illegal search and seizure, as well as a 1978 statute by Congress establishing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which created a secret court with authority to grant eavesdropping warrants. The president says his secret domestic surveillance program is not aimed at gathering evidence for criminal trials per se, but at preventing future 9/11-style attacks and is therefore "vital and necessary" to national security. Cfr.org asked five lawyers and legal scholars whether the president’s wiretappings are legal, from a constitutional or statutory standpoint. Lee Casey, partner at the law firm, Baker & Hostetler, LLP Yes, because FISA does not cover all the potential situations where intelligence must be gathered in the current conflict. In particular, that statute applies only in four situations: Where a U.S. person is the target of, rather than incidental to, the surveillance; where the acquisition of the intelligence will be accomplished by devices in the U.S.; where the sender and all recipients of the communication are present in the U.S.; where surveillance devices are used within the U.S. to collect communications other than wire or radio communications. FISA simply does not apply to the most important category—surveillance of a non-U.S. person overseas.   In addition, there are procedures that must be followed under FISA that, while streamlined, still take time. In a war where seconds and minutes matter, even hours may be too long. Finally, the FISA court is not a rubber stamp. There may well be instances in which the president believes surveillance justified, but where the court refuses to issue a warrant. To the extent the foreign surveillance is otherwise within his constitutional power, it is up to the president to make the final decision here. Just as the president cannot intrude upon the constitutional authority of Congress or the courts, neither Congress nor the courts can intrude upon his constitutional authority. In some sense, the outrageous thing is the outrage being ginned up by the media over this monitoring program, which frankly seems run of the mill. U.S. spies gather intelligence on a lot of countries overseas and on a lot of individuals, mostly government officials, but also individuals who may pose a threat or can provide useful intelligence. All this is perfectly legal. Simply because an American interposes himself into that situation doesn’t mean the U.S. government must shut down its intelligence-gathering and get a warrant. Carl Tobias, professor of law at the University of Richmond I think there are more persuasive arguments that the president should not have had taken these actions. The administration claims that AUMF is a very broad grant; if this is true, then authority to use domestic surveillance, which is the argument the attorney general is using, is that there’s a factual case that it can’t move quickly enough under the 1978 FISA statute. The argument on the other side is that under this statute, there is a secret court that Congress specifically established for these kinds of issues and the court has been favorably disposed to all administrations when requests are made for warrants. Only a tiny percentage has been rejected. So the argument does, then, go back to Congress and seeks an amendment on procedures in FISA.   It raises a question of checks and balances. When Congress passes a Statute that specifically deals with an issue and then the president ignores that statute, then that’s a problem in terms of separation of powers. It’s not as if he’s operating in a vacuum. Congress was very clear about procedures to use for domestic surveillance, so it seems the president ought to follow it, or at least have that procedure modified if it’s inadequate. Apparently, six weeks later, Congress included in the Patriot Act provisions that provide exceptions to FISA; that cuts against the argument that Congress meant to authorize it. The other big issue is that lawyers for those being prosecuted will argue that if any information used in the prosecution was secured in this manner, [does] that play back to Fourth Amendment issues? If this is illegally obtained evidence, what does that mean for prosecuting, or indicting them? Some lawyers are saying if the information used to convict was secured illegally, they intend to raise that issue and argue it has to be thrown out. John R. Schmidt, partner at the Chicago-based law firm Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw Based on what we now know, I think the president acted lawfully. The weight of judicial authority supports the president’s inherent constitutional authority to carry out surveillance without judicial approval in order to obtain intelligence on foreign threats to the United States. The Supreme Court expressly declined to reach that issue back in 1972, but we have had four Court of Appeals decisions that have explicitly upheld that inherent presidential power. Most recently, the FISA Court of Review, consisting of three court of appeals judges, reviewed those cases in support of the president’s authority and said it agreed. If the president has that inherent constitutional authority, it is hard to think of a more compelling case for its exercise than the aftermath of 9/11, when we had not just a threat but had seen an actual attack on the U.S. by an identifiable group, al-Qaeda. We knew they were planning future attacks; and surveillance offered a way, perhaps the only one, to find out where and when those future attacks might take place.   The Court of Review also said explicitly, and I think correctly, that FISA could not encroach on the president’s inherent constitutional authority. But we avoid any conflict between that statute and the Constitution if we conclude, as I think is correct, that the post-9/11 congressional authorization to the president to "use all necessary and appropriate force" against al-Qaeda carried with it the authority to carry out necessary intelligence activities for that purpose. The authorization to use military force naturally carries with it the authority to carry out the necessary related intelligence activity. The only reason that conclusion seems surprising now is because in this case the enemy forces were here in the U.S. and therefore some intelligence activity might take place here and involve U.S. citizens. But that is the fact of the al-Qaeda threat, and I think Congress gave the president the authority to respond to that threat. Michael J. Williams, attorney with the Georgia-based law firm Fincher & Hecht, LLC There is disagreement over whether the president, as commander in chief, has plenary power under the Constitution to authorize these kinds of wire taps separate and apart from any authority Congress may have provided him under FISA. Some say the argument that the president has plenary power to conduct the surveillance [has been] faulty since after 9/11, [when] the administration sought changes to FISA under the Patriot Act to make certain anti-terrorist surveillance activities easier. In other words, if FISA did not apply, why seek the amendments?   In any event, one might view FISA as a sort of compromise between the president and Congress on this question. Under FISA, in response to concerns about the monitoring of U.S. citizens, Congress authorized wiretaps to be conducted without a court order if the attorney general certifies, among other things, that the surveillance is directed at "foreign powers" and that it is unlikely parties to the communication will not include a "U.S. person." In theory, the administration is concerned about having the ability to monitor communications of U.S. persons if they are part of terrorist organizations. Part of the problem is that FISA authority regarding these wiretaps extends to communications among "foreign powers" but as currently drafted, does not cover communications within terrorist organizations. For instance, the government might be able to monitor communications involving foreign governments under the FISA conditions without a court order, but does not allow monitoring of communications of terrorist organizations. The administration has said that not only does it have plenary authority under the Constitution but also because of the [post-9/11] joint resolution authorizing the president to go after al-Qaeda. Arguably, this has the legal effect of a congressional declaration of war. If we’re at war, under FISA, Section 1811, the president may authorize electronic surveillance without a court order, but only for fifteen days. This is in addition to the 72-hour emergency surveillance provisions that presumably are applicable to peace-time conditions. I think there is enough legal wiggle room on a number of fronts for the president to argue there’s no clear-cut case he broke the law or engaged in an impeachable offense. Dakota S. Rudesill, defense consultant, former professional staff member on national security for the U.S. Senate, and J.D. candidate at Yale Law School As a legal question, we are going to hear three interrelated debates. The first is about the Fourth Amendment. How do the Fourth Amendment’s basic guarantee of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures and its warrant requirement constrain congressional legislation and executive activity in the war on terrorism? The other debates are about inherent constitutional executive and congressional war powers, and how, in light of those constitutional powers, we should read together two statutes. Those statutes are the FISA law that governs electronic surveillance specifically, and the Authorization for the Use of Military Force that authorizes military operations post-9/11 generally. The Bush administration has advanced a sweeping reading of presidential war power, saying that AUMF has put the president’s constitutional power as commander-in-chief of the armed forces at its maximum, and that includes broad authority for warrantless surveillance of communications with some foreign terrorist link. On the other hand, we can expect to hear from many on Capitol Hill a different line of argument, that the Congress can restrict executive power under the legislative branch’s constitutional authority "for the government and regulation" of the armed forces, that Congress intended to regulate NSA and all wiretaps under the FISA statute, and that Congress did not intend to create a way around FISA in the post-9/11 AUMF. Therefore, the argument will run, the administration should have either gotten FISA warrants or worked with Congress to amend FISA. This is a profoundly important debate, and everyone interested in national security and foreign policy should pay close attention.
    Expert Roundup by Lionel Beehner, Lee Casey, Carl Tobias, John R. Schmidt, Michael J. Williams and Dakota S. Rudesill January 4, 2006
  • Terrorism and Counterterrorism
    Terrorism Havens: Afghanistan
    This publication is now archived. Where is Afghanistan? Afghanistan is a mountainous, landlocked country in central Asia. It’s about the size of Texas and has a population between twenty-two million and twenty-seven million. The lower figure is a recent U.N. estimate, the higher a U.S. government figure; chaos in Afghanistan in recent years has made taking a census impossible. What countries are Afghanistan’s neighbors? There are six. Iran is to its west. Pakistan is to the southeast. Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan—three former Soviet republics—are to the north. A northeastern panhandle of Afghanistan borders on China. How did Afghanistan become such a dangerous, lawless place? Modern Afghanistan has been in turmoil since the late 1970s. After infighting among ministers who deposed the long-ruling royal family, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and installed a sympathetic regime in the capital, Kabul. Anticommunist Muslim rebels—known as mujahadeen, or holy warriors—received support from the United States and from many Muslim countries, particularly Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Joining the Afghan mujahadeen were several thousand Muslim volunteers from abroad. After the Soviets withdrew in 1989, rival Afghan factions fought a fierce civil war that led to the rise of the Taliban, who ruled until the U.S.-led invasion toppled the regime in 2001. Has Afghanistan always been a trouble spot? Yes. Although it enjoyed relative stability during the reign of Zahir Shah (1933-73), over the centuries Afghanistan has often faced internal strife and been overrun by foreign invaders. The population of Afghanistan is made up of many ethnic groups—the Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks are the largest—and tribal and factional rivalries run deep. Ethnic groups straddle Afghanistan’s borders; many ethnic Pashtuns live in Pakistan, as do Hazaras in Turkmenistan, and so on. Afghanistan’s geographical location also rendered it prize territory for outsiders. Ancient trade routes connecting Europe and the Middle East with India and the Far East pass through Afghanistan. Moreover, it has been the site of conflicting imperial ambitions: between Persia and India in the 16th and 17th centuries, and as the setting of the "Great Game" of the 19th century. What was the Great Game? A geopolitical struggle between the British and Russian empires. The British controlled the Indian subcontinent, the Russians held the Central Asian lands to the north, and their spheres of influence overlapped in Afghanistan. In 1839, the British invaded Afghanistan, launching the first of three bloody wars and decades of machinations between the British and the Russians. In 1919, after the third Anglo-Afghan war, Afghanistan won its independence. What was Afghanistan’s role in the September 11 attacks? Thanks to the ruling Taliban—Muslim fundamentalists who imposed radical Islamic rule on the country—Afghanistan had become a base for terrorists, namely Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda training camps. Because Afghanistan was such a chaotic place, and because the Taliban were deeply influenced by bin Laden’s philosophy, the Taliban welcomed him and his network into the country. There they could plan their attacks with less fear of reprisal because other countries were wary of entering Afghanistan. What has happened since the U.S. declared war on Afghanistan in 2001? Just two months after the October 2001 invasion, the Taliban fell and was followed by an interim government led by Hamid Karzai. Since that time Afghans voted for a new constitution, elected Karzai president, and voted in the first parliamentary and provincial elections in more than thirty years. U.S. and coalition forces still have a strong presence in the country, where they continue to put down scattered insurgent attacks against the coalition and the government. The coalition continues building and training the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. The Afghan Army, in joint operation with the Coalition forces, continues to seek and root out al-Qaeda and Taliban elements still active in Afghanistan. Both Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar and Osama bin laden still remain at large. When did the United States get involved in Afghanistan? The United States first recognized Afghanistan in 1934, the year it joined the League of Nations, and President Dwight D. Eisenhower visited in 1959. During the Cold War, Afghanistan had closer ties with the Soviet Union , its neighbor to the north, than the United States. American involvement really began after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979.
    Backgrounder December 7, 2005
  • Terrorism and Counterterrorism
    U.S. Treatment of Terror Suspects and U.S.-EU Relations
    This publication is now archived. Introduction In response to media reports that the United States is detaining top al-Qaeda suspects in secret prisons in eight countries, including Romania and Poland, European officials have launched a series of investigations. These moves follow a spate of stories in Europe alleging that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is ferrying terrorist suspects by air between the so-called black sites and countries in the Middle East that regularly torture detainees. The allegations have deepened dismay among European Union (EU) members over Washington’s conduct leading up to the Iraq war, which was widely unpopular in Europe, as well as over revelations of torture in U.S.-run facilities inside Iraq and Afghanistan. What, exactly, is being alleged? Media reports suggest aircraft operated by the CIA have been spotted at airports in Finland, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Poland, Portugal, and Spain, and that these planes were used to carry terrorist suspects and other detainees. There is little doubt planes operated by the CIA flew through and stopped over in Europe, since airport records that note flight plans and identification numbers are publicly available. At issue for the Europeans is whether these flights are a breach of international law, and whether local intelligence agencies were aware of—or even complicit in—the operations that many allege involved human rights violations. The allegations are part of a continuing debate between the United States and European governments on the practice of "extraordinary renditions," or the overseas arrests or abductions of suspected terrorists by U.S. officials. British Foreign Minister Jack Straw, who supported the U.S. war in Iraq, wrote to Washington on behalf of the European Union (EU) asking for formal clarification of the policy—specifically raising the issue of covert prisons in Eastern Europe and CIA airplanes stopping in European bases, which may be in violation of international law. What is rendition? Is it legal? Once a low-profile counterterrorism tool, the practice of rendition has become integral to U.S. intelligence-gathering efforts since the September 11, 2001, attacks. Although little is publicly known about the nature and frequency of U.S. renditions, press reports indicate the United States has captured more than 100 terrorism suspects since 9/11 and rendered them to Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and other nations. Some of the suspects arrested abroad are held by the United States for interrogation, while others are sent to countries cited by the U.S. State Department for human-rights violations, including torture. Human rights activists and the governments of some prominent U.S. allies decry the extrajudicial nature of rendition. Citing former detainees’ reports of abuse, they criticize the government for failing to ensure U.S. terror suspects are not rendered into the hands of torturers. The extent of U.S. agencies’ legal authority to carry out renditions remains unclear. The United States is a signatory to the UN’s Geneva Convention Against Torture that prohibits the cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of prisoners. But although President Bush issued a February 2002 directive stating all detainees should be treated "humanely," Washington has determined the Geneva Conventions do not apply to the war on terrorism. A still-classified March 19, 2004, draft memo by the Justice Department authorized the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to render terrorism suspects out of Iraq to foreign countries for interrogation. The CIA was also granted broader authority to act independently by a still-classified presidential directive signed just after 9/11. And in 2002, another Justice Department memo (PDF) for President Bush’s then-legal counsel Alberto Gonzalez—now the U.S. attorney general—advised the White House that torturing al-Qaeda terrorists in captivity abroad "may be justified." What has been the U.S. response? In her December 5 briefing to journalists before leaving on a four-nation tour of Europe, Rice was careful to note interrogations of terror suspects have produced intelligence that helped "save European lives." Rice also defended the legality of U.S. tactics against stateless "enemy combatants" and reminded Europe that terrorism is a global threat. "We share intelligence that has helped protect European countries from attack," she said. She said the United States does not permit, tolerate, or condone torture under any circumstances, but defended rendition as a "lawful weapon" for taking "terrorists out of action" and saving lives. She made no reference to secret prisons. In Kiev December 7, Rice said the United States had barred all personnel from engaging in "cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment," which some experts point to as a marked shift in U.S. policy. Nonetheless, according to Charles Kupchan, the Council on Foreign Relations’ director for Europe studies, Rice’s statements in Europe have taken a "relatively tough line" with the Europeans. "She seems to be saying, ’You need to choose whether you’re with us or against us on this question,’" he says. The administration’s critics in Europe, however, say Rice’s reassurances are undermined by the prisoner-abuse scandals at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, and Baghram, a U.S. facility in Afghanistan. The White House’s opposition to congressional anti-torture legislation proposed by Senator John McCain (R-AZ) has further undermined Rice’s defense of U.S. policies, experts say. What are Europe’s objections to the U.S. treatment of terror suspects? The controversy touches on a broader European discomfort with the Bush administration’s approach to countering terrorism. Experts say the outrage over the clandestine prisons and secret flights stems from two broader issues plaguing transatlantic relations: Europe’s discontent with Washington’s unwillingness to grant due process to terror suspects and making assurances that these suspects’ human rights were not violated during allegedly abusive interrogations. Experts say both issues—due process and the alleged use of torture—are in contradiction with European norms on human rights. What actions have European governments and courts taken? Currently, there are at least six investigations into alleged CIA flights through various countries. The UK Parliament has formed a nonpartisan committee, chaired by Conservative Andrew Tyrie, to investigate whether the British government tacitly condoned torture when it allowed CIA flights through British airspace to transport terror suspects to countries where they were reportedly tortured. Britain’s highest court also ruled December 8 that evidence obtained abroad through torture cannot be used in British courts. The Council of Europe is also conducting an inquiry into allegations of secret prisons in Eastern Europe. Lead investigator for the Council of Europe probe, Swiss Senator Dick Marty, has asked for data from the European air traffic control agency and requested images from the EU’s satellite center for images that might indicate the construction of detention facilities at Polish and Romanian military bases. Poland, already an EU member, and Romania, currently petitioning for EU membership, deny their involvement in the alleged U.S. clandestine prison network. Meanwhile, in Germany, Lebanese national Khalid el-Masri—a German citizen who says he was abducted from Macedonia in 2003, beaten, and taken to Afghanistan by U.S. agents in an apparent case of mistaken identity—has filed a lawsuit in federal court against former CIA Director George J. Tenet and three companies suspected of being involved in secret CIA flights. And in Italy, prosecutors are charging twenty-two Americans with the kidnapping of Islamic militant Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr in February 2003 and "rendering" him to Egypt, where he says he was tortured. Some skeptics claim Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi may have been complicit as well. "Someone knew," said Daria Pesce, lawyer for one of the CIA station chiefs in Milan, in a November interview with the New York Times. "I don’t think that it is possible that an American comes into Italy and kidnaps someone. It seems really unlikely." How has the rendition controversy affected domestic European politics? The investigations into the rendition allegations are putting pressure on governments across Europe. EU Justice and Home Affairs Commissioner Franco Frattini warned November 28 that any EU member found guilty of participating in the CIA’s alleged conduct would lose its voting rights. While this threat has been dismissed as hyperbole by some, Frattini notes the use of secret prisons would violate the European Convention on Human Rights. European human rights groups and opposition parties are also demanding assurances from their governments that their officials were not involved in secret U.S. rendition plots. Opposition parties and the media in many European countries are seizing this opportunity to criticize their governments. The prison reports are "ammunition for the opposition, a gift to the anti-Americans," says Guillaume Parmentier, director of the Paris-based French Center on the United States. In Germany, where newly elected Chancellor Angela Merkel campaigned on the promise to improve transatlantic ties, the opposition has demanded an explanation for a list of at least 437 U.S. flights and landings in German territory. What does this mean for EU-U.S. relations? The news about U.S. rendition operations in Europe "plays into the Europeans’ worst fears about the Bush administration," says John Glenn, director of foreign policy at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. On the one hand, the renditions allegations against the United States—which remain speculative and without hard evidence—have reinvigorated already-strong anti-war, anti-American sentiment, experts say. "Even in places [in Europe] where governments have been supportive, the populations have been opposed to American actions," says James Goldgeier, adjunct senior fellow for Europe studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. On the other hand, "neither side is looking for another bloody nose," Kupchan says. "If the European [governments] had their way, this issue would quietly disappear, but there is a lot of public outrage about it." The accusations of rendition come at a time when the United States and the European Union have made a concerted effort to improve transatlantic ties. Experts say that in his second term President Bush has been much more concerned with European partners, and there has been concrete cooperation on a host of important issues, including the administration’s Middle East policy. Additionally, many European governments are reluctant to push Washington on the rendition charges for fear their own intelligence agencies’ cooperation with CIA operations will be revealed. Will this controversy hurt EU-U.S. intelligence-sharing operations? The intelligence-sharing relationship has remained quite strong since the 9/11 attacks, despite political discord over the unpopular war in Iraq, experts say. But renditions could pose a real political obstacle to future collaborative intelligence operations. Little is publicly known about the nature and frequency of U.S. renditions. Some of the more politicized cases include Lebanese national Khaled el-Masri, a German citizen, who claims he was picked up by Macedonian authorities in Skopje and turned over to U.S. officials in Afghanistan, where Rice has admitted he was wrongfully detained for five months. German prosecutors are currently investigating the possibility that former German Interior Minister Otto Schily knew of Masri’s abduction. In December 2001, Swedish police handed two Egyptian nationals over to U.S. agents, who rendered the men to their home country. Sweden’s security police, in response to public outrage over the renditions, have since promised never to allow foreign agents control over an intelligence operation on Swedish soil. The political fallout from questionable renditions in Italy, Sweden, and Germany has made it more difficult for these countries to cooperate in future counterterrorism exercises with U.S. intelligence. "It’s at least conceivable," Kupchan says, "that this row could, to some extent, be a setback on the intelligence and law-enforcement front and make the parties more reluctant to share information."
    Backgrounder by Mary Crane December 6, 2005
  • Terrorism and Counterterrorism
    Torture, the United States, and Laws of War
    This publication is now archived. Why is torture in the news? A confluence of events has put torture and the treatment of detainees at center stage: the recent revelation of a network of so-called black sites, covert prisons for suspected terrorists run by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Eastern Europe; the White House is threatening to veto an anti-torture amendment passed by the Senate; the Supreme Court announced it would hear a case challenging the legality of war-crimes tribunals used in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; the Senate voted to strip Guantanamo detainees of further legal rights; and a leaked classified report by the CIA’s inspector general provided evidence that interrogation techniques approved by the White House may violate an international convention against torture. What is the debate over the use of torture? There are many issues at stake. Critics say the administration’s handling of detainees violates international law, produces poor intelligence, and putsU.S.detainees abroad at risk. Human-rights groups further allege that instances of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad, Baghram Air Force base outside Kabul, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay are part of a larger pattern of behavior and harsh interrogation techniques approved at the highest levels. Critics allege that the abuses stem from the White House’s willingness to bend the accepted legal definition of what constitutes torture. Further, these groups charge the U.S. government, from before September 11, 2001, of engaging in renditions: the transferring of prisoners to countries that engage in torture. Instead of leaving these detainees in legal limbo, human-rights groups say they should be turned over to U.S. courts and afforded legal counsel. Administration officials counter they neither advocate nor order the use of torture. However, White House officials argue that members of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other suspected terrorists do not qualify as lawful “enemy combatants” and therefore are not accorded rights under the Geneva Conventions, the internationally accepted rules on conduct during wartime that govern the treatment of detainees, among other things. Experts say terrorists do not enjoy legal protections because they do not follow any rules of war: They fight for no nation-state, they target innocents, they wear no insignia, and they disguise themselves as civilians. What is the torture amendment? Senator John McCain (R-AZ), who was tortured during his time as a prisoner of war in Vietnam, has proposed an amendment outlawing all forms of “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment” for U.S.-held detainees. The amendment, attached to a defense-spending bill, passed the Senate by ninety votes to nine, but faces a veto by the White House over objections the bill may hinder the CIA’s ability to gather intelligence from detainees. When asked about the torture amendment during his recent visit to Latin America, President George Bush replied, “We do not torture,” but added that “our government has the obligation to protect the American people.” Supporters of the amendment say laws prohibiting torture mirror those already found in the U.S. Army’s field manuals. Opponents, including Vice President Dick Cheney, say the amendment should not apply to detainees held by CIA agents who might have invaluable information about an imminent terrorist attack. What are “black sites”? Secret prisons established in the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, used to house “high-level” detainees. The existence of these CIA-run detention centers was first reported November 2 in the Washington Post. Although the exact locations of these camps are unknown, news reports suggest they are located in Romania and Poland. Similar camps in Afghanistan and Thailand have already been closed down. There are some thirty detainees in the camps considered to be major terrorist suspects, while seventy less-important detainees have been reportedly sent to Egypt, Morocco, and other Muslim nations. The camps were established under a sweeping law signed by President George Bush less than one week after September 11 that gave the CIA wide-ranging authority to disrupt terrorist operations, including the right to kill, capture, or imprison suspected members of al-Qaeda. Several U.S. senators have called for an investigation into the secret prisons. Others are calling for an inquiry into the source of the leak of information about the CIA camps. Why did the Senate vote recently to limit detainees’ access to U.S. courts? On November 10, the Senate voted forty-nine to forty-two in favor of overturning a Supreme Court decision last year that allowed prisoners in Guantanamo Bay to challenge their detentions in U.S. courts. The purpose of the ruling was to stem the flow of lawsuits filed by detainees. More than 200 of some 700 detainees held, or once held, at Guantanamo Bay have filed writs of habeas corpus, motions that order unlawfully held prisoners be brought before a judge. The amendment would void any suits currently pending. Human-rights groups charge the Senate’s decision will allow detainees to be held indefinitely without a trial and beyond the reach ofU.S.or international law. What issues does the Supreme Court face in deciding to review military tribunals? On November 8, the Supreme Court announced it would hear an upcoming case reexamining the constitutionality of President Bush’s authority to establish military tribunals, the first courts of this kind since World War II. The defendant, Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a native of Yemen and former driver for Osama bin Laden, charges the tribunals are in violation of the Geneva Conventions, which uphold his rights as a detainee and prisoner of war. Hamdan, captured during the 2001 war in Afghanistan and held in Guantanamo Bay since 2002, has been charged with conspiracy, murder, and acts of terrorism. He says military tribunals fail to give defendants a free and fair trial, a universally recognized right that falls under customary international law (which is binding and carries nearly the same jurisdiction as codified, or treaty, law). The Bush administration argues Congress granted the president, as commander in chief, direct authorization for the use of military force, which allows for the creation of military courts. Further, the White House says such military courts are necessary to fight a shadowy enemy like al-Qaeda, and that affording detainees the same inalienable rights as in a U.S. criminal court, such as the presumption of innocence, is unnecessary. How is torture defined by international law? Torture, as defined by Article 1 of the 1984 Convention Against Torture, is the “cruel, inhumane, or degrading” infliction of severe pain or suffering, physical or mental, on a prisoner to obtain information or a confession, or to mete out a punishment for a suspected crime. The United States ratified the treaty in 1994 but took a reservation to the convention’s addendum on the definition of torture, deferring to the U.S. Bill of Rights’ Eighth Amendment, which outlaws cruel and unusual punishment. However, the 1980 court case Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, in which a Paraguayan citizen won a suit in the U.S. Court of Appeals’ Second Circuit against a former Paraguayan police officer, established that torture falls under the realm of customary international law—thus, all countries, whether party to the Torture Convention or not, must abide. Further, the suit found that  torturers become, “like the pirate and slave trader before him—hostis humani generis, an enemy of mankind.” Other agreements that outline similar definitions of torture include the Geneva Conventions and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Do U.S. interrogation techniques qualify as torture? A leaked 2004 report by CIA inspector general John Helgerson found that several of the interrogation techniques approved by the agency may violate some of the provisions of the Convention on Torture. Human-rights groups charge the United States has tried to narrow the definition of torture to include only those interrogation techniques that result in severe harm to a bodily organ. Thus, they argue that the use of “waterboarding”—when a detainee is strapped down, forced underwater, and made to believe he is drowning—or the use of sleep deprivation would not legally fall under the definition of torture. What the Bush administration essentially did was “rip up the rulebook as far as military interrogators were concerned, telling them that the decades-old rules of the Army interrogation manual didn’t apply,” said Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch, in an April 14 Council event on the laws of war. What are “extraordinary renditions”? The policy of deporting terrorist suspects to countries, typically in the Middle East, with records of using torture. More than 100 detainees have reportedly been subject to renditions by the United States in recent years. The most widely known example was the case of Canadian citizen Maher Arar, apprehended by U.S. officials for having alleged connections to al-Qaeda and deported via Jordan to Syria, where he was imprisoned and tortured. He is currently suing the U.S attorney general’s office. U.S. officials deny deliberately engaging in the practice of renditions and maintain they receive pledges from recipient governments the detainees will be treated justly. Another aspect of this practice is what’s known as “reverse renditions,” when foreign officials apprehend terrorist suspects abroad in non-combat settings and hand them over to U.S. custody. The most famous case is that of the “ghost prisoner” Abdul Salam Ali al-Hila, a Yemeni businessman and alleged intelligence officer arrested in September 2002 in Egypt and then sent via Afghanistan to Guantanamo Bay, where he was held incommunicado for a year and a half.
    Backgrounder by Lionel Beehner November 11, 2005
  • Diplomacy and International Institutions
    Perceptions of U.S. Public Diplomacy
    This publication is now archived. Introduction One of the most commonly heard questions after the events of September 11 was: “Why do they hate us?” Four years later, anti-Americanism, particularly in the Muslim world, remains high. A June poll by the Pew Global Attitudes Project found that large majorities of the Muslim world still view the United States unfavorably. Much of the animosity, the poll shows, stems from U.S. policies in the region, including the war in Iraq and U.S. support for Israel. But anti-Americanism is not limited to the Muslim world. The same poll suggests that most British, French, and Germans think the United States is motivated by its own interests and ignores the concerns of its European allies. A large part of the United States’ poor image abroad stems from the little attention paid to public diplomacy in recent years, experts say. Public diplomacy entails the efforts—international publications, broadcasts, cultural, and educational exchanges—to shape public perceptions of the United States abroad. Whereas traditional diplomacy is a government-to-government exercise conducted between officials behind closed doors, public diplomacy is aimed broadly at two groups of people: the public at large and influential figures like academics, journalists, or business leaders. Experts say public diplomacy hasn’t been a priority for the United States since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. During World War II, President Roosevelt established American Information Centers in Europe and launched Voice of America, a radio service that today broadcasts news and cultural programs in dozens of languages to some 94 million listeners worldwide each week. During the Cold War, public diplomacy emerged as an essential part of the United States’ national security strategy, encompassing an ideological as well as cultural component. “One of our greatest exports [during this period] was jazz,” says Geoffrey Cowan, former director of the International Broadcasting Bureau. After the Soviet Union disbanded, funding for public diplomacy dwindled, and in 1998, the U.S. Information Agency, the bureau created to promote U.S. cultural values abroad, was folded into the State Department. By 2001, the United States devoted only $1.1 billion to public diplomacy, or roughly three-tenths of one percent of the annual Defense Department budget, says Edward Djerejian, former ambassador and chairman of a 2003 report entitled Changing Minds, Winning Peace (PDF). The number of public diplomacy officers—as high as 2,500 in 1991—was cut in half and technology began to supplant human-to-human contact, says Helena K. Finn, a Tel Aviv-based senior American diplomat. “Local foreign newspaper editors critical of U.S. policy no longer get visits from a press attache, let alone invitations to visit the United States, but instead receive mass-produced email messages assembled thousands of miles away,” Finn wrote in a 2003 Foreign Affairs article. Public diplomacy’s turnaround A renewed emphasis has been placed on public diplomacy after the July 2005 appointment of Karen Hughes, previously an adviser to President Bush for more than ten years, as undersecretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs. One of her first tasks was a five-day “listening tour” of the Middle East in September, accompanied by Dina Habib Powell, the Egyptian-born, Arabic-speaking assistant secretary of educational and cultural affairs. Her trip, which met with resistance and opposition from some Saudi and Turkish women, has received mixed reviews from U.S. experts. Some have praised her candidness and commitment to boosting the budget for public diplomacy. Her high profile has helped give her tour coverage, both good and bad, Cowan says. “How many undersecretaries of state, when traveling abroad, have their trip covered on the front page of the New York Times?” She has also pushed for more high-ranking U.S. officials to appear on Arab television networks like al-Jazeera, as well as for rapid-response teams to counter misinformation put out by the foreign media—a task previously carried out by the Office of Global Communications that was weakened after a 2004 Defense Science Board report (PDF) slammed the agency for ineffectiveness. Still, some have been less supportive of Hughes’ efforts. John Brown, a research associate at Georgetown University’s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy and a twenty-two-year veteran of the Foreign Service , has raised three other concerns about Hughes: First, she may needlessly raise expectations in the region she can’t deliver. Second, her message may sound hollow because of the unpopularity of the U.S. occupation of Iraq among Arabs. Third, “given Hughes’ prominence,” Brown says, “I think some foreign leaders will be wondering who’s in charge of the State Department: Karen or [Secretary of State] Condi [Rice]?” And it is not just the State Department that has ramped up its public-diplomacy efforts. In June, it was reported the Pentagon awarded three contracts, worth $300 million, to companies to add creativity to the Defense Department’s psychological operations, or “psyops program,” in an effort to improve the U.S. military’s image abroad. Previous attempts by the Pentagon at public relations have been controversial. In 2002, the Defense Department scrapped its Office of Strategic Influence after reports surfaced it had disseminated false information to the foreign media (The Pentagon has denied this occurred). But does public diplomacy work? Several experts question the efficacy of such efforts and whether this style of public diplomacy is still relevant or necessary. There are skeptics who say that much of the world is not anti-U.S., per se, but rather anti-U.S. foreign policy. No amount of public relations, marketing, or “listening tours” will undo resentment abroad over U.S. policies in the Middle East, they argue. “The problem we face, in the Arab world especially, but really everywhere, is not that we are misunderstood, but that we are understood only too well,” Ivo Daalder, senior fellow for foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, told the Wall Street Journal. The Defense Science Board’s report found that "American efforts [at public diplomacy] have not only failed, they may have also achieved the opposite of what they intended.” Others, however, including the drafters of the 9/11 Commission that investigated the circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, have called public diplomacy an essential part of U.S. foreign policy, especially after the events of September 11. They point out that public diplomacy is a necessary additive to, not a substitute for, foreign policymaking. “The final analysis is policy, but in terms of the formulation and framing of policy, I think public diplomacy is a very important dimension,” says Ali Banuazizi, an expert on Islamic studies at Boston College and member of the Council on Foreign Relations’ 2003 Task Force on public diplomacy. Other experts argue that public diplomacy is vital, given the stakes anti-Americanism poses for U.S. businesses abroad. “Nations are affected by the images that others hold of them in their minds,” Cowan says. “If people see America as being arrogant, greedy, or ruthless, they’re less likely to want to be partners with us at the highest level of government, or buy our products.” Public diplomacy also serves a similar function as it did during the Cold War: to counter an informational war being waged against the West by the enemy—in this case, radical Islamists. Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Abu al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian-born leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, have used the media—most famously by passing videotapes to Arabic television—to publicize al-Qaeda and sway public opinion in the Middle East, stressing themes that resonate with Arab and Muslim viewers. Some experts say bin Laden’s skill in shaping and publicizing his message makes U.S. public diplomacy in the Middle East especially important. “How can a man in a cave out-communicate the world’s leading communication society?” asked Richard Holbrooke, a former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, after September 11. Reforming public diplomacy In general, most experts say there must be a renewed focus on building person-to-person contacts between the United States and other nations. “An important step is to try to establish connections with civil-society groups in these countries—professional groups, journalists, academics, literary people—and promote that kind of cross-societal connection,” Banuazizi says. He also emphasizes the need to differentiate issues of security—specifically 9/11 and the war on terrorism—from the public diplomacy agenda. “Public diplomacy cannot be saddled by that memory and casting it in terms of this question: ‘Why do they hate us?’” he says. Most experts agree that public diplomacy is not adequately funded or staffed. Public diplomacy was allocated $758 million for the 2006 federal budget, in addition to $652 million to fund U.S.-sponsored media ventures like the Voice of America. Djerejian’s report calls for additional funding of more cultural exchanges, whose current budget is just $25 million for the entire Muslim world, “a depressingly small amount,” he notes. He also suggests adding more linguistic experts in the region, recounting a recent episode when 500 Arabic-speaking U.S. officials were asked if they would feel comfortable appearing on Arabic television. Only five responded that they were. Another area in need of reform is altering the coverage of U.S. foreign policy in the foreign press. The proliferation of twenty-four-hour media outlets and information technologies makes public diplomacy more complicated—and expensive—than ever before, experts say. One way to improve coverage, Brown says, is to make sure these outlets have up-to-date and complete copies of important speeches and documents. “Bottom line is, lots of the [foreign] media’s reporting is just plain wrong,” he says. “Rather than sending the information marines, or rapid-response teams, it’s more important to cultivate local editors through local embassies, establish close contacts, and make sure they get at least the full texts of official statements.” Alvin Snyder, a fellow at the University of Southern California’s Center on Public Diplomacy (CPD), suggests using the Internet to the United States’ advantage. According to the Nielsen’s Internet ratings, he says, the U.S. government’s website is the sixth most visited site in the world. Pete Peterson, chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations and chair of the Council’s public diplomacy Task Force, favors the privatization of some parts of public diplomacy. He has proposed a not-for-profit Corporation for Public Diplomacy, similar to the Corporation for Public Broadcasting founded by Congress in 1967, which could receive private-sector grants but is intended for an international audience. One advantage of a private corporation is that any media venture sponsored by the U.S. government will look like propaganda. “ Washington must be mindful of something every good salesman understands: If you do not trust the messenger, you do not trust the message,” Peterson wrote in a January 21, 2004, Financial Times op-ed. Another advantage, he says, is the private sector’s ability to generate more funding. Public diplomacy since 9/11 Despite its criticism, the Bush administration has launched an array of new efforts to handle public diplomacy. To influence media coverage of its military campaign in Afghanistan, for instance, Washington launched twenty-four-hour Coalition Information Centers in 2001 in Washington, London, and Islamabad. Shortly after, to reach out to Arab viewers, top U.S. officials gave interviews for the first time to al-Jazeera and other media outlets in the Islamic world. The State Department circulated more than one million copies of a brochure about the September 11 attacks and al-Qaeda, The Network of Terrorism, throughout the Middle East. Translated into thirty-six languages, it was the most widely distributed public-diplomacy document ever produced by the State Department. Washington has also rehabilitated and adapted dormant public diplomacy initiatives for use in the Middle East. One program originally designed to expose Eastern European reporters to American culture is now being used to bring Arab journalists to the United States. The United States has also gotten involved in a number of media ventures to influence opinion in the Middle East. In March 2002, the United States launched Radio Sawa, an Arabic-language radio station with studios in Washington, DC, and Dubai. Modeled after American top-100 radio stations, the station aims to reach young Middle Easterners by mixing American and Arab pop music with short news broadcasts. In July 2003, the U.S. government established a glossy Arabic-language lifestyle magazine called Hi, aimed at improving the U.S. image among the Arab world’s eighteen- to thirty-five-year-olds. In February 2004, the U.S. also launched al-Hurra (“the free one”) in order to, as President Bush said in his 2004 State of the Union Address, “cut through the barriers of hateful propaganda” by Arabic television stations. Although al-Hurra supposedly reaches 120 million in twenty-two countries, experts say it is widely ignored by the Arab world’s chief opinion-makers. Will these efforts polish America’s brand abroad? Probably not, most experts say. Although these initiatives represent the most serious public diplomacy drive in years, they still don’t approach the extent of America’s Cold War efforts. Some experts argue that because anti-American sentiment is motivated principally by unpopular U.S. policies and perceptions of American unilateralism, brochures and radio broadcasts aren’t enough. Instead, they argue, public diplomacy considerations should be woven into the policymaking process. Otherwise, as Peterson points out, the United States risks losing “the battle for hearts and minds.”
    Backgrounder by Lionel Beehner September 29, 2005
  • United States
    Ending the Post 9/11 Security Neglect of America’s Chemical Facilities
    Written Testimony before a hearing of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United States Senate on “The Security of America’s Chemical Facilities" Chairman Collins, Senator Lieberman, and distinguished members of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, I am the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior fellow in national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. I am honored to appear before you this morning to discuss the vitally important issue of assessing the security of America’s chemical facilities and to provide recommendations for moving beyond the tepid federal government effort since 9/11 to reduce the vulnerability of this critical sector to terrorism. There is no more important work this Committee can undertake than holding hearings such as this one. With the passage of time, it has become tempting for many in Washington to become self-congratulatory about the efforts that have been made to date to deal with the catastrophic terrorist threat. Some would like to believe that our post-9/11 military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have dissuaded terrorists from doing their worse on U.S. soil or at least distracted them from attacking the U.S. homeland. Others would like to assign a deterrent value to the very modest measures that have been taken to date to bolster security at home. On the other end of the spectrum, as Americans become aware of just how “target-rich” we are as a nation, many simply become fatalistic. One view holds that a determined terrorist will succeed no matter what measures we put in place so any effort is hardly worth the effort. Some go so far as to argue that the expense of safeguarding what is valuable and vulnerable in our midst is itself a concession to terrorism; i.e., “the terrorists have won” if we have to make post-9/11 adjustments to the way we conduct business or go about our daily lives. When the optimists who believe America is winning the war on terror by way of its overseas exertions are combined with the pessimists who believe efforts to protect the U.S. homeland are futile, what is left is a very small constituency who support tackling the complex issue of critical infrastructure protection. This is why it so important that this committee continues to exercise leadership on these issues. It is my conviction that al Qaeda or one of its many radical jihadist imitators will attempt to carry out a major terrorist attack on the United States within the next five years. At the top of the list of likely targets is the chemical industry. I also believe that there are practical steps that can be taken right now at a reasonable cost that can reduce the risk that the next terrorist attack will be catastrophic. We must necessarily begin with a far more active role by the federal government in advancing security within an industry that has long been accustomed to managing its own affairs. The case for purposeful federal leadership to bolster security in the chemical industry rests on two legs. First, is the attractiveness of the industry as a potential terrorist target? Second, are the inherent limits of the marketplace— left on its own— to advance security within this sector? THE THREAT One of the questions that is asked with growing frequency today is why there has not been another attack since 9/11? If America is indeed vulnerable, why have the terrorists not struck again? Implicit in this question are both: (1) a critique that perhaps observers like me are overstating the threat and underestimating what the U.S. government has accomplished since 9/11 to reduce the risk, and (2) a concern that new investments in added security may end up being wasteful. There is a compelling explanation for a lengthy interval between the 9/11 attacks and the next attack that should serve as an antidote for the quickening slide back towards national complacency. Al Qaeda has made clear that they want to carry out a more devastating attack then those on New York and Washington. Launching such an attack requires developing a plan and mobilizing the capacity to carry out that plan. This includes setting up a logistics cell, surveillance cell, and attack cell to scope out the target, conduct dry runs, and ultimately to execute the attack. Establishing this organizational capacity takes time, particularly within the United States, where al Qaeda must work from a much smaller organizational footprint than it has in Western Europe or countries like Indonesia. Going after lesser targets puts that organization at risk because any attack exposes terrorist cells to enforcement action. This is because it is impossible to carry out an attack without leaving a forensic trail that can put a carefully built organization at risk. In short, while it is true that there are many easy targets within the United States that terrorists could have struck since 9/11, carrying out a truly catastrophic terrorists attack requires more time. Of the carefully selected potential targets that al Qaeda or its imitators might seek to attack, the chemical industry should be at the top of the list. There are hundreds of chemical facilities within the United States that represent the military equivalent of a poorly guarded arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. Terrorists do not need to produce or procure chemical weapons and smuggle them into the United States. Just as on 9/11 they converted domestic airliners into missiles that destroyed the twin towers, they can target facilities that manufacture or conveyances that transport such lethal chemicals as chlorine, anhydrous ammonia, boron tri-flouride, cyanide, and nitrates. These facilities are found around the country in industrial parks, in seaports, and near the major population centers. Dangerous chemicals routinely travel along our highways, inland waterways, and on railcars that pass through the heart of major cities including Washington, DC just a short distance from Capitol Hill. Terrorist attacks on the U.S. chemical industry have the potential to kill tens of thousands of Americans and seriously injure many more. In many instances, these attacks hold the potential for having a cascading effect across other infrastructures, particularly in the energy and transportation sectors. This is both because of the damage that can be caused by the attack, and the enormous expense and effort associated with the clean-up to an affected area in its aftermath. The four metropolitan areas that deserve the most federal attention and support are Newark, New Orleans, Houston, and Los Angeles. THE LIMITS OF THE MARKET The White House National Strategy for Homeland Security, released on July 16, 2002, assigns most of the responsibility for funding the protection of potential targets within U.S. borders to the private sector. In Chapter Six, “The Costs of Homeland Security,” the strategy lays out “the broad principles that should guide the allocation of funding for homeland security [and] help determine who should bear the financial burdens.” It declares: "The government should only address those activities that the market does not adequately provide— for example, national defense or border security…. For other aspects of homeland security, sufficient incentives exist in the private market to supply protection. In these cases we should rely on the private sector." Unfortunately, this expression of faith in the market has not been borne out by security investments within the private sector. According to a survey commissioned by the Washington-based Council on Competitiveness just one year after September 11, 92 percent of executives did not believe that terrorists would target their companies, and only 53 percent of the respondents indicated that their companies had increased security spending between 2001 and 2002. With the passing of each month without a new attack, the reluctance of companies to invest in security has only grown. If there were indeed “sufficient incentives in the private market to supply protection,” there would be no need for the hearing we are having today. 3 ½ years after the September 11 attacks we should be seeing the chemical industry making substantial investments in addressing longstanding security weaknesses. But, there are two barriers to this kind of investment taking place. First, executives in this increasingly competitive industry worry that such investments will place them at a competitive disadvantage. Second, there are unique liability issues associated with industry-led efforts to define and implement adequate security. Security is not free. A company incurs costs when it invests in measures to protect the portion of a vital sector it controls. If a company does not believe other companies are willing or able to make a similar investment, then it faces the likelihood of losing market share while simply shifting the sector’s vulnerability elsewhere. If terrorists strike, the company will still suffer the disruptive consequences of an attack right alongside those who did nothing to prevent it. Those consequences are likely to include the cost of implementing new government requirements. Therefore, infrastructure security suffers from a dilemma commonly referred to as the "tragedy of the commons." The “tragedy of the commons” applies to the chemical industry in this way: By and large, chemical manufacturers have had an impressive safety record. They routinely work with and transport some of the most dangerous substances known to man, but accidents that result in serious loss of life and damage to the environment are rare. However, the post-9/11 security imperative poses a special challenge for them. Operating on thin profit margins and faced with growing overseas competition, most companies have been reluctant to incur the additional costs associated with improving their security. Consider the case of a hypothetical manager of a chemical plant who decides to spend a day looking around his facility to access its security and discovers many serious lapses. After a fitful night of sleep, he wakes up and decides to invest in protective measures that raise the cost to his customers by $50 per shipment. A competitor who does not make that investment will be able to attract business away from the security-conscious plant because his handling costs will be lower. Capable terrorists and criminals will target this lower-cost operation since it is an easier target. The result is that the terrorist threat is only displaced, not deterred. Even if the chemical industry could agree amongst itself to a common set of security measures and felt confident that good faith efforts would be made across the sector to abide by them, it still faces the unique uncertainties associated with liability when it comes to deciding, “How much security is enough.” Since all security measures follow the rule of diminishing returns; i.e., higher investments buy incrementally less additional security; at some point a decision about the cost-benefit trade-off must be made. When executives make decisions about safety or other business issues, they can refer to empirical data from reliable open or proprietary sources. But decisions about adequate security require information about the threat. Typically, that information/intelligence is carefully controlled by the public sector and often lacks specificity. So the private sector is left essentially making their best guess about how much security they should invest in. However, a successful attack on their sector in the wake of new investments to protect it, will inevitably lead to a public judgment that the bar was set too low. The only way to prevent the tragedy of the commons and to address the liability issue is for the public sector: (1) to be intimately involved in the decision about what security measures should be taken, (2) to have a credible enforcement role in assuring industry compliance with these measures, and (3) to provide a reasonable level of indemnification should agreed upon security measures be found wanting following a terrorist attack; i.e., to provide the industry with a measure of “Good Samaritan” protection as long as they abide by agreed upon standards . In short, security of critical infrastructures such as the chemical industry requires an effective performance-based regulatory regime developed at the federal level. To this end, I recommend this committee consider holding hearings and drafting legislation that incorporates the following: (1) Provides the necessary resources for the Department of Homeland Security to work with (a) the Local Planning Emergency Committees created under the Emergency Response and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA) and (b) the FBI’s district-based INFRAGARD program to identify minimal standards for the industry to: Establish physical security, communications capabilities, and access control at chemical facilities based on the quantity and lethality of the chemicals produced and stored within a facility, its proximity to major population centers, and its proximity to other critical infrastructure such as energy and transportation. Conduct regular exercises to test the adequacy of security measures to prevent intrusions. To conduct community outreach on incidence management with neighbors to the facilities who would be directly affected in the aftermath of a successful attack. To set minimal intervals for emergency response training involving local firefighters, police, and emergency healthcare based on the likelihood of large-scale casualties in the aftermath of a successful attack. (2) To authorize the creation of bonded, third-party inspectors to audit compliance with these minimal standards at intervals appropriate to the risk posed by a successful attack on the chemical facility. (3) To create within the Department of Homeland a chemical security compliance office that conducts periodic inspections of facilities to determine both the adequacy of their compliance and the care at which third-party inspectors have conducted their compliance audits. In carrying out this “auditing-the-auditors” program, DHS must possess the authority to swiftly sanction third-party inspectors who it finds to be providing substandard audits. (4) To sponsor research and development and to provide tax incentives which reward the adoption of less dangerous processes for making, handling, and storing the most lethal chemicals. (5) To sponsor research and development of new technologies to mitigate the risk of chemical releases beyond a chemical facility. (6) To sponsor research and development of lower-cost, more user-friendly protective equipment for emergency responders. (7) To create a task force that recommends a new protocol for resolving the conflict associated with the pre-9/11 community outreach requirements of EPCRA and the post-9/11 trend towards restricting public access to information deemed to be sensitive by DHS. The need for advanced information to be available for communities to take necessary life-saving measures in the aftermath of an attack should be assigned as much of a priority as DHS’s tendency to treat public disclosure of details associated with high-risk/high-consequence facilities as sensitive information. This is especially the case in the near term to medium term, given the low-probability that DHS will have actionable intelligence to prevent a terrorist attack. (8) To require security risk assessments that are reviewed by the senior homeland security official at the state level before new non-industrial development is allowed in the vicinity of existing chemical facilities. This is designed to provide the means for an appropriate evaluation of decisions such as the one made this year by the Los Angeles Community College District to build a campus to accommodate up to 12,000 students in the southeast Los Angeles community of South Gate, next to one of southern California’s largest chemical plants. CONCLUSIONS: While this hearing has focused on the issue of chemical facilities, it is important that the issue of transportation of chemicals receive equal attention by this committee and by the federal government. At the end of the day, precursor chemicals must be shipped to manufacturing facilities to produce their final products, and those products need to reach consumers for them to have commercial value. This means that virtually all of the chemicals that we should be concerned with at industrial facilities are concurrently moving about on railcars, barges, and trucks, often in close proximity to major population centers. There are even some chemicals that are so hazardous that they become unstable if they do not reach their destination within prescribed timeframes; i.e., they will explode. The limited progress there has been made to date within the chemical industry has primarily involved efforts to improve physical security. While these “gates, guards, and guns” issues warrant the attention they have been receiving, they represent only a small part of the overall security agenda. At the end of the day, determined terrorist organizations will be able to compromise any existing industrial security regime. This does not mean these measures are futile because the harder a target becomes to compromise, the more expertise, money, planning, and dry-runs a terrorist organization requires to compromise it. This translates into improved odds that they will do things that will allow them to be detected by vigilant law enforcement. However, the best way to protect both the American people and an industry as critical to the U.S. economy and our modern way of life as the chemical sector is to reduce the probability that targeting chemical facilities or the transport of hazardous chemicals is the equivalent of constructing and deploying a weapon of mass destruction. We can accomplish this by adding a new security lens to the safety lens that is already well entrenched within the industry. The safety lens which has evolved from training, professional protocols, regulation, and liability law, requires that the industry automatically anticipate the possibilities and potential consequences of an act of God, human error, or mechanical error and devise means to mitigate those risks. In our post-9/11 age, the new requirement must be that the industry also automatically asks: “What is the possibility and what are the potential consequences that we could be targeted by someone with malicious intent?” Based on the answer to that question, they must incorporate appropriate safeguards to lower the risk. In the end, given that it will be several years before the recent reforms to our intelligence community will bear fruit, we must accept that while a “threat-based” approach to homeland security may be desirable, it will be elusive for some time to come. The only prudent alternative to dealing with our intelligence shortcomings is to look at the sectors where the consequences of an attack would be greatest and assume that our adversaries are interested in attacking those targets. This means that we must put in place, as quickly as possible, reasonable safeguards to both protect those targets and to reduce the consequences should our prevention efforts fail. One of the central conclusions of the 9/11 Commission noted the pervasive lack of imagination across the U.S. government in anticipating that organizations like al Qaeda would use aircraft as instruments of terror. What should be guiding our efforts on homeland security today is not whether there is explicit evidence that demonstrates that our adversaries are thinking how and when to harm us, but whether there are in place credible measures that would prevent an attack from happening. As I look at the chemical industry today, I do not see credible barriers to a determined and resourceful terrorist organization. This is clearly an unsatisfactory state of affairs in our post-9/11 world. Stephen Flynn is the author of America the Vulnerable, published by HarperCollins in July 2004. He is the inaugural occupant of the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Chair in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. Flynn served as Director and principal author for the task force report “America: Still Unprepared— Still in Danger,” co-chaired by former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman. He spent twenty years as a commissioned officer in the U.S. Coast Guard including two commands at sea, served in the White House Military Office during the George H.W. Bush administration, and was director for Global Issue on the National Security Council staff during the Clinton administration. He holds a Ph.D. and M.A.L.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and a B.S. from the U.S. Coast Guard Academy.
    Testimony by Stephen E. Flynn April 27, 2005
  • Terrorism and Counterterrorism
    TERROR: War on Terror Update
    This publication is now archived. Three years after 9/11, has progress has been made in the war on terror? Yes, most analysts say, but precisely how much is unclear. On the home front, considerable steps have been taken to protect potential targets, especially airplanes and airports. Terrorism experts say more still needs to be done. Internationally, the United States has captured and killed scores of al Qaeda members in Afghanistan and elsewhere, says Magnus Ranstorp, a terrorism expert at St. Andrews University in Scotland. But enlistments in al Qaeda and like-minded organizations, some experts contend, keep pace with those setbacks. "Every time someone is captured, there are people to take their place," says Matthew Levitt, a terrorism analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. In which areas has the most substantial progress in homeland security been made? Among its achievements, the Bush administration cites: Government reorganization: In 2002, the White House created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) by merging 22 separate agencies into a single department whose primary mission is to protect the U.S. homeland. "The creation of the Department of Homeland Security is a major step in the right direction," says Warren Rudman, former senator (R-N.H.) and co-chair of the Council on Foreign Relations-sponsored independent task force on homeland security. But, he adds, "it will take time before we see total coherence in coordinating our [counterterrorism] efforts." Aviation security: DHS officials say air travel is significantly safer than it was on 9/11. Hardened cockpit doors have been added to all large passenger aircraft. Inspectors have conducted vulnerability assessments at the nation’s 75 largest airports. All checked baggage in U.S. airports is screened for prohibited items. Thousands of federal air marshals have been deployed in airports and aboard flights. All passenger names for domestic flights are checked against an expanded terrorist watch list. Border security: In 2003, DHS launched the US-VISIT system, which links government databases to provide information to port-of-entry officials and consular officials overseas and creates a database of pictures and finger scans of everyone entering the United States with a non-immigrant visa. Biological attack security: A new environmental monitoring system, BioWatch, monitors air samples in major U.S. cities, providing early warning of a potential bioattack. The program is intended to work in coordination with BioShield, a program to ensure that vaccines, drugs, and medical supplies are ready for rapid distribution in the event of an attack. Which areas lag behind? Port security: DHS says that every U.S. port has submitted a security plan that includes security measures such as surveillance cameras and background checks on port workers. But, says Rudman, "We’ve got a long way to go on port security." According to Stephen E. Flynn, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick senior fellow for national security studies at the Council and author of "America the Vulnerable: How Our Government is Failing to Protect Us from Terrorism," insufficient resources are devoted to securing U.S. ports. "The federal government has made available $500 million in grants to support the protection of our seaports," Flynn says. "That’s what we’re spending every three days in the war on Iraq. If this is the new threat ... then we’re not waking up to that reality to recalibrate." First responders: According to Flynn, those with the responsibility to respond first in a major terrorism emergency still lack the necessary funding and training. Communications problems persist; local police and fire departments, county, state, regional, and federal emergency response teams cannot easily exchange information. And protective gear and portable detection equipment needed in a chemical attack is in short supply. FBI and intelligence reform: The 9/11 Commission report recommended the establishment of a national intelligence director "to oversee national intelligence centers on specific subjects of interest across the U.S. government and to manage the national intelligence program and oversee the agencies that contribute to it." On August 2, 2004, President Bush established such a position, but the extent of the new director’s powers and responsibilities remain unclear. The president also announced on August 27, 2004, the creation of a National Counterterrorism Center intended to build on the intelligence-gathering capacity of the current Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) and to better coordinate counterterrorism operations. CIA (www.cia.gov) and FBI reforms are currently being debated in Congress. What progress has been made internationally? Intelligence-sharing among governments. This has clearly improved since 9/11, experts say. "We’re getting much better cooperation from the French, from the Germans, from the Saudis, from the Pakistanis," says Max Boot, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. "Lots of people who are not huge fans of the war in Iraq, for example, are nevertheless providing substantially more cooperation on intelligence, on busting up terrorist rings now than they ever did in the past," he says. Afghanistan and other operations against Qaeda leaders: After 9/11, the United States and its allies ousted the Taliban from Kabul and disrupted the operations of senior Qaeda leadership. Many Islamist fighters were killed or captured, but many escaped, including Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and his primary deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Overall, the Bush administration says the war against al Qaeda has eliminated 70 percent of the network’s leadership and captured or killed 3,400 of its members. But Ranstorp says it is difficult to know how significant these statistics are, because it’s not clear who all the captured leaders are--the names are largely classified--or the roles they played in the network. Nor is it clear how rapidly killed or captured leaders are replaced in the organization and how quickly new members are recruited. Tracking weapons of mass destruction (WMD):The Bush administration created the Proliferation Security Initiative, an international partnership of more than 60 countries to share intelligence information about WMD and interdict lethal materials in transit. Through this effort, U.S. and other intelligence agencies exposed a worldwide, Pakistan-based smuggling network that sold nuclear technologies and equipment to outlaw regimes, including Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Libya, a U.S.-classified terror state, has since renounced its WMD programs. On the other hand, "There’s still tremendous concern that terrorists can get access to WMD, either cooperatively through state sponsors of terrorism or by stealing them," Levitt says. Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Indonesia, and Pakistan: These countries, which before September 11 often turned a blind eye to the activities of domestic Islamist militants, are now going after terror organizations. "But there is still so far for these regimes to go," Levitt says. Terrorism financing. Nearly $140 million in terrorist assets have been blocked in more than 1,400 accounts worldwide since 9/11, according to a White House fact sheet. But much more needs to be done to halt the flow of funds to terrorists, especially in Saudi Arabia, whose citizens remain the largest single source of Qaeda funding, according to a recent Council-sponsored independent task force on terrorism financing. What larger issues must be solved? Formulating a long-term, strategic approach.Many experts say the Bush administration has not yet developed a strategy to counter the ideology of the Qaeda movement and radical Islam and to prevent a new generation of terrorists from emerging. "We need a real long-term strategy to press for reform in countries that are incubating radicalism," says Daniel Benjamin, a terrorism expert and senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "Our gains are fleeting because we aren’t doing nearly enough to deal with the global radicalization of a lot of young Muslim men." Many experts argue that addressing the challenges posed by al Qaeda’s ideology is as important as attacking the organization with military force, adds Levitt. "We have yet to really get in the game of the war of ideas," he says. Getting Iraq right. In its current state, with its poorly secured borders, multiple armed factions, and surplus of weaponry, "the environment in Iraq is perfect from a terrorist perspective," Ranstorp says. The war in Iraq "exacerbated the global war on terror to some extent by radicalizing a lot of individuals locally and helping in mobilization," he adds. "We’ve cut off sanctuary to terrorists in Afghanistan and given them new sanctuary in Iraq," says Benjamin. If Iraq is to become a net gain in the war on terror, experts say much more needs to be done to get the situation there under control. How likely is another large-scale terrorist attack inside the United States? Most experts expect one. In a recent interview, Lee Hamilton, the vice chair of the 9/11 Commission, said, "We interviewed a very large number of people, over 1,000 people.... I don’t think a single one of them said, ’Do not expect an attack.’ Everybody expects an attack." Hamilton added: "We think the terrorist has: No. 1, the intent to kill as many Americans as possible, and No. 2, the capability. And that equation makes for a real danger." Why hasn’t there been an attack inside the United States since September 11, 2001? It’s impossible to say. It may be because the war on terrorism has made strategic planning for Qaeda and other terrorists more difficult, experts say. Or it may be that al Qaeda is taking time to plan an attack on a scale at least as significant as the 9/11 attacks. "They may be going for something spectacular again," says Rudman, "something that will take time to properly plan." Is it possible to define victory in the war on terrorism? It’s not clear. "There will be no clear endgame--it’s a long-term struggle," Ranstorp says. "The war will be won when we no longer fear catastrophic terror attack," says Benjamin. "We’ll never be able to go back to where we thought we were on September 10, 2001, but if we can come up with a strategy to limit the appeal of radical Islam to moderate Muslims, we can live in a world where the threat of terrorism is no longer the center of our politics."Richard Haass, the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, says the goal is "not the elimination of terrorism; that’s beyond our power. It’s the reduction of it so it no longer drives our lives, it no longer drives our national security strategy."
    Backgrounder by Sharon Otterman February 17, 2005
  • Intelligence
    INTELLIGENCE: Intelligence Reform
    This publication is now archived. What does the intelligence reform bill do? The National Intelligence Reform Act, which was strongly influenced by the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, dramatically overhauls the U.S. intelligence-gathering bureaucracy. It creates a director of national intelligence (DNI) and places him or her in charge of intelligence-agency budgets and personnel. The Senate and House passed different versions of the bill in October 2004, and congressional negotiators worked out a compromise bill that was scheduled for a November 2004 vote. House opponents balked at the revised legislation, and House Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-Ill.) declined to send the bill to the floor. Presidential pressure revived the bill, which became law on December 17, 2004. Which issues delayed passage of the bill? Key Republican members of the House of Representatives claimed that some provisions of the comprehensive restructuring of the nation’s intelligence community could threaten national security by interfering with U.S. troops’ access to battlefield intelligence and by failing to restrict drivers’ licenses for illegal immigrants. Congressional and White House negotiators resolved the military issue, which appeared to be the main sticking point, and put off the license dispute. What were the opponents’ main objections? There were two key grievances, each backed by a powerful House committee chairman. James Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.), the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, pushed for several immigration and law enforcement measures that had been in the House version of the bill, including the limit on licenses for immigrants who enter the United States illegally. Sensenbrenner was angry the provisions he backed were dropped from the final version of the legislation, which he called "woefully incomplete. "Duncan Hunter (R-Cal.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, was concerned that the new intelligence structure would interfere with what the Pentagon calls "warfighter support"—getting military intelligence to soldiers on the battlefield. Hunter’s concerns were allayed when negotiators added language to the bill explicitly preventing intelligence officials from interfering in the military chain of command. What were the details of Hunter’s argument? Hunter, a Vietnam veteran with a son in the Marine Corps, was concerned about provisions that shifted responsibility for key intelligence operations from the Pentagon to the DNI. A central issue was whether the Pentagon would have priority access to satellite images from the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). Both are currently Defense Department agencies that will, under the terms of the reform bill, report to the DNI. Some experts say Hunter represents the feelings of the military establishment, which has long opposed civilian control of technical intelligence collection. The intelligence arms of the military services fought "tooth and nail" in the 1960s against the creation of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), which provides military intelligence to the armed forces and lawmakers, says Alton Frye, presidential senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and director of the Council’s Congress and U.S. Foreign Policy project. What were the details of Sensenbrenner’s argument? Sensenbrenner argued that state policies allowing illegal immigrants to apply for drivers’ licenses pose a serious national security risk. Most states require drivers to be legal residents of the United States, but 10 states--including Wisconsin, Sensenbrenner’s home state--do not. He pointed out that the 19 September 11 hijackers possessed a total of 63 drivers’ licenses. Sensenbrenner pushed for a national standard for drivers’ licenses that would deny them to illegal immigrants and, in the case of temporary visitors, link the expiration date on the license to the end date of the visitor’s visa. Was there opposition to intelligence reform from otherquarters? Yes, although the bill steadily gained support. General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote a letter to Congress in October arguing that control over three intelligence agencies that provide combat support--the National Security Agency (NSA), the NGA, and the NRO--should stay with the Pentagon. On December 2, 2004, however, Myers said measures in the compromise bill had addressed his concerns. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has opposed the idea of centralized control over the nation’s intelligence operations in the past, but eventually said he would support President Bush’s position. What are the bill’s major elements? The National Intelligence Reform Act will: Create a National Intelligence Authority to coordinate the efforts of the nation’s intelligence community. This new office will be independent of the Executive Office of the President and will oversee 11 of the 15 agencies that make up the U.S. intelligence community. Create a DNI to head the National Intelligence Authority. The DNI will be the principal intelligence adviser to the president and have responsibility for counterterrorism and intelligence related to national security, but will not be a member of the Cabinet. The DNI will have budgetary authority over the country’s civilian intelligence program and will "participate" with the defense secretary in creating the budget for military intelligence programs. The DNI will also be responsible for submitting a national intelligence budget to the president. Create a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to coordinate the work of the nation’s intelligence agencies, as recommended by the 9/11 Commission. Which agencies fall under the DNI’s authority? The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) , which gathers intelligence related to national security. The NSA, which encrypts sensitive U.S. information and works to decode foreign intelligence. The NGA, which collects and analyzes satellite images. The NRO, which develops and launches satellite systems for gathering intelligence. The DIA, which gathers military intelligence. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) at the State Department, which uses intelligence to advance diplomatic initiatives. The Office of Terrorism and Finance Intelligence (TFI) in the Treasury Department, which monitors money laundering and seeks to halt terrorist financing. The Office of Intelligence and the Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence Divisions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI). The Office of Intelligence of the Energy Department, which safeguards the nation’s nuclear weapons and ensures a stable energy supply. The Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) in the Homeland Security Department. The Directorate of Coast Guard Intelligence of the Department of Homeland Security. The intelligence arms of each military service--the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines-would remain under the direct control of the Defense Department. What else would the bill do? Establish a unified network to share more intelligence information among federal, state, and local agencies and the private sector. Each intelligence agency currently has its own database that only its members can access. Declassify the annual intelligence budget. The current annual total is thought to be around $40 billion, much of it controlled by the Pentagon. Create a Privacy and Civil Liberties Board to monitor government counterterrorism agencies for violations of civil and privacy rights. Establish an Analytic Review Unit in an ombudsman’s office to take a second look at National Intelligence Estimates and other analytical products to ensure their accuracy and search for and correct bias. Add border patrol agents, install cameras in baggage-handling areas of airports, increase cargo inspections, and take other measures designed to secure borders, transportation, and critical infrastructure. Promote outreach to the Muslim world in order to improve the image of the United States abroad and stem terrorist recruiting. Does the bill differ from the 9/11 Commission proposal? The bill is largely faithful to the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations. In its July 22 report on the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the commission called for an overhaul of the nation’s intelligence services to reform the "broken" culture of intelligence-gathering and analysis that failed to prevent the attacks. However, the bill does not directly address a key commission recommendation: the creation of a single congressional committee with responsibility for overseeing the work of the National Intelligence Agency. Currently, more than 80 House and Senate committees and subcommittees deal with intelligence, a situation the 9/11 Commission called "dysfunctional." The Senate has appointed a task force to examine ways to implement the commission’s recommendations on this issue. — by Esther Pan, staff writer, cfr.org
    Backgrounder by Esther Pan February 16, 2005
  • Pakistan
    PAKISTAN: U.S.-Pakistan Relations
    This publication is now archived. Is Pakistan an effective ally of the United States? Yes and no, experts say. President Pervez Musharraf accommodated U.S. requests for assistance after 9/11, especially in the search for al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. "The United States and [President] Bush have confidence in Musharraf. He’s seen as the best alternative in Pakistan," says Mahnaz Ispahani, senior fellow for South and West Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations. At the same time, many experts say Musharraf is not doing enough to crack down on Islamic radicals in Pakistan who have strong ties to theTaliban and sympathies for al Qaeda. What has Pakistan done in the war on terror? Pakistan joined the U.S. war on terror and broke relations with Afghanistan’s Taliban government, to the chagrin of many Pakistanis. In June 2003, Bush announced that Pakistan had arrested more than 500 Taliban and Qaeda members. One of the most significant catches: the March 2003 arrest of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the former No. 3 leader of al Qaeda and the alleged mastermind of the September 11 attacks. Pakistan has also deployed 25,000 troops to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the mountainous region that borders Afghanistan, to track Qaeda fugitives. Why do critics say it hasn’t done enough? Many critics doubt the loyalty of Pakistan’s armed forces and the military’s intelligence agency, Inter Services Intelligence; some members of both have openly sympathized with al Qaeda and its fight against the West. Pakistani military officers have recently been arrested for alleged ties to al Qaeda, including a solider who reportedly sheltered Mohammed. And politicians in Musharraf’s government express open admiration for al Qaeda. In addition, the government hasn’t been able to locate bin Laden or other Qaeda figures thought to be hiding out in border regions. That’s partially because many locals revere bin Laden and his fellow extremists. "Nobody will turn them over," says Kathy Gannon, Edward R. Murrow Press Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the Associated Press Pakistan and Afghanistan bureau chief since 1989. What were U.S.-Pakistan relations like before 9/11? Chilly. Experts point out that Pakistan used to be a world pariah: censured and sanctioned for its nuclear ambitions, which culminated in five successful nuclear tests announced on May 28, 1998. It also actively supported the Taliban and was one of very few countries to recognize Taliban rule in Afghanistan as legitimate. What effect did 9/11 have? Pakistan sided with the United States in the war on terror and, as a result, regained the strategic importance it had during the 1980s, when it was a base for U.S. aid to Islamic militias fighting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. On June 24, 2003, President Bush hosted Musharraf at Camp David and announced a $3 billion aid package for Pakistan, as well as $1 billion in loan forgiveness, in recognition of its assistance to the United States in fighting al Qaeda. Is the aid package what Musharraf wanted? Yes and no. The amount pledged almost equals the sum given to Pakistan under Ronald Reagan’s administration, when fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan was a regional security concern. It will certainly help Pakistan pay down its crushing debt burden, which in 2001 was 115 percent of its gross domestic product. However, the aid package announced by Bush does not include 28 F-16 fighter jets that Pakistan ordered from the United States 13 years ago. The sale has been blocked since then by the U.S. Congress because of concerns over Pakistan’s nuclear program and Musharraf’s path to power. Is Musharraf the elected leader of Pakistan? No. He seized power in a 1999 military coup. Tensions between then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Musharraf were exacerbated after Sharif in July 1999 ordered Pakistani troops to retreat from their positions on the Indian side of the Line of Control, which divides the disputed territory of Kashmir. That decision was highly unpopular with the army. The crisis came to a head when Musharraf, then the head of the army and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, was flying home from Sri Lanka in October 1999 and Sharif’s government denied his plane permission to land. With fuel running low, the plane was at risk of crashing. Musharraf supporters stormed the palace, took over the airports, state radio, and television, and allowed the plane to land. They also took Sharif into custody. Where is Nawaz Sharif now? Living in exile with his family in Saudi Arabia. Sharif accepted a 10-year exile in return for his release from prison after the coup. Another former prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, also lives in exile abroad. She was convicted in absentia of corruption, and faces arrest if she returns to Pakistan. When did Musharraf become president? Musharraf named himself president of Pakistan before meeting with Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in July 2001. He resisted calls for elections at that point, but engineered a referendum in 2002 that confirmed him as president for five years. He also changed the constitution to grant him increased powers over parliament and the new government. Is Musharraf a reliable partner for the United States? Experts aren’t entirely sure. "We’re dependent on someone who has done a lot of distorted and anti-democratic things to get into power," says Ispahani. "I don’t think we can rely on one man, especially a military man." Gannon says that Musharraf will not sacrifice either his domestic or regional agenda--particularly the twin issues of Kashmir and nuclear weapons--for the United States. At the same time, Musharraf has given the United States almost everything it’s asked for since 9/11, including public support, the use of military bases, and a crackdown on local militants--at significant domestic political cost. What are the political costs? There is a "deep and wide anti-Americanism in Pakistan today," Ispahani says. The country, officially an Islamic republic, is more than 97 percent Islamic, and many Pakistanis are angry that Musharraf has joined forces with the United States to hunt down Muslims. Pakistani Muslims are, by and large, moderates, and the country has a history of secularism and freedom of religion, Ispahani says. However, radical fundamentalist groups are gaining in both strength and numbers. What happened in Pakistan’s October 2002 elections? Religious parties made large gains, in part due to Musharraf’s maneuvering, some analysts say. Instead of running against Bhutto and Sharif, whom he probably would have defeated, Musharraf banned them from participating. This left their supporters in the secular political parties--Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples’ Party and Sharif’s Muslim League--disorganized, and created an opportunity for Muttahida Majlis e Amal (MMA), or United Action Front, an alliance of religious parties. The MMA polled 11 percent of the vote, which gave it control of 20 percent of Pakistan’s parliament. It now also governs the North-West Frontier Province and shares power in Baluchistan province. What’s the status of Pakistan’s parliament? Stymied. Last year, members of Parliament objected when Musharraf named himself president, because the Pakistan constitution forbids the head of the army from becoming president. Musharraf promptly sidelined them. Parliament still meets but exercises little power. Do some of Pakistan’s religious parties have links to terrorism? Yes. One political party, Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), is part of the powerful Deobandi sect that controls 65 percent of nation’smadrasas, or religious schools. As many as 15 percent of the students at madrasas are thought to be foreigners. The party is also associated with Harakat-ul-Mujahadeen, the first Pakistani group to be put on the U.S. list of terror organizations. The JUI has a large component of ethnic Pashtuns, the tribe many Taliban belong to, and both groups have strong ties to the Taliban. What is the biggest issue for Pakistan’s religious parties? Kashmir. The predominantly Muslim province has been a point of contention and the cause of three wars between India and Pakistan since Partition in 1947. Pakistan supports an army on the Line of Control and is accused by India of funding armed militants who cross it into Indian territory. "Kashmir allows a playing field for jihadis," Ispahani says. Many Islamists in Pakistan also oppose the government of Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan, which they think is biased against Pashtuns and which, Gannon says, is seen in the region as "hugely corrupt." Why is Kashmir important? "Kashmir is the focal point of extremism" in the region, says Gannon. "The radicals can claim,’Islam is under attack,’ and rally everyone under the Kashmir banner." She says there must be progress on resolving the Kashmir problem in order for Pakistan’s military and intelligence service to be "de-radicalized." The international community has to make a commitment to settling the Kashmir dispute, Gannon says, before Musharraf can face down Islamic parties at home and reduce their influence. Does Musharraf face personal risk from radical groups in his own country? Yes. He cannot travel safely in Pakistan, says Ispahani, and has faced several assassination attempts. But, she points out, "he’s survived so far, and that’s a great sign."
    Backgrounder by Sharon Otterman February 16, 2005
  • Terrorism and Counterterrorism
    TERROR: 9/11 Commission
    This publication is now archived. What is the 9/11 Commission? The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States is a bipartisan, independent panel. Its 13 members and staff of nearly 80 are charged with examining the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks--including the country’s preparedness for and response to the attacks--and making a full and complete report, including recommendations to prevent future attacks. In a much-anticipated public appearance, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice will testify April 8 before the commission. When did it begin its work? The commission was created by Congress and the president in November 2002. Families of victims of the 9/11 attacks had pressed for its creation. The Bush administration initially resisted, and there were subsequent disagreements over the commission’s funding and its access to executive branch documents. Congress also authorized an inquiry into 9/11 conducted by the House and Senate intelligence committees, which was completed in December 2002. The 9/11 commission held its first public hearing March 31, 2003, in New York City. The Rice testimony will mark the commission’s ninth public hearing. When will it complete its report? It will report its findings to Congress and the president on July 26, 2004. Who are its members? They are from both major parties and have served in various government positions: Thomas H. Kean the commission chairman, is a Republican former governor of New Jersey and the current presidentof Drew University. Lee H. Hamilton the commission vice chair, is president and director ofthe Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars inWashington, D.C. A Democrat, he served 17 terms as a U.S.representative from Indiana and is a former chairman ofthe House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the PermanentSelect Committee on Intelligence. Richard Ben-Veniste is a partner in the Washington law firm of Mayer, Brown, Rowe, & Maw. He is a Democratic former assistant U.S. district attorney and worked on investigations of both the Watergate and Whitewater scandals. Fred F. Fielding is a senior partner at the Washington law firm of Wiley, Rein, & Fielding. He served as counsel to the president for five years in the Reagan administration. Jamie S. Gorelick is a partner at the law firm of Wilmer, Cutler, & Pickering. A former vice chair of the Fannie Mae corporation, she was a deputy U.S. attorney general in the Clinton administration. Slade Gorton is of counsel at Preston Gates & Ellis LLP. He was a three-term Republican senator from Washington state. Bob Kerrey is president of New School University in New York City. A Democratic former governor of Nebraska, he also represented the state for two terms in the U.S. Senate. John F. Lehman is chairman of J.F. Lehman & Company, a private equity investment firm, and several other companies. He served as secretary of the Navy in the Reagan administration. Timothy J. Roemer is president of the Center for National Policy and a distinguished scholar at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. He is a former six-term Democratic U.S. representative from Indiana. James R. Thompson is chairman of the law firm of Winston & Strawn, headquartered in Chicago. A Republican, he was Illinois’ longest-serving governor, from 1977-1991. What is the commission authorized to investigate? The commission is mandated to investigate the "facts and circumstances" around the 9/11 attacks. Topics it is examining include intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies, diplomacy, immigration, visas, border control, terrorist financing, aviation, and congressional oversight and funding. What is the background of commission staffers? Among the full-time employees are a former deputy director of intelligence, state attorney general, deputy attorney general, federal prosecutors, and former congressional staff members. How large is the commission’s budget? Congress has approved $15 million. The funding is contained in three pieces of legislation. Has the commission received full access to documents and sources during its investigation? There have been many press accounts describing Bush administration efforts to withhold documents or delay their release to the commission. But a statement on the commission website says that, up to this point, the commission has received access to every document it has requested--more than 2 million--and interviewed every official it has asked to meet, including national security advisers, FBI directors, chairmen of the Joint Chiefs and Cabinet secretaries. In all, the commission will interview more than 1,000 individuals in 10 countries. Will top officials testify before the commission? Yes. Many top officials from the last two administrations--including former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, current Secretary of State Colin Powell, former Secretary of Defense William Cohen, current Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and former National Security Advisor Samuel R. Berger--all testified publicly during the commission’s eighth public hearing March 23-24. President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney, after initially refusing to meet with the commission, agreed to meet jointly with commissioners and answer their questions in a private session. The commission will also interview former President Bill Clinton and former Vice President Al Gore in private sessions. Has Rice testified before the commission before? Yes. She testified privately before the commission for four hours on February 7, 2004, at the White House. Why is she testifying again? To address claims made by Richard A. Clarke, former counterterrorism official for both the Clinton and Bush administrations. In his testimony before the commission and in a new book, Clarke says the Bush administration failed to take steps to fight al Qaeda and possibly prevent the 9/11 attacks. Clarke worked for Rice in the Bush White House. His charges have fueled questions about what the Bush administration did and did not know or do about al Qaeda in the year before 9/11. What is the commission likely to conclude? We don’t know. Commission staff reports contain information about the investigation, but final conclusions are up to the commission. Commission chairman Thomas Kean has publicly suggested wide-ranging reforms to U.S. intelligence services, including consideration of creating a domestic intelligence agency like Britain’s MI-5.
    Backgrounder by Esther Pan February 15, 2005
  • Middle East and North Africa
    NATO: Keeping the Peace in Afghanistan
    This publication is now archived. Can NATO keep the peace in Afghanistan? The United Nations Security Council unanimously agreed October 13 to allow the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to expand its Afghanistan peacekeeping mission beyond the capital city of Kabul. NATO’s involvement is an important step in the evolution of the transatlantic alliance--created after World War II to counterbalance the Soviet threat--and will help increase security in Afghanistan in the future, experts say. But the move’s immediate implications are less clear. Many experts warn that it will be months before there is a significant expansion in the number of peacekeeping troops. What’s the current status of peacekeeping in Afghanistan? The U.N.-sanctioned International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has about 5,500 troops based in and around Kabul. Most of the peacekeepers are Germans and Canadians; about 90 percent come from the NATO’s 19 member nations. NATO took control of ISAF on August 11, 2003, ending an unwieldy system of rotating command among individual nations. The peacekeepers support and protect the transitional Afghan government, headed by Hamid Karzai. Outside of the capital, however, the reach of the central government is limited. Much of Afghanistan remains controlled by regional militia, and the security situation in some provinces has deteriorated over the past year. The biggest threat comes from increasing attacks by Taliban gunmen. There are also some 11,500 U.S.-led coalition troops in Afghanistan hunting down terrorists, but for the most part they do not get involved in peacekeeping. Which U.S. forces participate in peacekeeping? Americans run two of four Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) deployed in Afghan cities. These small, civilian-military units (in general, made up of 100 to 200 personnel) play a limited role in reconstruction and provide security for international aid groups. The United States has encouraged other nations to take over command of these teams. One of the factors behind the expansion of ISAF was to help pave the way for other nations--particularly Germany--to lead PRTs throughout Afghanistan. What new NATO deployments are on the horizon? The German government has indicated it wants to send approximately 450 peacekeepers to the city of Kunduz, approximately 150 miles north of Kabul. NATO is currently assessing conditions in the rest of Afghanistan for additional troop deployments, but no other NATO nations have yet stepped forward to offer more peacekeepers. Because of the slow pace of this process, some Afghanistan-watchers do not expect to see a significant increase in ISAF forces until next spring. Afghanistan’s first national election is scheduled for June 2004. Why was Kunduz selected as the first city for ISAF expansion? There is already an American-run PRT in Kunduz, and the security situation is more stable than in other parts of the country. NATO officials say more detailed preparations are required before ISAF deploys into more dangerous areas, particularly the south and east, where there has been a resurgence of Taliban-related violence. Of Afghanistan’s 32 provinces, 16 have high-risk areas for international assistance workers and five have seen serious factional fighting, says Kevin Henry, the advocacy director of CARE. Only eight provinces, including Kunduz, are relatively secure. What does ISAF expansion mean for NATO? NATO’s willingness to command ISAF marks a milestone in the history of the 54-year-old military alliance: its first mission outside of the Europe-Atlantic area. With the Soviet threat a thing of the past and Europe largely at peace, NATO is searching for ways to remain relevant in the post-Cold War world, experts say. Since the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, NATO members have determined that the alliance should evolve into a more flexible organization with the capacity to intervene in small conflicts, fight terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, conduct peacekeeping operations, and support humanitarian missions inside and outside of Europe. NATO’s command of ongoing peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Kosovo are part of this transformation. And in October 2003, NATO announced the creation of its first "rapid reaction" force. What is the new NATO force? Launched on October 15, the NATO Response Force (NPF) is a 9,000-member expeditionary fighting unit that can deploy on short notice anywhere in the world. Essentially, it is a pool of elite infantry and other forces from NATO nations trained to deploy and work as a team. So far, Spain is providing the largest share of NPF troops--2,200--plus ships, planes, and helicopters. The United States is contributing 300 troops. There will also be specialists in handling nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The NPF will eventually number 20,000 soldiers, according to current plans. While its exact rules of engagement are still being determined, experts say it will likely deploy only with U.N. Security Council backing. Is NATO involved in Iraq? Yes, but indirectly. It is providing logistical and technical support to the Poles, who are leading a multinational military force stationed south of Baghdad. Spain will take over command from Poland, with NATO support, in 2004. Some former U.S. generals and other experts are calling for NATO to become the umbrella organization for peacekeepers there, in an effort to further internationalize the occupation force. But there has not been "a request yet for NATO to be formally involved" in Iraq, outgoing NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson said October 9. Dutchman Jaap de Hoop Scheffer will take over as NATO secretary general in December. Does NATO have enough resources to take on all these new missions? Not without difficulty, many experts say. Most NATO nations have small military budgets--and in many cases military spending is declining, says Michael Peters, an expert on NATO affairs and executive vice president of the Council on Foreign Relations. Only a handful of NATO nations--France, Germany, Britain, Turkey, and Poland--have the capacity to field significant numbers of troops, and cash-strapped Poland and Turkey require financial assistance to do so, Peters says. Ongoing Balkans deployments involving some 40,000 personnel already strain the capacity of some NATO members. NATO’s focus for now is getting Afghanistan "absolutely right" because it’s somewhere we cannot possibly fail before we start looking at other elements," Robertson said October 9. Is there resistance to NATO transformation? There is an ongoing debate within Europe over the level of resources that should be devoted to the European Union’s new Rapid Reaction Force, a 60,000-member military unit that may act independently of NATO and the United States. Support for making the force a centerpiece of E.U. security policy remains limited, but that could change if Britain--NATO’s strongest supporter in Europe--decides to throw its weight behind the effort, Peters says. The unit has already taken on two small peacekeeping missions: it currently commands the 400-member peacekeeping force in Macedonia, and it led a peacekeeping mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo between June and September 2003.
    Backgrounder by Sharon Otterman February 3, 2005
  • Democracy
    MIDDLE EAST: Promoting Democracy
    This publication is now archived. How is the United States promoting democracy in the Arab world? The Bush administration has taken two distinct approaches since September 11. It has pursued an aggressive policy of "regime change" regarding Iraq and the Palestinian Authority. But other Arab governments are participating in a long-term democracy "partnership" program that encourages gradual political reform. Many democracy experts say they believe the impact of this program will be limited. What is the "partnership" approach to promoting Arab democracy? In December 2002, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell announced the creation of the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). The program aims to lay the groundwork for an eventual transition to democracy in the region’s autocratic and semi-autocratic countries. Projects funded through the program fall into one of four categories: reforming and opening economies; encouraging political change; promoting educational reform; and enlarging the role women play in economics and politics. In his speech, Powell made it clear that MEPI is not a "regime change" program but, rather, one that considers the region’s governments willing partners in a U.S.-sponsored initiative. Why was MEPI established? U.S. policy has traditionally backed stable, autocratic Middle Eastern regimes and turned a blind eye to their lack of democratic structures and open economies, many experts say. But since September 11, there’s been a growing recognition of this policy’s shortcomings: pervasive poverty, corruption, illiteracy, and economic stagnation in much of the Arab world have fed extremism and terrorism. Democracy has emerged as the desired long-term policy solution to the Middle East’s woes. "By failing to help foster gradual paths to democratization in many of our important relationships--by creating what might be called a ’democratic exception’--we missed an opportunity to help these countries become more stable, more prosperous, more peaceful, and more adaptable to the stresses of a globalizing world," said Richard N. Haass, the then-director of policy planning at the State Department, in a November 2002 speech about Middle East democracy. "Stability based on authority alone is illusory and ultimately impossible to sustain." Haass is now the president of the Council on Foreign Relations. What countries are eligible to participate in MEPI? All countries in the region except Syria and Libya, which the State Department classifies as terror-sponsoring states. Potential and current participants are: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. None of these countries are considered by experts to be democracies, though their governments range from highly repressive (Saudi Arabia and Tunisia) to relatively open (Morocco, Kuwait, and Jordan). Representatives from Iraq and the Palestinian Authority participate in MEPI regional programs. Iran, a designated terror-sponsor and the only non-Arab nation eligible for MEPI, has permission to participate in the program, but no Iran-based programs have yet been funded. MEPI does not include Israel, which is a democracy. What do the programs consist of? In 2003, MEPI’s primary focus is on economic reform programs to help Arab states restructure banking systems, boost trade, and develop more effective commercial law systems. These reforms are largely designed to prepare countries for a related Bush administration initiative: a Middle East Free Trade Area. MEPI’s political reform grants include training for political parties in Algeria, judges in Bahrain, and journalists and parliamentarians throughout the region. These "bottom-up" reforms operate on the assumption that better-trained professionals will press for democratic reforms and win the respect of their citizens and governments. Other programs include: a girls’ scholarship program in Morocco, Internet access in high schools in Yemen, and a region-wide partnership program between U.S. and Middle Eastern universities. What’s the budget of the new program? MEPI was funded at $29 million in fiscal year 2002 and $100 million in fiscal year 2003. The State Department plans to request $149 million in 2004, according to MEPI officials. After that, MEPI’s fate is unclear; the U.S. presidential election in November 2004 could change the White House’s occupants or priorities. Other U.S. military and economic assistance programs in the region receive far greater funding. Egypt, the primary recipient of U.S. assistance to the Arab world, has received some $2 billion in direct economic and military aid annually since 1979 as part of an Egypt-Israeli peace accord. In 2002, some $1.3 billion of Egypt’s funding went for military aid, and $660 million took the form of economic assistance grants administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Total military aid to the Middle East, not including Israel, was $3.4 billon in 2002; economic assistance grants totaled some $1 billion. Israel received $2.8 billion in direct military and economic aid in 2002. How does the MEPI program fit into the broader picture of current U.S. aid to the Middle East? Unlike other funding, the MEPI money is explicitly targeted for promoting democracy. MEPI may influence the distribution of other economic aid to the region, because the $1 billion in USAID assistance to the Arab world is now coordinated with the State Department’s MEPI office. The head of MEPI is Elizabeth Cheney, the deputy assistant secretary for Near Eastern Affairs and Vice President Richard Cheney’s daughter. She reports to Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who reports to Secretary Powell. Will MEPI be an effective way of promoting democracy in the Middle East? Because MEPI is a small, "bottom-up" program that works in partnership with autocratic and semi-autocratic regimes, administration officials acknowledge that it will take time for MEPI to have a significant impact. "I don’t see this as something that is going to be done in one year or five years. This is a long-term prospect," Powell said in announcing the program. Administration officials also say they see MEPI as one part of a wider strategy that also includes diplomatic pressure on Arab regimes to reform. Some experts argue that MEPI’s gradual approach is flawed and point to the success autocratic Middle Eastern leaders have had co-opting previous democracy programs. "They all make important steps, but then a year or two later they go back on these steps," says Radwan Masmoudi, the president of the Washington-based Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy. Some of those who question MEPI say the Bush administration needs to push Arab states more forcefully, for example, to rapidly end press restrictions and embark on constitutional reform. "MEPI is an outgrowth of the same democracy programs that the U.S. has pursued in the Middle East for nearly a decade," says Daniel Brumbergof the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "However inspiring the administration’s vision [of democracy] appears, the actual reform plan that it has thus far set out is unlikely to produce radical changes in the Arab world." Why is the Bush administration taking a gradual approach? One reason: U.S. policymakers say the pressure for democracy ultimately has to come from Arabs themselves. "Unrestrained zeal to make the world better could make it worse," Haass said in his November 2002 speech. "We must undertake this task with humility, understanding that the stakes for others are greater than for ourselves." Among other reasons experts cite: The United States has multiple national security priorities in the Middle East, many of which are not compatible with a quick and destabilizing transition to democracy, many experts say. In the short-run, the autocratic governments in the Middle East are important partners in the U.S. war on terror and vital suppliers of oil to the world market. In many cases, the United States may object to the kind of government elected to replace an autocratic regime in an accelerated transition to democracy. In some Arab countries, especially the most repressive ones, anti-U.S. Islamists account for the most potent opposition and would likely do well in an election. Experts, however, disagree about the seriousness of this threat. In some cases, such as in Egypt, autocrats play up such fears to encourage tolerance for the status quo, says FouadAjami, a professor of Middle Eastern studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. In what countries is MEPI likely to have an impact? The ones that are truly interested in reforms, many experts say. This is because all MEPI grants are coordinated with the governments of the recipient countries, so MEPI’s success is dependent on the willingness of leaders to allow change. In 2002 and 2003, most MEPI grants went to Morocco, Yemen, Algeria, Tunisia, and Bahrain. On the other hand, there were no MEPI programs specifically targeting Saudi Arabia, though Saudis are participating in some regional programs. Even in countries that accept the grants, there is no guarantee that the programs will result in greater political freedom. "Some countries are more MEPI-ready than others," says Isobel Coleman, a Council on Foreign Relations expert on the role of women in the Middle East. "You can pour money into a country, but if it’s not willing to support the policies, then it’s money down a black hole." What other factors will affect the spread of democracy in the Arab world? Iraq is a key factor. If democracy succeeds in Iraq, it will enhance U.S. credibility in the region as a promoter of democracy. If it fails, or if U.S. democracy-promotion is interpreted as a smokescreen to disguise other geopolitical interests, anti-Americanism will continue to feed extremism in the Arab world. "It’s incredibly important that we get Iraq right," Coleman says. Another critical issue is progress resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, which has inflamed tensions in the Middle East for decades.
    Backgrounder by Sharon Otterman February 3, 2005